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Effectiveness Refers to an absolute level of outcome attainment. Something that is 
effective works well and produces the results that were intended. 
Efficiency Refers to an input-output ratio or comparison of input (cost, time, 
effort) and output (result, performance) 
Hermeneutics Hermeneutics is defined as the theory or philosophy of the 
interpretation of meaning. Several types of hermeneutic research 
approaches exist, but in this research we adhere to the pragmatic-
constructivist approach where interpretation involves entering into the 
interpretative norms of a community and where meaning operates and 
is to be found within the historical contexts of the interpreter and 
interpreted. Understanding works in broadening concentric circles. 
HROs High Reliability Organization – Organizations where the risk of calamity 
is very high, but that yet are successful in their avoidance and/or 
mitigation. 
HRT High Reliability Theory – The collection of work on HROs. It is a theory on 
how a high degree of reliability can be achieved. 
IM Incident Management – The process of handling incidents in an efficient 
and effective manner. 
LCT Loose Coupling Theory – LCT incorporates a multidimensional 
perspective to the organizing process by studying the (1) causation, (2) 
typology, (3) effects, (4) compensations and (5) organizational outcomes 
of coupling. According to LCT’s dialectical perspective on loose coupling 
‘not tightly coupled’ is not the same as ‘loosely coupled’. In this sense 
LCT opposes against the one-dimensional approach to coupling of NAT. 
NAT Normal Accidents Theory – A theory on reliability that posits that 
accidents are a normal consequence of a system’s interactive complexity 
and tight coupling 
SeMa SenseMaking – The process of creating a mental model of a situation, 










Have no fear of perfection 
 – you’ll never reach it. 
Salvador Dali 
 
A preface should explain and thank; it has two audiences, those who might be interested in reading 
the manuscript and those who have made reading possible. 
Seventeen years after my graduating as a Master in Commercial Sciences, the goal is to get a PhD. In 
that time a lot has happened: I got married, became a father of two, changed jobs a few times, made 
and lost friends and relatives. Professionally I became fascinated by organizations and more 
specifically by the coordination mechanisms they employ. Coordination is related to organization 
design and organization behavior which in their turn are all about organization structure, decision 
making, leadership style, culture etc. Not surprisingly therefore, postmodern science philosophy 
teaches us that most problems are multidisciplinary. It seems as if no issue can be solved except 
when tools, techniques or insights from neighboring fields of study are drawn in. As a child of 
postmodern thought, my field of interest is broad, triggered by a complex observable reality that 
emphasizes the necessity of taking a broad perspective on things. A doctoral thesis however has 
little to do with this postmodern view. For a doctoral candidate, the exigencies are not to widen 
one’s knowledge but to deepen it. Instead of getting to know more about more, one is encouraged 
to learn more about less. Regarding my background and personal interest this represented a conflict: 
how could I combine a genuine broad interest with the exigencies of a doctoral thesis that forces 
one to specialize to the extreme? I found the solution by looking not at what is there, but by looking 
at what is not there. Allow me to explain this a bit further by referring to the house building 
metaphor. In building a house one needs bricks, lots of them. Some of these bricks are of more 
interest than others (corner stones, foundation bricks, etc), but all of them are needed to build a 
house. And the mason knows this. He does not want to find out the details off all the particular types 
of bricks, for him it is enough that he has a general idea in order to be able to use the bricks to 
construct the building. He is a generalist, driven by a strong desire to build. The worker in the brick 
factory or stone quarry is completely different from the mason. He is interested in the particularities 
of the brick or stone in terms of e.g. absorption capacity, hardness, heat resistance, isolation etc. He 
specializes in them and is not interested in actually building the house. The mason can be compared 
to the consultant or manager, the stone specialist to the academic. 
Getting back to our idea of looking at what is not there, I state that what is not there is what links 
the stones and bricks of a house. If it is mortar, it is a kind of glue that ties the stones together, if 
there is no mortar, it are the written and unwritten laws of an invisible gravity. Taking the metaphor1 
to organization studies, I chose to deal with the unwritten organizational laws of gravity by looking 
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at what links the organizational building blocks (like organization behavior, structure, decision 
making, strategy etc.). I found a way of combining the objective of doctoral research with the desire 
to become a mason. The key was to focus on the mortar instead of on the bricks, on the spaces 
between the stones instead of on the stones themselves, on a language that uses a plethora of 
underspecified formulations as a vehicle through which I could work on difficult conceptual 
problems (Levine in Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 204). The set of constructs I have used throughout my 
research – High Reliability Theory (HRT) and SenseMaking (SeMa) – are a reflection thereof. I 
cordially invite you to be my guest on my journey into ‘making sense’ of what I have read, observed 
and written, and to read this dissertation. I hope you will enjoy reading it as much as I have enjoyed 
writing it. 
Also from another perspective, writing a thesis is like building a house. When you start you have a 
vague idea of what kind of building you want to construct, a house that fulfills your dreams, uttered 
or unuttered. The new to build house holds a promise of a new life and of the excitement and 
learning on the journey on your way to construction. Writing a doctoral dissertation shows more 
than one characteristic of such a construction project. Once one decides to go on this journey the 
dreams at times get very real, at other times however they seem to vanish with every step you take 
in achieving it. Then you ask people, especially friends who are going or have been going the same 
doctoral journey. They tell you their experiences and what they have gone through: The solitude, the 
struggle with theory, method and data, the reward in the end. You nod your head but still think that 
your own thesis will be different from all the others. In the end, you is still you. You still hold on to a 
romantic view of the academic in search of Truth. And then complete disappointment overcomes 
you and good friends really have to pull you through. The thing about PhD theses is that you come 
across yourself in the process. You get to know your strengths and weaknesses, start to see where 
the dangers and opportunities could be. These insights come at a cost however. You learn it the hard 
way, there is no easy way. A PhD title is the proof of concept and the concept is you (David 
Mendonça). 
Writing an interdisciplinary thesis alone, is a contradiction in terms. I am not even able to pretend 
that this piece of work was a solo-activity. The scientific mores, however, require that I am the one 
and only author of the dissertation. However, I will use the plural ‘we’ throughout this thesis to 
indicate that most of the inspiration and creativity arose out of teamwork and that all thoughts and 
ideas presented in this thesis have been thoroughly improved through discussion with colleagues. 
Needless to say, there are many people who have contributed to the completion of this thesis, in 
one way or another, as friends, colleagues, inspirers, critics, financers and advisors. First of all, I want 
to thank Bartel Van de Walle for being my thesis supervisor. He has been my guide in the doctoral 
process. He learned me how to set up good research, and thought me the true meaning of academic 
rigor. Above all he was a source of continuous inspiration and challenge. I thank him for the infinite 
number of hours he spent with me at the university, on the road, on the phone or Skype, on the 
research sites, on conferences etcetera. I especially am grateful for the way he welcomed me in his 
personal life. Without his energy and commitment I would not have completed this dissertation. It is 
as much his work as it is mine. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
 
The more we study the major problems of our time 
the more we come to realize 
that they cannot be understood in isolation. 
They are systemic problems, which means 




The study of reliability is of considerable importance to society, and this from different 
perspectives. Society and mankind seem to be devoted to risky ventures. Throughout its 
evolution mankind has made progress by following a mixed strategy of risk averse and risk prone 
behavior, of sticking to the known values on the one hand and of searching for the unknown and 
the experiment on the other. This strategy has proved to be very rewarding considering the 
‘success’ of our species. Many doubt this success from a socio-philosophical perspective, but 
contemporary life unarguably is much more safe and satisfying than life of previous generations. 
New technologies, new procedures, new places have been developed or discovered resulting in 
more welfare and (sometimes) more wellbeing. Hence it pays off to take risk, at least if the 
upside risk is greater than the downside risk. 
With our apologies to Bob Dylan for stealing his title and to our readers for laboring an obvious 
point, but in a doctoral dissertation on reliability, we have no choice but to state it: The times, 
they are a-changin’. “To succeed, organizations must now contend with complex global markets, 
large-scale systems, and a hyper-dynamic economic context, all of which require organizational 
members to detect and manage unexpected events in a rapidly changing environment (Knight, 
2004, p. 1). From a business perspective, reliability has shifted from the background to the focus 
of interest in recent years. Internationally, the awareness of operational risk management has 
increased tremendously2. Recent scandals stress the importance of operational reliability. Legal 
or regulating frameworks like Basel II and Sarbanes-Oxley (on operational risk), Code Lippens in 
Belgium and Code Tabaksblat in The Netherlands (on Corporate Governance) are streamlining 
ethical management practice and offer benchmarks to do so. 
Anno 2009 organization members want to be taken seriously, want to be part of the decision 
making, want premium information on the organization and to foster their autonomy. The 
paradigms of the nineties on becoming a learning organization, to name just this management 
creed, should be seen in this light. However, there occasionally seems to be a discrepancy 
between what managers preach and what they do. They preach openness and say they believe 
in empowering their people, but in practice they want to keep control on everything and 
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everybody. This should not come as a surprise since one of the most compelling shifts of the last 
decade has been the aforementioned need of being compliant. 
With this dissertation we wish to make a contribution to the expertise developed by 
organization scientists in recent years in the field of highly complex and tightly coupled 
organizations (Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 1994, p. 614). More particularly we hope to make clear 
in which way High Reliability thinking can find the balance between the desire to be open and 
the need to be in control, to exhibit a reliability that consists out of stability and flexibility. This 
study aims at contributing to the debate on what constitutes organizational effectiveness and in 
this sense it modestly subscribes to a long tradition that started with Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations (1776) and Frederick Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management (1911). Contrary to 
the mainstream organizational effectiveness research, the focus is not on efficiency (in the sense 
of ‘doing the things right’), but on effectiveness (‘doing the right things’) and in this it 
fundamentally differs from seminal publications like Peters’ and Waterman’s In Search of 
Excellence (1982). However, this does not imply that the efficiency notion remains out of scope, 
since efficiency will prove to be indispensable in understanding effectiveness. The purpose of 
this research is to develop a theory that explains how organizational reliability can be enhanced 
by balancing structural and contextual organization factors. The title of this dissertation does not 
imply that we are going to find some kind of magic spell for assuring reliability, but that we are 
searching for insights into what constitutes organizational reliability. Insight itself does not 
increase predictability or reliability of complex systems, but it may give those trying to manage 
such systems indications where and how to look for clues to remain on course within the 
parameters of effectiveness and efficiency (Longstaff, 2003, p. 30). Based on our a priori 
deduction from the literature and our field observations, we argue that contextual dimensions, 
such as the degree of mindfulness and the way decisions are made, and structural dimensions, 
such as the overall focus/implicit strategy on efficiency and the way the Information Systems are 
used, have the potential of explaining (un)reliability. 
This first chapter introduces the foundations our research is built upon: the whole of context, 
axioms, choices, problem definition, limitations that underlies the search we have embarked on. 
In line with Linstone and Turoff, we believe this is essential when building a framework that has 
the potential of contributing to the body of scientific research: “Any human endeavor which 
seeks recognition as a professional or scientific activity must clearly define the axioms upon 
which it rests. The foundation of a discipline, as the foundations of a house, serves as a guide and 
basis for the placement of the building blocks of knowledge gathered through research and 
development activities. It is the definition, exposure, and investigation of the philosophical 
foundation that distinguishes a scientific profession from other endeavors”(Linstone & Turoff, 
1975, p. 15). *…+ “Have we taken a broad enough perspective of the basic problem? Have we 
from the very beginning asked the right question? Have we focused on the right objectives? *…+ 
(Linstone & Turoff, 1975, p. 19). In view of this objective, the remainder of this chapter first 
builds a phenomenological taxonomy of reliability, providing a definition of the reliability 
concept (Section 2). Next, the principle of triangulation introduces the multidisciplinary, system 
theoretic and paradoxical nature of our research (Section 3). Subsequently, the chapter 
addresses the notions of complexity (Section 4) and coupling (Section 5) as they are at the heart 
of what constitutes organizational reliability. Finally, the research questions are formulated 
(Section 6) and the structure of the dissertation presented (Section 7). 
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2 A Phenomenological Taxonomy of Reliability 
Reliability is fragile, not only in its physical manifestation, but also as a construct. Yet one talks 
about reliability as if one perfectly knows what it means and that we all share the same mental 
model. Nothing is further from the truth. Depending on the discipline, the context and the 
individual or collective world-view of the person interpreting the term, the meaning of reliability 
is fundamentally different3.  
In this section we give an overview of the ways in which practice and academia deal with the 
concept and we make a beginning of what could qualify as a more generic phenomenological 
taxonomy of reliability, independent from the practitioner domain or scientific discipline. First, 
we give an overview of popular definitions of reliability, with an indication of their strengths and 
weaknesses and how they can be used in building the intended taxonomy. Next, we decompose 
the notion into its constituting parts and make the distinction between the domains in which 
concepts of reliability over the years are – or have been – applied (e.g. machine- or software- 
reliability). Third, we combine these insights by asking whether reliability is a matter of ‘and/and’ 
or of ‘and/or’. Finding this answer is this dissertation’s leitmotiv. 
2.1 Defining reliability 
Reliability can be defined in numerous ways, and the following is just a selection out of many 
possible definitions. But two threads seem to emerge from literature and practice: (1) Average 
reliability and (2) Variance of reliability. First, we look into how these two approaches get 
operationalized. After that, we present the definition of reliability we adhere to in this 
dissertation.  
2.1.1 Average reliability 
The first thing that comes to mind when thinking of reliability is that the object or process (tool, 
system, organization…) should be effective ‘most of the time’, meaning that we implicitly think 
in terms of averages. Often one can accept that something is not working, but it must work most 
of the time. The following is a selection of different notions of average reliability (or the 
probability thereof) in literature: 
 “*W]hat one can count upon not to fail in doing what is expected” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 
91). 
 “System effectiveness is the probability that the system can successfully meet an operational 
demand within a given time when operated under specified conditions” (Prasad et al., 2001, 
p. 6).  
 “*T]he probability that a system will perform satisfactorily for at least a given period of time 
when used under stated conditions”(Prasad et al., 2001, p. 2). 
 “System reliability is a measure of how well a system meets its design objective and it is 
usually expressed in terms of the reliabilities of the subsystems or components” (Prasad et al., 
2001, p. 2). 
 “The probability of performing a specified function without failure under given conditions for 
a specified period of time” (Arblaster, Griffith, Hochmuth, Howells, & Reeves, 2005, p. 28). 
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2.1.2 Variance of reliability 
Another characteristic of reliability is its spread. Here we make a distinction between the total 
time an object or process is reliable on the one hand, and the time spans between periods of 
reliability and unreliability and the duration of this unreliability on the other hand. The following 
is a sample indicating how this notion of variance of reliability is dealt with in literature: 
 The unusual capacity to produce collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984, p. 153): “In a world of uncertainty, potential members, investors, 
and clients may value reliability of reliability more than efficiency. That is, rational actors may 
be willing to pay a high price for the certainty that a given product or service of a certain 
minimum quality will be available when it is needed. Reliability depends on the variance of 
reliability (including its timeliness) rather than its average level. Organizations have higher 
levels of reliability than ad hoc collectives in two senses: one cross-sectional and the other 
temporal. Cross-sectional reliability means that an outcome chosen at random from a 
population of organizations will have a lower variance than one chosen at random from a 
population of other kinds of producers. Temporal reliability means the variability over time in 
the quality (including timing of delivery) of an outcome is lower for those produced by 
organizations than for those produced by ad hoc groups. Overall, we argue that the distinctive 
competence of organizations is the capacity to generate collective actions with relatively 
small variance in quality”. 
 “[T]he lack of unwanted, unanticipated, and unexplainable variance in reliability” (Hollnagel 
1993, p. 51, Cited in Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999, p. 86). 
 “Performing reliability, maintainability and availability assessments of equipment, machines, 
subsystems and system, reliability being the probability that an item will perform a required 
function under stated conditions for a stated period; for example, how often a failure may 
occur, the estimated mean time between failures, the mean repair times and the availability 
and effectiveness factors” (Azadeh, 2000, p. 209). 
 For a computer engineer, IS reliability might stand for a small ‘mean time between failure’, or 
an acceptable ‘mean time to repair’, or an agreed upon Failure unit (FIT).4 
 
The aggregation of average reliability and spread in reliability is called availability. Availability 
enables users who need to access information to do so without interference or obstruction, and 
to receive it in the required format (Whitman & Mattord, 2008, p. 9). Availability does not mean 
that information is automatically accessible to any user, but it needs verification of the user to 
become reachable to that nominated user. Purposefulness is built in the term ‘availability’ – it 
has connotations about benefit, relevancy, understanding, meaningfulness, effectiveness, and 
immediate usability (Kuusisto, 2006, p. 2). A widely accepted equation for availability (Fox & 
Patterson, 2002) is: Availability=MTTF/(MTTF+MTTR), where MTTF is the mean time to failure of 
a system or subsystem (i.e. the reciprocal of reliability), MTTR is its mean time to recovery, and 
Availability is a number between 0 and 1. The equation suggests that to improve availability, a 
10x decrease in MTTR (for example) is just as valuable as a 10x increase in MTTF. 
2.1.3 Our definition 
So what determines these components of reliability? As can be derived from our discussion 
above, the element time plays a central role. Note also that reliability is not value-free and also 
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that its meaning depends very much on the context. The complexity of finding a good definition 
of reliability is best captured by Rochlin: “The criteria for and evaluation of reliability, whether 
defined positively by the dynamic of organizational structure and culture or negatively as the 
avoidance of seemingly inevitable errors and failures, are even more demanding than the 
traditional search for definitions and models of organizational effectiveness. Seen in this light, 
the problem of arriving at a consensual definition becomes a primary research issue rather than 
a disciplinary side-alley” (Rochlin, 1993, p. 30). 
For the purpose of our research we integrate the various components of reliability into the 
following generic definition of reliability: 
Reliability is the system outcome that can be described as safe, effective and 
efficient, in terms of average and variance. 
It is the starting point for the decomposition that follows. 
2.2 Reliability decomposed 
We approach the reliability notion from its relationship to adjacent notions: Safety (2.2.1) and 
Performance, which in its turn can be decomposed as Effectiveness (2.2.2) and Efficiency (2.2.3). 
We posit that all these notions are subsets of reliability, as can be derived from Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1 - Reliability decomposed 
In what follows, we deal with these concepts in more detail, limiting ourselves to those aspects 
that are relevant to our research. First, we examine what can be learned from the study on 
safety in view of overall organizational reliability. Next, we argue in what way insights from 
engineering can contribute to organizational effectiveness. Finally, our focus is on the efficiency 
paradigm, and more, in particular on the inherent tension with effectiveness. 
2.2.1 Safety 
A great deal of reliability literature is on safety, not reliability. There is an intuitive link between 
both notions, so the study of safety in this sector can contribute to what we know on reliability 
in a broader sense. In order to do so, the precise nature of safety needs to be explained first. We 










6 Two Cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
 
framework regarding safe and unsafe industries. In view of their potential contribution to the 
understanding of reliability, we look at the difference between incidents, accidents and crises. 
Incidents and accidents 
Scholars5 in the field of reliability studies and safety all have their own interpretation of the 
terms incident, accident and crisis. Perrow, for example, has proposed a taxonomy of incidents 
and accidents, and to understand his conclusions it is important to know what he means by an 
accident, and what he does not mean by it (1999, p. 65-66). A comparative analysis of these 
terms, may allow us to gain insight in the mechanisms they originate from. Perrow defines 
incident as a failure involving damage that is limited to parts or a unit, whether the failure 
disrupts the system or not, meaning that the output ceases or decreases to the extent that 
prompt repairs are be required (Perrow, 1999, p. 66). An accident is defined by Perrow as “an 
event that is unintended, unfortunate, damages people or objects, affects the functioning of the 
system of interest, and is non-trivial” (Perrow, 1999). There are two types of accidents: 
component failure accidents, which “involve one or more component failures (part, unit, or 
subsystem) that are linked in an anticipated sequence” and ‘normal accidents,’ or system 
accidents (Perrow, 1994). Normal accidents encompass multiple component failure accidents, 
and they are ‘normal’ because we expect that they will occur at some time in complex systems. 
Perrow (1994) explains: “Two or more failures, none of them devastating in themselves in 
isolation, come together in unexpected ways and defeat the safety devices [of a system] – [that 
is+ the definition of a ‘normal accident’ or system accident”. 
Crises 
Pearson and Clair (Pearson & Clair, 1998) provide the following definition of crisis: a low-
probability, high impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is 
characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that 
decisions must be made swiftly. This leads to the following characteristics: 
 highly ambiguous situations where causes and effects are unknown 
 a low probability of occurring but posing a major threat to the survival of an 
organization. 
 little time to respond 
 surprise organizational members 
 dilemma in need of decision or judgment that will result in change for better or 
worse. 
Further Pearson and Clair (1998, p. 64) mention that all crises share the following characteristics: 
 a breakdown in the social construction of reality; 
 organizational leadership which is likely to come under close scrutiny. Turnover 
of (or revolt against) leadership may be likely as well; 
 organizational members are likely to question the organization’s cultural beliefs 
and to feel a need for a transformation of the culture; 
 crisis management is unlikely to be successful without a reformation of 
organizational leadership and culture.  
 




It has been reported upon in many disciplines that a compelling number of causes of accidents 
and incidents can be attributed to human action so that there is a wide-spread consensus that 
human error plays an important role in unreliability (Reason, 1990;1997). Bea and Moore (1993) 
and Roberts and Bea (2001a) report up to 80% of maritime accidents finding their root in human 
failure. Azadeh (2000) argues the same for security failures in organizations but also shows that 
the technical failure should not be minimized either. Recent research on the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster (Salge & Milling, 2006, p. 89) has pointed out that this accident was caused by the 
combination of human failures in the design of the reactor and on-line operations6. As such, this 
suggests that a pure univocal emphasis on either human error (e.g. Dörner, 1996) or technical or 
‘system’ failure (e.g. Perrow, 1999) cannot offer valuable insights. 
Safe and unsafe industries 
Amalberti et al. (2005) provide a framework (shown in Figure 1.2) for categorizing the risk of 
catastrophic events across industries. They posit that the safe and unsafe industries differ 
greatly since some sectors continue to have a low safety level (for example, transport by micro-
light aircraft or helicopter, and emergency surgery), some are stuck at an average safety level 
(for example, road safety and occupational accidents in trade or fishing), some are at good levels 
(for example, the petrochemical industry and anesthesiology), and the best have achieved safety 
levels beyond 10–6 (for example, the nuclear power and civil aviation industries). 
 
Figure 1.2 - Average rate per exposure of catastrophes and associated deaths in various industries and 
human activities (Amalberti, Auroy, Berwick, & Barach, 2005, p. 758 - Reproduced with permission from 
the Annals of Internal Medicine) 
The convergence of safety and reliability in the nuclear energy sector 
The nuclear energy sector, in recent years, has come to pay considerable attention to the 
notions ‘safety’ and ‘safety culture’ (IAEA, 2002a;IAEA, 2002b). This is a particularly interesting 
phenomenon as in the nuclear context safety and reliability seem to converge to a great extent. 
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Indeed, if the nuclear installation is performant it is also considered to be safe and, vice versa, in 
order to be safe it has to be performant. Fucks (2004) puts it as follows: “Reliability is different 
from nuclear safety because it indicates the quality of a device or equipment to function as 
intended. Reliability is, for some part of the system or for the system as a whole, the probability 
of non-failure”.7 In this she clearly makes the distinction between reliability (fiabilité) and safety 
(sûreté). Nevertheless, especially in the field of nuclear energy production, both notions are 
interrelated: human safety cannot be seen independent from reliability. In the same way as in 
the case of mainstream organizations where operational reliability did not emerge suddenly, 
also in the nuclear sector the topic of nuclear safety went through some phases before it got 
shaped as we know it today. Fucks (2004, p. 24-25) distinguishes three major phases during 
which quite an evolution took place from an engineering approach in the 1970s, over a technical 
approach of human error in the 1980s, towards a human factor approach 1990s that valorizes 
the existence and influence of a safety culture and the organizational factor. What started in the 
nineties of the last century as an emphasis on the ‘organizational accident’ (Reason, 1997) is 
reinforced at the beginning of this decennium by adding yet another dimension, that of a set of 
mind oriented towards safety that goes beyond technical, procedural or managerial aspects of 
safety (Fucks, 2004, p. 25). 
2.2.2 Effectiveness 
Lessons from engineering 
We adhere to a quite straightforward definition of effectiveness: Something that is effective 
works well and produces the results that were intended. In this dissertation we focus on the 
non-technical aspects of effectiveness. We are therefore unconcerned with machine reliability 
(e.g. in terms of technical redundancy) but rather are interested in aspects of reliability resulting 
from procedure, culture, organization design, human resources management, co-ordination 
mechanisms, etc. Nevertheless, we can learn from the reliability engineering principles for our 
purpose because it is a much older discipline than organizational reliability and offers valuable 
and tested jargon and insights. The primary goals of reliability are the following (Prasad et al., 
2001, p. 1):  
1. Keeping the system as simple as is compatible with the reliability requirements; 
2. Increasing the reliability of the components of the system; 
3. Using parallel redundancy for the less reliable components; 
4. Using standby redundancy which is switched to active components when failure occurs; 
5. Using repair maintenance where failure components are replaced, but not immediately 
switched in, as in (4); 
6. Using preventive maintenance such that components are replaced by new ones 
whenever they fail, or at some fixed interval, whichever comes first; 
7. Using better arrangement for exchangeable components; 
8. Using large safety factors or product improvement management program; and 
9. Selecting burn-in components that have high infant-mortality. 
Noteworthy is that Prasad and colleagues (2001, p. 1) argue that the implementation of the 
above steps to improve system reliability will normally consume resources. A balance between 
system reliability and resource consumption is essential. 
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The above deals with the reliability of a ‘system’. A system can be characterized as a group of 
stages or subsystems integrated to perform one or more specified operational functions (Prasad 
et al., 2001). A ‘part’ or ‘element’ is the least subdivision of a system or an item that cannot 
ordinarily be disassembled without being destroyed. A ‘component’ is a collection of parts which 
represent a self-contained element of complete operating system. ‘Unit’ and ‘component’ are 
synonymous; They are assembled to form a ‘stage’ or ‘subsystem’ (Prasad et al., 2001, p. 2). 
In describing the reliability of a given system, it is necessary to specify: 
 the equipment failure process; 
 the system configuration which describes how the equipment is connected and the rules of 
operation; 
 the state in which the system is defined to be failed. 
 
The equipment failure process describes the probability law governing these failures. The system 
configuration, on the other hand, defines the manner in which the system-reliability function will 
behave. The third consideration in developing reliability function for a non-maintained system is 
to define the conditions of a system failure (Prasad et al., 2001, p. 2). 
Lessons from organization theory 
Since Taylor and his Scientific Management till today, the topic of organizational effectiveness 
has got a lot of attention. Especially the relation between effectiveness and efficiency has driven 
research for many years. The general observation in this respect is that, although the best 
performing organizations are both effective and efficient (Katz & Kahn, 1978), there may be 
trade-offs between the two. Thus, an organization can be effective, efficient, both, or neither 
(Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993). 
With the publication of popular books such as Peters’ and Waterman’s In Search of Excellence 
(1982), excellence (quality, continuous improvement, transformation, revitalization and so on) 
was brought to the forefront. This quality focus has dominated management research and 
practice until the beginning of the new millennium. Then the tone changed from an efficiency 
focus to one that fosters effectiveness. The new creed became managing (operational) risk, with 
much less focus on efficiency as a result. The problem with this literature is captured by Roberts: 
“To the extent that the organizational literature deals with reliability at all, it deals with 
effectiveness. However, the effectiveness literature deals with a whole range of outcomes, none 
of which are reliability” (Roberts, 1990a, p. 103). Such a decomposition shows reliability is about 
flexibility because a system that is perfect in repeating what it has done successfully in the past 
has no guarantee that it will be able to deal with unpredictability, i.e., future events for which 
there is no link with the past or the present (Weick et al., 1999, p. 86). 
Because of this shift from efficiency towards reliability scholars began to investigate non-normal 
organizational reliability situations from the mid eighties onwards (Whetten & Cameron, 1994), 
including high reliability systems. 
The combination of these two trends (i.e. a focus on effectiveness and the study of non-normal 
organizational reliability) forms the basis for the research on organizational effectiveness in this 
dissertation.  
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2.2.3 Efficiency 
Whereas effectiveness refers to an absolute level of either input acquisition or outcome 
attainment, efficiency refers to an input-output ratio or comparison (Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993, p. 
1345). This description of both notions ignores the complex and paradoxical nature of the 
relation between them. In this subsection, we tackle the duality that exists between them. To 
this end we introduce efficiency-related concepts that are necessary for our line of reasoning. 
Slack 
It is assumed that organizational slack, in terms of time and human resources is important for 
organizations coping with the challenges of the 21st century (Lawson, 2001). Increasingly 
complex systems and technologies require more, not less, time for monitoring and processing 
information. Flexibility and adaptation, creativity and innovation only exist when the 
organization allows for sufficient slack in its processes. However, this is more easily said than 
done since slack is often sacrificed on the altar of short-term efficiency. Even though there 
seems to be a consensus that driving slack out of the processes is of no avail to long-term 
effectiveness and that it is recommended that not all resources be committed to immediate 
output efforts, it is the imperative of being profitable in the short run that is the main driver for 
organizing. 
For these reasons, any balance between effectiveness and efficiency is doomed to be brittle. Our 
claim is that organizations capable of dealing with this fragility consistently, can be called high 
reliability organizations. 
Efficiency favors effectiveness 
The general belief concerning the duality between effectiveness and efficiency holds that an 
orientation towards effectiveness is a better determinant for organizational reliability than an 
orientation towards efficiency (Lewin & Minton, 1986). However, following Ostroff and Schmitt 
(1993), we hypothesize the opposite. In their study on school effectiveness and efficiency they 
found support for the importance of a high level of cost consciousness. The acknowledgement of 
this paradox is the basic thread running through the organizational choice model on competing 
values (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). With this study we want to continue this line of research. 
The question that comes to mind in this respect is whether reliability is a matter of adding 
measures on top of each other or is it a matter of choosing measures to implement on the one 
hand, and eliminating some other measures on the other hand? In other words: is it an additive 
model8 or a ‘replacement’ model?9 The risk persists that one source of unreliability is replaced 
by another source of unreliability.  
Whereas ‘Excellence’ (Peters & Waterman, 1982) was the management creed of the eighties and 
nineties of the previous century, the paradigm of this decade seems to have shifted towards 
‘Reliability’. The reliability paradigm shows itself through an emphasis on operational risk 
management in the aftermath of the Barings, Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat or Société Générale 
failures, to name just these. The question that can be heard in boardrooms is: ‘Can we be certain 
that our systems – in the broadest sense – will be sufficiently functional to guarantee business 
continuity?’ And also: ‘What measures do we have in place to guarantee a sufficient recovery?’ 
This change is quite remarkable because also in business, until recently, reliability was not an 
issue. There simply was no reason to take notice of it: business environments were more stable 
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and less complex than they are today and a compelling regulation, forcing the organization to 
put the reliability issue on the board table, was lacking. Besides, over the years the idea had 
emerged that systems are safe and reliable. Indeed, most systems have a very impressive 
reliability track record. Therefore, when thinking about reliability, the null hypothesis is that a 
system is reliable and, because failure is the test criterion used, we can never accept that 
hypothesis simply because we have failed to reject it over some given period of time (Wolf & 
Berniker, 2008). 
Therefore it is no wonder that reliability – although considered an organization’s bottom line – 
has not revealed all its secrets in full yet. We can assume there still are some ‘dark sides’ that 
need enlightenment, even sides we have not even started to realize they exist. With this study 
we wish to address this dark side of reliability and while full comprehension is unlikely, but that 
nevertheless some relevant progress can be made by changing perspectives.  
2.3 Methods for evaluating reliability 
2.3.1 Cartesian reductionism – Risk equation 
Since the Renaissance, and until the beginning of the previous century, scientist were guided by 
a strong Cartesian belief that if a system could be reduced to its basic forces and one could 
compute how those forces interacted, one could predict anything (Longstaff, 2003, p. 11). The 
study of reliability and risk would be reduced to an equation, its management to checklists, 
analysis and evaluation. The method of the risk equation is the most straightforward and most 
frequently used: “Risk is the uncertainty inherent in doing business; technically, it is the 
probability associated with losses (or failure) of a system multiplied by the dollar loss if the risk is 
realized” (Straub & Welke, 1998, p. 442). 
This method has the appealing advantage that it is straightforward to understand, and – at least 
at first sight – easy to implement and follow-up. This simplicity is deceiving, however, as has 
been pointed out by several researchers. Baskerville, for instance, argues that even such simple 
arithmetic becomes exceedingly complex because of “the interwoven nature of the wide variety 
of threats, the vast array of safeguards, and the variance of levels of probability and loss that are 
unique to every organization” (Baskerville, 2005, p. 6). He continues: “Threats and safeguards 
are overlapping. As a consequence, a database of threats, probabilities, potential losses, and 
potential safeguards can be complex” (Baskerville, 2005, p. 6). 
Since modern times, we have learned a lot and in the post-modern era we live in, we have come 
to realize that there is no such thing as a reliability or risk equation, much as this is desirable. 
Nonetheless, some of the most important methods of assessing and evaluating risk and 
reliability – for an overview of some of the methods, see Table 1.1 – seem to swear by the old 
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Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
 Computer Simulation of system behavior 
 Monte Carlo failure simulation 
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 Human Reliability Modeling and Analysis 
 Hazard and Operability Analysis 
 Time continuum failure modeling and analysis 
 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Table 1.1 - Overview of some reductionist risk management methods (Azadeh, 2000, p. 208) 
2.3.2 Reasonian holism 
An alternative for the Cartesian approach is to focus on the composition of this ‘reliability 
cocktail’. There seems to be a need for holistic studies that underpin how aspects of 
organizational design and task environment interact to affect organizational reliability (Pearson 
& Mitroff, 1993;Lin & Carley, 2001).  
 
Figure 1.3 - Swiss Cheese Model (Modified from Reason, 1990, p. 208) 
A first approximation to this holistic view on reliability is the Swiss Cheese metaphor, developed 
by Reason (1990). An organization is exposed to all kinds of threats from various internal and 
external sources. The organization may protect itself from these threats, but threats can still 
cause an organizational accident, as depicted in Figure 1. 
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Reason argues that each of the levels present in Figure 1.3 forms a layer that can prevent inputs 
of a malicious nature (‘threats’) from propagating through the entire system. Each layer forms a 
line of defense against specific types of threats. Because of the obvious analogy, this model of 
perforated layers, or slices, is referred to as the ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ (Reason, 1990;Reason, 
1997). Defenses, barriers, and safeguards occupy a key position in the system approach. High 
technology systems have many defensive layers: some are engineered (alarms, physical barriers, 
automatic shutdowns), others rely on people (surgeons, anesthetists, pilots, control room 
operators), and others depend on procedures and administrative controls. For the purpose of 
our research, the Swiss Cheese Model, we formulate three remarks. 
First, in an ideal system, each defensive layer would be intact or should have a limited number of 
‘holes’. Together, they should form a defense system that prevents threats of any kind to 
effectuate in the system. However, in practice, in each of the layers in Figure 1.3 holes do exist, 
allowing some threats to pass through a line of defense. Although a single threat crossing one of 
the defenses may not directly result in disaster, such a threat can trigger another event or risk, 
which may in the worst-case slip through the next line of defense, depending on where exactly 
the gaps in the layers are. 
Second, an additional problem is that – unlike in the Swiss cheese – the holes are continually 
opening, shutting, and shifting their location. This is due to changes in the organization that are 
bound to occur continuously as the organization develops and changes over time, the gaps in 
the subsequent layers will be dynamic10. The consequence is that eventually, at one point in 
time, the holes will line up, allowing a threat to escalate throughout the various layers of the 
organization. The result is an organizational accident: a latent danger becoming manifest as it 
bypasses all built-in defense mechanisms, routing its way through the holes in the system.  
Third, because of the dynamic nature of organizing, when one hole is plugged, another one may 
emerge elsewhere. Traditional risk management in such a setting is of not much use: finding the 
holes in the cheese (risk identification), estimating their importance in terms of impact and 
frequency (risk assessment), and finally, plugging them by effectuating the appropriate response 
(risk mitigation). The mainstream risk frameworks and best-practices, evangelized by consultants 
and business schools alike, propagate this same approach as sanctifying. We posit that 
guaranteeing tomorrow’s reliability by managing today’s risks is at best a partial solution for the 
foreseeable problems, but at worst, tells nothing about the future reliability in terms of the 
management of the unforeseeable ones. 
Fourth, as important as the holistic view offered by the systems thinking perspective, is the 
constructivist triangulation approach we adhere to (Berghmans, Van Den Eede, & Van de Walle, 
2008). In our philosophical assumption of the ontological and epistemological character of 
reliability, risks cannot be treated as a physical attribute ‘out there’ that can be measured 
(Oscarson, 2007). Risk identification based on this worldview assumes risks to be mediated 
through social experience and interaction (Renn, 1998). This stems with a constructivist view, 
which – in contrast to the objectivist approach – sees risk as a social artifact, produced by social 
groups or institutions, and determined by structural forces in society (Oscarson, 2007). 
From the above, one could derive that in a very complex environment, a univocal approach to 
risk and reliability is not what is needed. More than one mechanism, tool, backup, etc. is 
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needed. The danger however is that too many mechanisms might interrelate in an unforeseen 
manner. This idea refers to the notion of redundancy where you also see a two-sided cutting 
sword. Redundancy is good, but too much redundancy is dangerous because the defense 
mechanisms might interrelate, hence endangering the complete system. Besides, the 
conventional practice of managers is to limit redundancy, to obtain the best possible fit to 
contextual conditions, and to maximize efficiency (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). This viewpoint is 
reflected in organization and economic theory. Transaction cost economists, for instance, 
consider redundancy synonymous with resource waste. Agency theorists go even one step 
further and think of redundancy as an opportunity for actors to pursue their own interests 
rather than act in the interest of the organization (Jensen, 1993). 
On the other hand, it has been acknowledged that redundancy also has positive aspects. Cyert 
and March (1963), for example, proposed that organizations with slack find it easier to resolve 
goal conflicts between political coalitions, because redundant structures offer alternative 
options. They distinguish between three types of redundancy: (1) Information redundancy, (2) 
Task redundancy and (3) Relation redundancy. Information redundancy could be defined as the 
amount of unutilized possibilities to carry information. Once more, also this type of redundancy 
has an upside and downside component. Carley (1990), for instance, pointed out that increasing 
information redundancy may not only be a stimulus for (organizational) learning, leading to an 
increase in reliability, but that at the same time it might be detrimental to reliability because it 
adds to task complexity. As such, it is vital to find the balance between information redundancy 
and task complexity. A typical example is provided by Jervis (1997, p. 570): “Adding redundant 
safety equipment makes some accidents less likely but increases the chances of others due to the 
operators greater confidence and the interaction effects among the devices”. 
3 Triangulation 
If we genuinely want to understand more about reliability, we believe we must do so (1) by 
relying on multiple disciplines, (2) by taking a systems thinking perspective, (3) by acknowledging 
and fostering paradox and (4) by looking beyond the boundary. 
3.1 Multidisciplinary 
A first road that can lead to understanding more about reliability is to study the implications of 
alternative organizational choices in detail and to assess their impact on behavior, as this 
behavior is known to shape overall organizational reliability (Bourrier, 2005, p. 100). The 
numerous recent examples of collapses of organizational reliability (supra) teach that risks are 
not homogenous by nature as they involve multiple aspects. Therefore, their management must 
be multidisciplinary as well. For this reason, we make use of organization theory (in particular 
organization design and organization behavior theory), economics, as well as information 
systems and integrate theory by looking through these lenses. It is generally accepted that 
dealing with a complex system involves a variety of disciplines (Azadeh, 2000, p. 210). 
3.2 Systems thinking 
A second guideline is that one must be alert to critical problems falling between disciplines. 
There is a need for an integrated method to identify gaps at interfaces and any overlooked weak 
points. Indeed, the danger lies in the system, not in the components (Azadeh, 2000, p. 206). 
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Hence, the gaps between the components are what should be the object of our study. Such calls 
for a holistic kind of thinking, also known as systems thinking (McLucas, 2003;Alter, 2004). 
Various approaches to organization studies are feasible, systems thinking being one of them, 
even though “[systems thinking] can hardly be regarded as a new approach to scientific thought” 
(Koontz, 1980, p. 180). For our own research, we take the way Scott Snook (2002) has managed 
to identify these gaps in his application of systems thinking. This is explained next. 
In what follows we subsequently address the nature of systems, their boundaries and of thinking 
in an effort of finding out in what way they are valuable for understanding reliability.  
Ludwig von Bertalanffy has described a system as “an entity which maintains its existence 
through the mutual interaction of its parts” (Bellinger, 2008b). Crucial in the concept of system is 
the fact that there is mutual interaction (cf. interactive complexity) which will over time lead to 
emergent behavior that again is inherently part of the system. This interconnectedness in 
combination with the time dimension will lead to characteristics that cannot be found as a 
characteristic of the system’s individual components (Bellinger, 2008b). As a rule, people have 
inadequate understanding of systemic behavior (Sterman, 1989). This means that often they 
have no awareness for the drama that goes along with even a small failure or disruption. 
Presumably, it is beyond their cognitive, meta-cognitive and affective capabilities so that they 
notice too late what is really going on or that they make the wrong decisions to mitigate or 
compensate for what is happening. This interconnectedness is what distinguishes systems from 
non-systems. 
In fact, systems thinking theorist Peter Senge advises against the bias of looking for problem 
causes in convenient places, to look beyond the system boundary (Moberg, 2001, p. 21): 
“[There] is a fundamental characteristic of complex human systems: ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ are not 
close in time and space. By ‘effects’, I mean the obvious symptoms that indicate that there are 
problems ... By ‘cause’ I mean the interaction of the underlying system that is most responsible 
for generating the symptoms, and which, if recognized, could lead to changes producing lasting 
improvement. Why is this a problem? Because most of us assume they are—most of us assume, 
most of the time, that cause and effect are close in time and space” (Senge, 1990, p. 63). 
One such view is systems thinking. (Successful) Systems thinking is about being able to see the 
whole picture or context of a situation and its interconnections to its environment 
(Wolstenholme, 2003, p. 20). Such a perspective enables unintended consequences of well-
intended actions to be pre-empted and minimized. Systems thinking reverses the three-stage 
order of Machine-Age thinking:  
(1) decomposition of that which is to be explained; 
(2) explanation of the behavior or properties of the parts taken separately, and; 
(3) aggregating these explanations into an explanation of the whole. 
Note that this third step corresponds to synthesis. 
Opposed to the Machine-Age thinking, the systems approach has a different characterization, 
also three steps: 
(1) Identify a containing whole (system) of which the thing to be explained is a part; 
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(2) Explain the behavior or properties of the containing whole and; 
(3) Then explain the behavior or properties of the thing to be explained in terms of the role(s) or 
function(s) within its containing whole. 
 
Note that in this sequence, synthesis precedes analysis. 
In analytical thinking, the thing to be explained is treated as a whole to be taken apart. In 
synthetic thinking, the thing to be explained is treated as a part of a containing whole. The 
former reduces the focus of the investigator; the latter expands it. These two approaches should 
not (but often do) yield contradictory or conflicting results since they are complementary. 
Development of this complementarity is a major task of systems thinking. Analysis focuses on 
structure; it reveals how things work. Synthesis focuses on function; it reveals why things 
operate as they do.  
The cure for this deeply rooted practice can be best described as systems thinking. It forms the 
backbone of this dissertation. Systems thinking suggests that when we understand the structure 
of a system, we are in a much better position to understand and predict the behavior of the 
individual elements (people) and their relationships and can therefore make better decisions. 
Everybody's consciousness is limited by space and time, which presumes that a human being is 
necessarily unable to know the world in its entirety. In this respect, systems thinking can serve 
as an antidote for prejudice. In what follows we describe Reasonian holism as a way to go 
beyond this innate limitation. 
3.3 Paradox 
The notions of opposites, contradictions, dialectics, tensions, dilemmas, and paradoxes 
constitute an important basis for social science theorizing (Das & Teng, 2000, p. 84). This should 
not come as a surprise since all organization is founded on paradox (Clegg, da Cunha, & Cunha, 
2002, p. 483-484). On the one hand, an organization consists of independent human beings who 
freely commit to cooperate but on the other hand – in order to make this cooperation feasible – 
see their freedom bounded by rules and control. In essence, this is a paradox of centripetal (i.e. 
constraining) structure vs. centrifugal (i.e. enabling) structuring (Clegg et al., 2002). “Routines, 
resource allocations, interpretive schemes and norms, are all examples of ‘poles’ that create 
structural constraint. Structuring will be centrifugal and enabling. It is agency and everyday 
practice that accomplishes structuring”. In our view, this last statement explains the persistence 
of this paradoxical situation. A new deal of organizing is needed to cope with an endless array of 
conflicting choices by creating an organizational culture with shared beliefs, values and 
competencies without encouraging a herd mentality and trampling on the uniqueness of 
individual personality and creativity (Thite, 2004, p. 139). 
We believe such may be particularly true when studying a multifaceted reality like organizational 
reliability. So far, we have illustrated that reliability is paradoxical by nature. In order to be 
reliable, an organization has to be flexible and stable, efficient and effective, in the long run, but 
also in the short run, etc. In general terms, logical paradox can be defined as "two contrary, or 
even contradictory, propositions to which we are led by apparently sound arguments" (van 
Heigenoort 1967 cited by Poole & van de Ven, 1989, p.563). Typical of a paradox is that these 
opposites are clearly present and are generally accepted as worth striving for (Quinn & 
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Cameron, 1988). Acknowledging this paradox and trying to understand or manage it is a far 
better plan than trying to categorically choose for either of the two extremes. Indeed, such a 
choice would merely result in a pendulum swinging between the two extremes, leading to a 
tremendous loss of energy. 
For this reason theory building has to “move away from ‘consistency’ and towards ‘the resolution 
of tensions or oppositions’” (Poole & van de Ven, 1989, p. 563). Such an approach would mean 
the emergence of "a dynamic theory that can handle both stability and change, that can 
consider the tensions and conflicts inherent in human systems" (Quinn & Cameron, 1988, p. 27). 
Poole and van de Ven posit that theories are “not statements of some ultimate ‘truth’ but rather 
are alternative cuts of a multifaceted reality” (Poole & van de Ven, 1989, p. 563). 
In this dissertation we follow Poole and van de Ven (1989, p. 562) in their methodology as they 
distinguish four different modes of working with paradoxes: 
1. accept the paradox and use it constructively (Opposition) 
2. clarify levels of analysis (Spatial Separation) 
3. temporally separate the two levels (Temporal Separation) 
4. introduce new terms to resolve the paradox (Synthesis) 
 
“A great deal can be learned from juxtaposing contradictory propositions and assumptions, even 
if they are incompatible. Theorists may feel a strain toward cognitive consistency, but that does 
not mean that theories must fit together neatly. Paradoxes remind theorists of this inconsistency 
and enable them to study the dialectic between opposing levels and forces which are captured in 
different theories” (Poole & van de Ven, 1989, p. 566). By contrasting theories, constructs and 
concepts, we ask the questions that before were unuttered and attempt to make connections 
that before were unthinkable. We temporally separate the levels on which they are analyzed by 
making the distinction between (for instance) (1) individual vs. team vs. organization, (2) 
collaborator vs. executive and (3) physical proximity vs. physical distance. Researchers who take 
this approach must grapple with difficult and important theoretical problems. For instance: 
despite much research on the aggregation of individual acts, attitudes, and preferences into 
social actions, climates, and choices, these are still no completely satisfactory solution to the 
paradox (Poole & van de Ven, 1989, p. 566). Finally, a set of new terms is needed to resolve the 
paradox. “The resolution of paradoxes by level distinctions or temporal analysis leaves each set 
of assumptions or processes basically intact. Both sides of the paradox are assumed 
fundamentally sound, and the paradox is resolved by separating them and specifying how one 
side influences the other. However, it is also possible that the paradox may stem from conceptual 
limitations or flaws in theory or assumptions. To overcome these limitations it is necessary to 
introduce new concepts or a new perspective” (Poole & van de Ven, 1989, p. 567). “However, 
such advances are hard-won, and many apparent resolutions may lead to dead ends. When 
perspectives radically shift, theorists may lose as well as gain. The new perspective may 
oversimplify some issues or ignore the problems that originally gave rise to previous positions. 
These risks are the price theorists pay for theoretical advances” (Poole & van de Ven, 1989, p. 
567).  
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Throughout our research, we combine these four strategies of dealing with paradox. As such we 
acknowledge the Genius of the ‘and’ (Graves & Waddock, 2000, p. 414) and oppose the Tyranny 
of the ‘or’. In fact, the reconciliation between ‘or’ and ‘and’-like thinking lies in the notion of 
ambiguity. Dealing with ambiguity is thinking in both the registers of ‘and’ and ‘or’.  
3.4 Triangulation: multidisciplinary, system theoretic and 
paradoxical 
This dissertation makes a start in acknowledging paradox and does so by proposing a system 
theoretic perspective supported by a thorough triangulation of research theory and method. As 
for theory, we build on High Reliability Theory (HRT) and SenseMaking (SeMa), while we 
examine the role of Information Systems (IS) Fit. In the elaboration of this dissertation, we deal 
with these issues in more detail. They are covered in Chapter 2. For method, we rely on 
qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods, the hermeneutic approach 
underlying our research is presented in chapter 3, leading to a reconceptualization of our 
theoretical framework in chapter 4. In chapter 5 the reconceptualized model is presented and 
the propositions and hypotheses developed. They are analyzed in chapter 6 and discussed in 
chapter 7. 
3.4.1 Study unreliability as well as reliability 
Management practice and literature tends to develop a bias towards the investigation of 
successful organizations, thereby neglecting the research of failures (Denrell, 2003). Failures as 
such are under-sampled which is dangerous because it is impossible to understand reliability if 
one does not understand unreliability. The consequences are important. For instance (Denrell, 
2003, p. 228), the fact that only successes are looked into, will mistakenly show that risky 
behavior is rewarding in terms of reliability but this observation and conclusion does not take 
into account that risk-taking in many cases has led to failure because these cases are under-
sampled. This might lead to a remarkable result in the sense that even if a practice is frequent 
among organizations with high reliability, it does not follow that the practice is linked to success. 
The most well-know example might very well be Peters’ and Waterman’s (1982) ‘In Search of 
Excellence’. Like the drunken man who has lost his keys, the organization study discipline has a 
tendency to look where the light is (Clarke, 1993;Roberts & Bea, 2001b). Instead they should pay 
attention to a language that uses a plethora of underspecified formulations as a vehicle through 
which one could work on difficult conceptual problems (Levine, quoted in Orton & Weick, 1990, 
p. 204). One of the main conceptual problems is how to combine reliability and flexibility (c.q. 
effectiveness and efficiency; bureaucracy and adhocracy). These concepts are worth pursuing 
but difficult to realize simultaneously (Figure 1.4). This observation explains the almost 
continuous swinging of the pendulum between extremes such as centralization and 
decentralization, trust and control. 




Figure 1.4 - Combining Reliability and Flexibility (Van Den Eede, Kenis, & Van de Walle, 2004) 
As discussed above, if the purpose is to find out what constitutes reliability it cannot be found in 
any single element of the system. Hughes et al. after having investigated reliability in British air 
traffic control, expressed it as follows (Hughes, Randall, & Shapiro, 1992, p. 119): “It is certainly 
not to be found in the equipment….for a period of several months during our field work it was 
failing regularly….Nor is it to be found in the rules and procedures, which are a resource for safe 
operation but which can never cover every circumstance and condition. Nor is it to be found in 
the personnel who, though very highly skilled, motivated and dedicated, are as prone as people 
everywhere to human error. Rather we believe it is to be found in the cooperative activities of 
controllers across the ‘totality’ of the system, and in particular in the way that it enforces the 
active engagement of controllers, chiefs, and assistants with the material they are using and with 
each other”.11 Behavior that is asymmetric (cf. Snowden) from the symmetric behavior that 
could be expected when reading the procedures and organization charts. Although it is useful to 
have a clear understanding of every element within a system, from a systems perspective, this 
will not necessarily lead to a complete understanding of the whole system. This vision has some 
resemblance with an old Indian story about the blind men and the elephant. They all touched a 
different part of the animal. When they tried to describe what they felt, everyone gave a 
different description, which leads to an inconsistent total image of the animal (Aerts, 2008, p. 
45). 
We adhere to Weick’s translation of Ashby’s law of requisite variety – only complexity can cope 
with complexity – to the way organization studies should be conducted, namely to complicate 
yourself (Weick, 1995, p. 56). This becomes obvious in the conceptual models built, the 
combination of techniques that are used, and the underpinning theoretical frameworks. It 
becomes even more obvious in the use of constructs stemming from High Reliability Theory 
(HRT) or SenseMaking (SeMa). Such constructs have the potential of taking the discussion a bit 
further than the traditional conclusions from contingency theory. We rely on them to address 
the question whether there are design and behavioral characteristics that are robust (Lin & 
Carley, 2001, p. 5) – in the sense of stable and flexible enough – to allow for an ‘all-seasons’ 
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approach to organizational reliability.12 This boils down to dealing with paradox. For that reason, 
we have chosen HRT as our main theoretical framework. HRT, or the study of High Reliability 
Organizations (HROs) is dealt with abundantly throughout this dissertation. In this introductory 
chapter, we point out why this framework can provide its usefulness. 
3.4.2 HRT relevance 
With our research question in mind, it is clear that the study of HROs could be promising. More 
in particular, there are four reasons behind our choice for HRT as the theoretic framework for 
studying operational reliability of the incident management process.  
A first reason is because it permits to deal with the two dominant organizational dimensions: the 
structural and the contextual dimension (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968;Pugh, 1973). 
Both dimensions are necessary to understand what constitutes organizational reliability. A mere 
structural approach, focusing e.g. on procedures, coordination mechanisms, communication 
channels, does not take into account social and cognitive aspects. A mere contextual approach, 
focusing on organization culture, leadership style, self-efficacy etc, however relevant and often 
ignored, on its own is not capable of explaining/guaranteeing reliability or the lack thereof. This 
combination normally cannot be found in one theory but calls for an integration of individual 
theoretical concepts, with incompatibility as a consequence. It is the merit of HRO scholars that 
they have built a coherent framework that overcomes this shortcoming. 
A second reason for our choice for HRT is that HRO as a noun has a great business value. Citing 
Weick and Sutcliffe: “In today’s context it makes sense for any organization to become more like 
an HRO. Today’s business conditions involve increased competition, higher customer 
expectations, reduced cycle time, and tight interdependencies. These changes produce 
environments that are almost as harsh, risky, and unforgiving as those that HROs confront. That 
being the case, organizations that confront HRO-like environment with HRO-like processes should 
have more success at learning and adaptation than those who don’t” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 
114). If our research is to have some value for the field, it needs to build on concepts with high 
face validity. We believe this is more important than high scientific rigor in the purest sense, at 
least as a starting point. A broad interest is an enabler for deepening, fine-tuning and correcting, 
such theory. It will allow for a broader empirical basis that is indispensable for its generalization 
and validating on a broader scale. 
A third reason for our choice of HRT is its relevance for the study of the reliability of mainstream 
organizations (as opposed to the organizations under physical threat). Attempts of transposing 
practices from archetypical HROs (like nuclear power plants, nuclear aircraft carriers, and air 
traffic control) to mainstream organizations have often been critiqued as too special, too exotic, 
and too ‘far out’ for the prosaic world of everyday organizations (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a, p. 
877). In line with Vogus and Welbourne, our study attempts to answer the question under what 
conditions do ‘prosaic’ organizations resemble ‘exotic’ HROs. The popularity of the HRO theme is 
ambiguous. On the one hand there is an (all-in-all limited) number of publications that aim at 
transposing HRO insights to mainstream organizations: CEO bandwagon behavior (Fiol & 
O'Connor, 2003), HRM practices in innovation (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a), organization change 
(Ramanujam, 2003), construction industry (Carlo, Lyytinen, & Boland, Jr., 2004;Smart, Tranfield, 
Deasley, Levene, Rowe, & Corley, 2003), mining (Sammarco, 2002), industry in general (Mascini, 
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1998;Azadeh, 2000;Cooke & Rohleder, 2006;Aase & Nybø, 2002;Qureshi, Ashraf, & Amer, 2007), 
Banking (Roberts & Libuser, 1993;Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003;Ramanujam, 2003;Montefusco 
& Pesapane, 2006;Van Den Eede, Van de Walle, & Rutkowski, 2006), electricity grids (Schulman, 
Roe, van Eeten, & de Bruijne, 2004;Roe, Schulman, van Eeten, & de Bruijne, 2005;de Bruijne, van 
Eeten, Roe, & Schulman, 2006;de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007) and Telecommunications (de 
Bruijne et al., 2006;de Bruijne, 2006;de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007). A noteworthy effort has 
been made to apply the HRO framework to the IT sector (Eisenhardt, 1993;Sullivan & Beach, 
2002;Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a;McBride, 2008). A similar effort can be noticed in the field of 
education (Rossi & Stringfield, 1995;Reynolds, Stringfield, & Schaffer, 2006;Hoy, Gage III, & 
Tarter, 2007;Bellamy, Crawford, Marshall, & Coulter, 2005). Some single publications on e-
government by means of electronic voting (Moynihan, 2004), automobile industry (Drogoul, 
Kinnersly, Roelen, & Kirwan, 2007), water supply (Roe et al., 2005), science (Baker, Jackson, & 
Wanetick, 2005), architecture (Carlo et al., 2004), pastoralism (Roe, Huntsinger, & Labnow, 
1998) and drug rehabilitation (Cooren, 2004). Some studies are at the edge of archetypical HRO 
research and more mainstream organization types: Prison management (Babb & Ammons, 
1996;Crichton, Flin, & Rattray, 2000), railways (Hale, Heijer, & Koornneef, 2003;Smart et al., 
2003;Rosness, Guttormsen, Steiro, Tinmannsvik, & Herrera, 2004;Busby, 2006;Drogoul et al., 
2007) and humanitarian relief (Ash & Smallman, 2008;Dougall, Horsley, & McLisky, 2008).  
A fourth and last, less sophisticated, reason why we have used HRT is because it ‘spoke’ to us 
(Walsham, 2006, p. 325).  
4 Complexity 
4.1 Decomposing complexity 
Since the fifties, the complexity theme holds an important position in literature on organizations 
- scientific as well as popular. The form however, under which this theme appeared, has differed 
considerably over the years. 13  In the beginning years, research appeared under other 
denominators than complexity (see for instance Ashby 1954 for a well-known example). Over 
the years, the tone also changed from ‘defeating complexity’ to ‘embracing complexity’ (Figure 
1.5). A thread throughout this evolution nonetheless is that organizations had to match the 
complexity of their environment (Boisot & Child, 1999, p. 237).  
The notion of complexity plays a special role in this dissertation. First, it is the setting under 
study; it is the object of our thinking. Second, it is the subject of our thinking in the sense that 
complexity is the lens through which we look at complexity. The frameworks and jargons we use 
are complex per se. It takes complexity to absorb complexity. Tsoukas calls this second-order 
complexity as opposed to first-order complexity (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001, p. 980-981). 
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Figure 1.5 - Embracing Paradox 
Management and other social sciences are familiar with the terms ‘lessons learnt’, or ‘best 
practices’. They imply that there is something like a general truth (be it contingent on a certain 
type of situation) upon which we can draw for the future, actions that should be committed or 
omitted.14 This line of reasoning implies that the future is foreseeable, but in many cases, it is 
not.15 One of the questions one could ask is “If you cannot predict the future, is it possible to 
manage a complex system?” Longstaff (2003) argues there are two answers to that 
commonsense question and he leads us to the important distinction between ‘complex ‘and 
‘complicated. The first answer is that not everything in a complex system exhibits the same high 
degree of complexity. The objective hence is to make that distinction. The second answer has 
more to do with hypocrisy than with science. Because the belief that ‘predictability rules’ is the 
null hypothesis, adhering the alternative hypothesis by saying that ‘unpredictability rules’, is 
detrimental for one’s career (Longstaff, 2003, p. 11). Much hypocrite as this might seem, it is 
nevertheless an important motive behind human behavior and hence worth noticing and taking 
into account when studying reliability.  
Without prejudice to the above, we believe that a distinction between complex and complicated 
can and should be made. If one makes this distinction, one could manage our contemporary 
systems by concentrating on the complicated issues, threads, themes in the systems. The 
complex counterparts can be observed – maybe one could even try to understand them – but 
only by acknowledging the fact that under no circumstances they can be managed in the 
traditional sense of controlling and leading (Fayol, 1916). 
On the other hand, an organization must embrace complexity and keep it as high as possibly 
acceptable without crossing the thin line between complexity and chaos. 
So it will have become clear by now that complexity has two sides; that there are two ways of 
approaching the topic of complexity (Ahlemeyer, 2001, p. 59): “One can describe complexity as 
the problem, and then look for solutions. Complexity, after all, makes things difficult, and it may 
easily get out of control. In this perspective, nothing is more welcome than an effective technique 
of reducing complexity. Or one can conceive of complexity as a solution, a solution for a problem 
yet to be described. Complexity then is not an unintended side effect of an otherwise complex 
world, but a form of the world itself, a mode in which the world deals with itself. In this 
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complexity is to be avoided”. By analogy with risk, we label the first type ‘downside complexity’, 
the second ‘upside complexity’. Downside complexity stands for the negative consequences of 
complexity. It appeals to the inherent peril of waste of energy, frustration or else even 
organization- or system collapse. Upside complexity appeals to the positive aspects of 
complexity. It stands for opportunity (chance) to yield a higher reliability than without 
complexity. 
4.2 Measuring complexity 
In literature we have found no complexity measure upon which there is a general agreement or 
that is broadly used to determine organizational complexity. We believe the reason is – at least 
in part – that the term is composed of two elements that are not univocal: organizational and 
complexity. Organizational: can relate to people, processes, products and services; it can address 
issues that are internally or externally oriented. 
The concept of complexity itself can be seen as the number of interactions between 
components; the degree/intensity at which that happens; the relationship cause-effect can be 
considered with a delay between both indicating a higher degree of complexity; there is the 
neighboring notion of complicatedness etc.  
Variety offers a good proxy measure of complexity (Boisot & Child, 1999) but an even better 
proxy is the complexity index (Ashmos, Duchon, & McDaniel, Jr., 2000). 
4.3 Managing complexity 
Whether an organization prospers or merely survives, depends on how it manages complexity 
(Ahlemeyer, 2001;Ashmos et al., 2000;Beard, 1978;Berniker & Wolf, 2001;Klatzky, 1970;Meyer & 
Trice, 1979;Stacey, 1996;Stengers, 2004;Van Uden, 2005). Complexity can transgress into chaos 
if it is not kept within a certain range (Bennet & Bennet, 2004). Since complexity refers primarily 
to the number of decisions that need to be made and the number of factors that need to be 
considered when making these decisions, this calls for a tremendous effort. According to Cannon 
(1995, p. 96), as the cognitive capabilities of most people are limited to handle only a limited 
number – working memory capacity is said to be five plus or minus two – this poses a problem to 
dealing with complexity. However, successful organizations seem to accomplish a manageable 
complexity-level. For this, they have a set of strategies. They are dealt with next. 
Requisite variety 
Requisite variety refers to Ashby’s (1962) argument that it takes internal complexity to cope with 
external complexity. In this sense, a complexity absorption response involves holding multiple 
and conflicting portrayals of the variety in the environment (Boisot & Child, 1999, p. 238). 
“Managerial responses to complexity from the absorption perspective would include the 
development of multiple and sometimes conflicting goals, the importance of a variety of 
strategic activities, more informal and decentralized structural / decision making patterns, and a 
wide variety of interactions and connections for decision making” (Ashmos et al., 2000, p. 581).16 
Absorbing complexity means they “hold multiple and sometimes conflicting representations of 
environmental variety, retaining in their behavioral repertoire a range of responses, each of 
which operates at a lower level of specificity'' (Boisot & Child, 1999, p. 238). 
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The notion of requisite variety – despite its high face validity – is not without problem. For 
instance, it is obvious that this need of requisite variety should be balanced with the limited 
cognitive capabilities (supra) and the need of dealing with tight coupling. It has been reported in 
military settings (Dov & Gil, 2003, p. 853) that is done by using a shared a meta-script system 
that resulted in similar representations of the environment, i.e., conceptual convergence. This 
reduces requisite variety to cognitively manageable proportions.17 Another caveat concerns the 
contradiction between requisite variety and trust. “[I]t is argued that the management of 
requisite variety must be accompanied by attention to power relations and the development of 
practical wisdom, since diversity inevitably means differences in belief and opinion within groups 
and potential increases in anxiety, which while necessary for innovation may often work against 
the building of high levels of trust and shared understanding that may be required for such 
innovation” (Moss, 2001, p. 11/20). 
Simplification: codification and abstraction 
At first sight in contradiction with the techniques of increasing requisite variety, are the set of 
techniques that aim at streamlining the observed reality. They do so by codification (specifying 
categories to which data are assigned) and abstraction (limiting the number of categories that 
need to be considered in the first place) (Ashmos et al., 2000, p. 581). Popular tools include 
Balanced Scorecards and Key Reliability Indicators. The opposing phenomena of Requisite 
Variety and Simplification tend to occur together in organizations and as such, they are a nice 
example of paradox. This a priori so, because both phenomena exhibit dynamic characteristics. 
Organizations, for instance, tend to become simpler over time (Miller, 1993) and have a 
propensity to increase variety. We refer here to organization growth models like the one of 
Greiner (1972) where organizational variety increases in the wake of the solutions for 
organizational crises.18 
Sinks 
The presence of ‘sinks’ that absorb external impacts and buffer subsystems from change will 
make the system less complex (Longstaff, 2003): “For example, when the price of an input to a 
product goes up but the firm can immediately pass this on to consumers this acts as a sink 
protecting the firm from the impact of the price increase and makes it unnecessary for it to build 
a complex system for response” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 17). 
Shortening feedback loops 
“Positive and negative feedback (and feed forwards) loops of different lengths. Long feedback 
loops, with communication going through many agents or subsystems tend to be more complex” 
(Longstaff, 2003, p. 16-17). 
Also the connectivity, ‘the extent to which agents or units are all connected or are connected 
through hubs’ will increase the complexity of the system” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 16-17). 
A self-creating paradox – Acknowledge the boundaries 
At several occasions in this dissertation, we stress the importance of looking ‘beyond the 
boundary’. Paradoxically enough, this does not imply that boundaries have to be omitted. On 
the contrary, they are needed: how else can one look behind them? However, there is more: in a 
field that is as complex as reliability, taking a broad perspective is a merit, but it is also a vice if 
there is no partitioning of knowledge. “We also realize, however, that some partitioning of 
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knowledge is necessary and some boundaries to this knowledge must be set if meaningful 
progress in summarizing and classifying pertinent knowledge is ever to be made” (Koontz, 1980, 
p. 183). 
Hence, our plea to acknowledge the boundaries, even though the aim of our approach – and 
especially its systems thinking component – is to cut across the boundary perspective of 
organizations. Boundaries are and remain vitally important for organizational structure. ‘You 
can’t live with them, you can’t live without them’ In search of a balance, the key would seem to 
be to recognize the boundaries, but to make them as transparent as possible. “To see them as 
necessary ‘net curtains’, not ‘heavy drapes’” (Wolstenholme, 2003, p. 9). 
Complexity and variety 
Referring once again to the models of organizational growth (Greiner, 1972), we believe that 
over time organizations/systems are capable of handling more and more complexity (Boisot & 
Child, 1999, p. 238). They “*…+ differentiate internally, acquiring sophisticated data-processing 
capabilities as they do so.” *…+ “With growth and specialization comes an ability to handle an 
ever wider and varied range of internal representations of the external environment” (Boisot & 
Child, 1999, p. 238). 19Ashby’s Law states that systems exhibiting a high degree of variety will be 
better in dealing with complexity. The variety of control measures must match the variety of 
disturbances (Gazendam & Jorna, 1998, p. 5). 
Complexity , resilience and structure 
If a complex system exhibits resilience it will bounce back from changes and is more likely to be 
stable in the long term (Longstaff, 2003, p. 16-17). Lin and Carley (2001, p. 34) state they have 
found empirical evidence that in response to crises, organizations should move to complex 
structures with greater resource access. 
Complexity is a young field searching for laws, theories, and principles that can be used to build 
a structure and a discipline (Bennet & Bennet, 2004, p. 285). Nevertheless, sufficient knowledge 
is present to understand that if an organization wants to prosper, or merely survive, such 
depends on how it manages complexity. The inconvenience is that complexity can transgress 
into chaos if it is not kept within a certain range (Figure 1.6). This calls for a tremendous effort 
and the application of a strategy to accomplish a manageable complexity-level: pursuing 
strategic chunking, sequential elaboration, organizational specialization/coordination and 
intermediate measures of reliability (Cannon, 1995). It is our opinion however that these 
strategies seem to aim at a reduction of complexity, and not its management. 
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Figure 1.6 - Systems Space 
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Table 1.2 - Properties of System Dimensions (Bennet & Bennet, 2004) 
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The future is truly unknowable and therefore we must learn to live and deal with uncertainty, 
surprise, paradox, and complexity (Bennet & Bennet, 2004, p. 297-298). In this dissertation we 
therefore do not aim at reducing complexity – like suggested by Cannon (1995), but at keeping it 
as high as possibly acceptable without crossing the thin line between complexity and chaos 
(Table 1.2) and as suggested in the Cynefin framework (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). 
5 Coupling 
5.1 Decomposing coupling 
Interdependence or coupling is the degree to which organization components – whether they be 
applications, functions, departments or individuals – depend on each other. Loose-coupling 
means that the components can operate independently from one another. Tight-coupling means 
a continuous interchange of information, goods or services. Coupling has many dimensions. 
Thompson (1967), for instance, in his framework of departmental interdependence, classifies in 
three types of interdependence: pooled, sequential and reciprocal interdependence. Another 
dimensional framework is to distinguish between piece, batch and continuous production. 
However, no matter what framework is used to define tight or loose coupling, essential is the 
question about availability of buffers, resources, time, and information that can enable recovery 
from failures. The looser components are coupled, the more possible recovery paths exist. The 
tighter they are coupled, the less an organization disposes of ways to recover (Berniker & Wolf, 
2001). Table 1.3 shows the differences between tight and loose coupling from a technical 
perspective. 
Tight-coupling characteristics Loose-coupling characteristics 
Time-dependent processes which 
cannot wait  
Processing delays are possible 
 
Rigidly ordered processes (as in 
sequence A must follow B) 
Order of sequence can be changed 
Only one path to a successful 
outcome 
Substitution is available 
 
Little slack (requiring precise 
quantities of specific resources for 
successful operation). 
Slack in resources is possible, buffers 
and redundancies available 
Table 1.3 - Tightly vs. loosely-coupled processes (Perrow, 1999, p. 92-93) 
From the above one might conclude that tight-coupling is not a choice as it is the consequence 
of requirements of the production or service delivery context. This may be true in part, but it is 
also true that poorly run, financially less successful organizations will have fewer resources 
available for e.g. preventative maintenance, replacement of aging equipment or modernization 
and less slack operating resources (Berniker & Wolf, 2001). Besides, as Wolf (2001) notes, such 
organizations may be forced to operate with tighter coupling as a result of cost cutting 
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measures, meaning that tight-coupling may be a managerial decision based upon budgetary 
stress or profit targets. 
We do not suggest a categorical approach to loose coupling, independent of the interactive 
complexity of an organization’s context. Stronger even, we acknowledge that an exclusive focus 
on reducing tight-coupling (e.g. by increasing redundancy) may lead to normal accidents if this is 
done in a setting that merely addresses single loop learning (Bain, 1999). 
5.2 Measuring coupling 
One way of measuring coupling is by looking at the resources that are available to the whole or 
parts of an organization. Berniker and Wolf (2001), for instance, use Return On Assets (ROA) as a 
measure of resource availability. They formulate an interesting remark concerning the relation 
between tight coupling and slack when they see tight coupling as a management decision and 
not as something that emerges independent of free will. “…as Perrow argues, poorly run 
organizations will have more discrete errors that are available for unexpected interactions that 
can defeat safety systems and thus will be more prone to ‘system accidents’ as he refers to 
normal accidents. Less financially successful organizations have fewer resources available for 
operational exigencies such as preventative maintenance, replacement of aging equipment or 
modernization and less slack operating resources. Poor financial reliability can also trigger risky 
actions including the use of low-bid outside contractors. But secondly, and Perrow does not note 
this, poorly run or financially starved organizations may be forced to operate with tighter 
coupling as a result of cost cutting measures. Tight coupling may not be just a requirement of the 
manufacturing process, but may be a managerial decision based upon budgetary stress or profit 
targets” (Berniker & Wolf, 2001, p. 22). 
5.3 Loose Coupling Theory (LCT) 
The basis and trigger for this section is an article by Karl Weick (Weick, 2004), in which he links 
Loose Coupling Theory (LCT) to high reliability theory (HRT) over normal accidents theory (NAT). 
For this he takes Snook’s (2002) friendly fire analysis as a starting point. Weick synthesizes this 
analysis as “reliability [that] had been achieved through a combination of differentiation, 
specialization, training, culture, and redundancy. These efforts loosened system coupling and 
made tasks more linear. But these very same moves toward higher reliability heightened 
vulnerability to misidentification when units were rejoined under conditions of tight coupling and 
interactive complexity” (Weick, 2004, p. 30). Since NAT is a theory on the causation of a specific 
type of accidents, it is hard to assess directly the impact of complexity and tight-coupling on 
overall reliability. Since HRT discerns strategies enhancing overall reliability, it is difficult to 
evaluate directly the proneness of these strategies to specific, normal accidents. Therefore, the 
effects of one theory's independent variables on the other theory's dependent variable will be 
assessed indirectly. The questions asked become: Which effects do complexity and tight-
coupling have on the effectiveness of reliability-enhancing strategies discerned by HRT and, 
hence, on overall reliability? How do HROs' reliability-promoting strategies impinge on 
complexity and tight- coupling and, hence, on normal-accident proneness (Rijpma, 1997b, p. 
16)?  
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5.3.1 In search of reliability 
As we have put forward in the preface to this dissertation, we do not aim at focusing on the 
bricks. It is the mortar that interests us most. The things that become visible by relying on an 
alternated combination of observation and reasoning. It boils down to searching for a story-line, 
based on what we see, hear or read and what our mind does with these components. It is this 
story-line that then can be checked against the observation and (other) theories in order to 
falsify or validate the hypotheses that go with the story. 
We are certainly not the first to take this approach. Our source of inspiration is Scott Snook who 
with his Friendly Fire (2002) has shown us his journey in search of a story line that had the 
potential to explain what happened in such a way that it could be abstracted from too specific a 
context and transposed to a generic framework. Something in which he succeeded magnificently 
by continuously, and over and over again looking at the same thing, but always from different 
perspectives: individual, team, organizational; technological, human factor, procedures; 
organization design; process, product; time, place; and finally complexity and coupling. With the 
development of his Practical Drift, Snook found his story-line. It took a tour-de-force, but he did 
it (Weick, 2001a).  
The story of reliability is complex. Reliability is a ‘dynamic non-event’ (Weick, 1995), because 
“organizations have to continuously manage and adapt to a changing and uncertain 
environment, while producing a stable outcome, the avoidance of accidents” (Intosh-Murray & 
Choo, 2002, p. 6). The tools and rigor that will have to be applied will be more comprehensive. A 
mere reduction will not suffice. Neither will it help much only to take a different perspective in 
the style of Snook. More is needed here. Our framework has to be wide and rich enough to allow 
for insights to emerge by means of the alternation of observation-ratio combinations. On the 
other hand, it has to be clear and acquainted enough to allow for the emergence to take place 
and to make the conclusions interpretable. We rely on LCT to accomplish this task. 
5.3.2 Relevance 
Like Orton and Weick (1990) have pointed out via their literature review, Loose Coupling Theory 
(LCT) incorporates a multidimensional perspective to the organizing process. “Organizational 
participants are linked simultaneously by bureaucratic and cultural ties, by functional and 
resource interdependencies, by vertical and horizontal linkages, etc.” (Beekun & Glick, 2001a, p. 
229). Numerous possible combinations of coupling emerge which makes it – both from an 
academic and practitioner’s perspective – an appealing phenomenon, but which at the same 
time holds a latent danger when researched or applied wrongly. “Unless prescriptive statements 
identify precisely which dimensions should be loose or tight, managers may implement coupling 
inappropriately” (Beekun & Glick, 2001a, p. 229). Bottom-line is to make a scan of the 
organization through the lens of coupling to gain a deeper understanding of it. We state that LCT 
is the ideal scalpel for organizational dissection, before which all other instruments pale. 
Therefore, we rely on the literature on loose coupling as an analytical tool to help us understand 
the dialectical discussion that has surrounded organizational reliability. The concept of loose 
coupling allows us to move in a more subtle and judicious direction toward understanding what 
reliability means. As such, we use the loose coupling perspective not only as an organization 
model to understand the degree to which organizational elements are linked, but as a cognitive 
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model to understand how Incident Management workers interpret, label, enact, or otherwise 
make sense what occurs in their environments.  
5.3.3 Identification 
The thinking in terms of tight and loose coupling originated from Robert Glassman (1973) who 
applied it in the context of biological systems. Soon it became clear that the concepts could 
prove very useful in other domains as well (Longstaff, 2003, p. 30-31) since coupling in essence is 
about organizing.  
Coupling 
Coupling is a tough concept. It is used with eagerness by many organization theory scholars. 
However, there is no univocal interpretation of tight-coupling (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 203). A 
turning point in the development of Loose Coupling as a theory is the 1990 Orton and Weick 
article in which the authors examined approximately 300 studies that invoke the concept of 
loose coupling (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 204). They divided the findings of their desk survey into 
five different categories which they called ‘voices’: (1) causation, (2) typology, (3) effects, (4) 
compensations and (5) organizational outcomes (Figure 1.7). They have linked them in a 
“preliminary theory of the loosely coupled system” (p. 204), a theory they have relied on to 
discuss some appealing organizational issues. We do not build on all aspects of LCT equally, but 
limit ourselves to those aspects that are most promising when applied to the context of 
management paradigms. 
Loose Coupling 
In fact, the phrase ‘loose coupling’ is a challenge because loose and coupled are opposites. But 
the dynamics that emerge from the duality between the two components (loose and coupling) 
make it in an interesting concept that is often more useful to deal with complex reality than the 
straight-forward notion of ‘tight coupling’. Loose coupling implies some kind of mixture of 
independent interdependence and dependent independence. Things are coupled but loosely, 
things are loose but yet coupled in a way. In this respect loose coupling is not the other end of 
the spectrum of tight coupling (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 205). The notions of distinctiveness and 
responsiveness are used to learn about the way systems are coupled. Furthermore it is 
important to notice that asserting that a system is loosely coupled is to predicate specific 
properties and a specific history to the system, rather than an absence of properties (Orton & 
Weick, 1990, p. 219). “Coupled events are responsive, but each event also preserves its own 
identity and some evidence of its physical or logical separateness” (Weick, 1976, p. 3). This 
happens suddenly, occasionally, negligibly, indirectly and eventually. (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 
203) Longstaff (2003, p. 31) points out: “A system could be tightly coupled if its components 
share many variables or the link between the variables is very strong. Engineered systems with 
automatic controls are said to be tightly coupled (if A happens then B is the automatic and 
immediate response)”. Weick continues (Weick, 1976, p. 3): “It might seem that the word 
coupling is synonymous with words like connection, link, or interdependence, yet each of these 
latter terms misses a crucial nuance. *…+ Loose coupling also carries connotations of 
impermanence, dissolvability, and tacitness all of which are potentially crucial properties of the 
‘glue’ that holds organizations together. Another way of looking at the coupling of systems or 
organizations is to study the behavior of their components. “Tightly coupled organizations are 
those where any change in one component (individuals or subsystems) of the system will 
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engender an immediate response from the other component(s)” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 31). Orton 
and Weick point out that several forms – they call this the voice of typology – of coupling exist: 
among individuals, subunits, organizations, between organizations, hierarchical levels, 
organizations and environments, among ideas, between activities and between intentions and 
actions (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 208). 
Dialectical approach 
Crucial in our discussion about coupling is the insight that ‘not tightly coupled’ is not the same as 
‘loosely coupled’. To assert that a system is loosely coupled is to predicate specific properties 
and a specific history to the system, rather than an absence of properties (Orton & Weick, 1990, 
p. 219). This dialectical perspective on loose coupling opposes against a unidimensional 
approach (e.g. by Perrow). By acknowledging the dynamics of the different views that can be 
developed between the layers of loose coupling (Orton & Weick, 1990) the palette the 
researcher has at his disposal for his investigation of organizational reliability has become much 
richer than under a one-dimensional framework. In the words of Orton and Weick (1990, p. 204-
205): “[t]he resulting image is a system that is simultaneously open and closed, indeterminate 
and rational, spontaneous and deliberate” (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 204-205). 
This dialectical perspective on loose coupling we have described stems with a Hegelian 
perspective on Organizations. The dialectical perspective on loose coupling opposes against a 
unidimensional approach (e.g. by Perrow, 1984). By acknowledging the dynamics of the different 
views that can be developed between the layers of loose coupling (Orton & Weick, 1990), the 
palette the researcher has at his disposal for his investigation of organizational reliability has 
become much richer than under a unidimensional framework. In line with what we have said on 
the philosophical stand that is needed in management, the possibility of a dialectical 
interpretation of coupling offers a powerful tool for organization analysis and design. 
Reality is not unidimensional, it is even deceiving because easy answers are always available for 
he/she who is looking for them. Often there is little to win by going to the bone of the causation 
of the accident, there are more forces present that foster the easy solution in terms of people to 
blame, technology that did not work, procedures that were wrong etc. The X causes Y direct 
effect is still the (social) science ideal (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 218). 
What loose coupling is not 
Organizations that have thought about (be it implicitly of explicitly) the way their processes are 
(loosely) coupled are interesting. One should not make the mistake to describe loose coupling as 
the absence of a management effort and vision to be ‘on top of things’. The absence of features 
of tight coupling does not boil down to being loosely coupled. The problem however is, that 
“[W]hen researchers define organizations as monolithic corporate actors, they overemphasize 
order and underemphasize elements; when researchers define organizations as mere aggregates 
of individuals, they overemphasize elements and underemphasize order. If researchers begin with 
richer definitions of organization, they will arrive at more accurate findings and conclusions” 
(Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 216 & 218). 
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Relevance 
The concept of loose coupling is a powerful yet underestimated one. Like Orton & Weick (1990, 
p. 203) write: “Loose coupling, however, is a metaphor that has a rare combination of face 
validity, metaphorical salience, and cutting-edge mysticism, all of which encourage researchers 
to adopt the concept but do not help them to examine its underlying structure, themes, and 
implications”. This combination is rare and is an interesting approach to systems thinking, to 
looking beyond the boundary of the easily observable. The thing is that loose coupling all too 
often is taken for granted, a bit in the same way the notion of complexity is. Seldom is it asked 
what exactly is meant by it but everybody seems to be satisfied with a vague description. A 
comprising definition is lacking and is even not desired. At best a circumscription by means of 
examples and cases is the only description available. 
5.3.4 Managing coupling 
Now that we know what coupling (loose and tight) is, we should ask ourselves once again 
whether loose coupling is worth striving for. One thing is certain: the Coupling concept is in an 
interesting one. Many scholars have tackled it, all from different viewpoints, but nobody seems 
to have dealt with it the way Karl Weick and his co-authors have (Weick, 1976;Orton & Weick, 
1990). Their contribution is important because of their multidimensional study of the idea. They 
seem to have taken coupling from the concept level to the construct level by pointing out what 
causes coupling, what typifies it, what its effects are, how it compensates and what can be 
expected as results. 
Weick (1976) argued that loosely coupled systems could more accurately register their 
environments through requisite variety. Registering improves when elements become more 
numerous and the constraints among them weaken (Orton & Weick, 1990). 
Anyway, it seems that the benefits of loose coupling cause some drawbacks to emerge as well. 
These drawbacks are often found in form of a lack of traditional control mechanisms. 
“As suggested earlier, it may not be the existence or nonexistence of loose coupling that is a 
crucial coupling that is a crucial determinant of organizational functioning over time but rather 
the patterning of loose and tight couplings” (Weick, 1976, p. 12). 
 




Figure 1.7 - Loose Coupling Theory (Adapted from Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 217) 
 
The question remains how this lens and toolkit from LCT can contribute to this dynamics. The 
answer is double. First, its approach goes to the essence of what organizations are: relating 
‘things’, be it people, concepts, facilities, processes, etc.). Second, the phrase loose coupling has 
a paradoxical nature since it implies a tension between determinacy (coupling) and 
indeterminacy (looseness) (Beekun & Glick, 2001b, p. 228) And it is this tension, this suggestion 
of a middle ground between the centrifugal tendencies of entrepreneurial creativity and the 
inertial tendencies of formal administrative systems (Lubatkin, Florin, & Lane, 2001, p. 1370), 
that keeps the balance between an innate tendency to organize things in a tightly coupled 
(closed, rational, deliberate) way (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 1995) on the one hand, and an on 
the field ‘practical drifting’ towards loose coupling. 
Therefore we fully agree with the following assertion from Weick and Orton (1990, p. 218): 
“Loose coupling may be able to do for the study of organizational structure what bounded 
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made by humans with limited interest, time and energy, Simon required studies of decision 
making to move into more subtle, more detailed, and more enigmatic directions. The concept of 
loose coupling, with its recognition of numerous structural dimensions, its emphasis on 
simultaneous coupling and decoupling, and its portrayal of structures as malleable through 
managerial intervention, similarly forces researchers to move more deeply into the human 
workings which underlie organizational structure. In the same way that bounded rationality has 
led researchers to study the processes of decision making, rather than merely the outcomes, 
loose coupling may lead researchers to study structure as something that organizations do, 
rather than merely as something they have”. It is for this reason that we intend to rely heavily on 
LCT for the discussion of our findings. 
6 Research Questions 
Our dissertation builds on the research on High Reliability Organizations (HROs) to understand 
and manage reliability and risk. For that reason, we transpose lessons learnt in the typical high 
hazard domains of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to the more mainstream, though still risky, 
domain of Information Technology (IT) in the field of Banking. We do so in the context of the 
operational risk management efforts in view of the incident management process20 of a large 
Western-European NPP on the one hand, and an important European financial institution, on 
the other hand. For clarity, we wish to stress that we leave the technology and its tight-coupling 
and interactive complexity, like described (for instance) by Thompson (1967) and Perrow (1999) 
out of the scope of our research. We focus solely on the handling of the incidents – not on the 
incidents themselves.  
6.1 Are the organizations HROs? 
Research on reliability is typical of high-hazard manufacturing settings, especially the ones that 
heavily build on complex technologies like civil and military aviation and nuclear infrastructure, 
oil refinery or transport over sea. The primary focus here is safety in the strictest sense: 
safeguarding staff and infrastructure from calamity. As is shown in Chapter 2, these 
organizations over the years have gained considerable expertise and can take pride in an 
impressive track-record. Creed et al. distinguish HROs from what they call TEOs – Trial and error 
organizations (Creed, Stout, & Roberts, 1993, p. 70). These are organizations that have the 
luxury of learning through trial and error whereas in HROs the stakes are too high and any 
mistake immediately is punished by catastrophe. Such catastrophe can be financial (severe loss, 
even Bankruptcy), human (casualties) or a combination of both. This distinction is easily made in 
theory, but much harder in practice. A first reason is that many organizations that cannot be 
labeled HRO (because they lack the physicality that underlies this organization type) can be 
labeled with the adjacent notion of High Reliability Seeking Organizations (HRSOs) (Vogus & 
Welbourne, 2003a). Ericksen and Dyer (2005) label any organization that is confronted with 
these tight coupling and interactive complexity as reliability-seeking organizations, while Vogus 
and Welbourne (2003a) seem to reserve this term for these organizations on the condition that 
they are not confronted with the physicality of technical infrastructure (and endangering life). 
However, because of the relative obscurity of HRSO as a term, we continue to use the more 
familiar HRO nominator. A second reason is that HROs do make errors, smaller ones mostly, but 
at times also not so small ones. What is interesting however is the way these errors are dealt 
with. A first particularity in this respect is that the organization takes learning from errors (and 
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near-errors) seriously. In our Learning Organization era, many an organization posits it learns 
from errors, but in the business-as-usual mentality, this is merely a slogan. A second trait of 
HROs, and this is an even bigger discriminator from TEOs, is that errors do not disable them. 
Our research aims at linking high reliability literature from physical high-risk settings to more 
mainstream economical high-risk settings (in our case a financial institution).  
Therefore the issue whether the organizations we study bear the HRO hallmarks is relevant. In 
this respect, the first question our research needs to answer is: 
 Are the organizations we study HROs? [RQ1] 
This question applies particularly to the Bank as mainstream and non-archetypical HRO, but does 
not take for granted the HRO compliance of the NPP and will look for empirical underpinning of 
this proposition. To answer the question whether the organizations we study are HROs, we split 
it into three sub-questions.  
- Are the HRO properties as described in literature observable in both organizations? [RQ1-1] 
- Are the same constructs observable in both organizations? [RQ1-2] 
- Has the NPP (as an archetypical HRO) the highest values on HRO properties? [RQ1-3] 
These questions may seem obvious but we dare to doubt this. 
6.2 What constitutes high reliability? 
A second question that is relevant in the field of reliability studies and that our research 
addresses is what constitutes high reliability? What makes one team more reliable, more 
performant than another team? Which contextual and/or structural dimensions contribute to 
high reliability? In other words: is there something like an ideal ‘reliability cocktail’? In addition, 
how do these dimensions (or constructs) interrelate? Can a non-archetypical HRO and 
archetypical HRO learn from each other? With this second research question, we analyze the 
interrelationships that exist between the different determinants and wish to come to an 
integrating framework that has the potential of contributing to the explanation of reliability. 
The second research question hence becomes: 
 What constitutes high reliability? [RQ2] 
To answer this second research question, we split it up into three sub-questions. 
- Do the HRO and SeMa constructs positively influence process reliability? [RQ2-1] 
- Is there a difference in the reliability cocktail of a Bank and a NPP? [RQ2-2-2] 
- Is there a difference in the reliability cocktail of one team, compared to another? [RQ2-3] 
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7 Structure of this Dissertation 
Following this introductory chapter – and with our research questions in mind – we next present 
a review of literature on HRT and adjacent theories (Chapter 2). After that, the methodology 
framework underlying our research is depicted (Chapter 3), in order to explain why and how we 
have proceeded to the reconceptualization of what constitutes high reliability organizing 
(Chapter 4). The result thereof is a conceptual model, with its underlying propositions and 
hypotheses (Chapter 5). Subsequently, this conceputalized model is empirically tested and 
analyzed (Chapter 6) and its results discussed (Chapter 7). A final chapter concludes on and 
answers the research questions raised and points out this study’s contributions and limitations 
(Chapter 8). 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
 




This chapter builds the theoretical framework that is necessary to examine and understand 
organizational reliability. The theme this framework is built around is High Reliability Theory (HRT), 
but its study is enhanced with constructs that put it in a wider perspective, the perspective of 
organizing itself. 
Since Fayol (1916) we know that management – i.e. management’s functions – is about planning 
(prévoir), organizing (organizer), leading (commander), coordinating (coordiner) and controlling 
(controller). Chester Barnard (1938) – later followed by Peter Drucker (1974) – added to this that 
management is about finding a balance between efficiency (doing the things right) and effectiveness 
(doing the right thing). Together, these ideas are at the core of organization theory. “They [i.e. 
management functions] are the basic aspects of management that have a high degree of universality 
among different enterprises and different cultures. By using the functions of managers as a first step, 
a logical and useful start can be made in setting up pigeonholes for classifying management 
knowledge”(Koontz, 1980, p. 183). Later on, System theorists (See De Leeuw, 1982 for an 
introduction) have added to these ‘pigeonholes’ a systems view, which encompasses a holistic 
approach to organizing and organization and which reserves a special place for the management of 
learning and knowledge. 
Despite of the high face-validity of this classification, we feel the essence of management is not 
captured by these categorizations. Although these activities certainly are what one thinks of when 
talking about what a manager does, they are not at the heart of it. What drives leading, controlling, 
planning, coordination, efficiency, effectiveness, learning and knowledge is a necessity to confront 
the unknown. All the aforementioned activities are determined by it. We state that organizing is 
looking for ways to enter uncharted territory. Man has developed tools to help him with this task: 
rules and regulations, reporting, planning, meetings, etc. (Daft & Lengel, 1986).  
Unfortunately, there is no ideal-type description of organization like the bureaucracy formulation by 
Weber (1968). So one has to help oneself by means of approximations: “Formal organizations are 
three things at once: contexts within which individual action takes place; sets of rules in the form of 
propositional statements; and historical communities” (Tsoukas, 2000). This chapter wishes to go a 
little beyond these approximations, applies insights, concepts, and constructs from a wide range of 
disciplines to the study of organizational reliability. 
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If one looks back at cases of organizational unreliability, one always has the idea the mishap could 
have been prevented had this or that been done or omitted. In addition, often this investigation 
finds the same cause: human error. It has been argued that 80% of all accidents can be attributed to 
a human mistake, in one way or another (Reason, 1997). The question arises however, whether this 
is really the case. Is it not so that error investigations stop when they reach the black box they call 
the human mind? The assumption taken in this study is that it are not so much the humans that are 
in error, but the organizations and the procedures that shape them. So whenever the root-cause 
analysis ascertains it has found what has gone wrong, it is always worthwhile to keep in mind that 
other and more hidden elements are involved. It is precisely the objective of this literature review to 
‘unhide’ these hidden elements. They are studied throughout this chapter; we name them, organize 
them around a taxonomy and connect them to each other or to related or non-related elements 
(Pearson & Clair, 1998).  
To this end, we focus on High Reliability Theory (HRT)21, a theory that seems to be really well suited 
for dealing with the complexity inherent to reliability. We do so by juxtaposing it against Normal 
Accident Theory (NAT), since both bodies of research share the same basic assumptions regarding 
the degree of coupling and interactive complexity. Ever since the eighties, these two sets of theories 
have dominated the discussion on organizational reliability. On the surface, both theories can be 
characterized as a pessimistic ‘accidents must happen’ and an optimistic ‘accidents can be avoided’ 
theory respectively. Remarkably, the origin of both NAT and HRT lies in one and the same 
publication from 1982, a book on the human aspects of the nuclear meltdown at the 1979 Three 
Mile Island power plant (Accident at Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions1982). Both Charles 
Perrow, whose work later culminated in his influential ‘Normal Accidents’ (Perrow, 1999, first edition 
from 1984) and Todd La Porte, founder of the research group at Berkeley which has since conducted 
research on highly reliable organizational reliability, contributed a chapter. Both authors laid the 
foundations for two major ways of thinking about accidents and reliability which, subsequently, 
were played off against one another (Rijpma, 1997a, p. 15).  
In the remainder of this chapter, we argue that this juxtaposition is not completely appropriate and 
that there are better ways of studying the reliability phenomenon. Indeed, by contrasting HRT 
against NAT, HRT’s potential as well as its shortcomings, become apparent. In that respect, the 
notions of (interactive) complexity and (tight) coupling are of particular importance since they play a 
prominent role in HRT as well as in NAT. For this purpose, first both theories are studied in more 
detail in the two subsequent sections (Sections 2 and 3), after which a synthesis emerges in Section 
4. Next, section 5 introduces SenseMaking as an additional set of constructs that is considered useful 
for the explanation of organizational reliability. Because of the vocation of this dissertation, we add 
to this the study of the role of the fit between the Information Systems (IS) and the Incident 
Management process they are meant to support. This study is the subject of the last section in this 
literature review (Section 6). 
2 Normal Accidents Theory (NAT) 
Society as a whole in general and separate organizations or systems in particular, face a paradox. On 
the one hand, they become more and more powerful and on the other hand, they become more 
vulnerable to threats than ever before. This is the basic premise underlying the theorizing on 
organizational reliability initiated by Charles Perrow in his seminal ‘Normal Accidents’ publication 
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(1999, first edition 1984) and that has become known from then on as Normal Accidents Theory 
(NAT). Even though Perrow is NAT’s founding father, the theory has been given a first (thorough) 
empirical underpinning and brought to maturity by Scott Sagan (1993). 
NAT posits that accidents are a normal consequence of a system’s interactive complexity and tight 
coupling (See: Chapter 1 Introduction). This combination results in yet another irreconcilable 
structural paradox: centralization, the method of dealing with the tight coupling, must be combined 
with delegation (i.e. decentralization), the approach of dealing with complexity (Bierly III & Spencer, 
1995, p. 639). The impossibility of a simultaneous centralization and decentralization means that 
systems that are tightly coupled and are interactively complex are bound to fail. Therefore, from a 
NAT perspective, the only organizations/systems being inherently reliable are either linearly loosely 
coupled, linearly tightly coupled or loosely coupled complex (Respectively represented in quadrants 
1, 3 and 4 from Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 - Interaction/Coupling Chart (Perrow, 1999, p. 327) 
Both determinants are communicating vessels, though not necessarily balancing. When trying to 
remediate vulnerability by reducing the tightness of the coupling, very often complexity increases 
because the development and integration of effective supervising systems (Karvalics, 2002). In this 
way, the smallest error or disorder can threaten the functioning of the entire system. Because of 
their central role in the thinking about reliability, this subsection deals with these two determinants 
of (un)reliability: (1) interactive complexity and (2) coupling, but we do so in a less univocal way than 
suggested above. We leave room for nuance by not only warning for the danger of the complexity 
and tight coupling, but equally by drawing the attention to their positive hallmarks. The thesis we 
put forward is that an organization should not aim at the reduction of complexity and tight coupling, 
but at managing them. In this respect, we first elaborate on the notion of interactive complexity 
(2.1). We decompose it and formulate possible strategies for its management. We conclude with an 
address to NAT’s relevance for the study of reliability (2.2). 
2.1 Interactive complexity 
Complex systems have intricate interdependencies among their various parts and many variables 
operating at the same time22 (Longstaff, 2003, p. 15). They exhibit cause and effect that are distinct 
in time and show emergent behavior. They are typically nonlinear, with surprising compounding 
effects as a result.23  Because of their non-linear character, “adding an element that can be 
duplicated to the system may cause a shift in the total system that is much greater than the amount 
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layers and more than a few variables the complexity starts to go up” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 23-24). The 
measure of interactive complexity is the number of ways in which components of the system can 
interact, which in its turn depends on the number of variables in the system, the number of 
relationships between the variables and the number of feedback loops through which the variables 
interact (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006, p. 215). Moreover, it is argued that a complex system exhibits 
complex interactions when it has unfamiliar, unplanned, or unexpected sequences, which are not 
visible or not immediately comprehensible. According to Perrow (1999), systems are either 
‘complex’ or ‘linear’. Table 2.1 shows the characteristics of both typologies. Although Perrow defines 
complexity by illustration rather than by rigorous definition, he illustrates his concept of interactive 
complexity with examples (Berniker & Wolf, 2001, p. 17-18). While not rigorous, the concept of 
complexity clearly conveys the idea that it is concerned with interactivity and not simply the number 
of parts, components or subsystems present (Thompson, 1967). 
Complex Linear 
Component proximity Spatial segregation (of components and 
subsystems) 
Common-mode connections Dedicated connections 
Interconnected subsystems Segregated subsystems 
Limited substitutions Easy substitutions 
Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops Few feedback loops 
Multiple and interacting controls Single purpose regulating controls 
Indirect or inferential sources of information Direct information 
Limited understanding of the processes 
involved 
Extensive understanding of process 
technology. 
Table 2.1 - Complex vs. linear systems (Perrow, 1999, p. 85-86;Berniker & Wolf, 2001) 
Whereas linear systems are far more easy to manage, complex systems confront us with the 
problem of ‘managing the unexpected’ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) due to the unpredictable nature of 
their interactions. These interactions are called ‘baffling’ (Perrow, 1999) because they surprise 
organization members; they are not intended to exist, but yet do exist. “These [baffling interactions] 
represent interactions that were not in our original design of the world and interactions that we, as 
operators could not anticipate or guard against. What distinguishes these interactions is that they 
were not designed into the system by anybody; no one intended them to be linked. They baffle us 
because we acted in term of our own designs of a world that we expected to exist-but the world was 
different” (Perrow, 1999)24. As such, these interactions are very difficult to anticipate.  
Conceptually, complexity is the condition of a system, situation, or organization that is integrated 
with some degree of order but has too many elements and relationships to understand in simple 
analytic or logical ways. Examples are a team of people, a city, or an ant colony. Internal complexity, 
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from an organization’s viewpoint, is its ability to exhibit or contain a large number  of states or 
behaviors (Bennet & Bennet, 2004, p. 290). It is measured by its variety, the number of possible 
states that the system can have. An organization of high variety has a large number of options and 
choices of actions it can take to adjust itself internally or when responding to or influencing its 
environment. If its variety becomes too high, the organization may become chaotic, with no 
coherence of thought or action (Bennet & Bennet, 2004, p. 290). 
In the Perrowian (technical) view, interdependence or coupling is the degree to which organization 
components – whether they are applications, functions, departments or individuals – depend on 
each other. Loose coupling means that the components can operate independently from one 
another. Tight coupling means a continuous interchange of information, goods or services. The 
degree of coupling can be inherent to the organization’s nature, but it can also be the result of 
management decisions. Such is the case where organizations are forced to operate with tighter 
coupling as a result of cost cutting measures, meaning that tight-coupling may be a managerial 
decision based upon budgetary stress or profit targets. 
2.2 Relevance 
The relevance of Perrow’s work has often been downplayed, because most accidents are not caused 
by the combination of complex interactions and tight coupling. It has even been suggested that 
some accidents are not caused by tight coupling but by loose coupling (Weick, 2001b). But 
interactive complexity and tight coupling are strong concepts, independent of each other (Rijpma, 
2003, p. 37). This is an explanation why NAT has had (and still has) a tremendous influence on 
organizational reliability studies. With over 2800 citations (scholar.google.com) it definitely is an all-
time citation favorite. We believe its popularity can be explained by (amongst others) its broad 
applicability, a high face validity, its theory foundation and the spirit of the times.  
The dimensions of coupling and complexity, along which the risk bearing of an industry, organization 
or technology is determined, are universally applicable over sectors, cultures, situations. The degree 
of interactive complexity and coupling, although hard to objectively measure, is consciously and 
unconsciously omnipresent, be it in interpersonal relations or conceptual notions. In theory, it is 
feasible to determine whether a situation is tightly or loosely coupled, or that the interactions 
between system components are linear or complex. 
The combination of the dimensions of interactive complexity and degree of coupling has great 
potential of explaining (un)reliability. Separately, these dimensions only in part indicate why some 
type of organization is more prone to accident. Complex organizations are more than linear 
organizations, and tightly coupled organizations are more complex than loosely coupled 
organizations. However, some complex organizations seem to be indifferent to calamity whereas 
others are not. The same goes for some tightly coupled organizations. Only those organizations in 
the complex-tightly coupled quadrant are the most danger-prone.  
Another aspect of NAT that is important for the development of the discipline as a whole is that 
Perrow used Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) provocative `garbage can’ theory to understand the 
safety risks in highly hazardous systems (Smart et al., 2003, p. 737). More in particular he drew on 
one of its two components, namely the emergence of unclear technology (the other two being 
problematic preferences and fluid participation). The high appeal of his Normal Accidents Theory is 
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to a large extent due to the popularizing of the Garbage Can metaphor in the 1970s and its 
challenging the rational view of organizations as depicted by the classical and early modernist 
tradition in organization theory (Smart et al., 2003, p. 737). Thus, indirectly, the tremendous appeal 
and face validity of Garbage Can theorizing has laid the foundation for work like ours. 
We live in an era where complexity and interconnectedness are part of our daily lives and get a lot of 
attention. It is commonly assumed that the evolution of both dimensions proposed by NAT are 
positively inclined and fast-paced. The NAT message of being risk-averse where nuclear technology, 
nuclear weapons and other potentially dangerous industries are concerned, finds a fertile soil in the 
spirit of our times. Therefore, the situations it addresses are easily recognized and what the theory 
proposes is eagerly acknowledged. 
Despite their appeal, these characteristics in themselves are not sufficient as a validation of NAT’s 
hypotheses. A rigorous gathering of data is needed. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence 
that can be found to validate NAT beyond what we have described above. This becomes clear when 
having a closer look at what a NAT authority like Scott Sagan (2004, p. 16) puts forward as part of the 
theory’s rationale when referring to scholars having applied or further developed the ideas to a 
much wider range of organizational, personal, and national activities. These include (to give just a 
partial list), hospital emergency room procedures (Paté-Cornell, Lakats, Murphy, & Gaba, 1997), the 
origins of the Franco-Prussian War (Nickles, 1999) and U.S. Air Force friendly fire incidents (Snook, 
2002). Apart from the last study, literature only addresses NAT superficially. A more recent thorough 
and successful validation of NAT has been provided by Wolf and Berniker (2008) who tested NAT’s 
application to petroleum refining by linking the occurrence of incidents and accidents to the 
structure of the organization and its technology. 
3 High Reliability Theory (HRT) 
Despite NAT’s prophecy of doom, some organizations seem to cope really well with errors. 
Moreover, they do so over a very long time. Researchers from the University of California, at 
Berkeley (Rochlin, La Porte, & Roberts, 1987), later followed by their colleagues from Michigan State 
University at Ann Arbor (Weick, 1987), started calling this kind of organizations ‘high reliability 
organizations’ (HROs). The collection of their work has become known as High Reliability Theory 
(HRT). High Reliability Theory is a theory25 on how a high degree of reliability can be achieved. An 
organization in which this theory is practiced is called a High Reliability Organization (HRO).26 HROs 
are organizations where the risk of calamity is very high, but that yet are successful in their 
management. HRT disagrees with NAT in its assertion that a simultaneous centralization and 
decentralization is necessary but practically impossible. Research in HROs argues that such is feasible 
because of structural and contextual idiosyncrasies, explored in the following subsections. We start 
by providing a definition of HRT (3.1), a depiction from the perspective of the two main schools of 
thought (3.2) and an overview of research in the HRO field (3.3). 
3.1 Definition 
Despite a considerable amount of publications on HROs, there does not seem to be a generally 
accepted definition of what the phenomenon is, which does not add to their study. We therefore 
have to rely on derivate definitions and descriptions. The best known27, in this respect, is the 
description Karlene Roberts (1990a) gave: “Within the set of hazardous organizations, some 
organizations have operated nearly error free for very long periods of time. These organizations are 
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‘high reliability’ organizations (HROs). To identify these organizations one must ask the question, 
‘How often could this organization have failed with dramatic consequences?’ If the answer to the 
question is many thousands of times the organization is highly reliable. In such organizations, 
reliability rivals productivity as a dominant goal” (Roberts, 1990a, p. 101-102). HRO research under 
the Berkeley HRO Project28 (as the Berkeley team has come to call it) deals with large, complex 
organizations that successfully manage advanced technological activities that meet the three 
following criteria (Rochlin, 1993, p. 15): 
1. The activities are inherently complex, in that tasks are numerous, differentiated, and 
interdependent (Thompson, 1967); 
2. The activities meet certain social demands that require reliability at the highest level of 
service obtainable within present safety requirements, with a desire for an even higher level 
of activity and a penalty (explicit or implicit) if service slackens (La Porte & Consolini, 1991); 
3. The activities contain inherent technological hazards in case of error or failure that are 
manifold, varied, highly consequential, and relatively time-urgent, requiring constant, 
flexible, technology-intrusive management to provide an acceptable level of safety to 
operators, other personnel, and/or the public (Rochlin et al., 1987). 
However useful, these typifications say only what HROs are, without explaining why and how. In 
what follows, we therefore expand this definition by including an answer to the why and how 
question. 
Essential in the above definitions, is that HROs cannot be easily characterized by static descriptors 
(Rochlin, 1993, p. 22-23): “The locus of reliability is in the dynamic of execution and the mobilization 
of organizational resources more than in any snapshot of organizational form”. Some of the best-
known examples are nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers and air traffic control29. Indeed, such 
organizations continuously face risk because the context in which they operate is high hazard. This is 
so because of the nature of their undertaking, the characteristics of their technology or the fear of 
the consequences of an error for their socio-economic environment. Elements of such a system can 
combine in unforeseen ways and when errors occur, they amplify rapidly. In other words: they face 
complexity and tight-coupling in the majority of processes they run (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a). 
3.2 Two schools of thought: Berkeley and Michigan 
In line with the way HRO research traditionally has been organized, this subsection gives a brief 
overview of the way conceptual and theoretical HRO research has developed. We subsequently deal 
with the approach taken by the Berkeley and the Michigan school as the most prominent of these 
descriptions. We start with the way the Berkeley project (New Challenges to Understanding 
Organizations1993) founding fathers (La Porte, Rochlin and Roberts) have described it. Next, we 
elaborate on the description of the school of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, by Karl Weick 
and his colleagues (notably Kathleen Sutcliffe, David Obstfeld and Timothy Vogus). 
In general, and at risk of oversimplifying, one could say that the Michigan school of thought pays 
more attention to the notion of culture (as contextual dimension) and that the Berkeley group favors 
the structural dimensions (e.g. the notion of bureaucracy) (Eisenhardt, 1993, p. 133). In this sense, 
the Michigan school takes independent dimensions (causes)30, the Berkeley school with dependent 
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dimensions (effects from the independent dimensions) as starting point for understanding the 
concept of high reliability.  
3.2.1 The Berkeley HRO School 
The University of California at Berkeley has become an international focal point for the progression 
of high-reliability theory (Smart et al., 2003, p. 736). The roots of this school are in the research of 
Morone and Woodhouse (1986) and Wildavsky (1988). It was on their work that the school’s 
founders – Karlene Roberts, Todd La Porte and Gene Rochlin (and by extension Paul Schulman and 
Paula Consolini) have built to bring HRT to full growth. Their research employs a number of 
methodologies (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989) and bears a number of characteristics that make up the 
originality of its contribution. 
In part thanks to their different background, Todd R. La Porte (political science), Karlene H. Roberts 
(psychology) and Gene I. Rochlin (physics - energy and resources) have made an important 
contribution to the way organizations are studied. What these scholars have in common and what 
differentiated them from their predecessors (and to a certain extent NAT) is the organizational 
perspective to organizational reliability. More particularly the merit lies in the combinatorial power 
of the elements they take into account to explain organizational reliability and in making these 
combinations and their effects explicit. The elements in themselves – the measures listed as 
Berkeley HRO apparatus – are part of well-studied organization theory, for instance from human 
resources management. For example, the Berkeley school relies on constructs like employee 
involvement, job rotation, regular sharing of information, and training, to name just these.31 The 
three organizations studied in the initial phase of the project were the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s Air Traffic Control System; Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s nuclear power plant 
at Diabolo Canyon, California; and the US Navy’s nuclear powered aircraft carriers (Roberts, 1993, p. 
2). Cornerstones in the examination of high reliability in work by Berkeley students are (Pidgeon, 
1997, p. 8): 
1. an occupational danger culture (relating to personal relationships and their relation to self-
protection from harm);  
2. a task/security culture (operations through norms of perfectionism and critique of 
information); and  
3. in times of crisis, typified by a pattern of decentralized decision-making and flexibility of 
response. 
Their work greatly acknowledged the dynamic nature of/resulting from organizational culture and in 
that sense opposes the critique expressed by NAT (Perrow, 1999;Sagan, 1993) that high reliability 
cannot be achieved in organizations that are simultaneously interactively complex and tightly-
coupled. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a full coverage of the Berkeley line of 
thought and to particularly address the constructs employed within the context of the Berkeley 
research group in the early years of HRT. We refer the interested reader to the literature to that 
effect (e.g. La Porte & Rochlin, 1994;La Porte, 1996;La Porte & Consolini, 1991;Roberts, Rousseau, & 
La Porte, 1994;Rochlin et al., 1987). 
3.2.2 The Michigan HRO School 
The Michigan school largely extended on Karl Weick’s notions of SenseMaking (Weick, 1995) which 
are discussed at fuller length below. In its turn, SenseMaking is the emanation of theorizing on 
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Loosely Coupled systems (Weick, 1976;Orton & Weick, 1990), which again finds its origin in the 
Social Psychology of Organizing (Weick, 1979). Michigan students of high reliability organizations 
emphasize “the importance of various people in the organization correctly perceiving the events 
before them and artfully tying them together to produce a ‘big picture’ that includes processes 
through which error is avoided” (Roberts, 2003). Their major contribution is a paper by Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld from 1999 (Weick et al., 1999) that has lead HRO research since because it has 
introduced/made explicit the notions of Mindfulness and Resilience (Weick et al., 1999). Because of 
their high face-validity, these notions have been capable of introducing the reliability theme with 
practitioners, as has become manifest with the publication of Managing the Unexpected (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001). This book has the merit of revitalizing the discipline at the end of the last, and the 
beginning of this century and of offering it a jargon and structural framework. It is our belief that the 
Berkeley group, as founding fathers of the HRO got bypassed by that other group of HRO scholars at 
the Michigan State University because the ingredients offered by the former were not novel enough, 
whereas with their concept of mindfulness and resilience, the latter offered a much more appealing 
body of theory.  
The central theme in the Michigan scholarship on high reliability is that HROs are so reliable because 
they have a certain state of ‘mindfulness’ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 p 42). According to Weick et al. 
(1999), mindfulness is less about decision-making, which is the traditional focus of organizational 
theory and accident prevention, and more about inquiry and interpretation grounded in capabilities 
for action. HROs possess five key qualities to reach their state of mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999). 
These qualities enable HROs to compensate for their inherent tight coupling with attributes that 
loosen their coupling, hence contributing to a balance between efficiency and reliability. Through 
their Preoccupation with Failure, reluctance to accept simplifications, and Sensitivity to Operations, 
HROs are able to anticipate and become aware of dangers. HROs are able to contain dangers when 
they are spotted because they are committed to resilience and deferred to expertise.  
The term Mindfulness was coined by Langer32 (Weick et al., 1999, p. 88) and stands for “[T]he 
combination of ongoing scrutiny of existing expectations, continuous refinement and differentiation 
of expectations based on newer experiences, willingness and capability to invent new expectations 
that make sense of unprecedented events, a more nuanced appreciation of context and ways to deal 
with it, and identification of new dimensions of context that improve foresight and current 
functioning. Mindfulness is a pre-occupation with updating. Mindful people accept the reality of 
ignorance and work hard to smoke it out, knowing that each new answer uncovers a host of new 
questions. Mindfulness is exhibited by high reliability organizations through the following five 
hallmarks of reliability: (1) Preoccupation with Failure, (2) Reluctance to Simplify interpretations, (3) 
Sensitivity to Operations, (4) Commitment to Resilience, and (5) Deference to Expertise”(Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 10 & 42-44). Note, in line with Vogus and Welbourne, that when we refer to 
mindfulness, we are referring to it at the system or organization level (i.e. collective mindfulness) 
contrary to Langer’s work on mindfulness (1989, 1997) which was derived from work on individuals 
(Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a, p. 880), stemming from psychology literature (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006, 
p. 502).  
The three core HRO properties of Mindfulness, namely Preoccupation with Failure, Reluctance to 
Simplify, and Sensitivity to Operations, are dealt with next. 
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Preoccupation with Failure  
Preoccupation with Failure is an important principle that gives HROs a distinctive quality, as this 
means that HROs are preoccupied with something they seldom see. Although HROs are successful in 
avoiding incidents, they do not boast about their superiority. HROs are wary for the common 
failures, caused by restricted search, reduced attention, inertia, risk aversion, and homogeneity. 
They treat even the smallest error as a sign that something could be wrong with the system. HROs 
regard narrow escapes as a kind of failure that reveals danger, and not, as most other organizations 
would do, as evidence of success and their ability to avoid accidents. Members of HROs know that 
they cannot foresee everything: they know that they do not know, and they expect to be surprised. 
That is why members of HROs are constantly worried that they make analytical errors and that these 
errors might be amplified, in combination with limitations to foresight, and lead to accidents 
(Muhren, Van Den Eede, & Van de Walle, 2007). 
Acting from an assumption that the organization knows enough may represent hubris at best and 
bad management at worst (Zack, 1999). Avoidance of hubris is essential in achieving long-term 
reliability, because constant awareness of the possibility of failure is a precondition for avoiding it. 
Or as Weick and Sutcliffe put it: “Arrogance and hubris breed vulnerability” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 
p. 9). On the other hand, a well-established culture of safety and reliability might still result in 
overconfidence and hubris, which is then again the harbinger of calamity. Therefore, HROs put great 
emphasis on a culture that takes even the smallest error serious. In this they strongly differ from 
non-HROs because they give strong responses to weak signals (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 3-4). The 
reason for this is twofold: firstly, avoidance of hubris by forcing organization members to remain 
alert and secondly, seizing every opportunity to learn from error. Such a culture of resilience (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2001) is built on strong norms, all-levels management commitment (Weick, 2001c), 
willingness and the competence to exchange information (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). “If managers 
refuse to examine what happens between heads, they’ll be eternally puzzled by what appears to 
happen inside individual heads” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 13-14). 
A culture of reliability and avoidance of hubris can be obtained in numerous ways. Grabowski and 
Roberts (1997;1999) name some: clear norms in the system about the relationship between failure 
and learning, secret ballots about volatile or sensitive issues, anonymous reporting of near misses in 
safety critical systems, use of brainstorming where the evaluation of ideas is suspended, a penalty 
box where people who commit glaring errors in the system are put for a finite period of time, after 
which they rejoin the action. Weick and Sutcliffe point out that the so-called ‘big picture’33 in HROs is 
less strategic and more situational than is true of most other organizations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, 
p. 13). Culture provides a useful portmanteau concept which bundles up the ‘baggage’ people bring 
to action: the different values, beliefs, norms, frames, and cognitive structures which influence sense 
making, filter information, and mediate the construction of organizational meaning (Intosh-Murray 
& Choo, 2002, p. 239). Despite these apparent advantages, culture poses a double dilemma though. 
A first dilemma, is that on the one hand, a strong culture is better for reliability in times of stability 
but on the other hand, a weaker culture is better suited to deal with change (Denrell, 2003, p. 237). 
The second dilemma is that strong cultures are more difficult to alter than weak cultures. The reason 
might be that success breeds confidence and fantasy (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 329-330). This 
reminds of the ‘boiling frog syndrome’ (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 337) that states that a frog can 
be boiled alive if the water is heated slowly enough. It is said that if a frog is placed in boiling water, 
it will jump out, but if it is placed in cold water that is slowly heated, it will never jump out. This story 
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refers to the phenomenon of ‘creeping normalcy’ which means that if organizations – and in 
particular their management – do not learn to look out for continuous change. 
These are all expressions of hubris. A good example is provided by Dörner (1996) in his monograph 
on the logic of failure where he reports on the Chernobyl disaster: “The Ukrainian reactor operators 
were an experienced team of highly respected experts who had just won an award for keeping their 
reactor on the grid for long periods of uninterrupted service. The great self-confidence of this team 
was doubtless a contributing factor in the accident. They were no longer operating the reactor 
analytically but rather ‘intuitively’. They thought they knew what they were dealing with, and they 
probably also thought themselves beyond the ‘ridiculous’ safety rules devised for tyro reactor 
operators, not for a team of experienced professionals” (Dörner, 1996, p. 33). When a group exerts 
this kind of thinking on the group it conflict is minimized, but at the expense of critically testing, 
analyzing, and evaluating situations. During such groupthink (Janis, 1982b) the organization is 
vulnerable to risk.  
Reluctance to Simplify 
Because HROs believe that the world they face is complex, unstable, unknowable, and 
unpredictable, they try to notice as much as possible. Simplifications produce blind spots, so HROs 
differentiate in order to get a more varied picture of potential consequences and in turn, a richer 
and more varied set of precautions and early warning signals. HROs make fewer assumptions, 
cultivate requisite variety and socialize people to notice more. The law of requisite variety was 
originally proposed by Ashby (1962), and suggests that the larger the variety of actions available to a 
system, the larger the variety of perturbations in its environment it can compensate. HROs stimulate 
frequent job rotation and hire employees with non-typical prior experience. By these means, HROs 
obtain a broader divergence of perspectives, which leads to a broader set of assumptions that 
sensitize it to a greater variety of inputs. Although diverse groups have more information available 
than more homogeneous groups, communication patterns and cognitive limitations often lead to a 
situation where unique information does not get shared (Muhren et al., 2007). 
Sensitivity to Operations 
Because of the often-devastating physical or socio-economical consequences, HROs are forced to 
learn from even the smallest errors they make. During the incubation period of errors, it is important 
to look for inconsistencies – like incidents and accidents – that are the harbinger of a much greater 
risk. Unless the organization has an attitude of detecting these often insignificant events, these 
occurrences will be overlooked or misinterpreted (Grabowski & Roberts, 1997). The consequence is 
that when this ‘preventative opportunity’ (Berniker & Wolf, 2001, p. 10) is not seized, continued 
reliable operations are not assured. Therefore, HROs try to signal errors when they are still tractable 
and can still be isolated by attaining well-developed situational awareness. Situational awareness is 
defined by Endsley (1997) as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space; the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future”. HROs consistently communicate the big picture of what the organization seeks to do, and 
try to get everyone to communicate with each other about how they fit in the big picture (Roberts & 
Bea, 2001a). With a situational awareness and a big picture, people in HROs can make continuous 
adjustments that prevent errors from accumulating and enlarging. Such Sensitivity to Operations is 
achieved through a combination of shared mental representations, collective story building, 
situation assessing with continual updates, knowledge of physical interconnections and parameters 
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of the organization’s systems, and active diagnosis of the limitations of preplanned procedures. 
Organizational awareness is enhanced by the extent to which members of an organization 
collectively become skilful perceivers of the business environment (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004). “For 
an organization to sharpen its collective capacity to perceive is more difficult than for individuals. The 
reason is that organizing is the process of generating recurrent behaviors, namely a process for 
reducing differences among individuals through institutionalized cognitive representations. This is 
what gives organized systems predictability and efficiency; but this is also what gives them rigidity 
and crudeness. Organizing induces abstraction and generalization in social activities for coordinated 
purposeful action to become possible” (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004, p. 6).  
Commitment to Resilience 
Resilience can be best described as: “The process of being mindful of errors that have already 
occurred and correcting them before they worsen or cause more serious harm” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001, p. 67). In this respect, the term is related to accident mitigation. “Organizations committed to 
resilience develop knowledge and skills to cope with and respond to errors, capability for swift 
feedback and swift learning, speed and accuracy in communications, flexible role structures, quick 
size-ups, experiential variety, skills at re-combining existing response repertoires, and comfort with 
improvisation. Such organizations move decision-making rapidly to those with the necessary 
expertise” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 67-68). Resilience is a tendency to return to a former 
equilibrium in the face of temporary perturbation or displacement (Longstaff, 2003, p. 16-17). If a 
complex system exhibits resilience it will bounce back from changes and is more likely to be stable in 
the long term. For this reason, Van Fenema (2005) labels resilience as some extraordinary ‘elasticity’. 
Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003), on the other hand, address it as something ‘ordinary’ as they suggest 
that it emerges from relatively ordinary adaptive processes that promote competence, restore 
efficacy, and encourage growth. They posit that Threat Flexibility is essential in its emergence, 
namely when information and resources are plentifully available and control is not tightened in up-
tempo times. In this their notion of Threat Flexibility is an alternative for threat rigidity (Staw, 
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).  
Resilience is a combination of keeping errors small and improvising workarounds to keep the system 
functioning (Muhren et al., 2007). People in HROs are so committed to resilience, that they see this 
‘firefighting’ as evidence that they are able to contain the unexpected. By contrast, managers in 
business may perceive successful firefighting as evidence that they are distracted and therefore 
unable to do their normal work (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 70). HROs need to have a broad 
repertoire of actions they can roll-out when a danger occurs. HROs support improvisation to be able 
to recombine the actions in their repertoire into novel combinations. As Wildavsky (1988, p. 70) 
describes, “improvement in overall capability, i.e. a generalized capacity to investigate, to learn, and 
to act, without knowing in advance what one will be called to act upon, is a vital protection against 
unexpected hazards”. Informal networks are a common resource for HROs to respond to dangers 
resiliently, because they provide an infrastructure that is needed to handle unanticipated dangers in 
a swiftly manner. When events get outside of normal operational boundaries, knowledgeable people 
organize themselves into ad hoc networks to provide expert problem solving. 
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Deference to Expertise 
What people in HROs have mastered is the ability to alter typical hierarchical patterns of deference 
when the tempo of operations changes and unexpected problems arise. People who have the most 
expertise, regardless of their rank, then make decisions on the front line. In these situations, 
expertise and experience are usually more important than rank, so the decision structure in HROs is 
a hybrid of hierarchy and specialization. Decision-making authority therefore is shifted down to the 
lowest possible levels and clear lines of responsibility need to be called into existence (Ericksen & 
Dyer, 2005, p. 29). This way, the shift to anarchy is a controlled one, and comes from a collective, 
cultural belief that the necessary capabilities lie somewhere in the system and that migrating 
problems will find them (Muhren et al., 2007).  
This argument has been further developed in Bigley and Roberts’ (2001) study of an incident 
command system (ICS). “An ICS is highly formalized, characterized by an extensive storehouse of 
rules, procedures, policies, and instructions. Jobs within the system are specialized and require 
particular training. Although highly bureaucratic, the ICS is also very flexible, because it is able to 
rapidly recombine people, resources, and structures to deal with unexpected situations. For example, 
the ICS is designed to 'oscillate effectively between various preplanned solutions to the more 
predictable aspects of a disaster circumstance and improvised approaches for the unforeseen and 
novel complications that often arise in such situations” (Bigley & Roberts, 2001, p. 1282). 
3.3 HRO Research 
The literature on HROs is on organizations that behave “under very trying conditions” (La Porte & 
Rochlin, 1994, p. 221), thus the data base available to us for analysis, consists of an eclectic mix of 
case studies involving effective action *…+, limited failure *…+, near catastrophes *…+, catastrophic 
failures *…+ and successes that should have been failures *…+ (Weick et al., 1999, p. 83). This eclectic 
mix of publications has two consequences: 
1. The ingredients that compose high reliability are always the same but they tend to be 
represented slightly differently. In what follows, we provide an overview of these 
representations. The reader will notice the overlapping of these characterizations. We have 
not been able to avoid this, since it is inherently part of the eclectic mix of studies in HRO 
literature. 
2. Whereas these publications are an indication of the popularity and broad applicability of 
HRT, one can notice the emergence of what one could call false HROs. The fact that HRT has 
gained interest among managers, leads to the danger that this interest and mainstreaming 
of what it stands for is going to be to its own detriment. It is good Public Relations to be 
labeled ‘HRO’ independent from the fact that one really is HRO or is just paying lip service to 
its principles. The following illustrates what we mean: “The employees said the company was 
preoccupied with safety slogans, such as the recently created ‘Pantex High Reliability 
Organization’, that were masking the stresses in the plant. Senior management is distracted, 
losing sight of the overall picture and circumstances,” the letter said, adding that some 
managers lacked specific experience in handling nuclear weapons” (Vartabedian, 2006). 
 
Recall that in this study we do not wish to research High Reliability Seeking Organizations (HRSO) in 
the way they have been described by Vogus and Welbourne (2003a). HRSOs focus on innovation, 
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adaptability to competition, decrease of response times and the like. Their focus is on efficiency. The 
HROs in our study have the containment of operational risk as their bottom-line.  
For our study of literature on HRO, we have reviewed n=192 publications, ranging from journal 
articles, over conference proceedings, scientific reports to more popular contributions in 
professional magazines over a 20-year period ranging from 1987 to June 2008 (with two outliers 
from 1982 because they are considered the trigger for what would later become HRT and NAT). The 
objective of this overview is not exhaustiveness, but to give a fair idea of the wide range of 
publications in the field of HRO and its evolution over time. 
The spread in publications is shown in Figure 2.2. Note that for reasons of comparison we have 
extrapolated the figure for the first semester of 2008. We notice the modest start of HRO 
scholarship end of the eighties, beginning of the nineties, followed by a short dip (to practically no 
publications) in 1991-1992, to see the publication output expand in 1993. The reason could be that 
the publication of New Challenges (edited by Roberts) and the Limits of Safety (Sagan) has triggered 
this sudden increase. The period following that, although showing a rate higher than prior years, 
witnessed a steady decline in the number of publications. This regression reached a minimum in 
1998. From 1999 onwards, the trend is up. We believe the trigger for this evolution can be found in 
the publication of Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld’s (Weick et al., 1999) seminal paper in that same 
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The most prominent researchers in the HRO field, responsible for one third of the publications in our 
study, are listed in Table 2.2. It can be noticed that the most productive HRO author by far is Karlene 
Roberts, followed by Karl Weick, Gene Rochlin, Todd La Porte and Paul Schulman (joint).  
Author No. Publications Share Cum. % 
Roberts,K. 22 11% 11% 
Weick,K. 8 4% 16% 
La Porte,T. 7 4% 19% 
Rochlin,G. 7 4% 23% 
Schulman,P. 7 4% 27% 
Gaba,D.M. 6 3% 30% 
Roe,E. 6 3% 33% 
Table 2.2 - HRO authors 
We have catalogued the publications in our study along 8 dimensions: (1) the sector they apply to 
(e.g. health care, industry, military); (2) their focus on safety and/or reliability; (3) the organizational 
process (Design & Development, Information Technology, security, Human Resources Management, 
Incident Management); (4) the management activity (Strategic management, Crisis management, 
Project management, Command and Control, Decision making, Planning and Risk management; (5) 
the management paradigm (Knowledge Management, Organizational Learning, Change 
Management, Total Quality Management, Intercultural Management); (6) the research method 
(Qualitative, Quantitative); (7) the explicit common ground with other theoretical frameworks 
(SenseMaking and Normal Accidents Theory); (8) the nature of the publication (research paper, 
conceptual paper, paper on theory building, or a popular paper). 
We can see from Table 2.3 that Health Care is the sector that gets most of the publications. This is a 
phenomenon especially from recent years (Figure 2.3). Nuclear energy, the military, aviation and 
firefighting, being much more traditional HRO sectors, count for much less, although taken together 
these five sectors account for 2/3 of total HRO publications (Table 2.3). It is clear that the interest 
from the Health care sector for the application of HRT is what has helped the theory survive. 
 
Sector No. Publ. % Cumulative % 
Health care 42 26% 26% 
NPP 25 15% 41% 
Military 20 12% 53% 
Aviation 12 7% 61% 
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Fire 8 5% 66% 
Industry 6 4% 69% 
Bank 6 4% 73% 
Space 5 3% 76% 
Marine 5 3% 79% 
Railways 5 3% 82% 
Electricity Grid 4 2% 85% 
IT firm 4 2% 87% 
Education 4 2% 90% 
Manufacturing 3 2% 91% 
Telecommunication 2 1% 93% 
Prison 2 1% 94% 
Humanitarian relief 2 1% 95% 
Off-shore 2 1% 96% 
e-government 1 1% 97% 
Water supply 1 1% 98% 
Science 1 1% 98% 
Architecture 1 1% 99% 
Pastoralism 1 1% 99% 
Drug rehabilitation center 1 1% 100% 
Total: 163 
  Table 2.3 - HRO publications by sector 




Figure 2.3 - Top 5 HRO Publications 
Recent published data on healthcare organizations and high reliability have largely addressed either 
recommendations for improving reliability in individual hospitals’ units that are at high risk of patient 
safety errors, or case studies of HRO principles (Dixon & Shofer, 2006). Again, applied at the clinical 
unit level, such as perinatal units (Frankel, Leonard, & Denham, 2006), operating rooms (Leonard, 
Graham, & Bonacum, 2004), and intensive care units (Pronovost, Berenholtz, Goeschel, Needham, 
Sexton, Thompson, Lubomski, Marsteller, Makary, & Hunt, 2006). The bulk of HRO writings are on 
safety, not on reliability (Table 2.4). 
Safety/Reliability No. Publ. % Cumulative 
Safety 113 70% 70% 
Reliability 49 30% 100% 
Table 2.4 - Safety vs. Reliability 
Business Process No. Publ. % Cumulative 
IT 13 50% 50% 
Design & Development 4 15% 65% 
Security 3 12% 77% 
HRM 3 12% 88% 
Incident Management 3 12% 100% 
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From Table 2.5 can be derived that, as far as the business processes are concerned, publications 
seem to attach a great deal of attention to IT (50%). More remarkable is that only for 26 publications 
we have been capable of determining applicability to one or other business process. This definitely is 
a shortcoming of this body of literature as a whole. As is shown in Table 2.6, the majority of HRO 
literature deals with management activities that are characterized by time-criticality: decision 
making, risk management, crisis management and command and control issues constitute 85% of 
publications. 
Management Activity No. Publ. % Cumulative 
Decision making 8 30% 30% 
Risk 7 26% 56% 
Crisis management 5 19% 74% 
Command and Control 3 11% 85% 
Project management 2 7% 93% 
Planning 1 4% 96% 
Strategic management 1 4% 100% 
Table 2.6 - Management Activities addressd by HRO literature 
From Table 2.7 can be derived that most HRT research in our survey of literature applies qualitative 
research techniques. 
Research method No. Publ. % Cumulative 
Qualitative 45 63% 63% 
Quantitative 27 38% 100% 
Table 2.7 - Research methods addressed by HRO literature 
4 Contrasting NAT and HRT 
HROs operate in a setting of complexity and tight coupling. Unlike what is suggested by NAT, these 
organizations continue their track-record of success by accepting the fact that they “cannot predict 
everything and set up systems that alert them to small changes so that they can prevent these small 
changes from becoming big problems” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 19). It is their way of dealing with 
complexity. 
For sake of clarity: we do not intend to favor either of the two theories over the other. Both have 
their merits, both have their tenuousness, both have potential. For this reason we agree with Rijpma 
(1997a, p. 22).to use insights from both to come to a framework integrating aspects of both frames 
of reference:“Therefore, it can be concluded that NAT and HRT may gain much from cross-
fertilization. Not only may theoretical discourse be enriched, but cross-fertilization is also important 
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to provide practitioners with more comprehensive and balanced answers to strategic questions 
pertaining to accident prevention and reliability”.  
Our starting point and foundation however, is HRT. The reasons are: 
- HRT allows for the study of organizations that have not failed, which leads to a set of 
constructs with a broader applicability than NAT. 
- HRT considers a broader set of constructs, originating from organization design, decision-
making theory, organizational behavior etc., which ensures a richer palette to start from for 
drawing a reliable organization. 
- HRT constructs are more easily measurable than the NAT dimensions of complexity and tight 
coupling. 
 
Table 2.8 summarizes the competing perspectives on reliability, from a HRT and NAT perspective 
respectively.  
HRT NAT 
Accidents can be prevented through good 
organizational design and management 
Accidents are inevitable in complex and tightly 
coupled systems 
Safety is the priority organizational objective Safety is one of a number of competing 
objectives 
Redundancy enhances safety duplication and 
overlap can make a reliable system out of 
unreliable parts 
Redundancy often causes accidents: it 
increases interactive complexity and 
opaqueness and encourages risk-taking. 
Decentralized decision making is needed to 
permit prompt and flexible field-level 
responses to surprises 
Organizational contradiction: decentralization 
is needed for complexity but centralization is 
needed for tightly coupled systems. 
A culture of reliability will enhance safety by 
encouraging uniform and appropriate 
responses by field-level operators. 
A military model of intense discipline, 
socialization and isolation is incompatible with 
democratic value. 
Continuous operations, training and 
simulations can create and maintain high-
reliability operations 
Organizations cannot train for unimagined, 
highly dangerous, or politically unpalatable 
operations. 
Trial and error learning from accidents can be 
effective and can be supplemented by 
anticipation and simulations. 
Denial of responsibility, faulty reporting and 
reconstruction of history cripple learning 
efforts. 
Table 2.8 - Competing perspectives on Safety - Modified from Sagan (1993, p. 46) 
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Roberts (1990a, p. 111) makes this more specific, by presenting an answer to the challenges set by 
NAT. She has enumerated some of the dysfunctional characteristics in hazardous organizations and 
has formulated some responses to lessen their effect. 
Characteristics of Complexity Responses 
- Potential for unexpected 
consequences 
- Continuous training 
- Redundancy 
- Complex technologies - Continuous training 
- Responsibility and accountability at all 
levels 
- Potential for systems serving 
incompatible functions to interact 
- Job design strategies to keep 
functions separate 
- Training 
- Indirect information sources - Many direct information sources 
- Baffling interactions - Training of specialized language 
- Flexible exercises 
 
Characteristics of Tight Coupling Responses 
- Time dependent processes - Redundancy 
- Invariant sequences of operations - Job specialization 
- System flexibility 
- Hierarchical differentiations 
- Only one way to reach goal - Redundancy 
- System flexibility 
- Little slack - Bargaining and negotiation 
- System flexibility 
 
Much can be learnt from the mutual criticism and self-criticism of both schools of thought. As we 
have stated in the introduction to this section, HRT and NAT have since long been described as 
opposing in that sense that they represent an optimistic and pessimistic view respectively. Not in the 
least, this duality has been reinforced by the publication of Sagan’s The Limits of Safety, a frontal 
attack at the address of HRT. Consequently this book has triggered a strong and well-elaborated 
response from HRO founding fathers, especially La Porte and Rochlin (La Porte & Rochlin, 1994;La 
Porte, 1994), a response upon which Sagan (2003) in his turn ardently responded to. Nevertheless, 
this categorization does not seem to be fruitful because of several reasons, the most important 
being that the scholars (from both sides) themselves do not seem to be satisfied with it. 
4.1 Critique from HRT on NAT 
4.1.1 Misreading 
HRT scholarship reproaches their NAT counterparts (namely Perrow and Sagan) to have misread 
their work and intentions (La Porte & Rochlin, 1994, p. 221). Working from secondary analysis of 
organizational structure, behavior and culture, NAT seeks to estimate from them the relative 
likelihood of serious accidents. Then they go on to attribute to these organizations properties that 
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they claim are representative of HROs, and then infer that the Berkeley group would have drawn 
contradictory conclusions (p. 221). 
4.1.2 Static and univocal 
“Most organizations are not frozen into one of the four combinations that are possible in Perrow’s 
2*2 of loose/tight coupling and linear/complex interaction. Instead, whole organizations change 
character in response to changed demands, some proportions of any organization fit all four 
combinations, and all organizations, because of interconnected technologies and interconnected 
resource demands, are moving toward an interactively complex tightly coupled state” (Weick et al., 
1999, p. 85). NAT’s static and univocal view on organizations is not realistic. Organizations change 
continuously because they are made out of people and together with this continuous change also 
their degree of coupling changes. 
4.1.3 Unfalsifiable 
Another critique is that Perrow’s theory is unfalsifiable (Schulman, 2001). Indeed, an organization 
will always remain as reliable as ‘the first catastrophic failure that still lies ahead, not the many 
successful operations that lie behind’ (Schulman, 2001, p. 346). 
4.1.4 Defeatism 
Cooke and Rohleder argue that although accidents may be ‘normal’ – in the sense that ‘accidents 
happen’ – disaster is not an inevitable consequence of complex socio-technical systems (Cooke & 
Rohleder, 2006): “Since incidents of varying severity are normal, a system must be put in place to 
control the frequency and severity of these incidents. Without such a system the incident rate and 
severity will not be controlled and only then is a disaster predictable”. They came to this conclusion 
after the analysis of the Westray mine disaster (Cooke, 2003) where they found that “the fatal 
explosion was not a spontaneous event, but a consequence of a chain of events or precursor incidents 
that could have been detected by an effective incident learning system” (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006, p. 
234). 
A similar argument can be found in those NAT predictions that did not come through. For instance, 
while Sagan’s empirical findings (1993) were quite embarrassing for HRO students (Rosa, 2005, p. 
232), the same can be said on the Y2K non-event, announced by Perrow in the epilogue of the 
second edition of his seminal work on Normal Accidents (Perrow, 1999). Another example pointing 
in the same direction is provided by Berniker and Wolf (2001, p. 23), where they report an 
unexplainable success for three of the more complex oil refineries in the sample they have studied.34 
4.2 Critique from NAT on HRT 
Cooke and Rohleder (2006) summarize Sagan’s (1993) analysis of high-reliability theory as a 
reduction to four essential elements for success: (1) high management priority on safety and 
reliability; (2) redundancy and backup for people and equipment; (3) decentralized organization with 
a strong culture and commitment to training; and (4) organizational learning through trial and error, 
supported by anticipation and simulation. This is the basis for NAT’s critique on HRT. 
4.2.1 Restricted organizational learning 
Sagan argues that the organizational learning required for the success of high-reliability theory will 
be restricted because of (1) ambiguity about incident causation; (2) the politicized environments in 
which incident investigation takes place; (3) the human tendency to cover up mistakes; and (4) the 
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secrecy both within and between competing organizations (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006, p. 216). This 
lack of scrutiny by HRO scholars has also been reported by Clarke (1993): “How is it possible that two 
groups of scholars, looking at the same class of phenomena, so fundamentally disagree on what they 
see? I am not really sure how to answer this question. But it is clear that HRO theory does not accord 
critical scrutiny to official statements and records”. Even an unsuspected source like Weick (Weick et 
al., 1999, p. 85) reports the danger of cover-ups of accidents compromising trial and error learning 
and of its anticipation of complexity but its failure to stop it from escalating: “Competing interests 
seldom align behind safety” (1999, p. 85). 
4.2.2 Cognitively impossible 
Being an HRO is cognitively impossible. “The evidence presented in validating NAT will show that 
with respect to complex systems, this is a cognitively impossible task” (Berniker & Wolf, 2001). 
“When issues get too complicated, people can’t keep their minds on the subject. There is a strict limit 
to how many things we can keep in our conscious minds at any one time” (Snowden, 2005, p. 24-25). 
Even La Porte and Consolini (1991) describe the HRO performance as very unusual, very hard to 
maintain and even theoretically unexplainable. “Variations in organizational mindfulness stem, in 
part, from differentiated role structures *…+, but also from individuals’ finite capacity for mindfulness. 
Every individual and organizational subunit cannot be mindful about all issues, and therefore the 
depth and breadth of what they are mindful of is likely to vary”. Most organizations are specialized. 
Specialization imposes the need to coordinate, and integrating divergent views requires ongoing 
efforts to keep the infrastructure from unraveling’ (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006, p. 506). A similar 
conclusion has been drawn by Bigley and Roberts (2001, p. 1290) where they mention that “[a]s a 
system becomes larger and more elaborate, fewer and fewer of its emergent properties are likely to 
be held in the mental model of any one individual”. As a result, evolving, discrepant, and 
disconnected representations can become more and more widely dispersed across the system in a 
short time period. 
4.2.3 The Cost of mindfulness 
HRT writers from the first generation35 seem to take a rather simplified approach to mindfulness 
where its costs are concerned. The conclusion therefore is that the sky is the limit: more is better. 
Mindfulness comes at a cost though, cognitively and financially. The Michigan school (in later work) 
and writers of the second generation have started to pay attention to the undesirability of 
mindfulness in less dynamic contexts (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 87-88) and the cognitive cost of 
mindfulness (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a;Swanson & Ramiller, 2004;Rerup, 2005).  
Thought-provoking and revelatory research by Levinthal and Rerup (2006) has laid the foundations 
for the integration of less mindful, routinized behavior with the mindfulness advocated by HRT. They 
draw the attention to the opportunity costs associated with mindfulness: “the opportunity costs of 
forgoing the use of established procedures as well as the opportunity costs of forgone attention” 
(Levinthal & Rerup, 2006, p. 504). Because mindfulness is costly and demanding, mindlessness is a 
valuable choice as well (Swanson & Ramiller, 2004, p. 566). The warning therefore is not to fire with 
a cannon at a mosquito, since vigilant attention may not always be necessary and may be a waste of 
resources. In view of this argument, research is needed to identify when, and under what conditions, 
collective mindfulness is most appropriate and valuable.  
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Research is also needed to investigate the relationship between collective mindfulness and overall 
productivity. Collective mindfulness requires a commitment to reliability, which can be costly 
(Roberts & Libuser, 1993;Weick et al., 1999;Sullivan & Beach, 2003). Indeed, being and becoming an 
HRO comes at a cost. Extensive training programs or the maintenance of volumes of detailed 
technical documentation for instance can be very costly (Sullivan & Beach, 2003). Therefore, not 
every organization can have the ambition to be an HRO. Other measures are less costly. “Measures 
to improve the communication between an organization’s management and its workers, and the 
empowerment of workers to make decisions in times of crisis” (Sullivan & Beach, 2003) for instance 
are more easy and cheaper to implement.  
4.2.4 Undesirable side effects 
Several of the mechanisms suggested by HRT have unwanted effects elsewhere in the system: 
- Redundancy makes the system more opaque and hence more opaque (Weick et al., 1999, p. 85). 
- Centralized decision premises can induce blind spots (Weick et al., 1999, p. 85). 
- Conceptual slack shatters a common perspective and spread confusion (Weick et al., 1999, p. 85) 
- Collective mindfulness might relate to individual-level outcomes, such as stress and burnout. 
Ensuring a mindful organization requires heightened vigilance and pro-activity (Weick et al., 
1999). It is possible that consistently operating at such a high level would lead to high levels of 
employee stress and even burnout” (Knight, 2004, p. 50-51). 
4.3 Self-Criticism 
HRT scholars acknowledge that HROs might have trouble to guarantee their high level of reliability in 
the long run (at the same time asking the question how long run reliability must be before one 
considers a system highly reliable). “How long does a system need to avoid disaster for that 
avoidance to count as evidence against the hypothesis of vulnerability to normal accidents” (Weick et 
al., 1999, p. 85). On the other hand, NAT scholar Perrow (Afterword of the 1999 edition of Normal 
Accidents, p. 372) writes: “A contrast of error-avoiding and error-inducing systems permits an 
‘optimistic’ element in what Sagan describes as a basically pessimistic theory. It shows that inevitable 
as normal accidents may be, their frequency can be significantly affected by the configuration of the 
system because that configuration can discourage, even in an error-inducing system the small errors 
that make the unanticipated interaction of errors possible. In my book I argued that the air transport 
system managed to reduce tight coupling enough to make collisions extremely rare. In this view, HRT 
and NAT are not incompatible, but can inform one another. It requires a detailed examination of 
system characteristics, in effect, a contingency theory of system accidents”. 
4.4 Beyond contingency: thesis, antithesis and synthesis 
The above analysis has shown that the classical distinction between NAT and HRT does not hold. Not 
only are there elements that seem to cast doubt on this divide, it is also the potential of both 
theories for academia and practice. Therefore, post-Sagan research on high reliability (e.g. Weick et 
al., 1999) has moved beyond the extreme positions of NAT vs. HRT. It has changed the way it looks at 
the notion of ‘higher reliability’. Older literature tended to see high reliability as a defining 
characteristic rather than as a reliability variable. Some researchers (Bain, 1999;Rijpma, 
1997a;Rijpma, 2003) have recast the debate between the NAT and HRT perspectives and suggests 
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that they should be seen as `complementary, not competing, perspectives’. This is more prominent 
from the side of HRT scholarship (e.g. La Porte & Rochlin, 1994), then from the side of NAT 
(Afterword to the 1999 edition, Perrow, 1999), were the stance is much more offensive36. HRT 
acknowledges the importance of tight-coupling and complexity but although it reaches a different 
conclusion, it cannot really be considered the conceptual opposite of NAT. Jarman (2001, p. 101-
102) introduces the concept of lower-level reliability organization (or LRO/LRT) as the opposite of 
HRO/HRT, rather than a NAT. From the NAT side, Heimann (2005, p. 115), although critical of high-
reliability organization theory, recognizes it “has hit on some key ideas in successfully managing risky 
technologies”. We agree with Smart et al. (2003, p. 737) in their argument that such views engage a 
more pluralist and post-modern perspective as a basis for organizational action, and halt the process 
by which HRT or NAT become entrenched as singular world views in the minds of managers. The 
conclusion of the overview of this mutual and self-criticism hence can be no other than that one 
needs to take a contingency approach to high reliability. 
NAT is HRT’s antithesis. It is its alternative thesis and the value of its contribution to the emergence 
of a reliability synthesis is due to the fact that it starts from failure, which is the strongest scientific 
basis possible (Schäfer, 1996, p. 30-31). HRT starts from success which is a much weaker scientific 
basis because it is not contributing to falsification. In what follows, we argue why HRT and NAT 
cannot explain organizational reliability. Also, why it cannot be explained independently from them.  
1. Both schools take unreliability as their starting point, with failure as a dependent variable (La 
Porte & Rochlin, 1994). Both schools start from a static view on reliability. NAT univocally 
describes organizations in terms of interactive complexity and coupling, deriving from this 
status their proneness to failure; HRT univocally describes them in terms of their culture, 
structure, behavior, information processing etc. Although HRT seems to take into account 
the dynamic nature of these properties and their change over time and the interaction 
between structure and behavior (La Porte & Rochlin, 1994, p. 221), it does not make it 
transparent and practical.  
2. Both schools start from organizations that are characterized by interactive complexity and 
tight coupling. They have collected little empirical data on organizations that do not fit this 
straitjacket. More cases ceteris paribus. The result of the HRO research approach to study 
cases of success and of failure, is that reliability is treated as a binary (success or failure) 
concept (Ericksen & Dyer, 2005, p. 9). However useful such an approach may be, the 
problem, according to Schulman (2001, p. 347-348) is that: “In research on high reliability in 
organizations we are beset by the problem of many variables and few cases. How, without 
more failures, can we really be sure which of the many organizational features we see are in 
fact adding to reliability? If we do establish a connection between given features of an 
organization and its operational reliability, can we assume that these features are necessary, 
rather than merely sufficient? *…+ Finally, even if an organization has evolved features that 
are necessary to its reliability, can we be sure that its evolutionary adaptation is stable, that 
what adds reliability today will also work tomorrow under changes in the character of 
technology, the work force, or in the life cycle of the organization?” In other words, too much 
reliance on single case studies leads to a danger because there are too many variables and 
too few cases.  
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Thus, from a contingency perspective, could it be possible to conclude that the advocates of HRT are 
pleased with NAT because it helps them to be themselves even more? From a certain point of view, 
NAT is an inclusion of HRT. Without NAT, no HRT. They need one another to form their identity. 
Another way of seeing NAT as an inclusion of HRT is that HRT takes the same principles (interactive 
complexity and tight coupling) as a starting point, but that they have developed the toolkit to use 
them to their advantage. This framework is related to the original optimistic/pessimistic division but 
consists of tools allowing for a more nuanced examination of the contingency. The study of this 
framework is the subject of the following section. 
5 SenseMaking 
In this section we examine the SenseMaking37 notion because of its potential contribution to a beter 
understanding of what constitutes organizational reliability.38  Whereas HRT seems to address 
structural and contextual dimensions that explain organization behavior, it does not offer a lens for 
better understanding decision making. Sensemaking fills that gap as it describes how people act 
upon what is happening and continuously make decisions in order to get grip of the situation. 
SenseMaking therefore is a valuable complement to HRT. 
SenseMaking literally means making sense of things. Thomas, Clark and Gioia (1993, p. 240) describe 
SenseMaking as “the reciprocal interaction of information seeking, meaning ascription, and action”. 
The central activities of SenseMaking are information seeking, processing, creating, and using 
(Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993), meaning that SenseMaking is not a noun, but a verb; that it is a 
process, with sense as its product. It encompasses intuitions, opinions, hunches, effective responses, 
evaluations and questions (Savolainen, 1993). SenseMaking is the process of creating a mental 
model of a situation, particularly when this situation is ambiguous (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006). It 
is "a motivated, continuous effort to understand connections (which can be among people, places, 
and events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively" (Klein et al., 2006, p. 71). In 
this respect, it is different from creativity, comprehension, curiosity, mental modeling, explanation, 
or situational awareness, although all these factors or phenomena can be involved in or related to 
SenseMaking. SenseMaking is a meta-cognitive framework that can be used to get a grip on the 
equivocal external environment and its openness to multiple interpretations. It addresses questions 
like: ‘What is happening out there?’, ‘Why is it taking place?’, ‘What does it mean?’ (Klein et al., 
2006, p. 5). Although not correct, we juxtapose SenseMaking and decision making, because in reality 
it could be argued that decision making is an inclusion of SenseMaking. However, for reasons of 
clarity, the remainder of this dissertation treats them as opposites. We do so because of the much 
broader perspective offered by SenseMaking opposed to the rationalistic and mechanistic 
characteristics of decision making (Boland, 2008). 
Practically speaking, SenseMaking is a cognitive process (Boland & Yoo, 2003) that can be described 
through seven properties (Weick, 1995): Identity Constructing, Retrospective, Enacting, Social, 
Ongoing, Cue extracting, and Plausibility seeking (Table 2.9). It is the process by which individuals (or 
organizations) “create an understanding so that they can act in a principled and informed manner”.  
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Identity Constructing. The organization seeks to discover what it ‘thinks’ and ‘knows’ about itself and 
its environment. Depending on who the Sensemaker is, the definition of what is happening will also 
change. What the situation means is defined by who one becomes while dealing with it or what and 
who one represents (Weick, 1995, p. 20). 
Retrospective. SenseMaking is an examination of past practices in order to learn/unlearn things about 
the current context (Nathan, 2004). 
Enacting. There is no objective environment out there separate from one’s interpretation of it. “People 
often don’t know what the ‘appropriate action’ is until they take some action, guided by 
preconceptions, and see what happens. Action determines the situation: The product of action is an 
orderly, material, social construction that is subject to multiple interpretations” (Weick, 1988). 
Social. “Other people are integral to our efforts to make sense of things because what we say or think 
or do is contingent on what others say and think and do. People learn about events when they compare 
what they see with what someone else sees and then negotiate some mutually acceptable version of 
what really happened” (Weick, 1985). 
Ongoing. SenseMaking takes place in a continuing and dynamic fashion as events unfold and we 
continually seek to understand what events mean in relationship to our organizations. SenseMaking 
has neither a beginning nor a formal end (Nathan, 2004). 
Cue Extracting. We decide what to pay attention to. 
Plausibility-driven. Looking for what is plausible is often of more practical help then finding accuracy. 
 
Table 2.9 - SenseMaking properties (Weick, 1995) 
In essence, the seven properties boil down to ‘How can I know what I think till I see what I say’. “This 
recipe, which is central in organizational SenseMaking, retains several elements of dissonance 
theory. The recipe is about justification (my thoughts justify my earlier words), choice (I choose which 
words to focus on and which thoughts will explain them), retrospective SenseMaking (I look back at 
what I said earlier from a later point in time when the talking has stopped), discrepancies (I feel a 
need to see what I say when something doesn’t make sense), social construction of justification (I 
invoke thoughts I have been socialized to label as acceptable), and action as the occasion for 
SenseMaking (my act of speaking starts the SenseMaking process)” (Weick, 1995, p. 12). The best 
synthesis, however, is offered by Weick et al. (2005, p. 419) when they formulate a conclusion on 
what the seven SenseMaking properties are all about: “Taken together these properties suggest that 
increased skill at SenseMaking should occur when people are socialized to make do, be resilient, treat 
constraints as self-imposed, strive for plausibility, keep showing up, use retrospect to get a sense of 
direction, and articulate descriptions that energize. These are micro-level actions. They are small 
actions. But they are small actions with large consequences”. They summarize SenseMaking’s 
distinguishing features as a “genesis in disruptive ambiguity, with beginnings in acts of noticing and 
bracketing, founded in a mixture of retrospect and prospect, characterized by a reliance on 
presumptions to guide action, embedded in interdependence and a culmination in articulation that 
shades into acting thinkingly”. 
Research on SenseMaking has been taking place for many years and by a great number of scholars, 
but unarguably it has reached full growth under the inspiration of Brenda Dervin (e.g. 1983a) and 
Karl E. Weick (e.g. 1995). Although both scholars have taken a different line of approach to the topic 
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and have been conducting their research independently from each other, their work definitely has a 
common denominator. For many years – and to a certain extent even today – the SenseMaking 
concept has remained undiscovered by mainstream literature but under the impulse of the 
Organizational Learning thought, it rightly got a broader interest by scholars in organization theory. 
This should not come as a surprise, since the process of improving action through better knowledge 
and understanding, is integrally connected to SenseMaking (Nathan, 2004). Organizational 
awareness is enhanced by the extent to which members of an organization collectively become 
skilful perceivers of the business environment (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004). The idea of SenseMaking 
has reached full growth under the inspiration of Karl E. Weick (2001). However, despite the 
increasing attention, it would not be wise to label SenseMaking a theory: “*…+ SenseMaking is best 
described as a developing set of ideas with explanatory possibilities, rather than as a body of 
knowledge” (Weick, 1995, p. xi). This is in line with Dervin’s depiction of SenseMaking: “Some people 
call it a theory, others a set of methods, others a methodology, others a body of findings. In the most 
general sense, it is all of these. It is, first and foremost, a set of metatheoretic assumptions and 
propositions about the nature of information, the nature of human use of information, and the 
nature of human communicating” (Savolainen, 1993, p. 16).  
The classification between individual and organizational SenseMaking is artificial. Individual 
SenseMaking is senseless without the collective (i.e. social) dimension, “making ‘individual 
SenseMaking’ something of an oxymoron” (Weick, 1995, p. 80). We therefore will not explicitly make 
that distinction as we carry on with the elaboration of the SenseMaking construct. What is far more 
characterizing is that SenseMaking is all about coping with interruptions. “To understand 
*S+ensemaking is also to understand how people cope with interruptions’ (Weick, 1995, p. 5). 
“SenseMaking is tested to the extreme when people encounter an event whose occurrence is so 
implausible that they hesitate to report it for fear they will not be believed. In essence, these people 
think to themselves, it can’t be, therefore, it isn’t” (Weick, 1995, p. 1). SenseMaking deals with 
omnipresent discontinuity in constantly changing situations. Dervin (e.g. Dervin, 1999) labeled this 
as ‘gappiness’, meaning that people are constantly confronted with dissonance, ill-structured 
problems, ambiguity and equivocality. 
If one were to name one setting where SenseMaking would be most relevant, it would be situations 
where the gappiness is the most evident. The handling of high priority incidents (high impact, high 
urgency) is such a setting. In such situations the observation is that discontinuity is the rule, 
continuity the exception, while usually management and systems are designed according to the 
exception (Turoff, Chumer, Van de Walle, & Xiang, 2004). If the dominant assumption is continuity, 
systems are designed to deal with flows, process alignment etc. They are not designed for dealing 
with the alternative assumption of discontinuity. The problem is that a system that is designed 
according to the worldview of continuity does not help in practice because it conflicts with the 
discontinuity of reality. We find ourselves always in the middle of a situation that needs being made 
sense of. The purpose of our action therefore is to overcome our thrownness (Heidegger, e.g. in 
Inwood, 1997), i.e. the ongoing experience and being in the middle of things.  
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6 Information Systems Fit 
6.1 Introduction 
This section deals with the issue of aligning (i.e. fitting) Information Systems, users and tasks. After 
an introduction of the problem statement and rationale behind IS Fit (6.1), we analyze the different 
components of user-system fit. In that respect we look into the position of information systems as 
such (6.2) and aspects related to the ‘user’ notion (6.3). Finally, we examine the role of fit (6.4). 
6.1.1 Problem statement 
An Information System is more than the hardware and the software. It is as much – or even more – 
the structure, procedures and people that make it work. We posit that the degree of flexibility that 
emerges from these system aspects is in essence determined by how the organization is coping with 
interruptions through its structural dimensions (Pugh et al., 1968;Pugh, 1973) – we have referred to 
this as High Reliability Organizing – and through its information processing capacities, referred to as 
SenseMaking. To guarantee the dynamics described in the previous sections of this literature review 
chapter, we believe that the design of Information Systems that are aimed at supporting 
organizational reliability hence should encourage and support a process of Mindfulness and 
SenseMaking. In practice however, it can be noticed that IS design does not support these High 
Reliability and SenseMaking modes. In fact, it does the opposite because it aims at replacing or 
suppressing the possibility to ‘make sense’ of situations. IS are conceived as a ‘repository of best 
practice’ model (Boland & Yoo, 2003, p. 390) which puts an emphasis on data storage, instead of on 
connecting people and stimulating reflection and building one’s own story line. Likewise, IS are 
designed top-down, with an emphasis on rigidly following predefined and static procedures. The 
consequence thereof is that IS are not supportive of stability and flexibility and that organizational 
reliability is jeopardized.  
It should be possible though to design IS in such a way that it combines both virtues (stability and 
flexibility), the sine qua non being that a dynamic one replaces the static approach. The key to such 
design is finding the right ‘fit’ or alignment between the different IS components. In this section we 
specifically address the consequences for the incident support tool and more particularly the way it 
is used in view of communication and coordination and the impact thereof on organizational 
reliability. We do not believe – as is argued by Bostrom and Heinen (1977, p. 18) that computer-
related technology is essentially neutral and that whether its application succeeds or fails depends 
entirely on the decisions that are made on how it shall be used (i.e. procedures, training, etc.).39 
Therefore, the fit we are trying to define cannot be seen as a static notion, as a cookbook recipe, but 
as a framework that can guide IS designers, analysts and managers in their daily practice of making 
collaboration and coordination work. Such an interpretation of IS fit, with working practices and 
organizational structures, including those that moderate collaboration between individuals (Payne, 
2003), now generally is acknowledged to be essential for the usefulness of a computer system.  
6.1.2 Rationale 
To account for the rationale of our writings in this section, we draw and juxtapose on Markus (1983) 
reporting three theories that have the potential of explaining why users resist to management 
information systems (MIS): (1) their own internal factors; (2) poor system design; (3) the interaction 
of specific system design features with aspects of the organizational context of system use. 
Important in Markus’ work is that he acknowledges that these theories differ in their basic 
 Literature Review 65 
 
 
assumptions about systems, organizations, and resistance. Remarkable is Markus gathering of 
empirical evidence for the dominance of the interaction theory. Our study, however, demonstrates 
the importance of the interaction of all three theories. We do so by means of the conceptual model 
depicted in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 - IS Interaction Model 
 
The originality of our contribution lies in the addition of SenseMaking and High Reliability constructs 
as lenses that offer the possibility of synthesizing the three presupposed theories. In all three of 
these classical theoretical streams, we add aspects of structure and agency. The application of this 
set of constructs is novel, because previous studies on the reliability of complex systems that also 
applied HRO constructs – for instance Carlo et al. (2004) – have approached HRO literature from an 
IT artifact perspective. By this, we mean that when HRO research deals with IT, it is merely in its role 
of increasing interactive complexity and tight coupling, not as a potential enabler of mindfulness. 
This section makes an original contribution to the Information Systems discipline, by addressing the 
link of high reliability theorizing and IS fit. We posit that it has the potential of offering a practical 
interpretation of what is meant by flexibility (and hence also stability). This fills a need, for two 
reasons: (1) the underdevelopment of Human Computer Interaction (HCI) in the field of coordination 
and (2) the under-specification of the flexibility notion. These issues are briefly dealt with next. 
Underdevelopment of HCI in the field of co-ordination 
Despite the general acknowledgement that systems are the aggregation of hardware, software, 
procedures and people, its translation into practice is less self-evident. Their design and 
implementation does not take into account the reciprocity that exists between them and moreover 
is static and therefore incapable of adjustment to contingency. Therefore it should not come as a 
surprise that much of the basic research into Human Computer Interaction (HCI) has not attempted 
to provide techniques to understand and help design for these situations, preferring to study and 
provide support for solitary and decontextualized activities (Perry, 2003, p. 193). Perry explains that 
– despite its tremendous importance – one of the reasons for this is that HCI theoreticians and 
modelers have not had a ‘way into’ the problem – cognitive theory tells us little about social 
behavior, while the social sciences’ understandings and explanations of social action are hard to 
apply directly to design. How process members adapt and make use of tools in their work to support 
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experimental methods that have been applied to the area are not, in general, able to investigate 
these kinds of behavior (Perry, 2003, p. 193). Therefore (IS) designers need to have a better 
understanding of work that goes beyond the individual, to look at how teams coordinate their 
behaviors with one another, collaborate, and perform problem-solving tasks (Perry, 2003, p. 193). 
Finding out how system users coordinate their action in relation to the structural and contextual 
determinants they are guided by is the first objective of this section. 
Under-specification of the flexibility notion 
Most research does not define what is meant by ‘flexibility’: “What should be flexible: the IT 
organization, the people, and the technology? How is flexibility developed, how is it managed?” 
(Patten, 2004, p. 4). The question arises how flexibility is achieved. The position taken in this 
dissertation is that it cannot be embedded statically in the design of the system but that it is 
determined by the degrees of freedom system users have when accomplishing their tasks. These 
degrees of freedom in themselves again are bounded by limitations so that stability can be assured. 
How this is combination of stability and flexibility is guaranteed with respect to information systems 
(in the broadest sense) design (also in the broadest sense) is the second objective of this section and 
its underpinning by data (Chapter 6). 
6.2 Information Systems (IS) 
Information technology research (at least in general) acknowledges an IS as an actual system of 
physical, social and cognitive elements that are built, used and rebuilt by people in everyday practice 
(Griffith & Dougherty, 2001, p. 208). Despite this acknowledgement, everyday practice (and part of 
scientific research) sticks to a static IS notion. This shows itself mainly in the disregard towards two 
factors mainly: (1) user characteristics and (2) contingency, i.e. the indeterminacy of the context.  
Several authors have dealt with this issue. Among them, Orlikowski (1992) who has reported several 
occasions where the combination of user characteristics and contingency has lead to users 
employing different strategies for using IS. “Rather than positing design and use as disconnected 
moments or stages in a technology's lifecycle, the structurational model of technology posits artifacts 
as potentially modifiable throughout their existence” (Orlikowski, 1992, p. 408). Such is also clearly 
shown in case of electronic mail by Mackay (1988), implying designers should seek flexible solutions 
that capture the important dimensions of use and provide flexibility for a wide range of users. Apart 
from the work by the authors mentioned above, at least in our view, it is Weick (1985) who has 
pinpointed the problem best: “Representations in the electronic world can become chaotic for at 
least two reasons; The data in these representations are flawed, and the people who manage those 
flawed data have limited processing capacity. These two problems interact in a potentially deadly 
vicious circle. The data are flawed because they are incomplete; they contain only what can be 
collected and processed through machines. That excludes sensory information, feelings, intuitions, 
and context — all of which are necessary for an accurate perception of what is happening. Feelings, 
context, and sensory information are not soft-headed luxuries. They are ways of knowing that 
preserve properties of events not captured by machine-compatible information. To withhold these 
incompatible data is to handicap the observer. And therein lies the problem” (Weick, 1985, p. 51-52).  
For these reasons, the technology will be appropriated in diverse ways and has different meanings 
and effects for different users. The conclusion therefore is that humans may appear to act within the 
constraints of technology and institutions (Rose, 1999). The combined effect of differing user 
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properties and indeterminacy means that information technology is not always used in ways 
envisioned by designers or intended by implementers (Orlikowski & Robey, 1991, p. 157). This 
combined effect at the same time means that “Information technology does not simply determine 
behavior, but is actively invoked and appropriated by human actors” (Orlikowski & Robey, 1991, p. 
157). “Examining selected relationships (e.g., studying how information technology influences users, 
without understanding how users appropriate the information technology, or the conditions within 
which the mediation occurs) can only result in a partial understanding of how information technology 
interacts with organizations” (Orlikowski & Robey, 1991, p. 154). 
The difficulty however, often is that most designers and engineers of such systems are comfortable 
identifying a problem and improving or fixing it. “They prefer to deal with absolutes rather than 
probabilities, and do not consider the stochastic nature of these systems and their associated 
subsystems” (Azadeh, 2000, p. 210). Designers and engineers tend to believe that reality can be 
modeled, but unfortunately, complex systems cannot be simplified and hence do not fit into a 
model. The reason is that due to the nonlinear nature of the interactions in a complex system, 
complexity is incomprehensible and therefore incompressible. This means that there is no accurate 
representation of the system that is simpler than the system itself (Cilliers, 2000, p. 9). In building 
representations of open systems, we are forced to leave things out, and since the effects of these 
omissions are nonlinear, we cannot predict their magnitude. This is not an argument claiming that 
reasonable representations should not be constructed, but rather one that the unavoidable 
limitations of the representations should be acknowledged (Cilliers, 2000, p. 9).  
6.3 IS Users 
The previous discussion has shown that user characteristics are essential in the way an Information 
System is used. What follows takes this discussion one step further by decomposing the notion of 
user characteristics. It does so by addressing cognitive profile (subsection 1), underlying worldview, 
assumptions and values (subsection 2), and the reverse designer perspective (subsection 3). 
6.3.1 Cognitive profile 
An individual’s psychological attributes (i.e. cognitive profile) influence his/her decision making 
behavior (and information processing behavior) (MacCrimmon & Taylor, 1976, p. 1439): 
1. Perceptual ability (The way in which a decision maker perceives a problem is a major 
determinant of the degree of uncertainty, complexity, and conflict. *…+ His perceptions 
depend upon the premises he holds about the decision situation.) 
2. Information capacity with the distinction between abstractness and concreteness as a most 
important feature. Concreteness is characterized by the use of few dimensions of 
information and simple integrating schemata; Abstractness is the tendency to process many 
dimensions of information and to use complex integrative schemata. 
3. Risk taking propensity 
4. Aspiration level 
6.3.2 Worldview, prior experiences, assumptions and values 
Apart from the cognitive profile outlined above, each individual interprets and internalizes 
knowledge differently depending on personality traits, prior experiences, expectations (Storck & 
Henderson, 2003, p. 513) (referring to Weick (1995)) and worldview. A range of social and 
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organizational factors are embodied in the values of various IS stakeholders (Tan & Hunter, 2002). 
Therefore, any explicit presentation of social and organizational factors is a discussion of people’s 
underlying assumptions and values (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). Values are the basis on which 
objectives can be created. As noted by Keeney (1992, p. 24), “bringing . . . values to consciousness 
allows you to uncover hidden objectives, objectives you didn’t realize you had”. Examples of these 
values are mental models and schemes. Dhillon and Torzadeh (2006, p. 295-296) report that 
although values have been considered important and various authors have used a variety of 
techniques to undertake their research, no specific methodology has taken hold. Our explicit 
formulation of what we understand as SenseMaking or High Reliability proneness therefore is a 
valuable candidate for labeling the values and assumptions underlying organizational behavior. 
6.3.3 Systems designer's implicit theories 
Independent from the worldview and cognitive profile of the user, it will be clear that a system – any 
system – will be designed according to one particular dominant worldview (or combinations 
thereof). In other words, the design will greatly depend on the designer’s worldview as well. This 
means that the fit between the system user and the system is heavily depending on chance. The fact 
that still at so many occasions the fit is realized despite of this chance element is not surprising since 
the designers and users very often share the same worldview.40 Nevertheless, systems designers 
clearly though implicitly make assumptions: (1) about people, e.g., ‘people are poor information 
processors’, (2) about organizations, e.g., ‘information flow downward must be controlled’, and (3) 
about the change process, e.g., ‘we must get users to participate or they will not accept the system’ 
(Bostrom & Heinen, 1977, p. 19-20). This corresponds to the Theory X, traditional or machine theory, 
and Theory Y, human resource theory. Theory X assumes a person is one who likes order, wishes to 
work within tightly specified boundaries, and does not want to have a great deal of personal control 
over one's activities. Theory Y assumes a person is a responsible, self achieving individual who can 
take full control of one's work environment (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977, p. 19-20). 
6.4 IS Fit 
This brings us to the topic of how fit is accomplished. Depending on the adherence to either theory X 
or theory Y, the way ‘fit’ is assured can differ substantially. The different approaches are dealt with 
next. 
6.4.1 Task/System Fit (TSF) 
If one is to consider how an incident handling tool (like Peregrine) is used – or not used – in view of 
process reliability, two theoretical concepts come to mind: Task/System Fit (TSF), also known as Task 
Technology Fit (TTF) (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995). The concept of task/system fit focuses on the 
alignment between capabilities or functionalities provided by a given information system and the 
information processing requirements of the task in which the system may be used (Nance, 2005). 
The idea behind this concept is that the better the fit, the better a task will be accomplished by a 
system user and therefore represents a contingency perspective on organizing (Goodhue & 
Thompson, 1995). As such, the quality of the task outcome is determined by the information 
processing requirements of a given task on the one hand and information processing functionalities 
in an information system on the other hand. This constitutes a mere ‘objective’ engineering 
perspective (Nance, 2005) on task/system fit. In that sense, it corresponds to Theory X (supra). 
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6.4.2 Congruent Fit 
The view underlying the static IS design outlined above is built on a resource based view on 
organizing (Wernerfelt, 1984) and more particularly since the nineties on a competence based view 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994;Conner & Prahalad, 1996). This school of thought posits the importance of 
a focus on core elements. This evolution is at odds with a systems perspective on organizing (see e.g. 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) and like it has been articulated by Galbraith (1973) as congruent fit. Porter 
(1996) formulates his critique on the resource based view and his plea in favor of congruent fit as 
follows: “The importance of fit among functional policies is one of the oldest ideas in strategy. 
Gradually, however, it has been supplanted on the management agenda. Rather than seeing the 
company as a whole, managers have turned to ‘core’ competencies, ‘critical’ resources, and ‘key’ 
success factors. In fact, fit is far more central component of competitive advantage than most 
realize”. In the words of Starbuck and Nystrom: “A well-designed organization is not a stable solution 
to achieve, but a developmental process to keep active” (Starbuck & Nystrom, 1981, p. 14). In that 
respect, congruent fit is a far more powerful notion for driving stability and flexibility than the static 
image of fit propagated by static business alignment frameworks like TTF. In our research we 
explicitly want to include the cognitive information processing style and underlying worldview of the 
individual completing as a third component (Nance, 2005).  
Our critique on TTF models – and herein lies the intended value of our contribution – is that 
contingency is overlooked in that sense that a one-dimensional perspective is taken towards TTF. 
The interaction between (1) task, (2) user characteristics and (3) system characteristics and 
capabilities remains underdeveloped and under-researched. The idea of a static notion of fit stems 
from a mechanistic worldview where context is stable and can be kept under control. Tasks and 
technology – like structure and strategy for that matter – can be aligned for an undetermined 
period, resulting in an optimal reliability. Adjustments to this fit are relatively infrequent and occur 
in a discrete way (as opposed to continuously) after a formal initiative and decision of system 
designers. The idea of a dynamic notion of fit finds its origin in systems- and complexity thinking 
where context is instable and the objective should not be to control it, but to go with it in order to 
yield the best (not the optimal) reliability achievable. Fit thus is continuously on the move. It cannot 
exclusively be caught in fixed procedures, best practices, structures and strategies. This kind of fit 
emerges from the day-to-day behavior of people trying to make sense out of the situations they run 
into. Therefore, adjustments to this fit are made incrementally and continuously. In that sense, the 
schism between the world of the system and the world of the organization can be bridged and 
combined changes can solve problems that any change on only one side (technology or organization) 
cannot resolve (Schwabe & Krcmar, 2000). 
Also important in this respect is that we adhere to Dervin’s (1983b) viewpoint that human use of 
information should be studied from the perspective of the actor, not the intermediating system, 
such as an incident management support tool. The mere system view looks at structural variables 
such as age, sex, education, team membership, life style, or task description (Savolainen, 1993, p. 
19) and derives from this system characteristics that should be met. The user view starts from the 
given that that the user is the essential order, and the system bends to it rather than the other way 
around (Savolainen, 1993, p. 19). 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
 
If we knew what we were doing, 





To effectively study a topic as complex as the incident management process reliability, it is 
difficult relying on one single or two measurement tools only (Sullivan & Beach, 2002, p. 1424). 
Early in our research, we realized we were studying quite an extra-ordinary process – the 
Incident Management Process – for which existing theory did not appear to be useful, showed 
drawbacks or did not exist. The absence of a well-established body of literature forced us to dig 
as deep as possible into the tissue of the matter, in search of something to go by. This called for 
another approach than the a priori royal road to scientific research, for which one kind of data 
gathering would suffice. In literature on research methodology this approach is known as 
triangulation and can – in brief – be best described as a combination of several data gathering 
techniques (and of theory). Triangulation – by permitting multiple instances for interaction 
between theory and data – offers multiple perspectives. The deeper, science-philosophical 
foundation of this approach is hermeneutics, which is the thread throughout our research and 
which has proved to be a very useful guide. 
This chapter describes the research methods and their science-philosophical foundations we 
have used throughout this dissertation. It shows why and how we triangulated between 
qualitative and quantitative research methods and – within these broad categories – between 
the different techniques. In that respect, the term ‘research methodology’ goes deeper than 
what is meant by ‘research technique’. Methodology is the overall process guiding the entire 
research project; technique on the other hand, is the primary evidence generation mechanism 
(Palvia, Mao, Salam, & Soliman, 2003, p. 3). After a description of both our case studies (Section 
2), we first elaborate on the conceptual and science-philosophical underpinning of our approach 
that has its roots in hermeneutics (Section 3). Next, we translate these remarks into HRO 
research taxonomies (Section 4). Subsequently, we describe the research build-up in more detail 
(Section 5). Special attention goes to the survey as our main data collection technique (Section 
6). We conclude this methodology chapter with a build-up of the hermeneutic circle of 
understanding (Section 7). 
2 HRO Case Studies 
2.1 Bank Case41 
This section and the next one provide an overview of the organizations at which this study has 
been conducted, the financial institution (hereafter referred to as the ‘Bank’) and the nuclear 
72 Two Cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
 
power plant (hereafter referred to as the ‘NPP’). A nuclear power plant, any nuclear power plant 
for that matter, is an archetypical HRO, as discussed above. A financial institution is an archetype 
of a mainstream organization. However, we posit that the incident management process under 
study bears the hallmarks of an HRO. A part of our research wants to find out whether this 
assertion holds. Therefore, it is essential to have a description of the organizations under study 
in mind. Subsection 2.1 describes the Bank and the Incident Management Process whereas 
subsection 2.2 portrays the NPP and the Maintenance & Repair Process. 
2.1.1 The company 
The Bank under study is a large European financial services provider in the field of Banking and 
insurance. It has branches in 30 different countries and offers a full range of financial services to 
retail and corporate customers. It holds a key position in several European countries. The 
holding was created in the late nineties through the merger of two Banking groups and one 
insurance company and now serves some 12 million customers and employs about 50.000 
people. It holds a Euro zone top-20 ranking in terms of market capitalization.  
2.1.2 The IT department 
The financial institution’s centralized IT department employs over 2000 people and has a budget 
of on average 400 million euro. It has an IT Governance program in place consisting of (De Haes 
& Van Grembergen, 2005): clear structures (roles and responsibilities, IT organization structure, 
IT strategy committee, IT steering committees), well-defined processes (Strategic Information 
Systems Planning, Balanced (IT) scorecards, Information Economics, Service Level Agreements 
(SLAs), Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) and Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), IT alignment, and governance maturity models), well-
described relational mechanisms (e.g. account management roles, and an IT governance internal 
magazine and intranet (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2006), active participation and 
collaboration between principle stakeholders, partnership rewards and incentives, business/IT 
co-location, cross-functional business/IT training and rotation). This research particularly 
addressed two (out of 27) IT processes that were deemed to be vital to the Bank’s survival. The 
first process is a cross-border payment service that provides back-office processing services to 
financial institutions for all international payments. The second process is an integrated solution 
that enables businesses customers and a number of government departments to carry out all of 
their Banking transactions and allows document handling (e.g. signing contracts, sending and 
receiving invoices).  
From this company and process description, we derive the resemblance with an HRO setting. 
The interactive complexity, tight coupling and high impact of failure make the Bank context 
comparable to an archetypical HRO like a NPP. The means and methods by which the 
organization ensures reliability – under continuous pressure to increase efficiency and decrease 
the potential for human error – are very costly in personal and economic terms. It can be argued 
that the handling of incidents in such a setting calls for working under particularly demanding 
conditions as nearly all critical business processes are relying on their services for their reliability. 
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2.1.3 The Incident management process 
The IT incident management process bears considerable resemblance with any incident 
management process, be it the IM of a mainstream organization or an emergency/high hazard 
organization (Wolf, 2004). The process is described in detail next.  
IT Service Management and Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
For the management of the exploitation of its services and Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) an organization like the one in our case study can build on IT Service 
Management (ITSM). ITSM is the discipline that strives to better the alignment of IT efforts to 
business needs and to manage the efficient providing of IT services with guaranteed quality 
(Brenner, 2006). Its de facto standard methodology is the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) which 
has been published in the UK by the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) 
(2000) since the late 1980’s (Brenner, 2006) where it emerged when the public sector started 
privatizing the exploitation of ICT and the principal wanted to have a grip on the services 
provided by these privatized ICT departments. This called for the gaining of insight in the tasks to 
be dealt with by an ICT organization. Not only the description of tasks viewed apart is important, 
but also the relationship between various tasks and the course of the processes within the 
various tasks must be clear (Van Den Eede & Van de Walle, 2005). Implementation of ITIL must 
lead towards implementation of process management supplying services meeting a certain 
service level (Thiadens & Spanjersberg, 2000). ITIL can be best labeled a ‘Best-Practices-
Framework’ (Sewera, 2005) and is at this point in time the only comprehensive, non-proprietary, 
publicly available guideline for IT Service Management (Potgieter, Lew, & Botha, 2005). Although 
ITIL covers a number of areas, its main focus is on Service Support and Service Delivery (Janssen, 
2003). The process under study, incident management, comes under Service Support, together 
with four other processes, as depicted in Figure 3.1. Their further discussion remains outside the 
scope of this dissertation. For the purposes of our research, we can restrict ourselves to a 
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Incident management 
Under ITIL, an incident is defined as a deviation from the (expected) standard operation of a 
system or a service that causes, or may cause an interruption to, or a reduction in, the quality of 
the service. It refers to “any event which is not part of the standard operation of a service and 
which causes, or may cause, an interruption to, or a reduction in, the quality of that service” 
(CCTA 2000, p.71). Example of incidents may be degradation in the quality of the service 
according to some measure of quality of service, the unavailability of a service, a hardware 
failure, or the detection of a virus. Users are the people who use the IT services in the business 
domain of the organization. The objective of Incident Management is to provide continuity by 
restoring the service in the quickest way possible by whatever means necessary (temporary fixes 
or workarounds) (Bartolini & Sallé, 2004). In this respect, Figure 3.2 illustrates the parameters 
that time to repair or downtime is composed of.  
 
Figure 3.2 - Parameters influencing downtime (Brenner, 2006) 
The detection time, i.e. the time until an incident is registered, can be shortened by technical 
measures like the use of monitoring tools (although in practice many incidents are still first 
reported by users to the service desk). The activities for the incident resolution however, mostly 
involve human intervention and their durations have a direct relation to typical Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) of Incident Management (response time, repair time) and Change Management 
(recovery time) (Brenner, 2006). Quintessential for a successful implementation of incident 
management is the presence of a Service Level Management ensuring continual identification, 
monitoring and reviewing of the optimally agreed levels of IT services as required by the 
business. Most targets set in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) are subject to direct financial 
penalties or indirect financial repercussions if not met. It is therefore critical for this 
management process to flag when service levels are projected to be violated in order for an IT 
organization to take proactive actions to address the issue (Bartolini & Sallé, 2004, p. 65). This 
means that tracking response, repair and recovery times is essential to achieving service level 
compliance. Incident priorities and escalation procedures are defined as part of the Service Level 
Management process and are key to ensure that the most important incident are addressed 
appropriately. (Bartolini & Sallé, 2004, p. 66). In the incident management process it is of 
fundamental importance to classify, prioritize and escalate incidents (Central Computer & 
Telecommunications Agency, 2000). Priority of an incident is usually calculated through 
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evaluation of impact and urgency (Bartolini & Sallé, 2004, p. 66). For this purpose, the collection 
of sound statistical data from tracking Incident Management instances, is crucial (Brenner, 
2006). 
To understand the Incident Management process at the financial institution, we first discuss 
their organization of the Incident Management process, whereupon we explain how incidents 
are handled. 
Organization of the incident management process 
The financial institution has a special Service Management division that coordinates the ITIL 
processes throughout the organization. One of the Service Management division’s staff 
members is the Incident Management process owner, in ITIL referred to as the Incident Manager 
(CCTA (Central Computer & Telecommunications Agency), 2000, p. 87). The Incident Manager is 
responsible for the efficiency and effectiveness of the Incident Management process. The 
Incident Manager monitors the Incident Management process, maintains the Incident 
Management information system, and makes recommendations for improvement. The financial 
institution uses a special IT Service Management application suite, Peregrine Systems’ Service 

































Figure 3.3 - Organization of the Incident Management process (Muhren, 2006) 
ITIL’s main tool to monitor a process is to set KPIs. KPIs are defined as “clearly defined objectives 
with measurable targets to judge process reliability” (CCTA (Central Computer & 
Telecommunications Agency), 2000, p. 88). Every month the Service Management division issues 
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a report on the reliability of the various ITIL Service Support processes, making use of the 
prescribed KPIs. 
The financial institution offers many services to their customers, for example asset management 
activities, financial transactions, and online Banking. To support all these services, many internal 
services have to be in place. The financial institution has split up all her activities into service 
domains, and each of the over 70 service domains maintains one internal or external service. 
Every service domain has a Service Delivery Owner (SDO) in place, which is responsible for 
supporting the service domain by the IT department. The SDO has a good overview of all 
activities within a service domain, from the IT department to the users in the business divisions, 
and is therefore an important contact person when incidents occur in a service domain. In 
literature on organization theory this role is known as ‘boundary spanner’ as it enables 
transgressing the departmental boundaries (Williams, 2002). 
Each division of the IT department has its own Incident Coordinator (IC), who is responsible for 
the Incident Management activities within his division. The IC coordinates the Incident 
Management activities of the teams in his division and communicates directly with the SDO 
when a higher priority incident occurs. ICs provide the Incident Manager of recommendations 
for improvement of the Incident Management process. Within each incident handling team 
there is a team leader, who functions as the contact person for the team. 
















































Figure 3.4 - The Incident life cycle (adapted from CCTA (Central Computer & Telecommunications 
Agency), 2000) 




Now that we have seen how the Incident Management process is organized, we can continue 
with examining how incidents are actually handled at the financial institution. As the maturity of 
the Incident Management process of the financial institution is very high compared to ITIL’s best 
practices and the same process at other companies, we discuss ITIL’s Incident Management 
process according to the implementation at the financial institution where we have conducted 
the research. Figure 3.4 gives a brief overview of the different steps in the Incident life cycle. A 
more extensive process layout is provided in Table 3.1. The process flow diagram can be found in 
Figure 0.1, under Appendix K. 
It is important to note that an incident is constantly monitored by the owner of an incident, who 
makes sure the agreed resolution time is not exceeded and who communicates the status of the 
incident to the user. 










 REG 1 Register the incident 
Open 
REG 2 



















SOLT 3 Check the assignment of the incident 
Inbox: Incidents assigned to my team(s), 
with status’open’ and ‘accepted’ 
 
SOLT 4 If the incident is assigned to the right team and you 
cannot start immediately with solving the incident, accept 
the incident. 
Accepted 
SOLT 5 If you can start immediately with solving the incident, 
assign it to a solver. 
(fill-in ‘assigned to user’) 
















SOL 6 Analysis 
Inbox: Incidents assigned to me, 
with status ‘Work in progress’ 
 
SOL 7 Work out (a part of) the solution  
SOL 9 Implement temporary solution (solution with aftercare) Flag ‘Temporarily 
bypassed’ 



















COO 10 Check the solution of the incident 
Inbox: Incidents registered by me, 
with status ‘Resolved’ 
 
COO 11 Close the incident Closed 
COO 12 Reopen the incident Open 
REG = Registered by SOLT = Team Solver SOL = Solver COO = Coordinator 
Table 3.1 - Description of the Incident Management process 
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Incident detection and recording 
When a user encounters difficulties in continuing his work, he calls the Service Desk, the first-
line support for incident handling in the organization. If the phone call is just a request for 
information, or the service desk employee can solve the difficulty immediately, it is registered in 
Peregrine as a ‘call’. No further actions are required and the user can continue his/her work. If 
the difficulty cannot be solved immediately, the Service Desk registers it as an incident. An 
incident ticket is then created in Peregrine and all possible incident details are entered in the 
ticket. From this point onwards, the Service Desk is the owner of the incident and is responsible 
for the timely handling of the incident and the communication to the user. The user needs to be 
updated regularly on the status of the incident. 
An incident can also be detected by operational personnel. Operational personnel could either 
be the cause of the incident, or they were just able to detect the incident in their day-to-day 
activities before any service disruption was noticed by a user. It is a common procedure for them 
to register the incident themselves in Peregrine. In this case, they are the owners of the incident 
and coordinate the incident until it is solved. In the remainder of the thesis, we focus on the 
normal procedure that the Service Desk coordinates incidents. 
Classification and assignment 
By asking targeted questions, the Call Desk can estimate the priority of the incident. The priority 
is set by determining the impact and urgency of the incident. The impact of the incident must be 
determined from the company’s perspective and indicates the (potential) financial loss the 
incident can cause. There are four different degrees of impact (Table 3.2) and three different 
levels of urgency (Table 3.3) an incident can have. 
Impact level Impact qualification 
1 Very many users are impacted (e.g. the entire head office) 
2 Many users are impacted (e.g. a few branches or several divisions) 
3 Few users are impacted (e.g. one branch or one division) 
4 One user is impacted 
Table 3.2 - Incident Impact Level (Bank) 
Urgency level Level qualification 
1 Very urgent 
2 Urgent 
3 Not urgent 
Table 3.3 - Incident Urgency Level (Bank) 
The priority is set by adding the impact and urgency degree and decreasing it by one. So the 
highest possible priority is 1, the lowest is 6. The timeframe within which the incident must be 
















4 working hours 
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12 working hours 
4 
12 working hours 
5 








Table 3.4 - SLA Time frames  
It is possible that the Service Desk is able to handle the incident, but cannot do this immediately. 
The incident is then assigned to the Service Desk. In most cases the Service Desk does not know 
what is causing the incident or how to solve it, so they must make an appeal to people with 
more expertise: second-line support groups, having more specialist skills, time or other 
resources to solve incidents (CCTA (Central Computer & Telecommunications Agency), 2000, p. 
74). Because the Service Desk inquired the user about the incident, they will have an idea on 
what could be causing the incident or at least in what area to start investigating it. In Peregrine, 
a list of teams appears that could be consulted for this kind of incident. The Service Desk assigns 
the perceived most suitable team to handle the incident. 
People from the IT department are split up into teams that each has their own specialization. 
These are virtual teams, because they could comprise people who work in different divisions 
and/or at different locations. They all have access to Peregrine, and when an incident is assigned 
to a team, it appears in the mailbox of the specific team and each team member can assign the 
incident to himself or herself. The team member that assigns the incident to himself/herself is 
called the incident handler. When the incident appears is assigned to the wrong team, it is sent 
back to the sender. 
Investigation and diagnosis 
The incident handler will investigate the incident and try to find a solution or a workaround. It is 
possible that a solution can only be implemented after some time, e.g. at a new release. A 
workaround could be suggested that will help the user until the real solution is implemented. 
When a team member cannot identify the underlying cause of the incident and propose a 
solution or workaround to it, the incident can be further rerouted to a higher-line support team, 
even an external vendor, until a solution to the incident is found. 
Resolution and recovery 
The incident handler implements the solution or the workaround, takes all necessary recovery 
actions and updates the documentation of the incident in Peregrine by describing how he/she 
solved the incident. 
Incident closure 
The Service Desk contacts the user to make sure the proposed solution is satisfactory. If this is 
not the case, the incident is sent back to the incident handler. The Service Desk closes the 
incident when the user is satisfied with the proposed solution. 
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Security incident handling 
Not all incidents are handled in this manner. Incidents that are a (potential) threat to the 
confidentiality or integrity of the information or even the organization, or incidents that have 
impact on the availability of the systems or networks and are suspected to be caused by criminal 
intent, are handled in a special process. This security incident handling process is not the scope 
of this thesis. 
Incident briefing 
Every morning the incidents with a priority code one or two that occurred the day before or still 
have an open status are discussed at a ‘morning briefing’. Employees who solved the incident or 
know more about it, explain the cause of the incident and the (proposed) solution to a public 
comprising general managers, incident process coordinators, service delivery owners, and other 
IT staff that is involved in Incident Management or just is interested. A staff member of the 
Service Management division serves as the chair of the meeting. Half an hour before the 
briefing, potentially interested employees to attend the briefing can read a document on the 
intranet that describes the incidents that will be discussed. The briefing can be attended ‘live’ at 
the head office of the financial institution or at another office via videoconference. 
2.2 NPP Case42 
2.2.1 The company 
The NPP under research is part of a European energy company which core businesses are (1) 
sales of electricity, natural gas and energy products and services; (2) electricity generation; (3) 
electricity and natural gas trading; and (4) management of electricity and natural gas networks, 
on behalf of distribution system operators. The company43 employs over 15.000 staff and 
realizes a turnover of over 12 billion Euros. It operates seven nuclear reactors and has numerous 
thermal plants as well with which it generates over 130 000 Giga Watt Hour (GWh) electrical 
power44. According to recent national legislation, nuclear power should be phased out, starting 
in 2015, which puts a large amount of stress on the organization. Equally noteworthy is that 
large scale commercialization of power production in Europe has unleashed a series of mergers 
and acquisitions that probably will continue for a while stressing the volatility of the European 
energy market.  
2.2.2 The Nuclear Power Plant 
Reactors 
The site houses four reactors, all of the Pressurized Water Reactor type. The two older reactors 
share various systems, among which a control room with separate consoles for each reactor, 
which makes them virtually unique. Their tight association accounts for the fact that these 
reactors are referred to within the plant as ‘twin-reactors’. They have a generating power of 
about 400MW. The other two reactors are of a more modern breed and although identical, they 
are separate entities, both generating some 1000MW. The reactors themselves and closely 
connected machinery such as steam generators and tools for fuel manipulations are housed in 
circular containment buildings, as is usual for reactors of this type. The turbines and other 
machinery are housed in adjacent machine halls. The control rooms and offices of staff that are 
closely involved in operation of the installations are in buildings that are connected to the 
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machine halls and reactor buildings. Separate buildings house administrative staff, workshops 
used by maintenance personnel, a restaurant and a wastewater facility. This facility deals with all 
the water that is used and discarded on the site, also by the actual nuclear installations, and it 
therefore fulfills an important function by taking care that no contamination leaks from the site 
into the environment. The two gigantic cooling towers and the eternal clouds of water vapor 
rising up from them can be seen from many miles. The site itself is dominated by a vast network 
of power lines crisscrossing the site and their continuous buzzing.  
Maintenance regime 
Both Maintenance & Repair work constitute a major part of the activity that takes place on the 
site of the power plant. Repair work is usually incidental of nature; whenever a defect is found, a 
notification is issued and the repair of the device is scheduled (a more detailed description of 
this process can be found below). Repairing defects is an activity that cannot be foreseen and 
planned a long time in advance in most cases. Maintenance work differs in that respect: 
maintenance work is planned for very long periods, some activities are dictated by 
(inter)national legislation or the plant’s designer and are planned for five or ten years. The 
complexity of a nuclear power plant, the sheer numbers of machines and devices and the 
narrow tolerances some parts and devices must function within, lead to elaborate maintenance 
plans. Information technology forms a vital aid in managing these maintenance plans. Periodic 
maintenance is automatically planned and interdependencies between parts that play a role in 
the maintenance planning are automatically monitored. 
In order to achieve an efficient maintenance regime that requires as little downtime of the 
reactors as possible, many maintenance activities are bundled per reactor and are executed 
within a time span of three to six weeks, during which the involved reactor is brought to a halt. 
These intensive maintenance periods are called ‘revisions’. They are not only used for 
maintenance, they also offer the opportunity to install new or updated instruments in places 
that cannot be accessed when the reactor and connected machinery (such as steam generators 
and turbines) are operational. Every reactor is subjected to one revision each year, with one 
major revision every four years. During revisions, maintenance crews are active 24/7 on the site 
and a single shift for a team can last up to fourteen hours. Not surprisingly, revisions are 
experienced by the NPP personnel as very intensive and stressful periods offering little 
opportunity for rest or time to spend with families. This is compensated for during the periods 
between revisions, when employees can go on leave. A major reorganization in 2001 has had an 
important influence on the organizational ‘tides’ that are dictated by the revisions. Before the 
reorganization, each reactor had its own maintenance team. This implied that each maintenance 
team had one revision on hand each year. Currently, each maintenance team works on a limited 
set of components all over the site. This means that each maintenance team now faces four 
yearly revisions. This imposes a much larger amount of stress on the maintenance crew and 
makes it more difficult for workers to take up leave and follow job-related courses. 
Organizational Structure 
In this section, a general overview on the organizational structure of the power plant will be 
provided. Please note that this overview only concerns this particular plant; it does not reflect 
any part outside the plant itself. The overview in this chapter is predominantly assembled from 
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information interviewees provided during the data collection stage of the research and 
observations made on-site by the researchers. 
One of the goals of this reorganization was to make the plant operate more efficiently by 
increasing cost awareness on behalf of the plant’s staff. One of the ways to make operational 
personnel more aware of the costs of their actions was the introduction of an internal customer-
supplier model. This model dictates that whenever a task must be performed or a part must be 
ordered, a request should be sent by the asking team to the EMS division (Electro-Mechanical 
Services), who should in turn respond by sending an offer, which can then be accepted by the 
team that identified the need for the service or product. In order to make things run smoothly, a 
division was put in place that could aid in the negotiation process. Other changes in structure 
after the 2001 reorganization include the transition from entity-based teams to functionally 
oriented teams. Before the reorganization, each reactor and the water treatment facility had its 
cross-functional, own servicing team, consisting of specialists for every function that existed 
within the part of the plant the team was responsible for. 
2.2.3 Maintenance & Repair Process 
In this subsection, the Maintenance & Repair process, which is the actual focus of this research 
within the power plant, is described. It is important to note that Maintenance & Repair jobs run 
through the process in much the same way with only minor differences. The flow of a typical job 
(Figure 3.5) is followed from the point where it originates until the spot where the job enters the 
filing cabinets as a piece of documentation for further reference.  
 
Figure 3.5 - Maintenance & Repair process (Vanhuysse, 2005) 
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For a comprehension of the Maintenance & Repair process, it is important to realize that there 
are three important types of administrative entities that play a role in the process: notifications, 
work orders and work clearance applications. 
Notifications 
Any employee that observes a malfunction can create a notification or deviance in the plant and 
it includes information like the description of the anomaly, a priority index estimated by the 
reporter of the problem and a required end date. The priority index is a number varying from 0 
(zero) to 3, 0 indicating a severe problem that must be dealt with immediately and 3 indicating a 
problem that needs to be solved, but that does not necessarily needs to be dealt with in the 
short term. The ultimate execution date is an additional piece of information that provides 
insight into the relationship between the priority (which should be regarded as a measure of 
importance rather than actual priority) and the haste that is involved in the issue. For example, a 
notification can have a priority level of 1, which denotes a fairly urgent/important job, but an 
ultimate execution date that lies several months in the future. This means that the issue is very 
important indeed, but that there is no necessity to immediately take action. This might seem 
contradictory, but in practice it does not need to be, for instance if the notification involves an 
additional safety requirement that is imposed by law, but does not need to be implemented 
before a specified date. If a specific device is involved in the notification, the reporter of the 
notification is required to put a paper tag in place on the device to indicate that a malfunction or 
deviance has been noted and reported. In the remainder of this dissertation, for the purpose of 
our research, the terms ‘notification’ and ‘incident’ are use interchangeably. 
To give an impression of the scale of operations: in 2004, more than 36,000 notifications were 
created. 
Priority level Description 
0 Critical; must be dealt with on very short term 
1 Crucial, but can be planned 
2 Important 
3 Required 
Table 3.5 - Priority levels in the M&R process (NPP) (Vanhuysse, 2005) 
Work orders 
The second important entity is the work order. A work order contains a description of the 
activities that are part of the actual job. A work order can either be the result of a maintenance 
request (entered manually or automatically planned by the information system), a malfunction 
report (in this case, a notification precedes the work order), a modification request (a request 
for modifying the plant in some way) or it can be generated by a work preparator as part of a 
higher level job. During the work preparation phase (see section ‘Work preparation’), the global 
information in the order is expanded and details are added that are necessary for the execution 
phase of the job. This information includes a short description of the work to be performed, a 
cost estimate and the device in the plant that is involved in the job. Workers must be able to 
present a printed version of the work order of the job they are currently working on (work 
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permit). That way, they can prove that the job has been prepared properly and that the workers 
have been instructed on the particularities of the job. The total number of work orders created 
in 2004 gives an impression of the scope of the Maintenance & Repair process: in that year, 
more than 73,000 work orders were processed. 
Work orders vs. notifications 
The apparent discrepancy between the number of notification (36,000) and the number of work 
orders (73,000) requires some explanation. In fact, even though the numbers may seem 
contradictory, they indicate the nature of the relationship between both entities, which is 
essential to the understanding of the Maintenance & Repair process. As explained earlier, the 
start of most Maintenance & Repair tasks is the creation of a new notification. If deemed 
necessary, such a single notification is forwarded to a servicing team. The servicing team will 
then further investigate the scope of work that needs to be done and creates the required work 
orders to be executed by the team’s workers. Additionally, a job may require auxiliary activities 
performed by other teams, such as decoupling a device and testing machinery after a repair job 
has been completed. A servicing team can create work orders and directly assign them to other 
teams without a notification preceding those work orders. In short, this means that a single 
notification can theoretically lead to any number of work orders, which accounts for the 
difference in the number of notification and the number of work orders. 
Work clearance applications 
The third entity that exists in the Maintenance & Repair process is the work clearance 
application. In Chapter 1, the concept of tight coupling was introduced. This tightness of 
coupling has a direct effect on Maintenance & Repair jobs that constitute a major portion of the 
work that takes place on the site. Along with the fact that building a nuclear power plant is an 
immensely cost-intensive endeavor, which implies that once the project is realized, the plant is 
expected to be operational most of the time45, the interconnectedness of the plant’s systems 
implies that most maintenance work will be performed on ‘live’ parts of the installation or 
systems that are directly connected to working parts of the plant. In order to ensure safe 
working conditions, the circuits and devices that are subject to maintenance or repair activities, 
must be shut down or de-coupled before actual work takes place. Therefore, EMS teams must 
file a request for consignation of the systems they are planning to work on (the so-called ‘work 
clearance application’) in order for Operations to decouple and inactivate these systems at the 
right time insofar as the operating and testing schedules as well as other ongoing work on the 
plant allow it. Consignation requests are involved in nearly every job in the plant and form an 
important part of the communications between Operations and EMS. The work clearance 
applications are created and processed in parallel to the creation and processing of the work 
orders they accompany. Once clearance is granted by Operations, a printed version of the work 
clearance application is used on the work floor as a permit to start work. Together with the work 
order itself that is provided by a work preparator from EMS, the printed work clearance 
application provided by Operations constitutes a worker’s permission to perform a specific task.  
Daily Committee Meeting (DCE) 
The first step all corrective jobs in the plant go through is an evaluation of all new notifications. 
New notifications are assessed on a daily basis by a committee (‘DCE’; Daily Committee meeting 
per Entity), including expert members from both Operations and EMS. Along with work in 
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progress, these new notifications are reviewed one by one and decisions are made whether a 
notification requires action to be undertaken, the assigned priority is correct, what kind of work 
must actually been done, which servicing team(s) would be most suited to handle the job and 
whether the job requires any particular safety measures. For example, jobs that involve work on 
the reactor building penetrations (through which control lines, steam pipes and cables for 
measurement devices run) are always treated with special care as they can possibly cause 
disturbances in the containment of the reactor and therefore constitute a serious risk. Also, new 
notifications are related by the committee to work in progress and the operating and testing 
schedules of the plant to ensure that no conflicts will arise when a job is started. Therefore, the 
multi-disciplinary nature of the DCE committee, induced by the presence of expert members 
from different divisions, is vital. 
Planning 
After the scope of the work has been determined and any conflicts with other activities on the 
site are avoided or resolved, the notification is forwarded to the EMS team the job has been 
assigned to. The sub chief of this team collects the jobs forwarded to him and assigns them to 
his work preparators. These work preparators in turn communicate their job portfolios to the 
planners, along with a proposed execution date for each job. The planners create a planning, 
which incorporates all the jobs that are assigned to the teams, but at the same time takes into 
account the available work force and other activities at the site in order to avoid conflicts as well 
as to benefit from advantages that result from grouping specific orders. For example, two work 
orders on the same electromotor can be scheduled adjacently so that the motor need only be 
decommissioned once for both jobs to take place. It is essential that the planners are constantly 
communicating with both EMS and Operations to remain updated on the current Maintenance 
& Repair situation as well as the current operation and testing situation of the plant. One way to 
achieve that is through weekly recurring planning meetings that are attended by the work 
preparators and the planners. The planning scope for day-to-day work is three weeks. For 
revisions, specific schedules are created that span the entire period of the revision. 
Work preparation 
As soon as a job is assigned to a team, the preparation of the work can take place. Typical 
activities in the preparation stage include an on-site inspection of the problem of the device to 
be serviced, the ordering of replacement parts, finding any repair procedures that exist within 
the organization for this particular job or creating a new procedure if no existing method can be 
found, creating a risk analysis for the job, adding information to the work order and creating a 
work clearance application for each job. If a job involves activities that fall beyond the scope of 
the team the job is assigned to, the job preparator can issue additional notifications (sub-jobs) 
directly to teams that have the necessary competencies. The work preparators who are 
responsible for these tasks are mostly employees that started out at the plant as workers 
(welders, mechanics) and were promoted to work preparator level. Their work floor experience 
provides them the necessary insight to perform their job. Moreover, work floor employees from 
EMS teams indicated during the interviews conducted in this research that practical experience 
grants work preparators the credibility they sometimes need to convince the workers that the 
proposed working methods are the optimal compromise between efficiency and safety. 
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Job execution 
As soon as a job is prepared and safety clearance is provided by Operations, a team of workers 
receives a printed work order and the job can be executed on the scheduled time. Activities that 
are regarded part of the job execution phase include the actual work itself, as well as safety 
measurements (performed by both Classical Safety and Radiation Protection officials), testing of 
the involved devices, followed by a canceling of the safety clearance and debriefing of the 
involved team(s). Of prime importance during work execution is the STAR principle, which stands 
for Stop Think Act Review. This principle is employed to make workers aware of their actions and 
to ensure that they go about their work in a conscious way. Forms are being used on which the 
workers are required to record, for example, that they are aware of the safety measures that 
apply to the job and that their job site is safe. As soon as a job has been completed, its status is 
set to ‘WOCO’ (‘Work Order COmpleted’) in the information system. Any tags that were put in 
place on devices when the notification was issued (in case of course a notification was involved) 
are being removed by the workers in order to make it clearly visible that the work has been 
completed. 
Documentation 
The final phase a job runs through is the documentation phase. Documentation of the work 
essentially takes place on two different levels: first, the team that has performed the work 
documents any particularities of the work in the central documentation of the plant and/or in 
the team’s own documentation set. On an evaluation form, the team can indicate whether all 
post-maintenance/repair tests have been passed and also whether the procedures that have 
been used in the maintenance/repair activity should be revised. Routine jobs do not receive 
much attention from the teams that have executed them as a specialized documentation 
department (‘Work Settlement’) takes care of documenting every piece of information that is 
available after a job has been performed and there is no need for the servicing teams to spend 
time on this routine documentation work. The Work Settlement department receives all work 
orders that have been used by the workers to perform their activities and all information on 
these orders is entered into the plant’s documentation. This way for example, information on 
spare parts used for repairs can be located by servicing teams in future occurrences of identical 
or similar jobs and historical data can be used to spot recurring problems and discover trends in 
defects. When a work order has passed through this final phase of its existence, it is marked 
‘teco’ (‘TEchnically COmpleted’) and it is filed away for future reference. 
3 Hermeneutics 
3.1 The origins of hermeutics 
Madison (1988) has proposed a list of criteria that act as methods for hermeneutic 
interpretation. The criteria included properties to be found in interpretations such as coherence, 
comprehensiveness, penetration, thoroughness, appropriateness, contextuality, suggestiveness, 
agreement and potential. They are explained in more detail in Table 3.6. It should ensure that 
the judgments or conclusions arrived at are not gratuitous or the result of subjective whim 
(Madison, 1988, p. 28). This is in line with a concern expressed by Walsham (1995) where he 
states that interpretive researchers should have a view of their own role in the complex process 
of “accessing other people’s interpretations, filtering them through their own conceptual 
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apparatus, and feeding a version of events back to others” (Walsham, 1995, p. 77). These 
principles challenge researchers to question their interpretation, especially given that the 
collection of data involves the researcher’s own subjectivity (Butler, 1998, p. 292-293). These 
principles were employed throughout the interpretive process in both our case studies as an aid 
in arriving at a deeper interpretation of the phenomenon and is component parts. Together with 
a knowledge and familiarity with the hermeneutic circle of understanding as the core concept of 
hermeneutic thought and of the central role of the dialectic is vital for the hermeneutic 
researcher (Butler, 1998, p. 293). 
Coherence The interpretation must be coherent in itself; it must present a unified picture 
and not contradict itself. This holds true even if the work being interpreted has 
contradictions of its own. The ‘interpretor’ must make coherent sense of all the 
contradictions. 
Comprehensive This concerns the relation of the interpretation in itself to the work as a whole. In 
interpreting texts, one must take into account the author’s thoughts as a whole 
and not ignore works, which bear on the issue. 
Penetration It should bring out a guiding or underlying intention in the text i.e. recognizing the 
author’s attempts to resolve a central problematic. 
Thoroughness A good interpretation should attempt to deal with all the questions it poses to the 
interpreted texts. 
Appropriate Interpretations must be ones that the text itself raises and not an occasion for 
dealing with one’s questions. 
Contextuality  The author’s work must be seen in its historical and cultural context. 
Suggestiveness A good understanding will be fertile in that it will raise questions that stimulate 
further research and questions. 
Agreement The interpretation must agree with what the author actually says. This is in 
contrast to reductive hermeneutics characteristic of Marxism or Freudlanism. 
Potential The interpretation is capable of being extended and continues to unfold 
harmoniously. 
Table 3.6 - Methodological principles for the interpretive process (Madison, 1988;Uysal, 2009, p. 7) 
In the positivist view on science, experience is thought to be the only source of meaning and the 
only source of knowledge. This is known as the Verification Principle: only assertions that are in 
principle verifiable by observation or experience can convey factual information (Gregor, 2006). 
The purpose is to explain (Das Erklären) the complex world. Generally speaking Organization 
Science research can be classified as positivist if there is evidence of formal propositions, 
quantifiable measures of variables, hypothesis testing, and the drawing of inferences about a 
phenomenon from a representative sample to a stated population (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991) 
(Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 69). The interpretive tradition on the other hand, steers researchers 
towards a different outlook, where the primary goal is not to develop theory that is testable in a 
narrow sense (although its validity or credibility may still be assessed), but in understanding (Das 
Verstehen) the complex world. “*…+ interpretive researchers insist that any observable 
organizational patterns are constantly changing because, as Parmenides observed, ‘you cannot 
swim in the same river twice’” lnterpretivists argue that organizations are not static and that the 
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relationships between people, organizations, and technology are not fixed but constantly 
changing. Therefore, interpretive research seeks to understand a moving target. In so far as each 
instance is treated as a unique historical occurrence, interpretive research is idiographic” (Klein & 
Myers, 1999, p. 73). 
Several interpretative approaches are possible, of which phenomenological hermeneutics is one 
(Butler, 1998, p. 285). It is elaborated on under the next section. Hermeneutics is defined as the 
theory or philosophy of the interpretation of meaning (Butler, 1998, p. 286). Several types of 
hermeneutic research approaches exist (For an overview, see: Butler, 1998, p. 286) but we 
adhere to the pragmatic-constructivist approach where interpretation involves entering into the 
interpretative norms of a community and where meaning operates and is to be found within the 
historical contexts of the interpreter and interpreted. This approach is based on Martin 
Heidegger and has amongst its proponents Hans Georg Gadamer and Ludwig Wittgenstein. We 
take a Gadamerian approach to our research, since it is characterized, not by a pure attempt to 
apply any pre-existing theory to the domain in question, but rather by the attempt to think from 
within that domain, and in a way that is attentive to it. In that sense, application of theory ‘is 
neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, but 
co-determines it as a whole from the beginning’ (Malpas, 2009, citing Gadamer in: Truth and 
Method, 1989, p. 324) Theory and application do not occur in separation from one another, but 
are part of a single hermeneutical practice (Gadamer, Weinsheimer, & Marshall, 2004).  
3.2 Hermeneutic circle  
Perhaps the most fundamental tenet of hermeneutics is that understanding has a circular 
structure. Understanding works in broadening concentric circles, hence Heidegger’s labeling it 
the hermeneutic ‘circle of understanding’ or in short hermeneutic circle. The unity of understood 
meaning expands in concentric circles, for instance from A through E, like in Figure 3.6. 
Important in this respect is that in understanding phenomena one remains permanently 
determined by the anticipatory movement of ‘for-understanding’ (i.e. pre-understanding’ or 
prejudice) (Butler, 1998, p. 291). The interpretation of a phenomenon (the hermeneutic whole) 
begins by the examination of its component phenomena (the parts). However, understanding the 
component phenomena can only begin when their relationships to the whole have been 
determined – the determination of these contextual relationships is itself guided by an 
expectation of meaning arising from the preceding context (e.g. derived from one’s tradition-
influenced prejudice). Through a dialectic process he will identify its parts. Operating from a 
holistic perspective and relationship to the whole consolidated into an emergent understanding 
of the phenomenon. In cycling through the circle of understanding, each part will be 
consolidated, and in so doing different perspectives will emerge – the horizons of interpreter and 
phenomenon will gradually fuse. This cycling through the ‘circle of understanding’ continues until 
the ‘breakdown’ has been repaired and the phenomenon achieves the status of a ‘ready-to-hand’ 
(i.e. understood, obvious). (Butler, 1998, p. 291). Thus, as Gadamer (1988, p. 68) points out: “The 
movement of understanding always runs from the whole to part and back to the whole. The task 
is to expand in concentric circles the unity of the understood meaning. Harmonizing all the 
particulars with the whole is at each stage the criterion of correct understanding. Its absence is 
failure to understand” (Butler, 1998, p. 291). 




Figure 3.6 - Hermeneutic Circle (Butler, 1998) 
The hermeneutic circle runs from understanding to explanation and back again. The 
understanding of a social phenomenon can only be reached by a dialectic process of narrowing 
the scope of generic concepts concerning it, and identifying the ‘whole’ the ‘hierarchy of topics, 
or primary and subordinate topics’, or primary and subordinate topics that constitute it – that is, 
its constituent parts (Butler, 1998, p. 291). 
The hermeneutic circle constitutes a paradoxical concept. Whilst analyzing an object (e.g. a text, 
an interview transcription, a cognitive map), we ‘break it down’ into its component parts (words, 
paragraphs, constructs, nodes and so on). However, these parts only make sense in terms of the 
whole object. There is an endless dialectic, according to Heidegger, in terms of how we read, 
between reductionism (breaking the object down) and holism (reading it as a whole) (Wallace, 
Ross, & Davies, 2003, p. 590). This introduces a paradox: we can never understand an object 
without breaking it down, and yet we must look at it as a whole before we understand the 
individual parts. For Heidegger, this is a ‘chicken or egg’ situation: either step logically 
presupposes the other. Interpretative analysis is therefore a paradoxical action. In order to 
escape this paradox, we must make a ‘leap’ of subjective (non-rational) intuition ‘into’ the 
object. However, the correlate of this is that once the analyst is ‘inside’ the circle, understanding 
can proceed via a dialectical process and, therefore, progress. The object is broken down and 
then built up again: and each time this is done its ‘meaning’ becomes clearer (Wallace et al., 
2003, p. 590).  
Usually the primary investigator is both the inquirer into the phenomenon of interest and the 
analyst of the information about it. Thus, when interviews are used as the mode of inquiry, the 
analyst already has a sense of the text given by a respondent even before it is transcribed. 
Moreover, the act of transcribing deepens understanding so that, irrespective of whether or not 
the text as a whole is read and reread prior to the analysis of its particulars, the analyst has a 
sense of the meaning of the text as a whole. Thus, the hermeneutic circle is entered. In other 
words, the understanding of the whole of the text influences the understanding of a part of it, 
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and the understanding of each part in turn influences the understanding of the whole. This 
circling of part to whole and back again results in progressive understanding that, in principle, is 
non-ending, although, hopefully, it reaches a kind of stability (Rennie, 2000, p. 484). 
3.3 Relevance of hermeneutics for our research 
In our research, we make the step to verification by taking the positivist strand of quantitative 
analysis of hypotheses. Our research methodology is one that tries to reconcile conventional 
theory-based design and hermeneutics. The essence of this approach is to view data not through 
the filter of an isolated theoretical abstraction nor as an unbounded collection of 
idiosyncratically interpreted, specific instances, but to recognize and analyze the multiple, 
simultaneous theories embodied by the data (Carroll & Kellogg, 1989, p. 13).  
The most fundamental principle of hermeneutics is that of the hermeneutic circle (Klein & 
Myers, 1999, p. 71). It is a notion that implies that one can come to understand a complex whole 
from preconceptions about the meanings of its parts and their interrelationships. This is what 
our research aims at. The hermeneutic circle helps in figuring out contradictions between theory 
and data. Moreover, since our thesis is about paradox, there are plenty of contradictions that do 
not necessarily mean that the underpinning theory is wrong or that the research is wrongly 
designed leading to faulty data. Data-Theory is dealt with at the level of the part, whereas a 
theoretical conceptualization independent from data could lead us to understand why data does 
fit theory after all. In other words, what we suggest here is triangulation. Not only a triangulation 
of data, not only a triangulation of theory, but also a triangulation on the level of the research 
perspective, meaning an alternation of induction and deduction, of interpretative approaches 
and positivism. This calls for high-level conceptualization and very down to earth research. This 
starting point explains the eclectic research mix we applied in this thesis. In this subsection we 
point out why we attach great importance to hermeneutics through a triangulation approach of 
our research by taking a (1) conceptual, (2) methodical and (3) construct/theory perspective. 
3.4 Triangulation 
The research paradigm of triangulation requires that qualitative methods be combined with 
quantitative methods to allow for assessment of the general validity of research findings (Koch, 
1993, p. 76). In addition, theory building was enhanced by insights gained from published 
research in related areas so that a triangulation of data and theory could be accomplished. 
Obviously, method, data collection, analysis, and theory stand in close relationship to one 
another.  
We propose here a combination of methods that will approach the data from multiple 
perspectives, each designed to provide a specific insight into the topic, a triangulation of 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Sullivan and Beach (2002, p. 1424) define triangulation of 
data as the “use of more than one form of data collection to test the same hypothesis within a 
unified research plan *…+ To minimize the degree of specificity of certain methods to particular 
bodies of knowledge, a researcher can use two or more methods of data collection to test 
hypotheses and measure variables; this is the essence of triangulation". In our research design, 
this means that interviews will be supplemented by other forms of field data – in casu meeting 
attendances, the study of internal documents, direct observation or participant observation of 
action, and surveys (Walsham, 2006, p. 323). 
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The theories/set of constructs is another component of the instrument. Even though a 
researcher does not begin a project with a fully preconceived and uncompromising theory in 
mind, we are convinced that taking a promising theoretical lens as a starting point for research is 
indispensable. Contrary to what is suggested by Grounded Theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 
12), we do not believe that research begins just with an area of study and without a theory, 
allowing the theory to emerge solely from the data. Making the right choice regarding theory 
therefore here is quintessential in order to reach valuable research outcomes. The theoretical 
constructs we rely on have been described in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, but in the following 
section, we point-out their methodological appropriateness. 
4 HRO Research Taxonomies 
After the science-philosophical background of hermeneutic research described above, we now 
take the discussion to the level of what it all means for research in the field of HROs and make a 
plea for taking a holistic, integrative and comprehensive approach to research on HRT and SeMa. 
The field of reliability studies could benefit from adding other taxonomies to gain additional 
insight into the merits of the theories involved. For this reason, we have chosen taxonomies that 
help in juxtaposing our two main theories but not without stressing the necessary nuance and 
dynamics between them. We subsequently use the Positivist vs. Interpretive (4.1), the 
Normative vs. Descriptive (4.2), the Quantitative vs. Qualitative (4.3) and the Inductive vs. 
Deductive (4.3) taxonomy. The presence of ‘versus’ in these descriptions generally implies that 
the researcher must choose between one or the other. However, typical of hermeneutics is that 
a middle way does exist. 
4.1 Positivist vs. interpretive 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, p. 5) posit that positivist studies are premised on the existence of 
a priori fixed relationships within phenomena and that they serve primarily to test theory, in an 
attempt to increase predictive understanding of phenomena. This would not serve us well 
because a pure positivist research tends to ignore that people shape their context. Thus, in this 
research we take a positivist position but one that has an interpretive aspect as well because of 
the instrument (i.e. HRT and SeMa) it uses46. This is in line with our theorizing on reliability from 
a systems thinking perspective, and more particularly from the perspective of dynamics and 
emergence (See: Swiss Cheese Model). This choice has three consequences for the nature of the 
conclusions that can be drawn upon the validation of the hypotheses put to the test. A first 
consequence applies to those hypotheses that are validated or falsified. A caveat is in place for 
their broader applicability than the cases. Because of the nature of the instrument, it cannot be 
guaranteed that the observations can be explained by the constructs we have relied on. In our 
survey of literature, we have found no evidence that constructs figuring under the HRT and 
SenseMaking label are exhaustive or limitative. A second consequence applies to those 
hypotheses that could not be validated or falsified. Our assertion is that the data underlying 
these non-validated hypotheses can contribute to a better understanding (das Verstehen) of 
organizational reliability, despite their inappropriateness for explaining (das Erklären). As a third 
consequence should be mentioned that whereas positivist research repulses bias, interpretative 
science (hermeneutics) acknowledges prejudice as an initial lens, as the necessary starting point 
of our understanding (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 76). During the research however, this lens has to 
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be adjusted to be in line with the research findings. However, it is important for the author to 
make this bias explicit because it helps in understanding the design.  
4.2 Normative vs. descriptive 
Traditionally organization theory distinguishes between normative (i.e. for making prescriptions) 
and descriptive (i.e. purely explanatory) approaches to organizations (Fucks, 2004;Donaldson, 
1990, p. 373). This especially with respect to organizational culture, but – to a lesser extent – 
also to an organization’s structure and coordination mechanisms. The normative approach is 
being identified with an Anglo-Saxon vision on organizing whereas the descriptive approach 
represents the continental European school of thought. We can use this opposing approach to 
learn about NAT and HRT. Both NAT and HRT can be considered normative theories. NAT, on the 
one hand, strongly recommends avoiding circumstances in which organizations/systems 
simultaneously tightly coupled and interactively complex. Therefore, Normal Accidents theorists 
(e.g. Perrow and Sagan) strongly recommend excluding nuclear energy production and nuclear 
warfare technology. High Reliability theorists on the other hand, clearly put forward solutions to 
solve the coupling/complexity dilemma. Although they stress there is no such thing as a unique 
recipe for reliability (de Bruijne, 2006, p. 63). This can clearly be seen in the formulation of their 
advices where they (e.g. Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) use substantives that have the look-and-feel of 
imperatives (cf. Commitment to Resilience, Reluctance to Simplify, Sensitivity to Operations, 
Deference to Expertise and Preoccupation with Failure). 
It is necessary to solve the normative-descriptive dichotomy before continuing our research. In 
fact, we believe it is not a dichotomy. The distinction between normative and descriptive is a 
theoretical one. Describing the situation as it is (descriptive) is a necessary condition for 
changing the organization (normative). Our research ambition is to be descriptive. More and 
broader research is needed for it to have the ambition to be normative. For instance, more 
research is needed on the set of constructs itself in order to make them more holistic. In 
addition, a larger set of case studies and/or a larger set of research units within the cases are 
needed as to reach conclusions that are more generalizable.  
4.3 Quantitative vs. qualitative 
Among the criticisms often leveled against recent research in HROs has been its heavy reliance 
on qualitative observation, the relative absence of testable hypotheses, the apparent lack of 
generalization to other kinds of organizations, and perhaps most seriously, the absence of an 
explicit theoretical foundation for this stream of inquiry (Creed et al., 1993, p. 56). Research on 
high reliability has been mainly qualitative, as well by NAT students (e.g. Sagan, 1993) as by their 
HRT counterparts (e.g. Rochlin et al., 1987). Whenever quantitative research methods are 
applied it is in the field of validating HRO in the field of safety, not reliability (Gary, 2003;Fratus, 
2008). The same applies a fortiori to the study of NAT with only Wolf and Berniker addressing 
the issue quantitatively (Wolf, 2001). In their application of HRT in the field of reliability that 
goes beyond safety, Vogus and Welbourne (2003a) provided a notable exception. This limited 
application of quantitative methods should not come as a surprise since the general belief is that 
this research type is not suited to gain a thorough understanding of what constitutes 
(un)reliability (Weick, 1995).This is remarkable, because quantitative research can contribute to 
a better understanding of High Reliability.  
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Also on SenseMaking, the same critique of absence of quantitative research could be uttered. To 
the best of our knowledge we do not know of any published research that not only formulates 
hypotheses but that in addition puts them to the test. This observation is quite remarkable since 
SenseMaking lends itself perfectly for quantitative analysis as well: “In the argument between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to research, sense-making likewise refuses to choose a 
side. It is explicitly both qualitative and quantitative. *…+ Sense-making, *…+ assumes there is 
something systematic about individual behavior to be found by pursuing process orientations. In 
this way, then, sense-making casts itself as systematic qualitative research -- an approach with 
qualitative sensitivity which is amenable to the systematic power of quantitative analysis” 
(Dervin, 1992, p. 81). 
Our approach tries to remediate this shortcoming in the field of HRO and SenseMaking research. 
We strongly believe that in essence there is a false dichotomy between quantitative and 
qualitative research methodologies. Instead of being dichotomous, quantitative and qualitative 
research strategies are lying on an interactive continuum, with theory as the driving force (Basch 
& Gold, 1986). That way, our research has the potential of ‘Erklären’ whereas in its quantitative 
aspects it has the potential of ‘Verstehen’.  
4.4 Induction vs. deduction 
HRT scholars from the first hour (notably La Porte, Rochlin and Roberts) have started their 
school of thought by observing high velocity organizations and systems (nuclear submarines and 
aircraft carriers). They collected individual ideas about what constituted reliability under tiring 
circumstances and derived from this a framework that could provide a coherent approach to 
safety and reliability (induction). Perrow on the other hand took a theoretical approach when he 
focused on the explanation of (near-) disasters (deduction) (de Bruijne, 2006, p. 62). Our 
approach is to combine both: we have started from observations by means of a risk analysis 
(induction) and went to HRT and SeMa constructs (deduction), which we have used for the 
construction of our survey (positivist), but have noticed that they were unable of explaining the 
data (deduction) so that we had to rely again on observations by means of an exploratory factor 
analysis (induction). The constructs derived thereof served for a positivist testing of hypotheses; 
the discussion of their analysis in its turn drew on theory. This is in line with Roberts and Creed 
(1993, p. 255) who state that “*…+ HRO research is moving apace from its earliest stages of 
primarily inductive and descriptive work to hypothico-deductive and prescriptive work”.  
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5 Research Approach 
5.1 HRO Research guidelines 
For our research on high reliability in high-velocity organizations, we have taken the guidelines 
by Roberts and Rousseau (Table 3.7) at heart.  
Spend time in the system and engage in active discussions with members at all levels. 
Build bridges and networks among research team and system members. 
Consider the attributes researchers bring to the organization that may influence the research enterprise 
(for example, maturity, and gender). 
Be concerned with messages conveyed nonverbally, as in dress and personal style, as well as those 
conveyed verbally. 
Summarize information to protect anonymity before conveying it onward. 
Learn and use organizational lingo.  
Carefully avoid going native (for example, by rotating team members) 
Use data from multiple sources and methods.  
Employ comparison units within the organization (such as operational and support units) to identify 
distinctive characteristics of extremely complex organizations. 
Maintain an organizational view by continually asking how a particular piece fits into the whole. 
Preserve impartiality. Do not become the organization’s advocate, nor its attacker. 
Table 3.7 - Prescriptions for the Research Team (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989) 
Not only the mind-set of the HRO researcher is of importance, also the attitude of the HRO 
manager, who acts as his sparring partner. For their part, managers of HROs ought to (Roberts & 
Rousseau, 1989) to co-operate as listed in Table 3.8. 
1. Develop a questioning stance vis-à-vis researchers to clarify the focus and scope of the 
research. 
2. Be ready to discuss and tackle problems important to the research. 
3. Engage in activities that use researcher skills in ways beneficial to the organization or its 
constituencies (e.g. identification of trouble spots). 
4. Listen and react to research results and feedback; check out and reality test conclusions. 
Table 3.8 - Prescription for HRO Managers (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989) 
While these recommendations may be good ones to make for any organizational research 
(Roberts & Rousseau, 1989), they are deemed essential in HRO research. Our research has taken 
into account all of them and this section describes the research mélange we have used to 
answer our research questions. In line with Moray (2000, p. 861) we posit that if one reflects on 
the findings of the HRT Founding Fathers, one can see not just that ethnographic and 
sociological methods must be added to the armamentarium of ergonomics research, but that an 
even wider approach is needed. For this reason, we collected data through a broad spectrum of 
techniques. First we explain how the case studies were prepared for (5.2). Next, we describe the 
different techniques used throughout the research (5.3 to 6) and finally we point out how this 
build-up fits the hermeneutic circle of understanding (7). 
5.2 Case study preparation 
5.2.1 Case study preparation 
In a first phase, several meetings were scheduled to fully prepare for the research project. These 
included meetings with General Management and Operational Management. During these 
sessions the scope, interdependences, timing, budget and approach were fine-tuned between 
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the two case organizations and its academic partners. Coordinating meetings were organized 
during which all participants were informed on the project and given the possibility to ask 
questions or provide feedback and additional remarks. These initial meetings formed the basis of 
further coordination of the research. Besides, we were granted full access to both the 
organization’s company intranet so that we could consult all incident management related 
documents, including tutorials, process descriptions, legacy data etc. Besides, we had at our 
disposal all necessary resources (desk, PC, internet connection, print and Xerox facilities, access 
badge etc). 
5.2.2 Researcher – subject interaction 
Action research 
If we want to do as we preach, our research had to reflect the characteristics of dynamics and 
emergence. At the same time, it had to be conducted in narrow collaboration with the 
organizations in which and for which it had been done. As we have argued above, this did not 
call for a mere quantitative or empiricist approach, but for a qualitative, ethnographic one 
(Woodward, 2001, p. 294). Therefore, asking people in a straightforward manner how they see 
things is not the right approach. Building an understanding of how they see things – in concert 
with them – is. This approach is generally described as action research, a technique involving 
researchers and practitioners in iterations of problem diagnosis, action intervention, and 
reflective learning. Action research combines theory and practice, researchers and practitioners 
(Avison, Lau, Myers, & Nielsen, 1999, p. 94). The particular approach we have taken in our study 
is a derivative form of this general action research tradition, with an emphasis on the fact that 
the researcher interacts with the research participants. We are convinced that “data are not just 
sitting there waiting to be gathered, like rocks on the seashore” (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 74). 
Instead, data are produced in a social interaction (Klein et al., 1999, p. 74) (Klein et al., 1999, p. 
74)of the researchers with the participants. Since action research is “continuously refining 
methods, data, and interpretation in subsequent cycles, in the light of the understanding 
developed in the earlier cycles” (Kasunic, 2005, p. 112), this approach suits the hermeneutic 
research style well. Worth mentioning is that on many occasions, two researchers collaborated 
on these cases. This constellation of working as a team offered broader opportunity to capture 
greater richness of data and to rely more confidently its accuracy (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 
1987). 
Ethnographic field study 
No research remains free from simplification because researchers tend to bring in line their 
findings with their theory. It could be assumed (hopefully) that this is mainly due to the need to 
fit the research data in the research framework. This simplification is normal since in many cases 
research-opportunity does not offer the possibility to spend a lot of time in the ‘bowel’ of the 
organization. Some of the reasons for this are listed below: 
- The time window often might be too small to get the occasion to spend a lot of time at 
the place the research is about. This especially is the case when investigating several 
organizations at the same time. 
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- The level of confidence to do research is sufficient to get full co-operation, but most 
organizations probably will feel they can do without someone looking over their 
shoulder, certainly, when this occurs at unexpected moments.  
Unfortunately, it is only by talking to organization members about how things really are, what 
gives sense to what people do, by asking questions and dialoguing with others, that the ‘as-is’ 
(IST) can be distinguished from the ‘to-be’ (SOLL). The only way of getting to know whether 
there is a deviation between the way procedures are used (IST) and how they are supposed to 
be used (SOLL) is by ‘sacrificing’ valuable research time in order to gain enough confidence and 
finding the right tone of speech. It is only when researchers are at the same wavelength – of 
course still keeping the necessary independence – with the object of their study that the danger 
of simplification can be limited. “Learning to feel the organization’s pulse comes only through 
close attention, listening, experience and reflection. Trial-and-error and living with the 
organization over time can develop a deep knowledge and understanding of how the 
organization functions and what it takes to correct problems” (Bennet & Bennet, 2004, p. 299) 
(Geyer & van der Zouwen, 2001, p. 299).  
Therefore, based upon the purpose of understanding the incident management process in the 
context of the organization in which it is embedded, part of the data collection was conducted 
along the principles of an ethnographic field study. To this end field observations were done in 
the two organizations over a two year period (each), overlapping one year, so a period of in total 
three years. They were gathered on the perspectives of several organizational levels, going from 
senior management to people on the floor. In addition, this study includes both real-time 
observations and retrospective data (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997, p. 3). For this observation, we 
got help from a team of master students47. At the Bank, these ethnographic field study activities 
included amongst others our presence at meetings, incident briefings and debriefings and 
project discussions of progress, but also – and at least as important – informal observations 
made and impressions gathered during lunches and coffee breaks. The same kinds of activities 
were conducted at the NPP. In addition, however, two idiosyncratic activities are worth 
mentioning and have resulted from the mutual trust between our research team and the NPPs 
senior management and staff. A first activity in that respect is that we were an observer at a 
training session at the plant’s simulator training center. Second, a particular mention is our 
experience as an in person and in real-time witness of a severe incident at the plant’s premises. 
This included our observation from the incident command procedure rollout, the decision 
making process and the incident debriefing. At all times, we kept daily records of these activities, 
providing real-time data (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997, p. 5). 
Previous research in HRO settings builds on ethnography as well. Gauthereau & Hollnagel (2005) 
for instance, in their effort of trying to understand a series of NPP incidents related to 
operational readiness verification, felt a clear need to understand work practice in its natural 
setting, i.e. the plant and thus the need for observations to be one of the sources of empirical 
materials (Gauthereau & Hollnagel, 2005, p. 121). Roberts and Rousseau (1989) called the need 
not only to focus on the activity of interest, but on the broader context “to have the bubble”. 
Like Gauthereau & Hollnagel (2005, p. 121) we experienced nonetheless that it was not possible 
to separate the specificity of the process under research from its specific environment. 
Therefore, we had to combine direct, reactive and non-obtrusive observations of selected staff 
with in-depth interviews. 





In a next phase, a substantial part of the research data was collected using semi-structured 
interviews with individual organization members as primary evidence generation mechanism 
(Palvia et al., 2003). The purpose of these time-consuming interviews was to gain a deeper 
insight into the potential risks and to avoid Groupthink. Janis (1982b) originally defined 
Groupthink as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a 
cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action”. According to this definition, Groupthink 
occurs only when cohesiveness is high. It requires that members share a strong ‘we-feeling’ of 
solidarity and desire to maintain relationships within the team at all costs. When colleagues 
operate in a Groupthink mode, they automatically apply the ‘preserve group harmony’ test to 
every decision they face (Janis, 1982b;1989). Findings by Eisenhardt and coworkers (Pelled, 
Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999) show that this is counterproductive because constructive criticism can 
facilitate vigilant problem solving. On the other hand, it needs mentioning that when individual 
values are shared within a group, there are implications for commonality in values that a group 
or organization might share. Together with Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) and following Weick 
(1995) we believe that by assessing individual constructs it is possible to understand group and 
organizational value systems (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006, p. 296). We argue that this is a fortiori 
so when combined with aggregation techniques on the level of interview analysis like cognitive 
mapping (5.4.1) or with data gathering tools like GSS (5.5). 
5.3.2 Interview organization 
We conducted interviews during several-day site visits (Table 3.9). The 51 interviews we 
conducted were taped and processed via cognitive mapping (42) or transcribed (9). Interviews 
typically lasted 90 minutes, although a few ran as long as 120 minutes.  
Case Total number of interviews 




Table 3.9 - Number of interviews conducted in both case studies 
We used an interview guide to conduct the semi-structured interviews (Appendix A and 
Appendix B). In both cases, we asked respondents open-ended questions that let them relate 
their stories of how the incident management process (in particular and in general) had evolved. 
We asked probing questions to establish details e.g., when a particular incident occurred (Brown 
& Eisenhardt, 1997, p. 5). Both our interview guides had five sections, addressing the contextual 
and structural factors (Pugh et al., 1968) we presupposed to be of relevance when explaining the 
reliability of the incident management. It began with the background of the respondent and the 
domain he/she worked in. The second part of the interview focused on HR related issues (HR, 
Knowledge Management, Training, and Culture), the third part concentrated on the incident 
management process (Incident, Procedure, and Meta), the fourth part on the role of technology 
and a final section addressed the influence of other contextual and structural factors. The order 
in which these categories were addressed during an interview was not necessarily the order 
presented here. Quite on the contrary even, since the interviewer followed the pace and story 
lines of his/her interviewee in order to obtain the most genuine data possible. The approach 
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taken in these interviews was one of risk identification (layer 1), but the deeper layer was a 
search for high reliability through the application of HRO and SeMa constructs. The outcome of 
this analysis constituted the basis for the development of the questionnaire developed in a later 
phase of the research. 
5.3.3 Protocol development 
It is not the answer, it is the question that matters. Questions therefore should be nuanced 
enough to allow for a nuanced answer. Straightforward questions like the ones we have asked in 
form of our research question are good as a start, but it is highly doubtful whether they are 
capable of delivering the desired results. If we ask shortsighted questions it should not come as a 
surprise that also the answer is shortsighted (Bellinger, 2008a), not useful otherwise than ad-
hoc, on a wider scale or under different circumstances. Wisdom is the result of an 
integration/connection of problems. This can only be accomplished when the questions are 
asked that reflect this connectedness, which calls for a thorough preparation. 
For this purpose – and starting from an interview protocol used in a similar research setting 
(Rutkowski, Van de Walle, Van Groenendaal, & PoL, 2005) – a generic questionnaire was 
developed that could be adapted to the specificity of the context of a Bank (Appendix A) and a 
NPP (Appendix B). The Bank Interview guide was tested by means of a pilot interview with the 
process owner and slightly adjusted as a result thereof. 
After a short introduction on the subject and methodology of the research, as much autonomy 
as possible was granted to the interviewees to define the direction the conversation followed, 
thereby allowing them to put emphasis on subjects that seemed of importance to them within 
this context. On moments where the interview strayed too far away from the subject or 
whenever a theme appeared to be exhausted, the interviewers would redirect the conversation 
using a new question chosen from the previously prepared interview protocol. The questions 
were divided into a few categories that proved useful in earlier research, allowing the 
researchers to provide a little structure to the conversations (Smals, 2006, p. 50). 
5.3.4 Interview organization and selection of interviewees 
Interviews were scheduled with various participants/stakeholders of the Incident Management 
process and the Maintenance & Repair process of the Bank and the NPP respectively. The 
purpose of these interviews was to gather a broad view on possible risks concerning the 
processes under study. For this purpose at the Bank, two business domains have been selected 
that together provide a rich and varied context, leading to nineteen interviews in total (n=19). 
The participants in these interviews are staff from both business domains, ICT domains, ICT 
audit, Operational Risk department, management and the ICT security department. At the NPP, 
staff from all of the Plant’s departments: Operations (3), Maintenance (13), Assets (4) and Care 
(2). Additionally, one contractor was interviewed as well (1), bringing the total number of 
interviews to twenty-three (n=23). Interviewees were selected based on their involvement in the 
Maintenance & Repair process. In selecting the interviewees, the organizations have been very 
helpful by proposing employees from all hierarchical layers of the organization and every 
discipline that somehow related to the processes. This of course raises the question whether the 
research data have not been biased by a deliberate selection of interviewees, based on a certain 
mindset or conformance to the organization’s policy. Although this risk cannot be completely 
excluded, the researchers believe that no purposeful bias has been introduced by the method of 
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selection. One of the strongest indications supporting this belief is the observation that during 
the interviews the interviewees appeared to very open about their work and in some cases were 
very critical about certain aspects of it (Smals, 2006, p. 50-51).  
All interviews were recorded by means of an electronic tape-recorder with explicit consent from 
all the interviewees in our sample. This allowed the researchers to fully concentrate on and 
participate in the interviews themselves. Taking notes during an interview can severely slow 
down the pace of the conversation, ultimately leading to stagnation of the conversation and 
thus negating the benefits of a semi-structured interview.  
5.3.5 Interviewing style 
The interviewing style could be described as colorful and provocative. We adjusted our style to 
the respondent’s language, worldview, professional experience, personality etc. We used 
statements, dichotomies, metaphors, relied heavily on examples and anecdotes, called on the 
interviewee’s imagination to find out the bottom-line. In this sense we also used a combination 
of the value focused thinking (Keeney, 1992;1996) and laddering (Rugg, Eva, Mahmood, 
Rehman, Andrews, & Davies, 2002) technique by asking ‘why-why-why’ instead of ‘what-why-
how’ (Muhren et al., 2008a;Muhren, Van Den Eede, & Van de Walle, 2009;Muhren et al., 
2009;Muhren et al., 2009). Reference literature (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2000) warns for 
two types of bias: interviewer bias and respondent bias. The former bias emerges when the 
interviewer influences the respondent through verbal and non-verbal behavior or through the 
way of asking questions. For instance, by imposing his/her own frame of reference upon the 
respondent, the interview outcome is colored. The latter bias emerges when the information 
provided by the respondent is distorted by his/her ideas on the interviewer, by sensitivities 
regarding some aspects of the interview items or by a lack of willingness to participate in a time-
consuming interview. These are caveats we have taken at heart during our interview sessions. 
5.4 Interview analysis 
Our research attempts to combine two main approaches in the social sciences. The first of these 
is to analyze interview data as qualitative data; that is, a transcription of the actual words used 
by the interviewee, through the technique of cognitive mapping. This verisimilitude is the key 
attraction of qualitative analysis (Wallace et al., 2003, p. 589). However, this advantage could 
also be seen as a disadvantage, in that the (comparatively) unstructured data produced are so 
resistant to procedural, ordered analysis. The quantitative approach, on the other hand, has the 
overwhelming advantage of producing data that are amenable to statistical analysis, something 
that is particularly important in a safety context (Wallace et al., 2003, p. 589). Therefore, we take 
a double approach to interview analysis. We first describe cognitive mapping (5.4.1), 
subsequently we depict what we have come to call the ‘diabolo’ technique (5.4.2). 
5.4.1 Cognitive mapping 
The recorded interviews were transcribed in the form of cognitive maps. Eden (2004) defines a 
cognitive map as: *…+ the representation of thinking about a problem that follows from the 
process of mapping. The maps are a network of nodes and arrows as links [...]. Cognitive maps 
form a tool for researchers to visualize how humans within organizations make sense of their 
environment and thus are helpful in the process of problem structuring in general (Montazemi & 
Conrath, 1986). Cognitive mapping is a set of techniques for studying and recording people’s 
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perceptions about their environment. These perceptions were recorded graphically in the form 
of a mental map that shows concepts and relationships between concepts. Each individual 
interview has been transformed in an individual cognitive map, and if desirable all individual 
cognitive maps could be combined into one aggregated cognitive map representing the way 
operational risk concerning Incident Management is perceived. Such structuring of data is 
essential in the process of gaining understanding of the incident management (Bank) and the 
Maintenance & Repair (NPP) process within its complex environment (Eden, 2004). This general 
methodology was previously used in similar research (Rutkowski et al., 2005). 
Working with cognitive mapping has the advantage that it can bridge the perception of the 
individual interviewee and the perception of the unit of analysis as a whole. The appropriate 
composition model for organizational culture is the referent-shift consensus model (Glisson & 
James, 2002, p. 771). It uses individual responses to measure culture in work-units (e.g. in teams, 
divisions, departments or organizations). The respondents are asked to describe the behavioral 
expectations and normative beliefs of people in the respondent’s organizational work unit 
(Glisson & James, 2002, p. 771). Noteworthy is that “the focus is on what the individual believes 
are the expectations and norms for the people in the respondent’s work unit rather than on what 
the individual respondent thinks is expected of him or her personally. Within-group consensus is 
then required to justify the aggregation of the individuals’ beliefs about the behavioral 
expectations and norms within the work unit as a representation of the unit-level construct, i.e., 
culture. In the absence of within-group consensus, the individual responses cannot be ‘composed’ 
to the unit-level construct because a lack of consensus suggests that common expectations and 
norms have not been identified” (Glisson & James, 2002, p. 771). Whenever in this dissertation 
we are interested in finding out how the culture or structure of the organizations under study is 
contributing to high reliability – and even though we are examining the perception of individuals 
– we should not focus on the appreciation of the individuals personally, but on their idea about 
what their team members might think. Therefore, this calls for the application of the referent 
shift consensus model (Knight, 2004, p. 9). 
In order to create the cognitive maps, the interviews with the employees were tape-recorded, to 
be transformed into cognitive maps afterwards, using Decision Explorer™ from Banxia™ 
(www.banxia.com). This approach allowed the researchers to capture the interviews in full detail 
without the disadvantage of having to take notes during the actual interviews.  




Figure 3.7 - Example excerpt of a cognitive map with categorized nodes 
The nodes in the cognitive maps were categorized by coloring them in order to allow for easier 
analysis of the information stored in them (Figure 3.7). An important category is that of threats 
to the Maintenance & Repair process or the entire organization that can be recognized in the 
maps. Nodes directly indicating such a threat were colored red. All the ‘red nodes’ from the 
maps were then assembled into an extensive list, from which double entries were removed, 
while the remaining threats were categorized in order to create an orderly list.  
Once completed, the cognitive maps were sent back to the interviewees, giving each of them the 
opportunity to comment on their personal map and to indicate if they thought the map reflected 
the conversation as it had taken place. In about eight cases, minor changes to the maps were 
proposed, adding nuance to certain points. None of the interviewees suggested major changes 
in the structure of their map. It can therefore be concluded that the cognitive maps accurately 
represented the course of the interviews.  
5.4.2 Diabolo technique 
The systems view we take in this dissertation is an alternative for analysis. The accompanying 
risk is that by breaking things down into smaller pieces to simplify the study, the researcher 
might lose the oversight and will be developing a less than complete understanding (Bellinger, 
2008b). However, we believe that ‘anasynthesis’, the combination of both techniques, i.e. 
analysis and systems thinking, is useful. This is exactly what we have tried to do in our research. 
To this end, this first research phase wished to determine how HRT – through the characteristics 
of HROs – could be applied in the particular organizational context of an important economic 
sector like Banking. Based on the outcomes of semi-structured interviews and workshops with 
process stakeholders/participants, the researchers gathered a list of operational risks concerning 
the IM process (Van Den Eede & Van de Walle, 2005). This outcome had to be formulated as an 
advice – for which there is a shared ownership – to senior management on how to manage risks 
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concerning Incident Management. The approach is not to do this on an operational one-by-one 
basis, but from a tactical or strategic management, more high-level perspective. Worthwhile 
mentioning is that it was the Bank’s management itself that chose to use HRT as a framework of 
analysis. Their interest for HRT was inspired by presentations and proposals the authors 
provided and – more importantly – by accepting the importance of culture, communication, 
structure, decision making and leadership as a complement to their IT governance frameworks 
and procedures (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2005;De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2006).  
The analysis is based on a systematic approach that aims at drawing qualitative conclusions from 
the data. By regrouping and looking for relevance, recommendations for the management of the 
risks could be formulated. Also has been possible to formulate questions for future research. 
In a first phase we have been diverging (risk identification), followed by converging (complexity 
& tight coupling) to end up again with diverging (tools). We have labeled this the ‘Diabolo‘ 
technique (Figure 3.8) and distinguish between the Converging and Diverging capacity. 
The diabolo model starts from the assumption that interactive complexity (C in Figure 3.8) 
(complex vs. linear) and tight-coupling (T in Figure 3.8) (tight vs. loose coupling) constitute the 
two major determinants of reliability. For the underpinning thereof, we refer to Chapter 1 – 
Introduction). In the converging (left hand) part of the diabolo, all the individually identified risks 
(from the individual interviews) are first aggregated and categorized. With the collaboration of 
the IM process owner the data have been cleaned (removal of double entries, irrelevant 
information) and categorized. From the original list of 384 entries, a list of 219 remained. The 
categorization helped the researchers to gain a better insight into the data and to see the 
threads in the results. Next, this categorization was used to regroup the 219 records into 42 
summarized risks in a meaningful way. Notably these 42 aggregated risks form the basis of the 
present investigation, which consisted in mapping them on the HRT framework.  
 
Figure 3.8 - Diabolo Technique 
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In the diverging (right hand) part of the diabolo, the exercise was performed to come up with 
tools that are typical of an HRO’s pursuit of reliability. As a next step, we therefore have mapped 
the issues to the HRT principles. Subsequently, we have transposed these findings to HRT 
techniques that are suggested by HRO literature to be proficient in managing risk. 
5.5 GSS Workshop50 
Socio-technical systems such as these are characterized by interactive complexity and tight 
coupling of risks, and therefore become systemic. Since the source of systemic risks often 
resides in the unpredictable interactions amongst different parts or components, it is not 
sufficient to control or mitigate the ‘top ten’ risks by periodical review meetings based on group 
consensus (Carlo et al., 2004). In order to improve the management decision process of systemic 
risks, a shared consensus based on an exhaustive set of potential risks and their interrelations 
has to be socially constructed (Rutkowski, Van de Walle, & Van Den Eede, 2006). Moreover, we 
assume that the parallelism, anonymity and the voting provided by a Group Support System 
(GSS) environment would efficiently support such a task.  
In past laboratory and field research, GSS have proven to efficiently facilitate preference and 
intellective tasks via anonymous exchange of information supported by an electronic 
brainstorming system (EBS) and to reduce process losses inherent to face-to-face meetings (van 
Genuchten, van Dijk, Scholten, & Vogel, 2001;Nunamaker, Vogel, & Konsynsky, 1989). The 
workshop used GroupSystems™, a software from GroupSupport.com, was used to support the 
exchange of information among staff. GroupSystems™ is a facilitator driven group decision 
support system (GDSS) that can be used to carry out a variety of strategic management and 
decision-making processes effectively and with high levels of group participation, ownership and 
commitment. The individual participants were able to anonymously enter their ideas on their 
personal computers, which were all connected by means of a local area network to a central 
computer, from which the output was projected on a publicly visible space using a data 
projector. A key benefit of using this GDSS can be a more efficient use of meeting time, through 
the ability to surface and ‘parallel process’ more contributions from a greater number of 
participants than is possible using manual facilitation techniques alone. At the Bank 19 staff and 
at the NPP 12 staff that were involved with the incident management process were invited to 
join a GroupSystems workshop (February 2005 and April 2006 respectively), for which the 
author has acted as facilitator. The purpose of the workshop was to decide on the risk 
identification, risk assessment and risk control measures. The result was an advice – for which 
there is a shared ownership – to senior management on how to manage risks concerning 
Incident Management. 
The advantage of anonymous data entry by the individual group members is that sensitive issues 
can be more easily brought into the open and discussed objectively without fear of reprisal. 
Each of the workshops was organized as follows: 
Phase I Brainstorming phase (Electronic Brainstorming Risks or EBS): The outcome of the 
previous research phases (interviews and aggregated cognitive maps) 
constituted the input for the GSS workshop. The categorized threats were 
presented to the participants (of which some were interviewed previously), who 
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were asked to anonymously add comments and add threats they felt were 
missing in the presented list. Based on idea exchange and free association, the 
participants were proposed to generate an exhaustive set of risks based on and 
departing from the compiled list of risks.  
Phase II Intellective phase: Individual selection of the most relevant top risks following 
‘truth supported wins’ schemes of decision.  
Phase III Preferential phase: Assessment of the selected risks during phase II in term of 
Expected Utility. To this end, the participants were asked to rate each threat on 
two scales: impact and likelihood. The most relevant risks have been discussed 
to build scenarios that can be activated through the formation of a group 
memory when the risks actually materialize.  
Special attention was given to the efficiency of the GSS on the preference and selection of three 
type of risks: Common Risks (CR) and Unique risks (UR) presented under the form of a list based 
on individual interviews on the one hand, and socially constructed risks generated during the 
brainstorming phase on the other hand. The fact that the participants of the GSS workshop 
provided information that was already present in the data gathered from the interviews 
illustrates the use of GSS as a tool to confirm the validity of previously gathered research data. 
An additional benefit of the use of GSS was the possibility provided to the participants to 
elaborate on specific problem areas (Smals, 2006). 
We believe the management of the decision process of systemic risks can be improved by co-
evaluation and an objective measure such as Expected Utility. Shared consensus based on an 
exhaustive set of potential risks and their interrelations have to be socially constructed and – 
when relevant – the unique information of the minority surfaces the collective iceberg. The 
results of the research demonstrate that the parallelism, anonymity and the voting provided by 
the GSS environment efficiently supports the task of risk management decision process in a spirit 
of socially shared consensus. 
GroupSystems increased overall the level of awareness amongst the participants on the 
importance of addressing risks in the organization. The large number of risks that were 
generated using the system gave a better understanding to the participants about the situation. 
The anonymity and the interview phase were two critical success factors. First, anonymity 
supported participants to express freely their private opinion about very sensitive information in 
the organization. Second, the risks of lists being a mixed of unique, common and EBS risks, the 
expression of the participants’ preference gave to the group of the participants a higher feeling 
of control and appropriation of the decision taken toward the scenario to be built. 
In the sense that this GSS workshops are a type of focus group, its outcome co-formed the basis 
for the development of a questionnaire (Yule, 2003). 
The resulting rankings showed two particularities: firstly, there was little scatter in the ranking of 
the top-rated threats; on a scale from zero to seven (zero representing a high likelihood 
respectively high impact), most assessments of both impact and likelihood were between three 
and five. The limited spread resulted in a rather flat distribution, delivering a quite large portion 
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of top-rated threats: 32 out of about 230 threats were deemed of special importance, although 
these top-rated items were not on a large distance of the less relevant threats in terms of impact 
and likelihood. Secondly, 10 out of the 32 top-rated threats were not present in the list that was 
extracted from the cognitive maps. 
The issues added to the list of threats during the session were subjects that were implicitly 
present in the cognitive maps and had been recognized by the researchers, but only those 
threats that were explicitly mentioned during the interviews and categorized as such were 
included in the list. For example, the highest-ranking threat was labeled ‘workload increases 
while the number of qualified employees decreases’. This threat was not in the list of threats 
extracted from the cognitive maps, but was added by the participants during the group work 
session. Although no node with the exactly matching content was present in the cognitive maps, 
several nodes conveyed parts of the same problem. For example, in the cognitive maps, 
constructs were present describing the increase of work pressure, the retirement of the current 
generation of experienced workers and the difficulty of attracting highly qualified workers to 
replace the older generation of employees.  
5.6 System dynamics modeling 
5.6.1 Application 
The outcome of the previous research phases formed the input for a system dynamics modeling 
exercise we undertook to model the reliability of the organization’s Incident Management 
process as determined by the capability of its supporting emergency response information 
system (Van Den Eede, Muhren, Smals, & Van de Walle, 2006). This work is based on the 
Capability Trap model by Repenning & Sterman (2001) and draws from the many insights on 
emergency response information systems design as described in the DERMIS (Dynamic 
Emergency Response Management Information System) framework established by Turoff et al. 
(2004). Whereas the latter authors describe the premises that underlie an Information System 
(IS) that is capable of ensuring a reliable and flexible emergency response, our model contributes 
to the research field by looking at the interrelations of the aforementioned premises. We take a 
System Dynamics approach and gain insights in the key determinants of IS Capability by 
highlighting the mutual interdependences grouped around the concepts of adaptability, control, 
implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. The following sections subsequently explain the 
technique (5.6.2) and the need of system dynamics for studying HROs (5.6.3). 
5.6.2 System dynamics 
System Dynamics was developed by Jay W. Forrester (1961) during the mid-1950s at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It is a method to gain insight – i.e. identifying, 
explaining, and eliminating problem behavior (Marais & Leveson, 2003) – into the behavior of 
(especially socio-economic) complex systems over time and enhances learning from these 
complex systems (Sterman, 2000, p. 4). Principally by identifying feedback loops in the system, it 
provides a framework for dealing with dynamic complexity, where cause and effect are not 
obviously related. System dynamics is grounded in the theory of non-linear dynamics and 
feedback control, but also draws on cognitive and social psychology, organization theory, 
economics, and other social sciences (Marais & Leveson, 2003). It does so by representing the 
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processes, structure, strategies and information flows of systems (Wolstenholme, Henderson, & 
Gavine, 1993). 
Forrester (1993) states that all decisions are made in an on-going circular environment in which 
each action is based on information that is the result of earlier actions. System dynamics is based 
on the idea that people cannot oversee the consequences of these feedback mechanisms in 
complex systems. There is a bias of looking for problem causes in convenient places (Moberg, 
2001). “[There] is a fundamental characteristic of complex human systems: ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ 
are not close in time and space. *…+ Why is this a problem? Because most of us assume, that 
cause and effect, most of the time are close in time and space” (Senge, 1990, p. 63). Therefore, 
much of the art of system dynamics modeling is discovering and representing the different 
feedback processes in a system (Sterman, 2000, p. 12). A System dynamics model is meant to 
give people a more effective understanding about an important system that could have 
controversial behavior. Influential system dynamics models are those that change the way 
people think about a system (Forrester, 1993). Wolstenholme (2004) distinguishes five 
components of system ‘structure’ in the concept of system dynamics: (1) processes, created 
using stock-flow chains; (2) information feedback; (3) policy; (4) time delays; and (5) boundaries. 
5.6.3 The need of system dynamics for studying HROs  
System Dynamics has been applied in all kinds of domains and for all kinds of problems, like the 
cold war arms race, the human immune system, the aircraft industry, and business and strategy 
issues (Sterman, 2000, p. 41-42) but the technique can play an equally important part in the 
study of High Reliability. We posit that HRO literature can do with more system dynamics 
exercises. In our case, for instance, by building an explicit representation of the incident 
management process, it should/might be possible to predict, simulate, and/or explain the 
resultant behavior of the system form the structure causality, functional and behavior of its 
components (Lewis, 2004). “If we do establish a connection between given features of an 
organization and its operational reliability, can we assume that these features are necessary, 
rather than merely sufficient? That is, are there alternative strategies possible for the production 
of the same outcome, or do the requirements for organizational reliability impose an inevitable 
solution on an organization? Finally, even if an organization has evolved features that are 
necessary to its reliability, can we be sure that its evolutionary adaptation is stable, that what 
adds reliability today will also work tomorrow under changes in the character of technology, the 
work force, or in the life cycle of the organization?” (Schulman, 2001, p. 347-348). Hence, this is a 
useful approach to deal with non-linear problems in a non-linear way (contrary to a classical risk 
management approach). While it is tempting to attribute the kind of reliability described in this 
dissertation to organizational culture and values (Little, 2005, p. 5) it is not sufficient. What we 
need is a laboratory setting that permits to verify independently the different building blocks51. 
System dynamics modeling is a relevant technique for our research because of the complex 
nature of the emerging interactions (i.e. complexity), the choice of our model is vital. 
Efforts to model HRO characteristics so far have mainly concentrated on unreliability, in studies 
of calamities and mishaps: for instance, the 1992 Westray mine disaster (Cooke, 2003), the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Salge & Milling, 2006). In part this is due to the prescription that 
system dynamics should model problems, not systems (Sterman, 2000), but such can be 
remedied by formulating high reliability as a problem, e.g. by modeling the absence of HRO 
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characteristics and investigating the consequences thereof on organizational reliability. 
Examples of application of system dynamics in HRO contexts include (for instance) outage 
planning and plant improvement efforts and maintenance (Caroll, Perin, & Marcus, 1993); 
patient safety (Cook & Rasmussen, 2005); security incident management (Gonzalez, 2005) and 
railways safety (Hale et al., 2003). Notable studies building on system dynamics for 
conceptualizing on HRO and NAT include the analyses by Cooke & Rohleder (2006) and Rudolph 
& Repenning (2002). 
The latter type of studies is interesting because they have the potential of combining system and 
culture, as “the two great tropes of the 20th century *…+. Whereas systems thinking holds out 
hope for the precise mapping and managing of complexity, cultural approaches are less focused 
on outcomes and more on understanding and appreciating the meanings people ascribe to 
collective behavior, and how these meanings help constitute communities and societies” 
(Eisenberg, 2006, p. 1697). For instance, Romme and van Witteloostuijn’s (1999) notion of 
‘circular design’ combines (1) insights from Organizational Learning Theory with (2) insights from 
Systems Theory. More specifically, they combine the concept of triple loop learning, manifesting 
itself in the form of ‘collective mindfulness’ with three important notions of system dynamics: 
(a) the pervasive influence of the deeper structure of a system on the behavior of its constituent 
elements; (b) the difference between static and dynamic systems; and (c) the dilemma between 
global patterns (e.g., corporate patterns and synergies) and local behavior (e.g., creative actions 
and findings at the unit or team level). The analysis of circular designs relates strongly to the HRT 
concepts as it also examines the relationship between structure and behavior. More in 
particular, circular design, like HRT, stresses the importance of the opportunity to switch 
between the circular and the hierarchical mode of organizing, as a pivotal element (Romme & 
van Witteloostuijn, 1999).  
6 Survey 
Without prejudice to the relevance of the previously described research techniques (5.3 to 5.6), 
this research’s main data collection technique is a self-administered survey. For this reason this 
separate section is dedicated to its description. The survey questions respondents in our case 
study organizations on those elements that have become apparent in the previous research 
phases. In this subsection we first point out why we have chosen for the survey technique (6.1). 
Next, we explain the way the conceptual model is operationalized (6.2) and how the survey is 
administered (6.3). We conclude this section with a description of the data analysis process 
(6.4). 
6.1 Rationale 
In an era where ‘what cannot be measured, is not true’, a particularly difficult task emerges to 
translate constructs like mindfulness and resilience into workable indicators (Le-Coze, 2006, p. 
8). As we have experienced ourselves, this exercise is necessary in order to get stakeholder’s – 
and especially management’s – commitment to cooperate. The buy-in 52 is obtained more easily 
with figures. The survey we have designed hence is a mixture of trying to measure the 
immeasurable and returning value for money. We have tried to find our way out of this dilemma 
by gaining trust of the organization by doing ‘consultancy’ jobs of a smaller order.  
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The use of quantitative research techniques in the field of organizational behavior is not very 
common (Balthazard & Cooke, 2004, p. 240). Qualitative and quantitative methods nevertheless 
are complementary approaches to the study and assessment of organizational processes and 
attributes. The advantages of qualitative methods can lead to intensive and in-depth 
information, especially useful in research on issues and processes about which little information 
exists (Balthazard & Cooke, 2004, p. 240). Quantitative methods on the other hand have the 
advantage of cross-sectional assessments and comparisons (across individuals, organizations, or 
sub-units). It is this last characteristic we have relied on since we deal with the phenomenon of 
an organization’s reliability through its subunits as level of analysis. A greater understanding of 
the factors and values that affect intra-organizational contextual and structural variations can 
only provide an even richer picture of how to optimize organizational systems to promote 
reliability (Balthazard & Cooke, 2004, p. 240).  
Quantitative methods facilitate asking large numbers of people their opinions in a relatively 
time- and cost-effective manner (Child & McGrath, 2001). It should not come as a surprise 
therefore that over the years, the survey method was extensively used and is still in 
predominant use. While the method can attain high levels of external validity, it is known to 
suffer from lack of control and internal validity (Palvia et al., 2003). Another critique on surveys 
in the field of reliability is that they are used merely to refine the question sets in order to 
improve face validity, and in some cases to conduct factor analyses and internal consistency 
checks (Child & McGrath, 2001). Yet, quantitative research that goes beyond this type of analysis 
is necessary in order to bring the discipline of reliability studies to reach a higher level of 
maturity.  
6.2 Operationalizing the conceptual model 
A conceptual model of variables and their relationships leads to the formulation of hypotheses. 
It relates dependent and independent variables and identifies the moderator variables that are 
likely to affect the outcomes. Essential in conducting research in organizations is assuring the 
accuracy of measurement of the constructs (Hinkin, 1998, p. 104). 
6.2.1 Item generation 
Although literature is readily available, quite rare are the practical translations of theoretical 
concepts into straightforward guidelines for measuring the degree of high reliability or 
SenseMaking. Moreover, when publications do get practical, they are concerned with safety, not 
reliability. The only notable exception being Weick and Sutcliffe with their ‘Managing the 
Unexpected’ (2001). These authors offer ways to materialize theory by means of High Reliability 
audit check-lists (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 90-110). We have gratefully used this material to 
build our own questionnaire. For SenseMaking the job was even harder. Probably because of the 
opaque nature of this set of notions, to the best of our knowledge, no practical translation could 
be found. For these reasons, we had to rely on interpretation of literature and above all, on the 
outcomes of the analysis of the interviews. These formed a cornerstone for the development of 
the ‘High Reliability Questionnaire’ (as we have come to call this survey) for the Bank (Appendix 
D) and for the NPP Case (Appendix E). The interviews were essential in customizing the 
constructs for the setting of the Bank as well as the NPP. Both questionnaires are identical apart 
from an adjustment to comply with specific process attributes and jargon.  
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The items were generated in such a way that they adequately represent the constructs (Hinkin, 
1998). We have taken a deductive scale development approach since the theoretical foundation 
provided enough information to generate the initial set of items, founded on a thorough review 
of the literature (Hinkin, 1998, p. 106). Items were developed according to the following 
guidelines: (1) Statements that are as short as possible, (2) Language as simple as possible, (3) 
Addressing one single issue per item, and (4) No reverse-scoring. At least four items per scale are 
needed to test the homogeneity of items within each latent construct, yet adequate internal 
consistency reliabilities can be obtained with as few as three items (Hinkin, 1998, p. 109). Scales 
with many items may have high internal consistency reliabilities even if the item inter-
correlations are low, an argument in favor of shorter scales with high internal consistency. The 
retention of four to six items for most constructs therefore is advisable (Hinkin, 1998, p. 109). It 
is also good practice to foresee twice as many items in the survey questionnaire. 
The survey consisted of 57 variables. As we had the data on the Incident Management reliability 
on team level, we had to aggregate the data of the individual respondents on team level as well. 
In order to correct for teams with an insufficient number of members participating in the survey, 
we put a double filter on the data. We selected teams that met one of the following criteria: at 
least 5 participants in the survey or at least a participation rate of 50%. This double criterion 
could only be maintained for the Bank Case. The NPP Case consisted of too few respondents to 
do so. In case of the NPP Case a preference was given to having a sufficient number of teams. 
All items were measured on a 5 point Likert scale and with respondents being asked to indicate 
whether they fully agreed (5), agreed (4), agreed, nor disagreed (3), disagreed (4) or fully 
disagreed (1) with the statements presented to them. The choice for a 5 point Likert scale is 
inspired by the fact that coefficient alpha reliability has been shown to increase up to the use of 
five points Likert scales, after which it levels off (Hinkin, 1998, p. 110). 
6.2.2 Constructs 
A construct is a representation of something that does not exist as an observable dimension of 
behavior, and the more abstract the construct, the more difficult it is to measure. A construct 
should meet the following criteria in order to assure construct validity (Hinkin, 1998, p. 105): 
(1) Content validity, i.e. specifying the domain of the construct; 
(2) Criterion validity, i.e. empirically determining the extent to which items measure the 
domain; 
(3) Internal consistency, i.e. examining the extent to which the measure produces results 
that are predictable from theoretical hypotheses. 
These requirements have been taken into account when developing our items (statements and 
questions that form the constructs). The constructs usually employed in research on 
organizational culture are of no immediate use for the study of High Reliability because they are 
too general and too distant from the functional imperatives of reliability enhancing 
organizations (Klein, Bigley, & Roberts, 1995, p. 773). Chapter 4 shows that the variables 
employed in our study therefore are somehow different from traditional studies on 
organizations. 
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The independent variables in the (reconceptualized) model relate to the constructs of (1) HRT 
propensity and (2) SenseMaking propensity. By propensity, we mean the natural tendency to 
behave in a certain way. In the case of HRO propensity, it therefore is the natural tendency to 
behave and to be structured like an HRO. As such, it is a tendency towards HRO-like behavior 
and HRO-like structure. It is the degree to which an individual, a team, or an organization fits the 
HRO ideal such as it is described in literature. SenseMaking and efficiency propensity can be 
defined in the same way (mutatis mutandis). All constructs are examined in relation to the 
incident handling process. In the a priori conceptual model, there is one moderator variable, 
namely the alignment of information systems to user characteristics (ISFit) (3) In the 
reconceptualized model, two additional mediator variables are introduced, namely Requisite 
Variety (4) and Structure (5). The dependent variables are the reliability in the handling of urgent 
and non-urgent incidents respectively (6). They are calculated values retrieved from the 
organization’s incident management databases. 
6.3 Survey administration 
6.3.1 Pilot 
In view of content validity assessment, we have subjected our items to an assessment in two 
phases. In a first phase, we have pretested them with a group of experts (from academia and 
practice) and have asked them individually to attribute the items to the constructs in question 
and to eliminate those items that in their opinion did not cover the constructs. In a second 
phase, we have pretested the remaining items with two pilot groups of respondents from our 
population (Pilot Bank Case and Pilot NPP Case). The outcomes of this pretest were on the level 
of language clarity, jargon utilization, team identification, the practicality of the questionnaire 
design (e.g. the use of drop-down boxes) and seven items that were dropped because of their 
inappropriateness.  
In the Bank Case, the first pilot survey consisted of six Information Security Officers (ISO) at the 
Bank. This survey has been administered as an MS-Excel file. The second pilot (Table 3.10) 
consisted of four incident management teams, selected from our population based on their 
representative character. This second pilot survey has been administered via CheckMarket™, the 
platform that has been used for the final survey. 
Descriptors  
Average fill-out time 15 min. 33 sec 
Panel size 35 
Number of respondents (completed) 27 
Number of teams 4 
Reminders 14 (40%) 
Resminder response 7 (50%) 
Table 3.10 - Pilot descriptors for the Bank Case 
The full questionnaire was administered electronically: online through the company intranet in 
the Bank Case and via e-mail in the case of the NPP. In each case study, a pilot survey was 
conducted to test the questionnaire prior to the administration. Electronic surveys have 
distinctive technological, demographic, and response characteristics that affect their design, use 
and implementation (Smith, 1996). Although it is advisable to compensate by 30% the number 
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of respondents for non-response so that the power of the survey (i.e., precision and confidence 
level) is not compromised (Kasunic, 2005, p. 27), we were only able to do so in the Bank Case. 
6.3.2 Distribution 
Running a survey is taking a snapshot of an organization at a certain point in time. In the Bank 
Case the period during which the survey was applied was June 21st - 30th 2006. The survey was 
announced by a personalized e-mail invitation, addressed to the organization mail account of 
the team members, containing a click-through link to an external server, hosted by 
CheckMarket™ (http://www.checkmarket.be), an online platform that provides tools to securely 
create and distribute online surveys. Anonymity has been guaranteed. In the Bank Case this 
could be done because no track was held of a the respondents who actually filled-in the survey.  
In the NPP Case, we relied on a self-administered questionnaire in the period Sept 17th - 30th 
2007. The survey was announced by a general e-mail invitation, addressed to the account of the 
team members, containing an attachment with an excel survey form. This form contained some 
Visual Basic Coding in view of ease of use for the respondent and the research analyst. The 
respondent was asked to return the attachment to the researcher. Note that unlike with the 
Bank Case, the survey in case of the NPP was not administered through a professional platform 
like CheckMarket™, but through a self-developed data collection tool. As a result some of the 
benefits of the former system could not be seized in case of the Bank. For instance on the level 
of quality control it was impossible to control on the time a respondent spent on filling out the 
questionnaire. More important is that for the same reason anonymity could only be guaranteed 
partially: The anonymity from the respondent to their organization could be guaranteed, but not 
towards the researcher. 
6.3.3 Population and sample 
In the Bank Case the research population consists of all the teams (and their members) that have 
been involved during the period January to December 2005 in incident handling (in whatever 
role or function) and that had a minimal average of 1 urgent incident (urgency 1 or 2) per month.  
This threshold has been built-in to guarantee that it reasonably can be assumed that the teams 
are familiar with the handling of urgent incidents. We wanted to avoid that urgent incidents 
would have the status of ‘exceptional’ because that would mean that they are not 
representative for the work of incident handling. In the Bank Case, because we have chosen to 
study five critical business domains (Assets, Payments, Accounting, Trading, and Markets) and 
their corresponding IT processes, the vast majority of teams are in the situation of being familiar 
with the handling with urgent incidents. This yielded a list of 69 teams consisting of 602 
theoretically corresponding e-mail addresses, representing an equal number of team-members. 
Of the 602 invitation e-mails 41 bounced back indicating that these addresses were fictive or did 
not longer exist. Two respondents declined the invitation to open the e-mail. The number of 
people that were reminded (after 7 days, so June 28th) to fill out the survey was 243, of which 84 
responded to the reminder. In total, a 477 people read the e-mail, from which 404 clicked 
through the questionnaire. A total of 399 persons answered the questionnaire, of which 356 
answered the questionnaire from beginning to end (except for an occasional blank question). 
From this cleaned dataset 53 of 356 respondents, those respondents filling in a management 
position were left out of the analysis because it was presupposed that they would be not 
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representative for a team’s HRO profile. This impacted the final sample size (n= 320) only 
moderately.  
Similarly, in the NPP Case, the research population consists of all the teams that have been 
involved during the period September 2006 to August 2007 (included) in the Maintenance & 
Repair Process and that had a minimal average of 1 incident of urgent notifications and orders 
(priority 0, i.e. urgent notification). This in order to guarantee that the teams under study are 
familiar with urgency (cf. Bank Case). The number of staff that has been selected (at random) 
was 213.  
6.4 Data analysis 
In the Bank case the number of respondents was 320. In the NPP case the number of valid 
responses was 124. These sets formed the basis for further data analysis, which was performed 
primarily by means of SPSS 15.0 for Windows. 
6.4.1 Data reduction 
To reduce the dataset into a set of less and more meaningful constructs, we conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis and measured the internal consistency of the emerging factors. 
Factor analysis allows the reduction of a set of observed variables to a smaller set of variables so 
that a more parsimonious representation of the original set of variables is obtained. The 
objective is to identify those items that most clearly represent the content domain of the 
underlying construct (Hinkin, 1998, p. 112-113). This approach has the one advantage over a 
pure inductive item generation that it builds on existing theory where possible, so that the factor 
analysis better guarantees construct reliability: The inherent risk of the inductive method that 
although items may load on the same factor without necessarily measuring the same theoretical 
construct therefore is mitigated (Hinkin, 1998, p. 107). We used a principle components analysis 
with a varimax rotation to examine their underlying structure. A .40 criterion level was used in 
judging factor loadings as meaningful (Koch, 1993) and a 60 % level of the total item variance 
that is explained by the factors (Hinkin, 1998).  
In our choice of the factors we have selected for building our conceptual model(Table 5.1), we 
have been lead by those factors that had a sufficient internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha ≥ 
0.60). 
6.4.2 Scale validation 
As described in the previous chapter, many of the hypotheses in our conceptual model are 
based on composite variables (scales) comprised of different items (questions). Before testing 
hypotheses, each of these composite variables or scales should be validated, to assess their level 
of internal consistency of reliability. Two important types of validity in survey research are 
(Kasunic, 2005, p. 12): (1) construct validity: Are we measuring what we think we are measuring? 
and (2) external validity: Can the results be generalized to other people, places, or times?  
We use Cronbach’s Alpha for the estimation of the former validity, the internal consistency 
reliability. Internal consistency reliability is the degree to which an instrument again and again 
measures an attribute. A large coefficient alpha suggests that the sampling domain has been 
captured adequately (Hinkin, 1998). In this research, a scale will be considered reliable only if a 
Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient of 0.60 or greater is found. In those cases, the item scores used to 
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create the scale can be aggregated and analyzed for statistical significance to test the 
corresponding hypothesis. In order to improve the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, and in those 
cases where the number of retained items was sufficiently large, those items were eliminated 
that that will improve or not negatively affect the reliability of the scales (Hinkin, 1998). 
6.4.3  Analysis of Variance 
In a first approach we followed Klein et al. (1995) and performed F-tests, one way analyses of 
variance and regression analyses to test differences and similarities across and within 
organizations. This approach however did not yield any significant results and this way of 
analyzing was abandoned and omitted in this dissertation. To test the hypotheses put forth in 
the previous chapter, General Linear Model (GLM) Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance are 
performed, which is an extension of the analysis of variance technique (ANOVA). More 
particularly for the purpose of our research, we performed Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
The leading idea behind this technique is the assumption that there are systematic differences 
between groups, in that sense that these groups show averages in the population that differ. 
These differences are to be discovered on the basis of a sample of observations (van den 
Bercken & Voeten, 2002). The term ‘repeated measures’ refers to multiple observations of 
either exposure or outcome on the same sampling unit, in our case a team. Often these 
observations within the same subject will be correlated and this has to be taken into account 
when analyzing such data. Whereas this is reported as a problem inherent to the use of the 
repeated measures technique, in our research this constitutes an advantage. Reliability can be 
defined in several ways, one of them being the reduction of variance in reliability outcomes, and 
therefore it is useful to see the pattern between reliability observations within a time interval. 
For the purpose of the analysis of variance, categorical variables needed to be created from 
continuous scale variables. By means of Visual Binning, we created new variables based on 
grouping values of existing variables into a two distinct categories. The median was used as a 
cut-point with border values included in the lower category. 
As we have the data on the IM reliability on team level, we had to aggregate the data of the 
individual respondents on team level as well. In order to correct for teams with an insufficient 
number of members participating in the survey, we put a double filter on the data: we selected 
teams that had (1) at least 5 participants in the survey or (2) at least a participation rate of 50%. 
The application of these selection criteria resulted in 37 teams for the Bank Case and 24 teams 
for the NPP. Even though the original data set yielded 320 valid and selected respondents in case 
of the Bank and 128 in the case of the NPP, the small sample sizes on the aggregated level (37 
(Bank) and 24 (NPP) teams) has the disadvantage of a lower probability of showing significance 
in an ANOVA. Therefore, we are convinced that the lack of a bigger sample requires a more 
flexible statistical significance level for our analysis. Instead of the common statistically 
significant p value ≤ 0.05, we worked with the practical significance of p ≤ 0.10. In line with 
Ferguson and Ketchen (1999, p. 387) we have chosen to include in our analysis levels of analysis 
of up to 0.10 because HRT is still not developed enough to allow for a more precise test, in 
contrast to theories that can build on much wider established body of quantitative research 
where a level of 0.01 would be more appropriate. 
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7 Conclusion: Build-up and Hermeneutic Circle of 
Understanding 
Throughout the research, we have made an attempt at connecting data and theory while relying 
on the research taxonomies enlisted above and while relying on a wide range of techniques. 
Their development is depicted in Table 3.11. The research methodology alternates between 
positivist and interpretive, between normative and descriptive, between deductive and 
inductive, between quantitative and qualitative. Individually, these lenses are valuable for 
analysis (deduction) but their true value lies in their combination in form of new constructs 
(induction). In the first case, the observations will be starting point, in the second they will come 
enhanced out of the process. In this model, observations are alpha and omega, but with the 
intermediary role of a theory that emerges from these observations. That way, the divide 
between empiricism and rationalism can be remedied.  
Following Butler (1998, p. 293), the concept of the hermeneutic circle of understanding was 
applied throughout the case studies on the incident management process reliability. Table 3.12 
provides a graphical representation of the hermeneutic research process in terms of the 
hermeneutic circle of understanding. Recall Figure 3.6 showing Gadamer’s argument that the 
unity of understood meaning expands in concentric circles with the letters A to (in our case) I 
representing the stages of understanding. Note however, that the actual hermeneutic process is 
much messier: less concentric, more fanciful and characterized by interruptions.54 Noteworthy is 
also that the outer circle most certainly will not be the final outer circle as our understanding will 
always remain incomplete and challenged by new circumstances. 
The apex stone of the hermeneutics underpinning this research is its multiple-case character. 
Because of the identical research build-up in both our cases, we were capable not only of data-
theory triangulating within-cases, but also in between them. This ‘twin’ approach is quite rare in 
HRO research since much of it is still based on individual case studies. Together with Schulman 
(2001), we deem this inflicts a danger to the discipline: “in danger of falling victim to a kind of 
evolutionary optimism that infers that because features have evolved in an organization that is 
surviving in a high-reliability niche, these features must all contribute to its overall reliability. In 
research on high reliability in organizations, we are beset by the problem of many variables and 
few cases. How, without more failures, can we really be sure which of the many organizational 
features we see are in fact adding to reliability?” (2001, p. 347). In themselves, these cases 
provide little evidence that the presence of certain HRO parameters will lead to high reliability. It 
might even very well be that they have a negative effect on it and that reliability is there despite 
of them. The twin case study approach hence offers an opportunity of enhancing insights in the 
nature of High Reliability. A warning is in place however. Formally, the research design is 
multiple-case but because of the number of cases limited to two, the replication logic, in which 
the cases are treated as a series of independent experiments that confirm or disconfirm 
emerging conceptual insights, does not fully apply. The purpose we had with the design of our 
research has been to compare both cases from the standpoint that the NPP Case should 
represent what is described in HRO literature, and that we would check whether our findings in 
the Bank Case would confirm this. For feasibility reasons however, the Bank Case was conducted 
prior to the NPP Case. This data are analyzed in Chapter 6. 































































Literature review (Chapter 2) 
x  x  x   x 
Case Study Preparation and 
Documentary Research 
(5.2.1)  
 x  x x  x x 
Action Research (0)  x  x  x x  
Ethnographic field study (0)   x  x  x  x 
Interviews – Putting HRT in a 
broader spectrum (5.3)  
 x  x x   x 
Interview Analysis – Cognitive 
Mapping (5.4.1)  
 x  x  x  x 
Interview Analysis – 
Converging diabolo (5.4.2)  
x   x  x  x 
Interview Analysis – Diverging 
diabolo (5.4.2)  
x  x  x   x 
GSS (5.5)   x  x  x x  
System Dynamics Modeling 
(5.6)  
 x  x  x x  
Survey – Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (6)  
x  x  x  x  
Survey – Testing HRT and 
SeMa Hypotheses (6)  
x  x   x x  
Table 3.11 - Alternation between research taxonomies and research techniques 
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Table 3.12 - Hermeneutic research build-up (In analogy with Butler, 1998, p. 296) 
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Chapter 4 Reconceptualization 
 
 
We all agree that your theory is crazy,  
but is it crazy enough? 
Niels Bohr 
 
This chapter presents a reconceptualization of HRT. In Section 1, we first address the initial 
conceptual model derived from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. As the exploratory factor 
analysis run on this model did not yield the results that were expected and were in line with 
what is suggested in literature, we had to (re)introduce (new) constructs into the research 
design. The outcome of this process is an extension of extant literature on HRT, notably with 
regard to the Michigan HRO School, and suggests the need for further theory building. For this, 
we fall back on writings by scholars from the Berkeley School (Section 2). These constructs are 
discussed in detail throughout the next five sections (Sections 3 through 8). Consequently, we 
are compelled to reconceptualize our a priori model (Section 1) and to formulate a new set of 
propositions and hypotheses (Section 2). 
1 A Priori Conceptual Model Construct Validation 
A conceptual model defines the elationships between constructs and variables through the 
explicitation of propositions and hypotheses (Bacharach, 1989). By analogy with what we have 
described in the methodology chapter, the basis for our initial conceptual model – henceforth 
referred to as the ‘a priori conceptual model’ – is formed by a double assumption. A first 
assumption is that the literature on high reliability theory – and more in particular the Michigan 
School – offers a set of constructs that captures the high reliability character of an organization. 
A second assumption is that this set is exclusive in a sense that the items that are suggested by 
literature univocally converge into one of the proposed items. These assumptions refer to 
hermeneutic circle of understanding G from Table 3.12. The corresponding conceptual model is 
shown in Figure 4.1. It regroups three propositions: 
P1: A higher HRO propensity results in a higher reliability than a lower HRO propensity. 
P2: A higher SenseMaking propensity results in a higher reliability than a lower SenseMaking 
propensity. 
P3: The more the dedicated IS is used for the registration of incidents and the more it is used 
for the communication during the incident handling, the higher the reliability.  
P4: The fit of a team’s HRO propensity and the use of the IS determines reliability. 
P5: The fit of a team’s SeMa propensity and the use of the IS determines reliability. 





Figure 4.1 - The A Priori Conceptual Model 
Based on our literature review from Chapter 2, we regroup the items per HRO construct as 
proposed in Table 0.1 through Table 0.5 in Appendix C. Apart from meeting validity 
requirements, the characteristics of the factors do not meet the expectations as expressed in 
Table 0.1 through Table 0.5. Appendix C further learns that KMO parameters and explanation of 
variance can be considered acceptable. Our conclusion hence is that our first attempt to 
structure and interprete the high reliability issue in our case studies, relying on literature in the 
field of HRT and SeMa does not yield the expected results. A comparison of the derived factors 
with the factors first reported by Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (1999) does not hold. We recall 
that these factors are: (1) Sensitivity to Operations, (2) Reluctance to Simplify, (3) Commitment 
to Resilience, (4) Preoccupation with Failure and (5) Deference to Expertise (See Chapter 2: 
Literature Review). These constructs were not supported by internally consistent factors in the 
data. Several factor analyses were carried out in order to fit theory to empiric observations, but 
the responses to the different items were not the way they had been conceived beforehand. 
Therefore, sticking to the theoretical constructs as provided by literature on HRT and SeMa is 
not leading to a workable conceptual model, at least not within the context of our research 
design and data.55 For this reason, we decided to let loose the original constructs and start 
searching for new ones that may be better supported by data.  
2 Reconceptualizing the A Priori Model 
Instigated by the hermeneutic approach described in the previous chapter, we posit that the 
theorizing on High Reliability Organizing has come to a turning point. Our review of literature 
HRT
1. Sensitivity to Operations
2. Reluctance to Simplify
3. Preoccupation with Failure
4. Commitment to Resilience
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(Chapter 2) has learned that the evolution of theorizing on High Reliability Organizations so far is 
one from the Berkeley school project’s focus to the Michigan approach. Our argument that it is 
time for a new phase is that the two previous phases have replaced one black box by another. 
We have not gained real insight in the why and how high reliability is achieved, neither on what 
role situational circumstances play in its emergence. We provide the following arguments for 
this statement: 
1. The reliability theme has not sufficiently taken into account the tension between 
effectiveness and efficiency. Even though it has been discussed by HRT and NAT 
theorists, it has not been formally integrated into their framework. Since reliability– 
especially today when pressure to be efficient is high – is one of the competing 
organizational objectives, any sound theory development cannot happen when the 
duality effectiveness/efficiency is not genuinely acknowledged as an endogenous factor. 
2. The reliability theme has not sufficiently stressed the dynamic nature of organizing. 
Although it has described reliability as ‘a dynamic non-event’, it has univocally described 
its constituting parts in a static way: a culture of mindfulness, a structure of resilience, 
without pointing out how these contextual and structural dimensions contribute to 
reliability. Knight (2004, p. 49): “Thus, while Weick et al.’s (1999) theory proposes that 
the five processes lead to collective mindfulness, it is plausible that collective mindfulness 
leads to these five processes. *…+ Future research is needed to determine the causal 
relationship between collective mindfulness and the five processes and evaluate Weick et 
al.’s (1999) conceptualization”.  
Just as the Michigan framework has built on the Berkeley research, we argue that we need to 
take the Michigan research as a starting point. What is needed is a re-appreciation of the 
Berkeley findings and a rereading of work that has lead the Michigan scholars to their theorizing. 
With this we mean that one should do a backward reading of Weick’s work: from (1) HRO (Weick 
et al., 1999), over (2) SenseMaking (Weick, 1995) and (3) Loose Coupling (Orton & Weick, 1990), 
to (4) The Social Psychology of Organizing (Weick, 1979). 
In what follows, we start the elaboration of what could become a third phase in the 
development of High Reliability Organizing, after the pre-1999 Berkeley and the post-1999 
Michigan approach. We do so by drawing on the insights and notions described above, by 
organizing them around five ‘building blocsk’ which originally come from Roberts and Bea 
(2001b)56: (1) Flexible Organizational Structuring; (2) Attention to Reliability as a Rival to 
Efficiency; (3) Avoiding Core Competencies Becoming Incompetencies; (4) Adequate SenseMaking 
and (5) Group Performance and Heedful Interaction. This calls for a nuanced and encompassing 
instrument. For this reason, we have explicitly and deliberately chosen for an analysis based on a 
comprehensive framework.  
The factors that – according to literature – constitute the essence of High Reliability 
Organizations are not systematically grouped, other than around the constructs of Mindfulness 
and Resilience. This is the same observation as the one made by Knight (2004) in his study on the 
HRO traits in the management of public swimming pools. Knight found no evidence of Weick et 
al.’s (1999) conceptualization of five antecedents to be accurate either. Instead, he found 
indications that the use of three variables would be more appropriate. Therefore, what is 
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needed is a framework that does allow regrouping them in a way that makes sense to the reader 
and that respects their essence, i.e. without reducing them to mere concepts from organization 
theory. It is our conviction that the choice for a relevant framework that meets these exigencies 
is paramount in view of a thorough understanding of the complexity of the fundamental nature 
of high reliability thinking. 
The end of this journey will be a return to the Berkeley starting point, but complemented with 
insights of some quarter of a century of literature on organizational (un)reliability and insights 
stemming from our own field experience. In the remainder of this chapter we center this 
reconceptualization exercise around the variables in our model. On the level of the independent 
variables, we first discuss the expansion of the HRT framework (Section 3) and Sensemaking 
(Section 4). On the level of the moderator variables, we address Requisite Variety (Section 4.4), 
Structure (Section 5) and IS Fit (Section 5). On the level of the dependent variables we describe 
the way reliability is measured (Section 8). 
3 HRT 
Our proposed reconceptualization of HRT consists of six constructs: Team Orientation (3.1), 
Threat Flexibility (3.2), Efficiency (3.3), Sensitivity to Operations (3.4), Preoccupation with Failure 
(3.5), and Deference to Expertise (3.6). The three first constructs are novel to HRT, the last three 
have been discussed at length in HRT literature. The focus in this section therefore is on the 
discussion of the former constructs. 
3.1 Team Orientation 
Roberts and Bea (2001b, p. 182) state that reliable organizations are characterized by social 
conduct and collective mental processes that are more fully developed than they are in 
organizations that are less reliable. People in these organizations create the social forces of 
groups by acting as if those forces exist. When people believe these forces are present in the 
group, they construct actions to contribute to the group while envisaging a social system of joint 
action, representing the system in their minds, and interrelating their actions with the envisaged 
system. Roberts and Bea argue that people in such organizations act heedfully, i.e. more 
carefully, critically, consistently, purposefully, attentively, studiously, vigilantly, and 
conscientiously (Roberts & Bea, 2001b, p. 182). Likewise, Campion et al. (1996, p. 450) suggest 
to monitor and encourage positive team processes: communication, workload sharing, social 
support, team self-efficacy or team spirit. Therefore this subsection focuses on the role of team 
behavior and the interaction that takes place between team members. To this end, we first 
provide a definition of team and Team Orientation. Next, we elaborate on how mindfulness 
occurs through interaction between people.  
A team is an entity made up of at least two individuals who see themselves and who are seen by 
others as a social entity because they have been assigned specific roles or tasks to perform, who 
are interdependent in their work as they work towards a common goal, who are embedded in 
one or more larger social system(s) (e.g. a business unit or an organization), and who perform 
tasks that affect others (e.g. colleagues, customers, suppliers) (Bernard, 2006;Rasker, 2002). . 
Team members have usually been recruited for their qualifications, experience, and skills with 
the objective of accomplishing a common team goal. Teams have a boundary, which is more or 
less permeable. Depending on the context, members can move in and out of a team over time 
 Reconceptualization 121 
 
 
(Bernard, 2006, p. 2). Team Orientation then is the degree to which team members rely on each 
other for the coordination of their action. Essential in this is the notion ‘shared mental model’ 
and the role of implicit coordination. Rasker (2002) describes the shared mental model as 
organized knowledge structures that allow team members to describe, explain, and predict the 
teamwork demands. It comprises team knowledge such as knowledge about the tasks, 
responsibilities, and informational needs of the team members and situation knowledge such as 
knowledge of the ongoing developments in the external situation. Implicit coordination stands 
for team members adapting to contingency, e.g. by providing each other the necessary 
information in advance of requests. Hence, team members anticipate on each other's 
informational needs. Rasker (2002) provides the example of the blind pass in basketball, where a 
player passes the ball over his or her shoulder to another player without looking and talking. 
Groups that perform well are likely to have higher levels of cohesiveness (Riddle, Anderson, & 
Martin, 2000), and members are likely to feel more involvement and connection with one 
another (Myers & McPhee, 2006, p. 442). 
Most assimilating interaction occurs not at the organizational level but at the level of the team 
and therefore team communication plays a much larger role than organizational influences 
(Myers & McPhee, 2006, p. 441). This particularly true for HROs since they are characterized by 
teams whose members must learn to coordinate their activities, develop trust, and rely on each 
other in order to perform essential aspects of their jobs. Changes in the group’s goals, 
membership, or context bring unceasingly new demands for learning and mutual adjustment 
(Myers & McPhee, 2006, p. 441).  
3.2 Threat Flexibility 
Research has shown that when faced with a threat, organizations, groups, and individuals often 
react with well-learned behaviors or habitual responses (Staw et al., 1981;D'Aunno & Sutton, 
1992). For familiar threats, responding in a rigid, habitual way may be effective at reducing the 
threat (Staw et al., 1981). However, if the threat is new, habitual responses may be maladaptive 
and may exacerbate the situation (Plotnick, Turoff, & Van Den Eede, 2009). This response rigidity 
has been observed under many different kinds of threats, from financial threats to emergencies 
that threaten to cause loss of life. Threat Rigidity theory is discussed by several authors: D’Aunno 
and Sutton (1992) on the response of Drug Abuse Treatment Organizations to financial 
restriction, Gladstein and Reilly (1985) in the context of a threat simulation experiment, D’Aveni 
and MacMillan (1990) in relation to behavior of CEO’s financial crisis behavior.  
3.2.1 Threat Rigidity 
The threat rigidity thesis proposed by Staw et al. (1981) attempts to explain and model this 
particular response to threat, to understand the mechanisms that underlie it, and to explore the 
consequences of this proclivity towards rigid, maladaptive responses in the face of adversity 
(Plotnick et al., 2009). In this model, environmental change is seen to lead to a threat; the threat 
then results in a restriction of information and constriction of control in an attempt to focus 
limited resources on dealing with the threat and to make certain there is centralized decision-
making. This in turn leads to rigidity in response (Staw et al., 1981) (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2 - Threat Rigidity (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003) 
 
Rather than reducing the stress that precipitates the perception of threat, stress can increase to 
a point that it is counterproductive. Some stress is needed to focus attention and achieve 
cognitive absorption. However, there is a point at which too much stress will degrade reliability 
if the task difficulty and arousal in response to the situational demands are also high (Bea & 
Moore, 1993). The rigid response, when maladaptive, is ineffective and intensifies the threat. 
Incremental small environmental changes will produce threats for which learned behavior 
responses can be effective. But, radical changes will create threats that require new flexible 
responses. It is this flexible responsiveness that the threat rigidity thesis is lacking (Staw et al., 
1981).  
3.2.2 Threat Flexibility 
Sutcliffe and Vogus’ Threat Flexibility model (2003;2007) as shown in Figure 4.3 challenges the 
Threat Rigidity View  
 
Figure 4.3 - Threat Flexibility (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003) 
 
Several researchers have found indications for the existence of the Threat Flexibility model. 
Smith-Crowe and colleagues (2003), for instance, using training history data and supervisory 
ratings of 133 hazardous waste workers' safety reliability collected within two organizations in 
the U.S. nuclear waste industry, examined organizational climate for the transfer of safety 
training as a moderator of relationships between safety knowledge and safety reliability. Their 
results supported the proposition that these relationships are stronger in the less restrictive 
(more supportive) organizational climate (Smith-Crowe, Burke, & Landis, 2003). 
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HROs are said to be archetypes of resilient response. They achieve this through the plethora of 
actions and tools that are available to them and that have been discussed throughout Chapters 2 
and 4. Yet one particular way of doing so that has not been linked to HRT is suggested by Barnett 
and Pratt (2000). Their notion of ‘autogenic crisis’ complements the Threat Rigidity thesis by 
suggesting that future crises could be pre-adapted by initiating latent threat (instead of real 
threat) to generate organizational flexibility, learning and renewal. By inducing such autogenic 
crises into the organization, top-management causes internal fragmentation (Orton & Weick, 
1990). The generation of a (be it controllable) crisis induces an uncertainty and ambiguity that 
has the potential of challenging what has been taken for granted for too long a period of time. In 
line with Orton and Weick’s (1990) reconceptualization of the Loose Coupling metaphor, this 
boils down to loosening the coupling of (structural and contextual) organizational ties, as such 
allowing for (tangible and mental) flexibility. 
Another hallmark of HROs, is that a lot of what contributes to the leadership style of HROs has to 
do with the fact that in general managers “know their problems aren’t simple and they know 
there are many forces at work that can throw their plans out the window” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 
13-14). In non-HROs managers know this also, but there they tend to believe they “have no 
choice but to play the game by rules that everybody can at least understand”. If things turn out 
differently, and damage is caused, a scapegoat is looked for – and found – who will be blamed 
for the error. HROs ban these practices and this creates a climate of well-being and feeling safe.  
3.3 Efficiency 
A paradox common to many – if not all – organizations, is the duality between the drive toward 
efficiency and the drive toward reliability (Roberts & Bea, 2001b, p. 180). Originally stemming 
from the automobile industry, the efficiency paradigm has penetrated the thinking of managers 
in both public and private sectors. The business world’s obsession with efficiency is a heritage of 
the Japanese management philosophy of lean thinking. The bottom-line of the lean paradigm is 
that production time and process time are reduced and that resources are cut: idle time, 
redundant resources, etc. We treat ‘slack’, ‘leanness’, ‘lean thinking’, and ‘efficiency’ as 
synonyms for which we adhere to Lawson’s definition: “Organizational slack is that cushion of 
actual or potential resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal 
pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy as well as to initiate 
changes in strategy with respect to the external environment” (Lawson, 2001, p. 126). 
In theory, it does not matter whether slack is constantly available or that it is a potential that can 
be called upon in time of need. It has the connotation of ‘weak’, ‘loose’, ‘lazy’ or even waste (cf. 
pit coal), all of which are rather pejorative. This negative connotation has been reinforced by 
management literature (Harrison, 1997). Even though the blind acceptance of the efficiency 
model and its alleged suitability, regardless of the context, has been criticized (e.g. Green, 1999), 
its popularity has hardly diminished. The reason is simply that a striving for efficiency does yield 
observable benefits. On the other hand, it has become obvious that the fascination for leanness 
has caused the removal of vital adaptive and responsive capacity or 'organizational slack', 
necessary for organizations that need to contend with complex and dynamic environments 
(Smart et al., 2003, p. 733)57. “[E]ngineers are mainly concerned with effectiveness issues; 
economists with efficiency” (Jarman, 2001, p. 100). This paradox has been expressed by Roberts 
and Bea like this: “One paradox in many organizations is that between the drive toward 
124 Two Cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
 
efficiency and the drive toward reliability. By its very nature, efficiency calls for reaching goals in 
as cost-effective and time-efficient a manner as possible. Most organizations try to do this by 
downsizing, outsourcing and cutting costs wherever they can. On the other hand, reliability 
requires constant attention to processes such as intra-group behavior, intergroup behavior, and 
communications; riveting attention to detail; cross training; paying attention to 
interdependencies of people, their organizations and outside constituents; and time-consuming 
vigilance. Efficiency is obtained through rational decision making; reliability is often achieved 
through trained intuition and in-depth analyses” (Roberts & Bea, 2001b, p. 180-181). 
The challenge is to determine where the critical point of too much leanness lies. This 
subsection’s objective is to shed some light on the determination of this balance between a 
striving for efficiency and a preoccupation with effectiveness. It builds largely on work by Smart 
et al. (2003) who argue that “integrating `lean’ thinking with `high-reliability’ thinking, presents a 
significant future challenge for managers reared almost exclusively on a diet of efficiency gain 
and shareholder value” (Smart et al., 2003, p. 735-736). In line with this position, we adhere to 
the general belief that HROs trade off efficiency for reliability because short-term efficiency may 
significantly undermine long-term viability by causing an organization to make potentially fatal 
errors of omission (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a, p. 885). In what follows we address this paradox 
in more detail. First, we provide an overview of the different slack types (3.3.1), after which a 
reminder of the classical HRO paradigm that warns against fine-tuning is presented (3.3.2). 
Finally, a balanced view on this paradigm is developed (3.3.3). 
3.3.1 Slack 
The slack and redundancy topic has strong relevance for the study of organizational reliability 
and more particularly to the HRO notion, as high-reliability theorists emphasize redundancy as 
one of the most prominent design features of unusually successful organizations (Roberts, 
1990b;La Porte & Consolini, 1991). Schulman posits that important conclusions can be drawn by 
“managers everywhere, especially those concerned about upgrading reliability in the face of 
diminished reservoirs of organizational slack” (Schulman, 1993b). He distinguishes between 
resource slack, control slack (Schulman, 1993b, p. 353-354) and conceptual slack (Schulman, 
1993b, p. 364). 
Slack types 
Resource slack is the surplus in terms of time, personnel, money and so on. It can be viewed 
negatively as nonproductive inefficiency in the organization, as a suboptimal allocation of 
resources. Two particular types of resource slack are (1) Technical redundancy and (2) Social 
redundancy. Technical redundancy is slack that is embedded in the form of duplication and 
backups – redundant computer and communications systems, backup power supplies, and 
multiple safety devices (Ericksen & Dyer, 2005, p. 29). Social redundancy is much less mentioned 
in HRO literature (Snook, 2002, p. 210). Control slack implies individual degrees of freedom in 
organizational activity, some range of individual action unconstrained by formal structures of 
coordination or command (Schulman, 1993b, p. 353-354). Conceptual Slack (1993b, p. 364) 
refers to a divergence in organizational member’s analytical perspectives about the 
organization’s technology or production processes, a willingness to question what is happening, 
rather than feign understanding, and greater usage of respectful interaction to accelerate and 
enrich the exchange of information (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 70-71). It is “a divergence in 
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analytical perspectives among members of an organization over theories, models, or causal 
assumptions pertaining to its technology or production processes” (Schulman, 1993b, p. 364). 
Although it can be assessed negatively, as ambiguity or confusion in an organization’s knowledge 
base, conceptual slack forces an organization to take less for granted and to remain vigilant. In 
this sense, conceptual slack relates to Mindfulness. 
Redundancy absorption 
The distinction between actual and potential slack is important from the perspective of 
efficiency. The continuous search of striking a balance between an urge to be effective and one 
to do so with the least resources possible (efficiency) tends to lead to a victory of the 
proponents of efficiency. Singh (1986) distinguished between unabsorbed slack, which is easy to 
recover, and absorbed slack which is not easy to recover. If slack is absorbed, it means that slack 
is interwoven in the organizational tissue, structurally and inextricably. It are resources of any 
kind that can be recovered to influence reliability over a typical temporal cycle to which 
managers' activities are entrained. Underlying these aspects of slack typology is the time frame 
over which resources can be redeployed (Nohria & Gulati, 1996, p. 1246-1247). In a study on 
reliability in high-velocity environments, one would expect that slack is seen in a short-run time 
dimension, which comes down to absorbed slack: The decision sequences have to occur in such 
a limited time-interval that slack simply has to be ‘innate’ to be effective. Often, there simply is 
no time to free-up the ‘unabsorbed’ capacity. An important exception, however, is that if the 
mechanisms to draw on them are innate themselves, a choice for unabsorbed slack would be a 
way to combine effectiveness and efficiency. Unabsorbed slack is more efficient than slack that 
is not: not only can it be cut away with a next budget round – which is a negative interpretation 
of our statement, but which applies – but also, using a football term, it can play a sweeper (or 
libero) position in the organization’s defense. The form this unabsorbed capacity can take can 
vary from a ‘flying brigade’ (human resources), back-up infrastructure (e.g. computer rooms, 
offices), unbound experts, etc... Key to the success of unabsorbed slack is to be sure it can be 
triggered at the right time, in the right way so that it becomes quasi ‘on the fly’ innate to the 
organizational components it is reinforcing. Therefore, the advice we could formulate to find a 
balance between effectiveness and efficiency is to make the slack itself unabsorbed, but the 
mechanisms that trigger them innate to the organization. 
The drawback of slack 
A caveat on the side-effect of the slack treatment, however, is that some of the approaches 
typically used to reduce component failure accidents, such as redundancy, may actually increase 
the likelihood of system accidents because it increases interactive complexity, which is one of 
the basic causal factors of unreliability—(Leveson, 2002, p. 32). Apart from this increase of 
inherent complexity, redundancy can increase the chances of an accident by encouraging 
operators to push safety limits well beyond where they would have, had such redundancies not 
been in place (Snook, 2002, p. 210). Snook further reports that redundancy in form of multiple 
overlapping components “dramatically increase system complexity, automatically compensate 
for hidden weaknesses, effectively stymie attempts to locate root causes and generally frustrate 
learning” (Snook, 2002, p. 210).  
A final observation Snook makes is that the components of redundant systems are quite often 
much less independent than we think (Snook, 2002, p. 211). While often no more than an 
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irritating design challenge in purely technical systems, meeting the demand for independence in 
a social system is next to impossible. “Everyone was responsible, hence no one was” (Snook, 
2002, p. 211). 
3.3.2 Classical HRO paradigm on efficiency: the danger of fine-tuning 
HROs seem to strike a balance between rewarding efficiency and rewarding reliability. Firms that 
have reduced numbers of accidents are fully aware of the simple truth that what gets measured 
gets managed (Roberts & Bea, 2001a, p. 74). They seek to establish reward and incentive 
systems that balance the costs of potentially unsafe but short-run profitable strategies with the 
benefits of safe and long-run profitable strategies (Roberts & Bea, 2001a, p. 74). They genuinely 
acknowledge the complexity they are dealing with in the sense that they believe there are no 
simple and stable answers. They trade off efficiency for reliability because short-term efficiency 
may significantly undermine long-term viability by causing an organization to make potentially 
fatal errors of omission (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a, p. 885). They focus on the notion of 
creating an HRO that privileges integrity in the achievement of medium- and long-term goals 
over short-term efficiency gains. 
Although apparently opposed to each other, there is a relationship between both concepts, 
which is explained below. 
1. Long-run reliability will affect financial reliability, which in its turn is a precondition for 
innovation, e.g. Research & Development, leading to innovative products or services. 
2. In a world of uncertainty, an organization’s stakeholders will value reliability. Flexibility 
(e.g. innovations) is an important signal of reliability and future reliability. In this way, 
flexibility contributes to reliability. 
3. An organization that has committed itself to be highly reliable by applying HRT principles 
has an organizational model that is built on trust and mindfulness. Such an organization 
has to explore and maintain more ideas and has to refresh its picture of the 
environment more frequently (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a), all preconditions for 
flexibility. “The tendency to seek confirmation and avoid disconfirmation is a well-honed, 
well-practiced human tendency. That is why HROs have to work so hard and so 
continuously to override this tendency and to remain alert. And that is why you may have 
to work just as hard. All of us face an ongoing struggle for alertness because we face an 
ongoing preference for information that confirms” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 35). 
Cognitive dissonance kills mindfulness, kills reliability. 
4. Long-run flexibility in its turn will make sure the organization is resilient in the way it 
copes with incidents. 
 
Reliability often can only be realized at the expense of short-term efficiency. When shareholders 
are taking a short-term perspective (profit taking or aiming at dividend increase), this would 
mean that there is no support for a policy of high reliability. Reliability comes at a cost and, in 
the short run, such a reliability policy will have a negative impact on share prices. The same 
scenario occurs, when the organization is operating in a dynamic environment – e.g. urging on 
innovation – there will be insufficient resources and/or management commitment to focus on 
the issue of reliability (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a). HRT has some suggestions on the way this 
long-term reliability can be achieved.  
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3.3.3 A balanced view on efficiency 
Although prior research on HROs has noted that HROs pursue reliability at the expense of 
efficiency (Creed et al., 1993) we have found indications that such might not univocally be the 
case. Therefore, we believe that the trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness is more 
subtle than that. Schulman (1993a) has typified reliability in HROs a ‘non-marginalizable’ 
property, meaning that they confront the economic rule of rationality. Non-HROs, when 
organizational resources reach the point of diminishing marginal returns, their consumption is 
likely to be reduced or rationed. (Schulman, 1993a, p. 34). In line with Amalberti et al. (2005) 
however, we do not agree, and would argue that non-marginalizability would be a characteristic 
of an ultra-reliable organization (URO), and not of a highly reliable organization. UROs are ruled 
by the primacy of safety instead of the holistic notion of reliability we have described in the 
introduction (Chapter 1). Another argument is that where Corporate Governance models 
propagate the importance of openness and transparency, HRO literature however seems to 
indicate that openness and reliability is not always compatible. Heimann (2005) argues that for 
instance for NPPs, there is an obscurity and opaqueness that surrounds the sector of nuclear 
energy, the so-called Nuclear black box. Nuclear incidents or safety problems at nuclear sites 
rarely get the news, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Vartabedian, 2006). 
The task for the non-URO – and they constitute the vast majority of all organizations – is to 
integrate both 'lean thinking' and 'high-reliability' principles (Smart et al., 2003, p. 733). Our own 
research therefore starts from the bidirectional nature of this relationship between a striving for 
effectiveness and a continuous concern to be efficient. We do so by taking into account the (1) 
time horizon, (2) adaptive capacity, (3) system wide perspective, (4) curvilinearity, and (5) risk 
appetite. 
Time horizon 
HROs pursue efficiency at the expense of short-term effectiveness, at least at the cost of an 
increase in its probability. In other words, it is not wrong to strive for efficiency by cutting on 
costs, time and resources. On the other hand, a strategy of striving for efficiency can be 
advisable to a certain extent. On the other hand, a remark that also has to be made is the risk of 
tautology: high performing companies over the years tend to generate slack. In other words, 
slack is associated to reliability which precisely generated it (Durand, 2004), which constitutes a 
system dynamics dimension in thinking about slack.  
System-wide 
HROs embrace lean thinking as a system-wide organizational philosophy, not as an isolated 
initiative (Smart et al., 2003, p. 735). They focus on their value-streams rather than on their cost-
streams. Non-HROs pursue lean thinking in extensive attempts to cut transactional costs, 
threatening an organization’s medium-term sustainability.  
Adaptive capacity 
The conventional approach to management is reactive and adaptationist (Staber & Sydow, 
2002). Organizations following this approach tend to adopt a ‘lean and mean’ strategy, focusing 
on their core competencies, streamlining routines, and tightening resource belts (Harrison, 
1997). They view organizational flexibility in terms of cost cutting, rationalizing, and routinizing 
and “behave as if complex, dynamic and interrelated environments are in fact simple, static and 
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unrelated” (Bozeman & Slusher, 1979, p. 346). The adaptationist approach considers 
organizational slack a form of inefficiency and frowns on experimentation with unproven 
structures and procedures, if such experimentation is seen as conflicting with activities that have 
clear and immediate payoffs. An alternative strategy is to develop adaptive capacity (Staber & 
Sydow, 2002, p. 408). HROs are archetypes organizations that go for adaptive capacity instead of 
adaption. The distinction between adaption and adaptive capacity is crucial in explaining HRO 
success and has the potential of distinguishing between the real HRO and the organization that 
is highly reliable by chance or because it is an Ultra Reliable Organization (URO). 
Curvilinearity 
Durand (2004) argues that too much slack, like too much organizational knowledge, is bad 
though. Too much knowledge can be a hindrance in developing responses to complexity. The 
organization will develop negative organizational slack, which will lead to some form of inertia 
and rigidities. Nohria and Gulati (1996), for instance, report a similar effect of slack on 
innovation. They point out the curvilinear nature of the relationship by arguing that too little 
slack inhibits innovation because it discourages any kind of experimentation whose success is 
uncertain, but that at the same time complacency and lack of discipline might occur as the 
consequence of too much slack (Nohria & Gulati, 1996, p. 1245) 58. An inverse U-shaped 
relationship like this, suggests that, taken together, an intermediate level of slack is optimal for 
innovation. We hypothesize that the same mechanisms that apply to the relationship between 
innovation and slack equally can be found in the relationship between slack and other aspects of 
flexibility (innovation being one of them) and reliability. 
Therefore, you have positive or ‘good’ organizational slack and you have negative or ‘bad’ 
organizational slack. The question remains however, what makes the difference between these 
two. We have the feeling that HROs seem to have found a recipe for developing the positive 
variant. 
Risk appetite 
In her review of Sagan’s ‘The Limits of Safety’ (1993), Rousseau (1996) comments on the nature 
of the debate between HRT and NAT: “Since each acknowledges the catastrophic potential for 
failure, what they disagree on is whether the risks are worth it. Such a question is not amenable 
to scientific test” (Rousseau, 1996, p. 201). This observation can be depicted by a Taylor-Russell 
diagram where the trade-off between Type I and Type II errors is described (Heimann, 2005).  
Type I and Type II errors can be described as follows 59:  
- A Type I error (Neyman and Pearson, 1933/1967), also known as an error of the first kind, 
occurs whenever the solution turns out to be inadequate, given the problem has been 
correctly identified and analyzed. Such an error relates to rejecting a null hypothesis when it 
is actually true. 
- A Type II error (Neyman and Pearson, 1933/1967), also known as an error of the second kind, 
occurs whenever the solution turns out to be inadequate because of a wrong analysis given 
the problem possibly has been incorrectly identified. It is the error of not rejecting a null 
hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is the true state of nature. 
The following is an example: “Moreover, the actors seemed to take into account the cost of 
making a mistake through action (shooting down an unarmed plane) along with the cost of 
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making a mistake through inaction (not shooting down an armed plane)” (Heimann, 2005, p. 8). 
Typical of HRT research is that the organizations it studies have to cope with ‘hazardous yet 
high-reliability technical systems’ and that in such systems failure is not an option because that 
would/could potentially radically jeopardize its survival. Schulman continues that in such 
organizations reliability is not considered a probabilistic property ‘that can be traded off at the 
margins with other organizational values’, but has to be considered a dichotomous 
organizational variable (Schulman, 2001, p. 346). 
From a reliability standpoint, an organizational structure that is effective for preventing one type 
of error may not be equally effective at preventing the other (Little, 2005, p. 2). The message 
that can be derived from the diagram is that an implicit choice for efficiency (avoiding a Type I 
error) unavoidably leads to an increase in the risk of a Type II error. Van der Pijl and de Wild 
(2007, p. 10) call this degree/amount of risk an organization is willing to accept in pursuit of 
value risk appetite. As the acceptance of risk is conditional on the pursuit of value, it is clear that 
risk cannot be seen in isolation. The balance inherent to the Taylor-Russell diagram (Figure 4.4) 
shows this, but at the same time it is our assertion that HROs are capable striking a balance that 
minimizes Type I errors (catastrophic failure) while at the same time keeps Type II errors 
(excessive and costly conservatism) at acceptable levels (Little, 2005, p. 5). 
  
(a) Minimizing alpha (b) Minimizing beta 
Figure 4.4 - Taylor-Russell diagram 
A crucial factor in the determination of the risk appetite is what Heimann (2005, p. 115-116) calls 
‘the bottom-line question about reliability’, namely whether risky technologies can be managed 
so as to achieve error-free operations for extended periods of time when the commitment by 
political and organizational leaders is missing. He posits that HRO principles of redundancy, 
culture, and learning will have no or much less effect when the steadfast motivation to pursue a 
course of action is missing. Although this bottom-line question is quintessential in HRO thinking, 
it might be taken for granted too easily. When asked about commitment in general terms, and 
independent from the specificity of a situation, people (and especially management) are inclined 
to answer truthfully affirmatively. 
3.4 Sensitivity to Operations 
The Sensitivity to Operations constuct has been elaborated at length in our review of literature 
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3.5 Preoccupation with Failure 
The Preoccupation constuct has been elaborated at length in our review of literature (Chapter 
2). We refer the reader in this respect to Chapter 2, subsection 3.2.2. 
3.6 Deference to Expertise 
Like the two previous constructs, Deference to Expertise stems from insights in High Reliability 
Organizing gained by the Michigan School (Weick et al., 1999).  
The Deference to Expertise construct bridges the divide between HRO literature and common 
organization theory. Mendelson (2000, p. 517), for instance, posits that information age decision 
architecture is embedded in the research of both organizational theorists (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967;Thompson, 1967;Galbraith, 1973) and economists (Hayek, 1945) as they show that moving 
decision rights closer to the point of information reduces information-processing requirements. 
In HRO jargon, this is called ‘Deference to Expertise’.  
The Deference to Expertise construct is also at the heart of explaining high reliability. In this 
section we address mainly the dilemma of the need of simultaneous centralization and 
decentralization that is at the core of NAT (See: Chapter 2 – Literature Review). It connects to 
the Roberts and Bea Building Block of ‘Flexible Organizational Structuring’ (Roberts & Bea, 
2001b). We recall that, from a NAT perspective, tightly coupled and interactively complex 
systems are doomed to fail because of their impossibility to be centralized and decentralized at 
the same time. HRO researchers – Weick (1987) and Rochlin (1989) – propose a solution to this 
dilemma, namely the HRO capability to maintain both. HRO research explains this phenomenon 
as “a successful management of the two opposites: central planning on the one hand providing 
coordination between individuals, and local improvisation of individuals’ actions on the other 
hand. Yet for the people involved the situation was not one of carefully balancing the two 
opposites, but rather one of going through a quite unproblematic process of ‘planning’ and 
‘performing’” (Gauthereau & Hollnagel, 2005, p. 128). In essence, this dilemma can be solved by 
integrating the design principles of stability and flexibility, rather than merely substitute the one 
for the other (Smart et al., 2003, p. 734). In this lies the challenge HROs are facing on a daily 
basis. Noteworthy is Gauthereau’s and Hollnagel’s (2005) argument that this is quite a natural 
process as people in HROs usually do not concern themselves with this centralization-
decentralization conflict (Rochlin, 1999). In part, this observation equally counters the critique 
from NAT that HROs are cognitively impossible.  
In the remainder of this section, we deal with the essence of Deference to Expertise and its 
preconditions: Trust (3.6.1), (Control slack (3.6.2), Hierarchy vs. bureaucracy (3.6.3), 
DecisionMaking styles (3.6.4), Training (3.6.5), Boundary spanners (3.6.6), and Layered 
architecture (3.6.7). 
3.6.1 Trust 
Schulman has described trust as the ‘lubricant of the organization’ (Schulman, 1993a, p. 46). 
Because of its perishable nature, it has to be continually nurtured and renewed if it is to survive. 
Trust never gets institutionalized. It is one party's willingness to be vulnerable to another party 
based on the belief that the latter party is competent, open, concerned, and reliable (Mishra, 
1996). In that sense, trust must be distinguished from related behaviors such as cooperation or 
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delegation. These behaviors follow from one’s trust in another (Mishra, 1996). Therefore, when 
HROs defer to expertise, it is because they meet the trust precondition.  
Despite its importance, research on HROs has shown little attention for the role of trust as a 
prerequisite for high reliability. One notable exception is the work of Cox et al. (2006) who have 
studied – for two types of high reliability settings, the nuclear and offshore industries – the 
importance of high trust relations and their associated impact on safety culture. However, this 
study has not gone into the HRO mechanisms themselves, but has merely referred to HROs as a 
type of safety-critical organizations “that have not just avoided failure through good fortune or 
the vagaries of probability, but that have actively managed to control and reduce the risks of 
technical operations whose inherent hazards make them prone to catastrophic failure”(Cox, 
Jones, & Collinson, 2006, p. 1125). Although the Cox et al. study describes trust as a precondition 
for high reliability in terms of safety, it does not address the link between the trust construct and 
the Berkeley or Michigan HRO constructs. This observation can be made for HRO research in 
general, as it deals with the trust construct only distantly (e.g. Myers & McPhee, 2006;Baker, 
Day, & Salas, 2006). More frequent are HRO studies that take an implicit approach to the trust 
theme. 
3.6.2 Control slack 
Control slack implies individual degrees of freedom in organizational activity, some range of 
individual action unconstrained by formal structures of coordination or command (Schulman, 
1993b, p. 353-354). Weick (1995) suggests that organizations operate with three forms of 
control: “First-order control by direct supervision, second-order control by programs and 
routines, and third-order control consisting of assumptions and definitions that are taken as 
given. Third-order controls are called ‘premise controls’ because they influence the premises 
people use when they diagnose situations and make decisions. Premise controls were the 
‘professional blind spots’ *…+ They are the deep assumptions that are the foundations of culture 
[..]” (Weick, 1995, p. 113-114). Together these control types, determine an organization 
member’s degree of self-efficacy, which is a prerequisite for a successful Deference to Expertise. 
3.6.3 Hierarchy vs. bureaucracy 
A mistake easily made when studying organizations and the reasons for their success or failure is 
to confuse hierarchy with bureaucracy. This distinction is pointed out by Hirschhorn (1993). He 
argues that “working in hierarchies, people can respond flexibly to their task demands. But when 
organizational leaders cannot or will not manage the inherent risks of the enterprise they 
paradoxically undermine the hierarchy and create a dysfunctional bureaucracy in its place. 
Diffusing responsibility and reducing the leader’s apparent accountability, the bureaucracy 
burdens employees while making it difficult for them to work. Bureaucracies, in effect, deform 
the hierarchical structure. We need to construct hierarchies in which authority is widely 
delegated, while the chain of command is preserved and secured” (Hirschhorn, 1993, p. 138). 
This distinction between hierarchy and bureaucracy helps to explain the Deference to Expertise 
property. By blending a hierarchical decision structure with a specialist decision structure, HROs 
recognize – and operationalize – a principle that often escapes decision makers at critical 
moments: Expertise and experience are usually more important than rank (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001, p. 74). Ruchlin et al. (2004), in their review of literature on leadership and safety rely both 
on HRT and NAT. They reach a similar conclusion: “However, there is also recognition of the 
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importance of human agency in shaping directions and being innovative. Furthermore, an 
important role of organizations becomes to experiment, learn and adapt. This leads to the 
emergence of strategy. But contrary to the top-down design approach, this autonomous strategy 
is less anchored in strong leadership but rather grows from bottom-up actions and middle 
management engagement. This view challenges the previous role understanding of top 
management. Competences take time to evolve, knowledge cannot be designed” (IBM Business 
Consulting Services, 2004, p. 31). 
3.6.4 Decision-making styles 
Typical of HROs is that they know many diverse decision-making styles, all based on the principle 
that it is natural to change from a bureaucratic style to a collegial style in situations where this is 
more convenient (Grabowski & Roberts, 1997). The precondition is the existence of ‘slack’ and 
‘safe areas’: decision makers can consider, off-line, the potential impact of their decisions 
(Grabowski & Roberts, 1997, p. 9).  
Another characteristic is that HROs are reluctant to simplify (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 11-12). 
Traditional management approaches favor working with simplifications (e.g. Key Reliability 
Indicators, KPIs), meaning a reduction of complexity through aggregated indicators. This is in 
contrast to HRO's continually redefining of their organizational structures, their decision-making 
styles, and their communication patterns in response to the needs of their environment 
Just as HROs know different decision-making styles, they also feature multiple authority 
structures. Grabowski and Roberts (1997) distinguish between ‘Rapid tempo for the build-up 
stage’, ‘Structural reporting for the maturation stage’ and ‘Bureaucracy for the maintenance and 
resolution phase’. In emergencies, in order to avoid the inconveniences and even dangers of 
rigid hierarchies “*…+ HROs push decision making down—and around. Decisions are made on the 
front line, and authority migrates to the people with the most expertise, regardless of their rank” 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 16). A different approach for each different situation is a good 
principle on the condition that it can be implemented in the organization in a natural/automatic 
way. This is subject to the premise of simultaneous tight and loose-coupling, for which flexibility 
and redundancy (slack) are the necessary constituents (Grabowski & Roberts, 1997). 
In general, HRO decision making is carried out in settings where (Grabowski & Roberts, 1997, p. 
156-157): 
 organization members are in close physical proximity to each other. 
 there is consistency among beliefs, actions and decisions 
 there is avoidance of public, irrevocable, escalating decisions 
 there are limitations of leadership uncertainties 
 there are collegial authority and decision making patterns which overlay bureaucratic 
patterns 
3.6.5 Training 
A remedy for the non-linearity of the number of states is found in constant training with the aim 
of presenting possible scenarios organization members could face (Roberts, 1990a). An emphasis 
on training has two advantages, both leading to the same result of increased reliability. The first 
benefit obviously is that routines are exercised. It has been reported on several occasions (e.g. 
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Tarn et al. (1998)) that lack of training is a reason why even small incidents activate a domino 
effect and lead to disaster. The better people are trained, the bigger is their frame of reference. 
This frame of reference serves as stepping stones to find a solution for crucial situations. We call 
this ‘Training as a Product’. From the perspective of ‘Training as a Process’, we argue that the 
mere fact of providing training to organization members on itself is a signal for them to remain 
aware of the brittleness of reliability. This comes down to training as an antidote for 
organizational hubris, the overconfidence which is the harbinger of calamity (Matthews, 2004). 
Like all effective forms of learning – and according to a social-constructivist vision on learning – 
training should be based on active participation, action learning or other participatory forms of 
training, e.g. in communities of practice (Aase & Nybø, 2002). 
3.6.6 Boundary spanners 
We stress the importance of ‘boundary spanners’ (Boland & Yoo, 2003) in connecting people and 
processes, as such making rich and varied information available to decision makers throughout 
the organization. They are bridge builders because of their inter-functional and inter-disciplinary 
background. These boundary spanners should have “diverse experience, skepticism toward 
received wisdom, and negotiating tactics that reconcile differences of opinion without destroying 
the nuances that diverse people detect”(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 11-12). Boundary spanners 
think end-to-end and as such, they not only help the organization in its attempt of becoming 
more reliable, but also in becoming more flexible and customer-oriented.  
3.6.7 Layered architecture 
HROs have been described as having a layered organizational structure (Lawson, 2001, p. 127). 
By this, Lawson means that HROs can operate according to at least three very different models 
on an as-needed basis: (1) hierarchical, (2) completely collegial and team-based and (3) acting as 
a disciplined machine during emergencies. The presence of such layers represents a challenge 
for communication. Yet, HROs foster varied communication. Effective and varied communication 
is one of the hallmarks of HROs, which provide a means of understanding roles, responsibilities, 
and relationships and is as such developing shared mental models among members of the 
organization (Grabowski & Roberts, 1997, p. 156). As a result, autonomy and interdependence 
between system members is made explicit and more understandable, thus providing 
opportunities for SenseMaking and discussion of improvements in the system (Grabowski & 
Roberts, 1997). This can be obtained by means of frequent briefings, multiple instances and 
opportunities for shared information (discussions), and acknowledgement of the necessity of 
talk at the individual, team, organizational and system level. The explicitation of an individual’s 
uncertainty through communication is also essential as uncertainty increases risk (Grabowski & 
Roberts, 1997). In this perspective, Aase and Nybø (2002) advocate so-called ‘spaces of non-
punishability’ where failures and near failures could be analyzed and discussed.  
4 SenseMaking 
From Chapter 2, Section 5, we have learned that it is not easy to define SenseMaking. Weick 
(1995;2005), for instance, refuses to describe SenseMaking as an exhaustive, limitative and 
exclusive enumeration of properties. Instead he clarifies that the seven properties (See Chapter 
2, Section 5) “*…+ serve as a rough guideline for inquiry into SenseMaking in the sense that they 
suggest what SenseMaking is, how it works, and where it can fail…This listing is more like an 
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observer’s manual or a set of raw materials for disciplined imagination than it is a tacit set of 
propositions to be refined and tested. The listing might eventually serve the latter purpose”. We 
have taken Weick’s advice at heart and have taken these properties as the starting point, but we 
have reorganized them into a new categorization of SenseMaking components and processes as 




Although the seven original properties might not be fully exhaustive or exclusive in the scientific 
sense, they still are a grand attempt to render the way people deal with interruptions more 
tangible. Therefore, they continue to act as constructs that underlie our research. For their 
elaboration, we refer to the Chapter 2, Section 5. From the first section of this chapter and 
Appendix C we recall that our a priori belief was that the factors would relate to the seven 
SenseMaking properties, the exploratory factor analysis has shown that the items regrouped 
along three new constructs, which were labeled: 
1. Making sense through team: The role of ‘Other’ for SenseMaking 
2. Making sense through identity: The role of ‘Self’ for SenseMaking  
3. Making sense through heuristics, rules, etc.: The role of ‘Scheme’ for SenseMaking 
The original SenseMaking properties have been attributed to one of these three newly labeled 
constructs (Table 4.1). 
Self Scheme Other 
Identity Constructing Retrospective Social 
 Enacting  
 Cue Extracting  
 Plausibility  
Table 4.1 - Self, Scheme and Other 
This attribution makes – at least to us and for our purposes – more sense than the original 
constructs. Because of their higher degree of mutual exclusiveness, these constructs can be 
applied more easily. Moreover, we posit that they form a more exhaustive set than the 
underlying SenseMaking properties because it acknowledges the non-limitativeness of the list.  
 









Depending on who the SenseMaker is, the definition of what is happening will also change. What 
the situation means is defined by who one becomes while dealing with it or what and who one 
represents. “The Sensemaker is himself or herself an ongoing puzzle undergoing continual 
redefinition, coincident with presenting some self to others and trying to decide which self is 
appropriate” (Weick, 1995, p. 20). The organization seeks to discover what it thinks and knows 
about itself and its environment. This identity construction is the basis for imparting meaning to 
information inside an organization, and, eventually, determining what problems must be solved. 
Identity can be seen on the level of the individual or on the level of an aggregation of individuals 
(a team, an organization, a society, a people). Organizational identity, like individual identity for 
that matter, is not stable over time. It is liable to intense emotional reactions that can redefine 
organizational identity drastically (Weick, 1995, p. 94). Organizational identity can be described 
as “an organization’s members’ collective understanding of the features presumed to be central 
and relatively permanent, and that distinguish the organization from other organizations”60 
(Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000, p. 64). 
Identity construction is seen by many to be one of the two basic properties that differentiate 
SenseMaking from basic cognitive psychology.61 We create our reality by making decisions based 
on what we observe and what we are. From the perspective of SenseMaking, who we think we 
are (identity) as organizational actors lies primarily in the hands of others: “How can I know who 
we are becoming until I see what they say and do with our actions?” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 416). 
In that respect, this image of self is not static: “Even if we delve to the ‘deep’ level of 
organizational identity, we discover that, contrary to lay conceptions of identity as that which is 
fundamentally stable and enduring over time, organizational identity is actually fluid and 
susceptible to prevailing interpretive currents. Identity amounts to a present way of 
understanding ‘who we are as an organization’, and although identity might have continuity with 
past conceptions, it is not bound by them. Only via retrospective interpretation can organization 
members articulate their identity” (Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002, p. 623). 
4.2 Other 
Social 
“People learn about events when they compare what they see with what someone else sees and 
then negotiate some mutually acceptable version of what really happened” (Weick, 1985). 
Cognitive and social aspects of SenseMaking are inextricably linked. Other people are integral to 
our efforts to make sense of things because what we say or think or do is contingent on what 
others say and think and do. Even if we are alone, we imagine the response of others to our 
actions or thoughts, and adjust our thinking and behavior accordingly. SenseMaking requires 
talking, interaction, conversation, argument, and dialogue with others. Links or bonds are 
created through social interaction. 
Whenever this section addresses SenseMaking, it does so on the level of the individual. In that 
respect SenseMaking corresponds to the ‘largely cognitive activity of constructing a hypothetical 
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mental model of the current situation and how it might evolve over time, what threats and 
opportunities for each action are likely to emerge from this evolution, what potential actions can 
be taken in response, what the projected outcomes of those responses are, and what values drive 
the choice of future action’. Brenda Dervin is the protagonist of individual SenseMaking. The 
SenseMaking construct can also be applied on the level of the organization, but then it relates to 
‘a collaborative process of creating shared awareness and understanding out of different 
individuals' perspectives and varied interests’. In that way, collective SenseMaking is what has 
been described above as mindfulness. When Weick addresses SenseMaking, he addresses it at 
the organizational level. “Organization is an attempt to order the intrinsic flux of human action, 
to channel it towards certain ends, to give it a particular shape, through generalizing and 
institutionalizing particular meanings and rules” (Tsoukas and Chia 2002, p. 570). “We need to 
grasp each to understand the other. The operative image of organization is one in which 
organization emerges through SenseMaking, not one in which organization precedes 
SenseMaking or one in which SenseMaking is produced by organization” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 
410). 
4.3 Scheme 
A cognitive scheme is a mental structure people rely on to organize information they come 
across, based on previous experiences and suitable for present and future SenseMaking (Ericson, 
2001, p. 117;Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979). It represents one’s understanding of the world 
by filling in white spots where information is missing (Gioia & Poole, 1984). The collection of 
cognitive schemes of people in a team or an organization is what is called its ‘cognitive profile’ 
(Ericson, 2001, p. 118). 
Several schemes are available. We categorize them as (1) DecisionMaking and (2) SenseMaking. 
The following quote makes clear what difference exists between both scheme-building 
strategies: “The Westerner and the Japanese man mean something different when they talk of 
‘making a decision’. In the West, all the emphasis is on the answer to the question. Indeed, our 
books on decision making try to develop systematic approaches to giving an answer. To the 
Japanese, however, the important element in decision making is defining the question. The 
important and crucial steps are to decide whether there is a need for a decision and what the 
decision is about. And it is in that step that the Japanese aim at attaining consensus. Indeed, it is 
in this step that, to the Japanese, is the essence of decision. The answer to the question (what the 
West considers the decision) follows from its definition. During the process that precedes the 
decision, no mention is made of what the answer might be. … Thus the whole process focused on 
finding out what the decision is really about, not what the decision should be” (Weick, 1995, p. 
15 (after Drucker 1974, pp. 466-467)). Decision analysis is the scheme fitting a rationalistic and 
predictable worldview. Interruptions of normal processes can be dealt with by applying the 
appropriate procedures, well thought-out and well tested. SenseMaking, on the other hand, is 
the scheme fitting a more complex and less-predictable worldview. Interruptions then call for a 
more intuitive and novel approach like improvisation to cope with the unexpected.  
Retrospective 
“SenseMaking is an examination of past practices in order to learn (and unlearn) things about 
the current context” (Nathan, 2004). Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005, p. 413) point out that 
answers to the question “What’s the story?” emerge from retrospect, connections with past 
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experience, and dialogue among people who act on behalf of larger social units. Answers to the 
question ‘now what?’ emerge from presumptions about the future, articulation concurrent with 
action, and projects that become increasingly clear as they unfold.  
Weick et al. (2005) synthesize it as follows: “To focus on SenseMaking is to portray organizing as 
the experience of being thrown into an ongoing, unknowable, unpredictable streaming of 
experience in search of answers to the question, “what’s the story?” Plausible stories animate 
and gain their validity from subsequent activity. The language of SenseMaking captures the 
realities of agency, flow, equivocality, transience, reaccomplishment, unfolding, and emergence, 
realities that are often obscured by the language of variables, nouns, quantities, and structures. 
Students of SenseMaking understand that the order in organizational life comes just as much 
from the subtle, the small, the relational, the oral, the particular, and the momentary as it does 
from the conspicuous, the large, the substantive, the written, the general, and the sustained. To 
work with the idea of SenseMaking is to appreciate that smallness does not equate with 
insignificance. Small structures and short moments can have large consequences” (Weick et al., 
2005, p. 410). 
Many a theory exists about strategy. Without any doubt, strategy (formulation, implementation, 
etc.) has been one of the most popular themes for scholars in management. In the majority of 
these writings and research, strategy is seen as a plan. Mintzberg calls this ‘intended strategy’, a 
set of a priori guidelines for future actions). He confronts this intended strategy with what he 
calls an ‘emergent strategy’, a strategy that emerges despite a lack of planning. The a posteriori 
result of intended and emergent strategy is the realized strategy (Houthoofd, 2001, p. 27-28). 
Because of the complexity of the organizational context, intended consequences might not 
come true whereas unintended consequences resulting from strategy might be much stronger 
than imaginable. Mintzberg (1978) has described emergent strategy as a stream of decisions (or 
even merely of issues) decoupled from action. “*…+ the strategy-maker perceived an unintended 
pattern in a stream of decisions and made that pattern the intended one for the future. An 
emergent strategy, once recognized, became a deliberate strategy” (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 946). 
Clearly, this is a case of the application of the retrospection SenseMaking property (Schneider, 
1997, p. 95). 
“We are conscious of what we have done, never of doing it. We are always conscious directly 
only of sensory processes, never of motor processes; hence we are conscious of motor processes 
only through sensory processes which are their resultants *…+ Actions are known only after they 
have been completed, which means we are always a little behind or our actions are always a bit 
ahead of us. To anticipate a later point, if hindsight is a bias *…+, then everyone is biased all the 
time. The nature of time and sensing guarantee that outcome” (Weick, 1995, p. 26). 
Cue Extracting 
SenseMaking is focused on and by extracted cues. We notice some things and not others. We 
pay attention and extract a particular cue, then link it with some other idea that clarifies the 
meaning of the cue, which then alters the more general idea to which we linked the cue, and on 
and on. The cues we extract from situations tend to be simple and familiar and are crucial for 
their ability to get us moving. While moving, we keep noticing other areas and we stop to update 
our understanding as we go along. These extracted cues enable us to act, which increases our 
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confidence and confirms our faith in earlier cues. In essence, we decide what to pay attention to 
(Nathan, 2004). 
Weick (Weick, 1995, p. 50) describes cues as simple, familiar structures that are seeds from 
which develop a larger sense of what may be occurring. Cue extracting is different from noticing. 
Starbuck an Milliken (1988, p. 60) refer to noticing as the activities of filtering, classifying, and 
comparing, and distinguish it from SenseMaking which refers more to interpretation and the 
activity of determining what the noticed cues mean.  
Plausibility 
Together with Identity construction, plausibility is seen by many as a pillar of SenseMaking that 
make it fundamentally different from basic cognitive psychology (Weick et al., 2005, p. 416). 62 
Looking for what is plausible is often of more practical help then finding accuracy (Nathan, 
2004). Totally accurate perception is not needed, which is good because what is needed is that 
which is plausible and reasonable. Plausibility helps us explore what we see and energizes us to 
act. The search for accuracy on the other hand, can de-energize us as the search drags on and 
on.  
Enactment 
Enactment – sometimes called recursion – starts from the belief that the context is not an 
unchanging environment. It states that organisms (systems, organizations …) are “like rivers 
carving their way across a landscape and changing its geography, then being guided by the new 
topography” (Boisot & Cohen, 2000, p. 119). “People often don’t know what the ‘appropriate 
action’ is until they take some action, guided by preconceptions, and see what happens. Action 
determines the situation: The product of action is an orderly, material, social construction that is 
subject to multiple interpretations” (Weick, 1988). The starting point is that there is no objective 
environment out there separate from one’s interpretation of it. Thus, the organization creates or 
enacts parts of its environment through selective attention and interpretation. Interpretation 
can shape the environment more than the environment shapes the interpretation. We act and 
actions become part of the environment that then constrains future actions. The subsequent 
action tends to confirm preconceptions. “*…+ people receive stimuli as a result of their own 
activity, which is suggested by the word enactment. *…+ we are neither the master nor the slave 
of our environment. We cannot command and the environment obey, but also we cannot, if we 
would speak with greatest accuracy, say that the organism adjusts itself to environment, because 
it is only part of a larger truth” (Weick, 1995, p. 32). Weick further distinguishes between 
SenseMaking and interpretation. He posits that SenseMaking is about invention, whereas 
interpretation is about discovery. “The act of interpreting implies that something is there, a text 
in the world, waiting to be discovered or approximated. SenseMaking, however, is less about 
discovery than it is about invention. To engage in SenseMaking is to construct, filter, frame, 
create facticity (Turner, 1987), and render the subjective into something more tangible” (Weick, 
1995, p. 13-14). 
Several authors (Heimann, 2005;Choo, 2001;Jennings & Greenwood, 2003) have built on Weick 
(1979) and his Enactment-Selection-Retention (ESR) model of SenseMaking. This ESR model 
treats SenseMaking as reciprocal exchanges between actors (Enactment) and their 
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environments (Ecological Change) that are made meaningful (Selection) and preserved 
(Retention) (Weick et al., 2005). “SenseMaking is an active two-way process of fitting data into a 
frame (mental model) and fitting a frame around the data. Neither data nor frame comes first; 
data evoke frames and frames select and connect data. When there is no adequate fit, the data 
may be reconsidered or an existing frame may be revised” (Klein, Phillips, Rall, & Peluso, 2003).  
4.4 Ongoing 
SenseMaking has neither a beginning nor a formal end. Instead, it “takes place in a continuing 
and dynamic fashion as events unfold and we continually seek to understand what events mean 
in relationship to our organizations” (Nathan, 2004). Most of us at any given time find ourselves 
‘in the middle of something’. As we move from one situation to another, we make and revise 
assumptions and beliefs along the way. Our SenseMaking is ongoing. We work at making sense 
of past events to develop a story that we understand, and as future events unfold, we revise our 
story. SenseMaking takes place in a continuing and dynamic fashion as events unfold and we 
continually seek to understand what events mean in relationship to our story. “SenseMaking 
never starts. The reason it never starts is that pure duration never stops. People are always in the 
middle of things, which become things only when those same people focus on the past from 
some point beyond it. *…+ To understand SenseMaking is to be sensitive to the ways in which 
people chop moments out of continuous flows and extract cues from those moments. There is 
widespread recognition that people are always in the middle of things. What is less developed 
are the implications of that insight for SenseMaking” (Weick, 1995, p. 43). 
5 IS Fit 
The IS Fit theme has already been addressed in Chapter 2 where we looked in general into the 
issue of aligning Information Systems, users and tasks. Here, we shift the focus further to the 
way IS could/should support the Incident Management process. More particularly, we do so by 
studying the way IS are used for the incident registration (5.1) and communication (5.2) and how 
this relates to the HRT and SenseMaking constructs. 
5.1 Registration 
Little has been written on IS and Mindfulness, except for a recent publication by Butler and Gray 
(Butler & Gray, 2006). These authors argue that there are two strategies for achieving high 
reliability, i.e. routine-based reliability and mindfulness-based reliability and that IS research has 
typically focused on one of these strategies at a time, not at their individual and cumulative 
benefits in achieving reliability. 
5.1.1 Routine-based reliability 
“Routine-based approaches to reliability are fundamentally Taylorist. Procedures and processes 
are designed in advance, usually by managers or analysts, and applied in the moment by 
operators. Information systems are created and training programs are prepared to lead users 
step-by-step through the proper routine. Procedures, routines, training, and systems are 
designed to decrease the need for creative human involvement in the moment, in an effort to 
reduce errors, unwanted variation, and waste”(Butler & Gray, 2006, p. 214). “Routine-based 
reliability implicitly assumes that systems and routines are themselves rationally constructed, 
stable, repeatable, and reliable. If this is untrue, as suggested by recent studies of organizational 
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rules, processes, and systems rather than solving the reliability problem, routines may aggravate 
it by adding greater complexity and more unreliable components” (Butler & Gray, 2006, p. 214). 
5.1.2 Mindfulness-based reliability 
While routine-based approaches focus on reducing or eliminating situated human cognition as 
the cause of errors, mindfulness-based approaches focus on promoting highly situated human 
cognition as the solution to individual and organizational reliability problems (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). A mindful response ‘to a particular situation is not an attempt to make the best choice 
from among available options but to create options’ (Langer 1997, p. 114). Mindfulness-based 
approaches hold that an individual’s and organization’s ability to achieve reliable reliability in 
changing environments depends on how they think: how they gather information, how they 
perceive the world around them, and whether they are able to change their perspective to 
reflect the situation at hand (Langer 1989). From this perspective, routines are a double-edged 
sword. They are helpful when they provide options, but detrimental when they hinder detection 
of changes in the task or environment. “Whether describing individuals or organizations, 
mindfulness-based approaches posit that—more than just consistency of action—properly 
situated cognition is ultimately the basis for reliable reliability” (Butler & Gray, 2006, p. 214). 
5.2 Communication 
5.2.1 IS and SenseMaking 
SenseMaking is important enough a process to deserve more attention than it usually gets. 
Especially in the field of IS, its design and use, the way SenseMaking is supported is decisive for 
success or failure. Computerized information systems force people to give up the powerful tools 
that they use to make sense of the world away from terminals. If people are to retain meaning in 
computer-mediated contexts, managers need to restore the techniques for SenseMaking that 
machines exclude (Weick, 1985). Weick and Meader (1993) put it like this: “We assume that 
people who are confused by equivocal events gain more understanding of these events as they 
use more SenseMaking activities. Interaction helps alleviate confusion, but more so when action 
is taken, multiple sources of data are compared, the results are pondered, and the confusion 
event is placed in a context. It is the contemporary nature of these five activities that seems most 
threatened when confused people are expected to define and resolve their confusion in front of 
computer screens. The magnitude of this task is artificially reduced when the task is described as 
one of problem identification rather than SenseMaking. It is our intention to convey an 
appreciation of this larger, messier process of SenseMaking, so that designers are made more 
comfortable when they constrain and exercise some of its features”.  
Therefore, in this section, we study those SenseMaking aspects that bear promises for IS design. 
We continue by discussing current IS design building blocks and their hindrance of SenseMaking 
activities. We conclude this section by making a plea for a more open IS type with the 
SenseMaking theorem as an underpinning. 
5.2.1.1 Relevance 
The study of SenseMaking in connection to Information Systems is not new. Apart from the 
obvious link with information, several researchers have linked SenseMaking theory more 
particularly to the design of Information Systems. Weick (1985) laid a basis for later work on 
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thinking about SenseMaking in connection to computerized IS by developing a framework 
capturing SenseMaking procedures like (1) effectuation, (2) triangulation, (3) affiliation, (4) 
deliberation, and (5) consolidation. More particularly, he argued that the ways in which 
procedures and systems are designed and implemented do not support these SenseMaking 
mechanisms. For instance, IS are not designed – either by system designers or managers – for 
social comparison through personal affiliation, to allow deliberation before taking action, nor to 
consolidate cumulative learning (Rice & Contractor, 1990). Weick and Meader (1993) have 
applied an updated version of Weick’s 1985 framework to the design of Group Support Systems; 
Gephart (2004) examined SenseMaking in computer-mediated communications; Landgren 
(2005) relied on it for deriving design criteria for IS used in emergency response systems. 
5.2.1.2 IS Support for SenseMaking 
Building on Weick and Meader (1993) and their observations in connection to Group Support 
Systems (GSS) research, we posit that the study of the process of group problem should pay 
attention to the stage of SenseMaking of the problem itself. This crucial stage is often – but 
wrongfully – taken for granted and in an overambitious attempt of avoiding Type I and Type II 
errors, a Type III error will occur. Therefore we build on the idea developed by Weick (1985) that 
data processing capacity can be fully operational only when the IS user is capable of 
SenseMaking, able to “connect the details and see what they might mean” (Weick, 1985, p. 52). 
However, we want to take Weick’s conclusion one step further by placing the source of this 
SenseMaking within the IS and not in its environment: metaphors, corporate culture, 
archetypes, myths, history. 
For this reason we argue that systems are needed that are designed in line with users’ mental 
model. We believe that the design of such an IS should encourage and support the SenseMaking 
process. In practice, however, it can be noticed that IS design does the opposite because it aims 
at replacing or suppressing the possibility to ‘make sense’ of situations. IS are designed 
according to three leitmotifs (Muhren et al., 2008a): 
- A first building block is that IS research and practice, heavily inspired by Herbert Simon’s 
work, use structured data as a substitute for information (Boland 1987). However, 
information is not a commodity; it is a skilled human accomplishment. Information is 
meaning resulting from a person’s engagement with data (e.g. Davenport & Prusak 
1998). In line with SenseMaking, IS should thus be designed to take dialogue, 
interpretation and an individual’s search for meaning as sacred (Boland 1987). 
- Another stronghold of IS design is the traditional hierarchy of information processing: 
the progression of data into information, information into knowledge, and knowledge 
into wisdom (Ackoff 1989). However, SenseMaking theory provides insights that this is 
not correct. There is neither a clear beginning nor end to the SenseMaking process (Klein 
et al. 2006). In the traditional hierarchy, data is perceived to be the starting point, but 
there is no data unless someone has created it using his or her knowledge (Tuomi 1999). 
- A third worn model is that of IS as a ‘repository of best practice’ (Boland & Yoo 2003) 
which puts an emphasis on data storage. However, more information does not 
automatically lead to better SenseMaking (Klein et al. 2006). SenseMaking should not be 
viewed as a setting in which people need more information. The central problem 
requiring SenseMaking is mostly that there are too many potential meanings, not too 
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few (Weick 1995). What becomes important in the SenseMaking view is the issue how 
systems (in the largest sense) allow their users (again, in the largest sense) to “access 
information, to conduct exchange, and to communicate in ways that foster mutual-
personal relations” (Woodward, 2001, p. 283). We can learn from this for the way future 
IS could be designed. 
The conclusion can be no other than that the current leitmotif in IS design lacks a reflection on 
the nature of information technology (Orlikowski & Robey, 1991) and could do with a strong 
antidote against a tendency towards oversimplification.  
5.2.1.3 Fitting is Enactment 
Orlikowski and Robey (1991, p. 151) have pointed out that users often continually shape and 
reshape applications, so that technology ceases to be a fixed, tangible constraint. It is enactment 
in the purest sense. Information technology, by providing a means of representing reality 
through its set of concepts and symbols, provides a set of interpretive schemes through which 
people make sense of situation. IS institutionalize those interpretive schemes—those stocks of 
knowledge—by formalizing and encoding them, making them standardized, shared and taken 
for granted. Information technology contributes to the signification order by objectifying and 
reifying human actors' knowledge and assumptions, reinforcing them over time. “When a person 
is able to connect the details and see what they might mean, processing capacity is restored. 
Meanings that can impose some sense on detail typically come from sources outside the 
electronic cosmos — sources such as metaphors, corporate culture, archetypes, myths, history. 
The electronic world makes sense only when people are able to reach outside that world for 
qualitatively different images that can flesh out cryptic representations. Managers who fail to 
cultivate and respect these added sources of meaning, and bring them to terminals, will make it 
impossible for people who work at screens to accurately diagnose the problems they are 
expected to solve” (Weick, 1985, p. 52).  
6 Structure 
This section deals with some of the structural dimensions of organizing. 63 We subsequently deal 
with the alleged duality between procedure and improvisation (6.1) and the physical 
organization (6.2). 
One of the most important structural dimensions of organizing is the way work is organized 
physically. Three aspects thereof come to mind: physical proximity (6.2.1), team size (6.2.2) and 
work load and time allocation (6.2.3). Although HRO literature so far has not dealt with these 
aspects, we posit that incorporating them into the research framework may be adding value to 
HRO research by putting HRO properties in a new perspective. 
6.1 Procedure 
Organizations spend a great deal of time and effort in developing, implementing and complying 
to procedures. Nevertheless, it seems an ironclad rule that procedures are deviated from. In this 
section we make a start with studying the mechanisms behind the compliance to and deviation 
from procedure. First, we describe what Standard Operating Procedures are (6.1.1). Next, we 
examine what is meant by improvisation (6.1.2). We conclude with looking into why and how 
people deviate from procedure (6.1.3). 
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6.1.1 Standard Operating Procedure 
Under the Total Quality Paradigm, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are generally 
considered good practice and a core competence of the quality enhancing organization: 
straightforward and well programmed. The only decision is which SOP to apply, meaning that 
there is only routine decision making. This view is in line with organizations “coming close to 
meeting the conditions of closed rational systems, i.e., a well-buffered, well-understood technical 
core requiring consistency and stability for effective, failure-free operations” (La Porte & 
Consolini, 1991, p. 24). An important advantage of such stable routine action is the reduced 
cognitive demands that such behavior entails (Cohen, Dosi, Egidi, Marengo, & Warglien, 1996). 
The underlying assumption is that of bounded rationality, namely that attention is scarce and 
thus costly and that the more things an organization can do routinely and in the absence of 
mindfulness, the more it can conserve attention for what really matters (Levinthal & Rerup, 
2006, p. 509). In this respect, mindlessness can be an option too. Nevertheless, despite the 
benefits of a linear application of a priori well-designed procedures, there is an inherent danger 
in too strong a confidence in procedures: “When an organization succeeds, its managers usually 
attribute success to themselves or at least to their organization, rather than to luck. The 
organization’s members grow more confident of their own abilities, of their manager’s skills, and 
of their organization’s existing programs and procedures. They trust the procedures to keep them 
appraised of developing problems, in the belief that these procedures focus on the most 
important events and ignore the least significant ones” (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 329-330). 
In this lies a warning against hubris and overlying simplification and reduction of reality, a 
warning that HROs take seriously. In that sense, HROs take a more nuanced stance towards the 
application of procedures. The following quote from Schulman makes clear how HROs 
differentiate from non-HROs in this respect: “Consider briefly two theories of reliability that 
could be applied to the reliability of complex, hazardous operations *…+ Under one theory, 
reliability would stem from a constant, certain, predictable set of performances. All system 
conditions would be fully specified and anticipated. Term this the ‘anticipatory model’ of 
reliability – an approach that equates reliability to invariance. Here an organization ought to 
determine its functions, or at least strive to determine them, unambiguously and completely. 
Once ‘correct’ job reliability is specified, it should be ‘locked in’ once and for all through formal 
procedures, unvaryingly applied. A unified chain of command guarantees swift action and 
preserves the ‘perfect’ model. But a second approach to reliability is possible. Here reliability 
would be equated not with invariance but with resilience. Being responsive, rather than trying to 
weed out, the unexpected would be the ultimate safeguard of stable reliability. Despite the 
knowledge and elaborate procedures of an organization, its technology, it would be believed, is 
still capable of surprises. This expectation of surprise would not only be a state of mind, it would 
be recognized as an important organizational resource. Under this model of reliability, an 
organization would value its capacity for real-time discovery as much as its ability to control by 
anticipation” (Schulman, 1993b, p. 368). This quote nicely depicts this subsection’s contribution: 
what is the balance between procedure and improvisation? 
6.1.2 Improvisation 
It is generally assumed that organizations operate either according to procedures and routines 
(Adler & Borys, 1996) or in a more creative, improvised way (Barrett, 1998;Weick, 1998;Zack, 
2000). This dichotomy however, is merely a hypothetical one as organizations do not operate in 
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either of these ideal modes (Zack, 2000). In Chapter 2, we discussed the impossibility for an HRO 
to learn by trial and error, making it necessary to develop proactive abilities in managing risk. 
Thinking in advance and ‘thinking the unthinkable’ is one way of describing what is meant by 
being proactive. Such an attitude calls for imagination and improvisation. Learning and feedback 
from small errors, incidents and near misses, simulations and emergency preparedness are 
examples of reliability activities based on imagination (Aase & Nybø, 2002). Improvisation can be 
defined in several ways: “bringing one's personal awareness ‘into the moment’, and on 
developing a profound understanding for the action one is doing. This fusion of ‘awareness’ and 
‘understanding’ brings the practitioner to the point where he or she can act with a range of 
options that best fit the situation, even if he or she has never experienced a similar situation” 
(Mirvis, 1998). A noteworthy definition of improvisation is ‘planning as action unfolds’ (Weick 
cited in: Clegg et al., 2002). Improvisation is a kind of synthesis between the expected and 
unexpected circumstances, however without replacing either of them. Improvisation is enacted 
in the relationship between them but it does not replace the bi-directional relationship between 
poles (Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6 - Planning, Action and their Improvisation Synthesis (Clegg et al., 2002, p. 489) 
Improvisation takes at least two things: experience and creativity (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006, p. 
506). For this reason it is a false dichotomy however to state that organizations choose to 
behave either through improvisation or routine-based. In practice, they operate under both 
modes, depending on the situation (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). This is particularly true in case 
of HROs where experiential learning prior to action provides the necessary experience or 
building blocks, whereas mindfulness in action brings together experience and creativity 
(Levinthal & Rerup, 2006, p. 506). “When encountering new problems, old ideas embedded in 
existing prototypes are often rediscovered as useful because they remind brokers of specific 
solutions embedded in particular designs” (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006, p. 505). 
6.1.3 Deviation from procedure 
Throughout the debate, the question remains in which circumstances SOP or improvisation 
yields the best result. And to which degree, and how it should be administered. 
In Chapter 1 we have already introduced several issues that are related to the study of 
Complexity. In the following paragraphs we go into these questions, since the complexity notion 
is essential for answering the Procedure vs. Improvisation question. We do so by relying on a set 
of frameworks: (1) the distinction between complex and complicated (Bennet & Bennet, 2004), 
Planning ActingImprovisation
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(2) the distinction between foreseeable and not foreseeable, and (3) the distinction between 
decision making and sense making. However, since they also constitute ‘tools’ that serve us well 
to gain insight in other issues than the application of procedures, we have chosen to present 
them as separate sections, on the same level as the SOP level they are capable of explaining. 
Organizations are most of the time loosely coupled, and only become tightly coupled at 
particular moments of time. Nevertheless, they are designed in an all-purpose tightly coupled 
way. This is not workable in the loosely coupled time-periods and therefore organizational units 
will start developing alternative procedures. That works fine: the floor is happy and 
management is happy because success is visible. Then the system gets tightly coupled (domino 
effect) and fails. This mechanism is called Practical Drift: the slow, steady uncoupling of local 
practice from written procedure (Snook, 2002, p. 194). “It is this structural tendency for subunits 
to drift away from globally synchronized rule-based Logics of Action toward locally determined 
task-based procedures that places complex organizations at risk” (Snook, 2002, note 2, at p. 24). 
Globally untoward action is justified by locally acceptable procedure (Leveson, 2002, p. 182). “… 
locally efficient procedures acquired through practice gain legitimacy through unremarkable 
repetition. If such emergent actions survive long enough without interfering with global interests, 
and if local procedures are successfully repeated consequence, they stand a good chance of 
becoming accepted practice” (Leveson, 2002, p. 182). 
6.2 Physical organization 
6.2.1 Proximity 
From an HRO perspective, physical proximity is an important component of reliability. Both the 
literature and common observation seem to suggest that individuals are most likely to interact 
and communicate with others when the physical characteristics of buildings or settings 
encourage them to do so (Pinto, Pinto, & Prescott, 1993, p. 1285). Although research on 
propinquity among team members is not totally conclusive, it is assumed that it is useful for 
enhancing communication flows among team members and can be an effective tool in creating 
supportive group relationships and improved communication flows (Pinto et al., 1993, p. 1285-
1286). Kraut et al. (2002) have illustrated how collocation and face-to-face communication, 
make collaboration easier to accomplish among people who are collocated than among those 
who are apart: communication will be more social, less focused on the topic at hand, less 
planned, more ambiguous, and less likely to contain misunderstandings than communication 
conducted from a distance. The reason that comes to mind is the role of eye contact, which 
serves a number of different functions in encounters, one of which is gathering feedback on the 
other person’s reactions. Eye contact is also linked to affiliative motivation, and that approach 
and avoidance forces produce an equilibrium level of physical proximity, eye contact and other 
aspects of intimacy. If one of these is disturbed, compensatory changes may occur along the 
other dimensions (Argyle & Dean, 1965, p. 289). 
Olson and Olson, for instance, have reported that groups with high common ground and loosely 
coupled work, with readiness both for collaboration and collaboration technology, have a 
chance at succeeding with remote work but that deviations from each of these create strain on 
the relationships among team members and require changes in the work or processes of 
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collaboration to succeed. When they do not succeed, it is because distance often still matters 
(Olson & Olson, 2000). 
For these reasons the efficacy of imitating face-to-face communication is an unquestioned 
presupposition of most current work on supporting communications in electronic media, an 
assumption challenged however by Hollan and Stornetta (1992) and Turoff et al (Turoff, Hiltz, 
Bahgat, & Rana, 1993). Research suggests that frequency of dispersion and/or geographic 
distance (1) negatively affect communication intensity and coordination effectiveness; (2) 
contribute to a perception of people as being less trustworthy and dependable; (3) negatively 
impact reliability effectiveness (van Fenema, 2002, p. 126-127); (4) increase stress; and (5) 
reduce job satisfaction (Monge, Rothman, Eisenberg, Miller, & Kirste, 1985). Traditional HROs 
have the advantage of physical proximity (Grabowski & Roberts, 1999), something virtual 
organizations have not. Workload 
6.2.2 Team size 
Research has long considered size as an important issue in research on teams (Campion, Papper, 
& Medsker, 1996) since team size and composition affect the team processes and outcomes. The 
optimal size (and composition) of teams is debated and will vary depending on the task. 
Research in the automotive industry for instance has been able to demonstrate only a small-to-
negligible influence of team size on reliability (Pearce & Herbik, 2004), whereas other settings do 
indicate a substantial influence. Members of larger teams seem to be less satisfied, participate 
less, and cooperate less than members of smaller teams. With increases in team size, the 
psychological distance between individuals can increase.  
6.2.3 Workload and time allocation 
Workload is the relationship between a group or individual human operator and task demands. 
It is the amount of work or of working time expected or assigned. It is the perceived relationship 
between the amount of mental processing capability or resources and the amount required by 
the task (Hart & Staveland, 1988). The relationship between workload and reliability is not 
univocal. As workload increases, reliability does not necessarily decrease. Nachreiner (1995) 
reports that permanent low workload (underload) can lead to boredom, loss of situation 
awareness and reduced alertness. In addition, as workload increases reliability may not decrease 
as the operator may have a strategy for handling task demands. 
These observations have their relevance from a HRO perspective that takes a nuanced view. 
HRO literature has for instance reported on the role of workload in relation to the property of 
Commitment to Resilience (Wilson, Burke, Priest, & Salas, 2005), adaptability (Xiao & Moss, 
2001) and the system dynamic nature of the relationship between slack/loose coupling and 
workload (Cook & Rasmussen, 2005).  
7 Requisite Variety 
Organizations tend to simplify the complexity of their environment to the extreme. There are 
two reasons for this. A first reason is that organizations seem to be caught in a seeing 
homogeneity as a magic formula for success. Therefore, they strive for management dashboards 
and cockpits, fed by Key Reliability Indicators (KPIs) that are a synthesized reduction of reality; 
they consider team homogeneity as a management ideal; they strive for a total quality 
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management that thrives on standardization and procedures; they design systems architectures 
that are transparent. These are all manifestations of an organization’s drift to simplify to the 
extreme. A second reason for so much simplification is – contradictory enough – in the 
organization’s success. Miller (1993) pointed out that success leads to simplification, i.e. a 
reduction of variety. This is because successful systems steadily become less sensitive to 
complex changes around them. This simplification concerns both the way reality is observed and 
the way an organization tends to homogenize its constituent parts, included its people. Nelson 
(2003), for instance, found by means of verbal network analysis that groups inter-
organizationally hardly differ (in his case study between hospitals), but that there exist 
considerable intra-organizational differences between them. As a result, Nelson (2003, p. 5) 
rightly warns for an overambitious conclusion in terms of a globalization of organization 
structure and culture. Superficial similarities may hide deep differences. 
The conclusion is that organizations could do with an antidote for so much reduction of reality. 
The principle of requisite variety could be a solution for this problem. Weick has elaborated this 
principle at length at several occasions but traces back to Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety 
(Ashby, 1958). In essence, the principle says that one needs variety to counter complexity. If one 
wants to construct a system able to deal with a high level of environmental variety, one has to 
provide a sufficiently high level of system variety (Ahlemeyer 2001). Bennet and Bennet (2004) 
are even more explicit when they state that for a complex system to survive in a complex 
environment, it must have greater variety than the environment (in areas that are relevant to 
the organization’s health). On the other hand, they warn that too much variety can waste 
resources and lead to chaos and incoherence, but that too little variety may mean an inability to 
respond to complex situations. Optimize complexity of the present and deal with the anticipated 
future level (Bennet & Bennet 2005, p. 303). 
7.1 Experience 
It is logical to assume that the average number of years (experience) in the job, has an effect on 
a team’s HRO and SeMa propensity. Also that it has an effect on its reliability. The experience 
that is needed for dealing with the unexpected shows itself when an individual starts improvising 
(Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). This is particularly true in case of HROs where experiential learning 
prior to action provides the necessary experience or building blocks, whereas mindfulness in 
action brings together experience and creativity (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006, p. 506). Also, it is the 
empiric experience that triggers learning. Together with the number of years, comes the 
witnessing of (near)misses and hence a higher level of Preoccupation with Failure.  
7.2 Temporary staff 
In a HRO context, requisite variety shows itself in more than way, for example in the choice for 
temporary staff. Vogus and Welbourne (2003a), drawing on Nemeth (1986) and Langer (1989), 
have reported skilled temporary employees stimulating divergence through processes of 
minority influence. The reason for this is that they stimulate the majority to exert more cognitive 
effort and think in more divergent ways. Vogus and Welbourne (2003a, p. 882-883) point out 
that from a HRO perspective, the use of temporary employees as a reliability-enhancing strategy 
is counterintuitive since it has been reported that inexperienced and untrained temporary 
workers have played a significant role in organizational accidents in several industries (Rousseau 
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& Libuser, 1997). However, the temporary employees and contractors in high-technology 
industries, like a Bank and a NPP, are highly trained and skilled.  
7.3 Various Variances 
The ‘Various Variances’ notion is an umbrella term we have called into existence to label 
possible variety in all other constructs in our conceptual model. It is measured as the standard 
deviation, as opposed to the average scale on which all constructs primarily are measured. As 
such, Various Variances it is not a proper construct, but the antipole of all other constructs in the 
design. More particularly – but not solely – regarding the variance in in a team’s HRO and SeMa 
propensity, we believe that the effect on reliability should be studied. Under contingency theory, 
team heterogeneity as well as team homogeneity have their value. Waterman (1990), for 
instance, argues that when team membership is too homogeneous, reliability usually suffers. 
The effect of such team heterogeneity or homogeneity is contingent on the circumstances. 
However, typical of contingency theory is that it remains unclear what, how and when this effect 
plays. Therefore we take an interest in studying the tension between and the combined effect of 
averages (homogeneity) and standard deviations (heterogeneity). Our findings have some 
relevance for practice as they may have the potential of fine-tuning the dosing of team 
homogeneity/heterogeneity composition. It can avoid a blind all saisons approach of making 
sure styles are diverse and complementary. On the one hand, such style diversity ensures that all 
perspectives on a problem are covered and different skills are brought to bear at stages of 
problem solving. On the other hand, greater diversity requires more time to be spent on 
acquaintance, team building, and conflict resolution, which all comes at considerable cost. 
(Waterman, 1990). 
8 Reliability 
As this study is about reliability, our independent variable is measured in terms of organizational 
reliability. Literature suggests a few sub-variables of reliability such as accuracy, effectiveness 
and efficiency (Lin & Carley, 2001). These may be interesting and theoretically different 
concepts, but in many cases, accuracy, effectiveness, and efficiency are indistinguishable (Lin & 
Carley, 2001). A second problem is that the measure of such reliability is a concept that “in the 
real world is in many cases difficult to obtain, due to both the lack of information and the lack of 
consensus on this measure” (Lin & Carley, 2001). We have chosen indicators of time to measure 
this organizational reliability: deadline alerts, closing time and their derivation, the relative 
number of incidents closed on time (expressed as a percentage). We believe that there should 
be other measures, but also that the ones we have chosen were practically the only ones that 
could be measured with the necessary scientific rigor. We are aware of the subjectivity of this 
choice. On the other hand, it is argued that “[c]riteria for evaluating organizational effectiveness 
cannot be produced by some objective *…+ process. They are always normative and often 
controversial, and they are as varied as the theoretical models used to describe organizations 
and the constituencies that have some interest in their functioning *…+ We should not seek 
explanations for organizational effectiveness in general, since such general criteria are not 
available”(Rochlin, 1993, p. 30). 
These are measures of effectiveness, which is “*…+ both apex and abyss in organization behavior 
research. It is an apex in the sense that all conceptualizations and theories of organizations are 
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aimed, ultimately, at identifying effective reliability. It is the fundamental dependent variable in 
organizational investigations, judgments of effectiveness and ineffectiveness are an inherent part 
of the activities of theoreticians, researchers, and practitioners in organizations. It is an abyss in 
the sense that no valid theories of organizational effectiveness exist in organizational behavior, 
and no list of criteria has ever been formulated that is either necessary or sufficient for 
evaluating the construct” (Creed et al., 1993, p. 57). Creed et al. describe reliability as a subset of 
effectiveness (Creed et al., 1993, p. 60) and state that “[T]o date, the link between reliability and 
effectiveness has not been adequately explored in the HRO research. Had it been, the possible 
position of HROs and reliability in a broader ranging contingent behavioral theory of the sort 
foreseen by Lewin and Minton (1986) could have been truly thought provoking”. As one of our 
objectives is to drive HRO research into mainstream management studies, we believe that the 
choice for a strong measurable and strongly measured operationalization of effectiveness may 
be indispensable. This is what has been lacking in the HRO research today. 
The dependent variables as a proxy forreliability are a team’s performance in the handling of 
urgent, respectively non-urgent incidents in time, i.e., according to what has been stipulated in 
the respective Service Level Agreements (SLA) (Table 3.4). These variables have been chosen 
because they meet the requirements of Measures of Reliability, i.e. quantities that describe 
system properties or mission requirements (Cothier & Levis, 1986). This choice is contestable, 
like any reliability measure would be contestable since there is no objective measure of 
organizational effectiveness (Creed et al., 1993, p. 58). The scores on the independent variables 
are assumed to reflect either directly or indirectly the cognitive activity of the participant (Smith, 
1996, p. 262). 
For this purpose we have examined the database of Incident Management module of 
Peregrine™ the Bank in which the incident management process is logged. we came up with the 
following reliability indicators: 
PU12: Team performance regarding the handling of incidents of Urgency level 1 and 2 
(urgent incidents) 
PU3:  Team performance regarding the handling of incidents of Urgency level 3 
(non-urgent incidents) 
PUA:  Team performance of the handling of All incidents regardless of their Urgency level. 
Also at the NPP, legacy data provided the numbers for team performance, as main dependant 
variable. For this purpose we have interrogated the Maintenance & Repair Process module of 
the SAP™ database regarding their reliability of teams in handling the notifications. This exercise 
lead to the following reliability indicators: 
PU0: Team performance regarding the handling of incidents of Urgency level 0 
(urgent incidents). These are notifications that cannot be planned because of too short a 
time horizon – less than 3 weeks – the normal time it takes to get the work done 
according to the procedures. In the context of a NPP this time horizon is considered 
urgent. 
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PU123:  Team performance regarding the handling of incidents of Urgency level 1, 2 and 3 
(non-urgent incidents) These are notifications that can and should be fully planned and 
dealt with through the incident registration system. 
PUA:  Team performance of the handling of All incidents regardless of their Urgency level. 
PU123: Team performance regarding the handling of notifications of priority/Urgency 1, 2 and 3.  
Noteworhty is that the organization is steering its members and unit towards these reliability 
measures that function as Key Reliability Indicators (KPI’s). For instance, the Bank labels them as 
‘deadline alert’. For the purpose of defining our dependent variable we have transposed them 
into an indicator (for urgent (PU12) and non-urgent (PU3) incidents respectively) that expresses 
the ratio of the number of incidents that is not in deadline alert over the total number of 
incidents a team has to handle. The Bank has set the norm for this deadline alert ratio to 95%, a 
norm that it does not manage to comply to in all its aspects. At the NPP, there is an implicit 
target ratio of 100%. 
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Chapter 5 Conceptual Model 
 
 
A theory is something nobody believes,  
except the person who made it. 
An experiment is something everybody believes,  
except the person who made it  
– Unknown 
 
1 Revised Conceptual Model 
In line with the hermeneutics underlying our research, the testing of the a priori conceptual 
model and the theorizing described in the previous chapter has lead to the development of the 
reconceptualized model as shown in Figure 5.1.  
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Factor Team Orientation  (Rasker, 2002;Burke, 
Wilson, & Salas, 2005) 
Threat 
Flexibility 
Factor Threat Flexibility  (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 
2003;Carroll & 
Edmondson, 2002) 
Efficiency Factor Efficiency (Heimann, 
2005;Denrell, 

















Self, Factor Self  (Weick, 1995) 
Other Factor Other (Weick, 1995) 
Scheme Factor Scheme (Weick, 1995) 
Enactment When handling an incident, I proceed step by 












Registration How often (measured as a percentage) do 
you use Peregrine/SAP for the registration 
/co-ordination/escalation/closing of an 
incident? 
(Po-An Hsieh & Wang, 
2007) 
How often (measured as a percentage) do 
you register quasi immediately the necessary 




Face-to-face communication (Daft & Lengel, 1986) 
(Brusoni & Prencipe, 
2005) 
Telephone/Cell phone communication Ibid. 
e-mail communication Ibid. 
Peregrine/SAP Ibid. 
Ratio non dedicated IS vs. dedicated IS 
[calculated field] 
Ibid. 
Ratio voice supportive vs. non-voice 
supportive communication [calculated field] 
Ibid. 







Are you an internal or external staff 
member?  
(Vogus & Welbourne, 
2003a) 
Gender What is your sex?  (Milliken & Martins, 
1996) 
Experience How many years of experience do you have 
regarding incident handling? 
 
 Conceptual Model 153 
 
 
Construct Sub-construct Variable Reference 
Structure Physical 
location 
Where is your work spot?  (Grabowski & Roberts, 
1997) 
Size Team Size  (Rasker, 2002) 
Time allocation How much of your time (percentage) do you 
spend on incident handling? 
 
Mean number of urgent incidents per team 
member 
Mean number of non-urgent incidents per 
team member  
Mean number of incidents per team member 
Table 5.1 - Operationalizing the constructs 
2 Propositions and Hypotheses 
Contingency theory differs from other theories in the specific form of the propositions (Drazin & 
van de Ven, 1985). “In a congruent proposition a simple unconditional association is 
hypothesized to exist among variables in the model; for example, the greater the task 
uncertainty, the more complex the structure. A contingent proposition is more complex, because 
a conditional association of two or more independent variables with a dependent outcome is 
hypothesized and directly subjected to an empirical test; for example, task uncertainty interacts 
with structural complexity to affect reliability. Central to a structural contingency theory is the 
proposition that the structure and process of an organization must fit its context (characteristics 
of the organization's culture, environment, technology, size, or task), if it is to survive or be 
effective. In a contingency theory, organizational reliability depends on the fit between 
organization context and structure and process – given that normal assumptions hold about the 
premises, boundaries, and system states derived from the theory” (Drazin & van de Ven, 1985, p. 
514-515). This hallmark of contingency theory forms the basis for the conceptual model 
underlying our research and explains in part its complexity and stratification. Based on the 
reconceptualization presented in the previous chapter, we defined possible gaps – 
contradictions and paradoxes – for which an in-depth study holds promising contributions to the 
HRO discipline. We describe these gaps as research issues in form of propositions, and this 
regarding the two aforementioned research questions. 
2.1 Research Question 1 
A proposition expressed by high reliability theorists, is the implicit supposition that not all 
organization types exhibit High Reliability characteristics to the same extent, with HRO 
archetypes (like nuclear power plants) at one end of the spectrum. The undefined other end of 
the spectrum however is more worrisome because as long as there is no research on what could 
be labeled non-HRO’s, research into high reliability is difficult and only partial. Therefore, we 
identify blind spots of this continuum by comparing a nuclear power plant – as an HRO 
archetype – to the IT department of a financial institution, as a so-called garden variety (Roberts, 
1993) or high reliability seeking (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a) organization. This choice is not 
arbitrarily since the IT department of a Bank has many characteristics in common with a Nuclear 
Power Plant (Table 5.2). The risk of failure is very real since IT is operating under conditions of 
tight-coupling and interactive complexity (Perrow, 1999) and that the impact of such failure is 
very high. 
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1. Both represent important economic sectors where stakes are high in terms of 
investment and expected return (shareholder value) 
2. Both are characterized by a spillover effect in case of a calamity: Effects do not stop at 
the boundaries of the respective organizations, neither at the frontiers of the countries 
in which the calamity occurs. Radioactive elements will be dispersed on an international 
scale and a major Bank failure might/will result in a domino effect that takes other 
institutions down too. The laws of physics (nuclear) and the laws of psychology (Banking) 
are universal. Moreover, because of a globalization tendency, both nuclear and financial 
incidents also have a considerable impact on the economic tissue of the world. Reasons 
are both tangible and intangible. 
3. Both have the same reliance on technology resulting in the same weaknesses and 
threats: (a) aging of the technology (reactors or mainframe) (b) aging of employees 
(retirements) (c) a (blind) overreliance on technology might lead to catastrophe (d) a 
remarkable track record in terms of reliability and reliability might lead to hubris 
(overconfidence) 
4. A body of national (e.g. Nuclear Control Agencies/ Commissions for Banking and 
Finance) and international organizations (Bank for International Settlements 
(finance)/International Atomic Energy Agency (nuclear)) is in place. 
Table 5.2 - Resemblance between the Nuclear and the Financial sector 
A NPP and a Bank are what would be labeled by Schulman a form of holistic high reliability 
organization (as opposed to a decomposable HRO) (Schulman, 1993a). The following quote by 
Schulman makes this clear: “The technology of a nuclear power in existing plant designs does not 
readily allow itself to be simplified for safety. An air traffic control network as we have seen can 
be decomposed to reach safety, was when traffic is kept out of a sector, separations are 
increased, or planes are denied clearance to take off. An automatic reactor shut down or ‘trip’, 
however, is in many respects a riskier mode than is continuous operation of the reactor. The full 
operational integrity of a variety of valve and pumping systems is necessary to relieve pressures 
and carry off heat from the core” (Schulman, 1993a, p. 42-43). In the same way, the systems of a 
financial institution cannot be simplified accept if one is willing to accept an excessive loss in 
usability, efficiency and even effectiveness. The power of the Information System is based on its 
potential of integrating processes. The upside risk and downside risk are definitely out of 
balance.  
No organization is a pure type (Schulman, 1993a, p. 52): “Even in a highly decomposable64 
organization there are structures of integrating authority and examples of overarching analysis 
that come into play in the solution of critical problems. Even in the most highly integrated, 
holistic organization, there will be examples of individualized initiative and action taken to save 
the day” (Schulman, 1993a, p. 52). 
One way of finding an answer to the resemblance of a NPP and the IT process of a Bank is by 
looking for a similar HRO propensity between both. Can we find the same constructs in both 
organizations? And also: Can we find them to the same degree? 
We posit that the HRO properties will be present in both organization types as they are generally 
recognizable because of their high face validity. HRO properties are a translation and 
interpretation of contextual and structural dimensions (Pugh et al., 1968) of organizations and 
therefore will be distinguishable as such.  
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Therefore, our first proposition becomes: 
Proposition 1-1: HRO properties are not unique, but HRO propensity levels are 
H1-1: HRO properties will be discernible in the archetypical HRO (NPP) as well as in the 
mainstream High Reliability Seeking organization (Bank). 
However, what makes HRO unique is the degree to which they score on these properties. 
Therefore, we posit that the archetypical HRO exhibits a higher score on these properties than 
will the non-archetypical HRO. 
Hence, the following research proposition: 
Proposition 1-2: The non-archetypical HRO the Bank) exhibits the same HRO 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (like the NPP) but to a lesser 
extent. 
The corresponding hypotheses become: 
H1-2a: The average HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2b: The average Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2c: The average Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2d: The average Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2e: The average Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2f: The average Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
In line with HRO literature (Roberts, 1990b;Klein et al., 1995) we see that HROs value requisite 
variety regarding several aspects (experience, gender, skills, prior professional career …). 
Therefore, we propose that this should be reflected in their HRO propensity. Hence, the next 
two proposition become: 
Proposition 1-3: The higher the requisite variety of a team, the higher its HRO propensity 
This results in the following hypotheses: 
H1-3a: Teams using richer media exhibit a higher HRO propensity. 
H1-3b: More experienced teams exhibit a higher HRO propensity. 
Propostion 1-4:  The higher the requisite variety of a team, the higher its SeMa 
propensity  
H1-4a: Teams using richer media exhibit a higher SeMa propensity. 
H1-4b: More experienced teams exhibit a higher SeMa propensity 
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Remarkably enough, this variety is not requisite in the domain of HRO propensity itself. There 
the implicit rule of thumb is: the more staff shares these same values, the more reliable they will 
be as a team or organization. Put differently: the smaller the variance in HRO propensity, the 
higher the reliability. This leads us to the following research proposition: 
Proposition 1-5: The non-archetypical HRO (the Bank) exhibits the same HRO 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but exhibits a lower 
variance. 
As we have argued at the beginning of this chapter, the general belief is that for an organization 
(or subunit) homogeneity in terms of HRO propensity is better than heterogeneity. For instance, 
teams that exhibit a low variance in the degree of orientation towards Reluctance to Simplify are 
supposed to be better than teams exhibiting a higher variance. This is remarkable the more so 
because it opposes the notion of requisite variety. 
The argument we develop is that for high reliability (synthesis) to emerge, HRO propensity 
(thesis) needs to be challenged by a critical, diverging HRO propensity and behavior (antithesis). 
This is a plea for not pursuing a strategy of univocal HRO propensity but for pursuing a strategy, 
that fosters deviant behavior vis-à-vis HRO propensity. Such deviance is the antidote that 
provides the HRO potion with its therapeutic effect. A monolithic HRO therefore would go solid. 
To avoid this from happening, an organization must continuously and simultaneously step on the 
gas and brake. To put it metaphorically: in the same way as a tank – despite its unwieldiness – 
can make a U-turn at a spectacular speed by stepping on the gas for one caterpillar track while 
slamming on the brakes of the other caterpillar track, an organization derives it robustness – the 
combination of stability and flexibility – from a balanced heterogeneity. 
With the NPP as an HRO archetype and the Bank as an example of a garden variety HRO, we 
posit therefore that the NPP exhibits a higher degree of heterogeneity in terms of HRO 
propensity. Taking the standard deviation as a measure of this variance (spread), we come to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1-5a: The variance in HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5b: The variance in Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5c: The variance in Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5d: The variance in Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5e: The variance Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5f: The variance Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
In line with the argumentation built above, the same proposition (mutatis mutandis) can be 
formulated regarding the SenseMaking propensity. The next propostion therefore becomes:  
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Proposition 1-6: The non-archetypical HRO the Bank) exhibits the same SeMa 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but exhibits a lower 
variance.  
H1-6a: The variance in SenseMaking propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-6b: The variance in Self propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-6c: The variance in Other propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-6d: The variance in Scheme propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
In the same philosophy of acknowledging paradox, we formulate the next proposition: 
Proposition 1-7: The constructs of Mindfulness and Resilience interrelate 
HRO literature seems to presupose there is no multicollinearity between the HRO properties. It 
is our assertion that this is not univocally so, since from a previous research phase we have 
learned that the constructs are highly correlated.65 Especially regarding the mutual influence 
between the constructs of Preoccupation with Failure and Deference to expertise, we 
hypothesize a strong negative correlation. In other words: Mindfulness (i.e. pars pro toto 
Preoccupation with Failure) is the enemy of Resiience (i.e. pars pro toto Deference to Expertise). 
An organization that tries to be mindful has a good (better) chance of being stable in the short 
run because it avoids intrusions on its processes. The organization is not endangered and can 
continue to operate as it is used to, ‘business as usual’. An organization that tries to be resilient, 
on the other hand, has a better chance of being stable in the end because it has learnt how to 
deal with intrusions in its processes. The relationship between Mindfulness and Resilience is not 
univocal. Hence, it is also more interesting and useful Mindfulness and resilience cannot live 
with each other, but neither can they live without each other. 
The hypothesis hence becomes: 
H1-7a: The higher a team’s Preoccupation with Failure, the lower its Deference to Expertise. 
In the same line of thought, another hypothesis relates to the conditions that are necessary for 
mindfulness and resilience to take effect. The question arises how one can be resilient without 
being mindful. We posit that it is very unlikely that someone (or a team) can be resilient without 
being mindful. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
H1-7b: Being mindful is a prerequisite for being resilient. 
Faithful to our assumption that a NPP is an example of an HRO archetype, whereas a Bank is an 
example of a mainstream organization, we come to the following proposition and hypothesis: 
Proposition 1-8: The NPP is more reliable than the Bank 
H1-8: The NPP is more reliable than the Bank. 
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2.2 Research Question 2 
In the second place, the research aims at validating the positive influence of HRT and SeMa 
constructs on process reliability. In other words: we want to test the assertion that HRO and 
SeMa Propensities will yield high reliability [RQ2]. 
 
Figure 5.2 - Propositions for RQ2 
The second analysis level is a further exploration of the first level. It will help considerably in 
gaining a better understanding of the traits of HROs, but it cannot provide an explanation, apart 
from what is theorized in conceptual literature on the subject.  
The research propositions are indicated in the conceptual model shown in Figure 5.2 and their 
formulation together with an enumeration of the underlying constructs shown in Table 5.3.  
Propostion Constructs Desription 
P2-1 HRT  Reliability The higher the HRO propensity, the higher the 
reliability. 
P2-2 SeMa  Reliability The higher the SeMa propensity, the higher the 
reliability. 
P2-3  IS Fit Reliability The lower the use of the dedicated IS, the higher the 
reliability. 
P2-4 HRT IS Fit Reliability The better the fit between HRO propensity and IS use, 
the higher the reliability. 
P2-5 SeMa IS Fit Reliability The better the fit between SeMa propensity and IS use, 
the higher the reliability. 
P2-6  Structure Reliability The more balanced the structural organization 
dimension, the higher the reliability. 
P2-7 HRT Structure Reliability The better the fit between HRO propensity and the 
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P2-8 SeMa Structure Reliability The better the fit between SeMa propensity and the 
structural organization dimension use, the higher the 
reliability. 
P2-9  Req. 
Variety 
Reliability The more balanced the variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
P2-10 HRT Req. 
Variety 
Reliability The better the fit between HRO propensity and variety, 
the higher the reliability. 
P2-11 SeMa Req. 
Variety 
Reliability The better the fit between SeMa propensity and 
variety, the higher the reliability. 
Table 5.3 - Propositions and underlying constructs (RQ2) 
Proposition 2-1  The higher the HRO propensity, the higher the reliability. 
A shared mental model between team members (Rasker, 2002) increases team performance. 
This shared mental model corresponds to what we have labeled ‘Team Orientation’. Rasker 
(2002) found that training team members in each others’ tasks or positional rotation did not 
improve reliability. The reason put forward by Rasker is that such does not enhance thorough 
knowledge. However, teams have other characteristics contributing to high reliability. For 
instance, they serve as redundant systems to help trap and mitigate the consequences of errors 
(Burke et al., 2005). It has been argued that a team-based strategy towards reliability is the best 
way to transform a garden variety organization into an HRO (Burke et al., 2005). For this reason, 
we posit that an orientation on the team favors reliability because it is a prerequisite 
determinant of collective mindfulness and resilience. Therefore, we come to this hypothesis: 
H2-1a: Teams exhibiting a higher propensity towards Team Orientation yield higher reliability in 
the handling of urgent incidents, whereas this is counterproductive for the handling of 
non-urgent incidents. 
A caveat is in place: concerning the interrelation between dependent and independent 
variables: Despite the unproblematic and univocal character of the relationship between HRO 
propensity (as an independent variable) and team performance (as a dependent variable), it can 
be hypothesized that the sense of this relation is bidirectional. In line with findings from Myers 
and McPhee (2006) in their multilevel analysis of the influences on team member assimilation in 
a municipal fire department, we are aware of the possibility of a team’s reliability influencing its 
HRO propensity66. The reason is that teams that perform well are likely to have higher levels of 
cohesiveness (Riddle, Anderson, & Martin, 2000), and members are likely to feel more 
involvement and connection with one another. 
We argue that the provision of team information positively influences organizational reliability. 
In our study, such team information corresponds to the construct of Sensitivity to Operations. 
Therefore, the hypothesis we deduct from this can be expressed as follows: 
H2-1b: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation and exhibiting a high 
degree of Sensitivity to Operations yield a higher reliability than teams than the same 
teams exhibiting a low degree of Sensitivity to Operations. 
Management tends to expand their control over the organization. The organization hence 
becomes more bureaucratic. What is suggested by literature on HROs is that the reflex of this 
kind of organization does not fit the conclusions from Threat Rigidity (Staw et al., 1981). Instead 
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of becoming more bureaucratic, adhocratic and organic mechanisms seem to take over from 
mechanist ones. The organizational authority structure shifts in the sense that people in HROs 
increase their reliance on connections to other people (people-to-people links) and depend less 
on procedures (sensu stricto). They also have a wider access to resources (people-to-resources 
links).67 68  This characteristic has been described by Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) as Threat 
Flexibility. The hypotheses hence become: 
H2-1c: The higher the average Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability. 
H2-1d: Teams that operate in a less restrictive (more supportive) organizational climate perform 
better than teams that do not (Smith-Crowe, Burke, & Landis 2003). 
H2-1e: Teams that operate in a less efficiency-driven (more slack) organizational climate 
perform better than teams that do not. 
Proposition 2-2  The higher the SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability. 
The same logic from above applies to the SeMa propensity. However, we examine not as much 
the average value of SeMa propensity (on the level of the root construct, Scheme and Ongoing, 
but the spread in observation SeMa propensity. We believe that the more diversity (i.e. 
variance) is present, the more reliable a team will be. The hypotheses hence become: 
H2-2a: The higher the variance in SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-2b: The higher the variance in Scheme, the higher the reliability. 
H2-2c: The higher the variance in Ongoing, the higher the reliability. 
Proposition 2-3  The lower the use of dedicated IS, the higher the reliability. 
We posit that dedicated IS are not suited for reaching high reliability, unless there is a fit with 
user and environment characteristics. Therefore relying on more richer tools for incident 
handling (especially communication) is a better strategy. The hypothesis hence becomes: 
H2-3: Teams using richer media are more reliable. 
The next proposition elaborates on this insight. 
Proposition 2-4 The better the fit between HRO propensity and IS use, the higher the 
reliability. 
An essential requirement for the effective support of a process in natural and artificial systems is 
the structural and dynamic compatibility between the information processing system and the 
process it supports (Kampfner, 1998, p. 154). One way to guarantee this is by putting the user 
and his characteristics central. An adaptable IS is built with and from people. Human beings 
should be the bricks; the technology should be the mortar. 
Which leads us to the following hypotheses: 
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H2-4a: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation, relying on richer media 
yield a higher reliability. 
H2-4b: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher HRO propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on dedicated IS. 
Proposition 2-5 The better the fit between SeMa propensity and IS use, the higher the 
reliability. 
This proposition is in line with what we have hypothesized under Propostion 2-4.  
H2-5: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher SeMa propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on dedicated IS. 
This hypothesis cannot be validated at an acceptable level of significance. 
Proposition 2-6 The more balanced the structural organization dimension, the higher the 
reliability. 
Working closer to each other, should be advantageous for reliability. SenseMaking and 
Mindfulness will be easier to achieve when distances are low. It can also be hypothesized that 
smaller teams will be more reliable than larger teams. From our interviews we have learned that 
also a higher workload is advantageous for reliability because scale will permit a more structured 
organization of the work-follow-up. The same applies to teams that are capable of spending 
more of their time to indicent handling (instead, e.g. on project work). The hypotheses hence 
become: 
H2-6a: Teams that work under close physical proximity perform better than teams that 
do not. 
H2-6b:  Larger teams are more reliable than smaller teams.  
H2-6c: Teams with higher incident workload are more reliable than teams with a lower 
workload. 
H2-6d: Teams with a greater deal of their time allocated to incident management are 
more reliable than teams with smaller time allocation. 
Proposition 2-7 The better the fit between HRO propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
It can be assumed that a higher HRO propensity will even increase reliability when the conditions 
regarding the physical work organization (Proposition 2-6) are met. The hypothesis hence 
becomes: 
H2-7a: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working under 
close physical proximity 
H2-7b:  A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
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H2-7c: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams with higher 
incident workload. 
Proposition 2-8 The better the fit between SeMa propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
In the same way, the hypothesis regarding this propostion become: 
H2-8a: A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working 
under close physical proximity 
H2-8b:  A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
Proposition 2-9  The more balanced the variety, the higher the reliability. 
One obvious hypothesis is: 
H2-9a: More experienced teams are more reliable.  
More important however, is the requisite variety that exists within teams regarding all 
constructs in our model. It is this kind of requisite variety, our research wishes to focus on.  
Like in all cases where paradox arises, it is good to come to realize that paradox is essential and 
good in keeping “the organization on its toes, in a state of continuous awareness of its own 
contradictions”. However important, this is not sufficient when decisions have to be made and 
actions taken. Juxtaposing opposites may help people in becoming aware of the tensions and 
tradeoffs that go along with making choices (Clegg et al., 2002, p. 487). 
We argue this is so because successful organizations tend to become simpler over time, not 
more complex (Miller, 1993). There are numerous factors that account for this, such as past 
success, overconfidence, and the way past experiences are viewed (Miller, 1993). 
Another paradox is introduced by the notion of Hyper vigilance. Janis (1982b) describes this 
phenomenon as an excessive alertness to signs of threat or pressure. It is triggered by the time 
pressure and other stressful situations (Amabile, Mueller, Simpson, Hadley, Kramer, & Fleming, 
2002, p. 4). In this respect, we hypothesize that it is conflicting with the need to be mindful. Two 
consequences can be drawn from this. It is a plea to take into account the time factor in any 
research on mindfulness. (Something that is reflected in our research by making a distinction 
between urgent incidents and non-urgent incidents.) Under time pressure, the access to tried-
and-tested decision-making best practices seems to be mentally or physically obstructed. 
Problem definition, alternative generating, alternative analysis and deciding do not take place in 
depth or even not at all. The most conspicuous observation being that Hypervigilance leads to 
restricted information gathering and processing. Janis warns that this “leads to ill-considered 
decisions that are frequently followed by post-decisional conflict and frustration" (Janis, 1982b, 
p. 81). This same logic, applies to the other HRT constructs as well. We therefore become the 
following hypotheses: 
H2-9b: The higher the variance in HRO propensity, the higher the reliability. 
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H2-9c: The higher the variance in Team Orientation, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9d: The higher the variance in Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability.  
H2-9e: The higher the variance in Preoccupation with Failure, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9f: The higher the variance in Sensitivity to Operations, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9g:  The higher the variance in Deference to Expertise, the higher the reliability. 
Proposition 2-10 The better the fit between HRO propensity and variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
Because of the strong consistency of these constructs of Threat Flexibility and Efficiency in the 
exploratory factor analysis we have performed, and therefore contrary to the previous 
proposition, we hypothesize: 
H2-10a: Teams that perceive Threat Flexibility more homogenously perform better than teams 
that do not. 
H2-10b: Teams that perceive efficiency drivenness more homogenously perform better 
than teams that do not. 
Proposition 2-11 The better the fit between SeMa propensity and variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
The hypothesis here becomes: 
H2-11: More Eperienced teams, relying more on SeMa propensity, are more reliable. 
 
2.3 Summary of propositions and hypotheses 
 
Research Question 1 
Proposition 1-1: HRO properties are not unique, but HRO propensity levels are 
H1-1: HRO properties will be discernible in the archetypical HRO (NPP) as well 
as in the mainstream High Reliability Seeking organization (Bank). 
Proposition 1-2: The non-archetypical HRO the Bank) exhibits the same HRO 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (like the NPP) but to a lesser 
extent. 
H1-2a: The average HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2b: The average Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2c: The average Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
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H1-2d: The average Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at the 
NPP 
H1-2e: The average Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the 
NPP 
H1-2f: The average Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
Proposition 1-3: The higher the requisite variety of a team, the higher its HRO propensity 
H1-3a: Teams using richer media exhibit a higher HRO propensity. 
H1-3b: More experienced teams exhibit a higher HRO propensity. 
Propostion 1-4:  The higher the requisite variety of a team, the higher its SeMa 
propensity  
H1-4a: Teams using richer media exhibit a higher SeMa propensity. 
H1-4b: More experienced teams exhibit a higher SeMa propensity 
Proposition 1-5: The non-archetypical HRO the Bank) exhibits the same HRO 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but exhibits a lower 
variance. 
H1-5a: The variance in HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5b: The variance in Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5c: The variance in Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5d: The variance in Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at 
the NPP 
H1-5e: The variance Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the 
NPP 
H1-5f: The variance Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
Proposition 1-6: The non-archetypical HRO the Bank) exhibits the same SeMa 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but exhibits a lower 
variance.  
H1-6a: The variance in SenseMaking propensity at the Bank is lower than at the 
NPP 
H1-6b: The variance in Self propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-6c: The variance in Other propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-6d: The variance in Scheme propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
 Conceptual Model 165 
 
 
Proposition 1-7: The constructs of Mindfulness and Resilience interrelate 
H1-7a: The higher a team’s Preoccupation with Failure, the lower its Deference 
to Expertise. 
H1-7b: Being mindful is a prerequisite for being resilient. 
Proposition 1-8: The NPP is more reliable than the Bank 
H1-8: The NPP is more reliable than the Bank. 
Table 5.4 - Summary of research propositions and hypotheses regarding Research Question 1 
 
Research Question 2 
Proposition 2-1 : The higher the HRO propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-1a: Teams exhibiting a higher propensity towards Team Orientation yield higher reliability in 
the handling of urgent incidents, whereas this is counterproductive for the handling of 
non-urgent incidents. 
H2-1b: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation and exhibiting a high 
degree of Sensitivity to Operations yield a higher reliability than teams than the same 
teams exhibiting a low degree of Sensitivity to Operations. 
H2-1c: The higher the average Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability. 
H2-1d: Teams that operate in a less restrictive (more supportive) organizational climate perform 
better than teams that do not (Smith-Crowe, Burke, & Landis 2003). 
H2-1e: Teams that operate in a less efficiency-driven (more slack) organizational climate 
perform better than teams that do not. 
Proposition 2-2 : The higher the SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-2a: The higher the variance in SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-2b: The higher the variance in Scheme, the higher the reliability. 
H2-2c: The higher the variance in Ongoing, the higher the reliability. 
Proposition 2-3 : The lower the use of dedicated IS, the higher the reliability. 
H2-3: Teams using richer media are more reliable. 
Proposition 2-4: The better the fit between HRO propensity and IS use, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-4a: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation, relying on richer 
media yield a higher reliability. 
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H2-4b: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher HRO propensity 
perform better than when they rely more on dedicated IS. 
Proposition 2-5: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and IS use, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-5: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher SeMa propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on dedicated IS. 
Proposition 2-6: The more balanced the structural organization dimension, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-6a: Teams that work under close physical proximity perform better than teams that 
do not. 
H2-6b:  Larger teams are more reliable than smaller teams.  
H2-6c: Teams with higher incident workload are more reliable than teams with a lower 
workload. 
H2-6d: Teams with a greater deal of their time allocated to incident management are 
more reliable than teams with smaller time allocation. 
Proposition 2-7: The better the fit between HRO propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
H2-7a: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working under 
close physical proximity 
H2-7b:  A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
H2-7c: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams with higher 
incident workload. 
Proposition 2-8: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
H2-8a: A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working 
under close physical proximity 
H2-8b:  A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
Proposition 2-9 : The more balanced the variety, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9a:  More experienced teams are more reliable.  
H2-9b:  The higher the variance in HRO propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9c:  The higher the variance in Team Orientation, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9d:  The higher the variance in Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability.  
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H2-9e:  The higher the variance in Preoccupation with Failure, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9f:  The higher the variance in Sensitivity to Operations, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9g:   The higher the variance in Deference to Expertise, the higher the reliability. 
Proposition 2-10: The better the fit between HRO propensity and variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-10a: Teams that perceive Threat Flexibility more homogenously perform better than 
teams that do not. 
H2-10b: Teams that perceive efficiency drivenness more homogenously perform better 
than teams that do not. 
Proposition 2-11: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-11: More Eperienced teams, relying more on SeMa propensity, are more reliable. 
Table 5.5 - Summary of research propositions and hypotheses regarding Research Question 2 
 Data Analysis 169 
 
 
Chapter 6 Data Analysis 
 
 
In the knowledge-based economy,  
the role of the statistician is 
to help people tell great stories.  
Geoff Carss 
 
In this chapter, we assess the conceptual mdoel developed in Chapter 5 and answer the two 
research questions raised in the Introduction (Chapter 1). First, we validate the reconceptualized 
model constructs as presented in chapter 4 (Section 1). Next, we address the question whether 
the organizations we study are HROs [RQ1]. We do so by comparing our two case studies 
(Section 2). Finally, we examine what constitutes high reliability [RQ2]. We do so by measuring 
the (high) reliability of our two case studies (Section 3).  
1 Reconceptualized Model Construct Validation 
The purpose of this section is to test the reconceptualized research model developed in this 
dissertation. To this end, we validate the constructs that are at the basis of our reconceptualized 
research model by subjecting the data to an exploratory factor analysis (1.1) and by testing the 
resulting factors to an internal consistency test (1.2). 
1.1 Data reduction  
We have used factor analysis to reduce various sets of items into a smaller number of compound 
factors. A full description of the factor analyses we conducted can be found under Appendix H 
(Bank Case) and Appendix I (NPP Case). All factors are extracted by Principal Component Analysis 
with Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization. We only performed such an analysis if the 
necessary conditions are met: KMO measure higher than 0.50 and a significant value of the 
Bartlett test (Poelmans, 2002, p. 135). The factors emerging from our analysis meet the exigency 
that they should explain for 60% of total Variance. 
Our approach is in line with Koch’s (1993) modus operandus. As a factor analysis with all the 
variables grouped did not give a desirable outcome, we first isolated the moderator items from 
the items relating to theory and we performed a factor analysis on the first set. Next, we chose 
to split the items in two sets: a set of items relating to theory (HRT and SeMa), and another set 
relating to the moderator variables. Some constructs could be labeled according to theoretical 
constructs and sub-constructs. For the factors relating to HRT, we refer to Weick et al. (1999). 
For the factors relating to Scheme, Self and Other, we specifically refer to our relabeling of 
SenseMaking in Chapter 4 (Reconceptualized model). Other constructs could not be labeled 
according to theoretical constructs and sub-constructs. For these factors we have chosen a new, 
best-fitting, label (e.g. Team Orientation). The factors with a sufficiently high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha ≥.60) were aggregated in a compounded indicator. Next, the procedure was 
repeated for the items relating to SenseMaking.  
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The outcome of this reconceptualization process is shown in for the Bank Case and NPP Case 
respectively. For the background behind and interpretation of the labels of these newly found 
factors, we refer to the corresponding sections in Chapter 4, addressing the reconceptualization. 
Construct N items Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Team Orientation 5 20.2 20.1 19.5 19.4 20.3 0.779 
Preoccupation with Failure 5 15.1 15.3 14.4 15.2 15.4 0.695 
Deference to Expertise 6 13.5 14.1 22.5 17.1 23.4 24.2 0.598 
Sensitivity to Operations 2 20.5 20.4 0.812 
Other 3 19.2 19.1 19.6 13.4 0.647 
Self 2 13.1 13.2 0.557 
Scheme 3 13.3 14.2 14.5 0.306 
Threat Flexibility 4 24.1 22.3 17.2 23.3 0.576 
Efficiency 2 24.4 22.1 0.605 
Peregrine 2 10 9 0.821 
Logics of Action 3 13.6 22.4 22.2 0.470 
Deviation 2 24.3 14.3 0.266 
HRT 18 20.2 20.1 19.5 19.4 20.3 
15.1 15.3 14.4 15.2 15.4 
13.5 14.1 22.5 17.1 23.4 24.2 
20.5 20.4 
0.806 
SeMa 9 19.2 19.1 19.6 13.4 
13.1 13.2 
13.3 14.2 14.5 
0.515 
Table 6.1 - Item Composition and Scale Reliability of Bank Case Constructs 
Construct N items Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Other 3 19.1 19.2 19.6 0.769 
Self  2 13.1 13.2 0.579 
Scheme 2 14.2 14.5 0.695 
SeMa 7 13.1 13.2 14.2 14.5 19.2 19.1 19.6 0.688 
Threat Flexibility 3 22.3 24.1 23.3 0.673 
Self Efficacy 4 22.3 22.2 24.1 22.4 0.742 
Efficiency 2 24.4 22.1 0.680 
Pressure 3 24.4 22.1 14.3 0.643 
Supplementary Resources 3 17.2 13.6 23.3 0.596 
Team Orientation 4 19.4 19.5 20.2 20.1 0.860 
Sensitivity to Operations 2 20.4 20.5 0.680 
Preoccupation with Failure 5 15.1 14.4 15.2 15.3 15.4 0.807 
Deference to Expertise 5 13.5 22.5 23.4 24.2 14.1 0.734 
HRT 16 19.4 19.5 20.1 20.2 20.5 20.4 15.1 15.2 
15.3 15.4 14.4 13.5 22.5 23.4 24.2 14.1 
0.898 
Table 6.2 - Item Composition and Scale Reliability of NPP Case Constructs 
1.2 Scale validation 
As a second step in the validation of reconceptualized model, its constructs internal validity was 
assessed. Cronbach’s alphas were computed for each of the subscales. For the Bank Case (Table 
6.1), their values ranged from 0.266 to 0.821. For the NPP Case (Table 6.2). Both tables regroup 
only those scales that have a sufficient internal consistency. In those cases in which the 
Cronbach’s Alpha is less than 0.60, the composite variable is deemed unreliable and the 
individual items are used for further statistical analysis when relevant. This is different from 
Koch’s choice to keep subscales with a disappointing Cronbach’s alpha of 0.50 because of its 
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major empirical importance (Koch, 1993, p. 88), we decided to take the general rule of taking 
0.60 as a cutoff point. A few exceptions are those constructs with values for Cronbach’s alpha 
approaching the .60 cut-off point: In the Bank Case this regards the constructs of Self (0.557) and 
Threat Flexibility (0.576). In the NPP Case this regards Self (0.579). Note also that some items 
were dropped from the original factor analysis (Appendix H and Appendix I) because of an 
amelioration of internal consistency.  
Note that generally speaking, the internal consistency of the constructs is stronger for the NPP 
Case (Table 6.2) than for the Bank Case (Table 6.1). In line with theory, this observation gives a 
first indication that the HRO propensity of the NPP is higher than the HRO propensity of the Bank.  
Given the difficulty in developing meaningful assessment devices that are not only based on 
statistical relevance but that also take theoretical considerations and empirical observations into 
account, this scale seems to represent a very acceptable and useful assessment (Koch, 1993, p. 
87). It is the basis for the analysis described in the remainder of this chapter. 
2 Comparing the Bank Case and the NPP Case [RQ1] 
Following this validation of the reconceptualized model on construct level, this section answers 
the first research question underlying this research. To this end, we test the corresponding 
research propositions and hypotheses. Their analysis is presented in what follows. 
Proposition 1-1 
Proposition 1-1: HRO properties are not unique, but HRO propensity levels are 
H1-1: HRO properties will be discernible in the archetypical HRO (NPP) as well as in the 
mainstream High Reliability Seeking organization (Bank). 
This hypothesis can be validated. From Table 6.1 (for the Bank Case) and Table 6.2 (for the NPP 
Case) can be seen that an exploratory factor analysis describes constructs with sufficient internal 
consistency that match the constructs described in HRT literature.  
Proposition 1-2 
Proposition 1-2: The non-archetypical HRO (the Bank) exhibits the same HRO 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but to a lesser extent. 
H1-2a: The average HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis can be validated Table 6.3. The standard deviation in the NPP (0,21450) is 
considerably higher though than in the Bank (0,11385).  
HRT Min. Max. Mean St.Dev. 
Bank 3,77 4,26 3,9912 ,11385 
NPP 3,60 4,74 4,1210 21450 
Table 6.3 - Comparison HRT propensity (team level) 
H1-2b: The average Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
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This hypothesis could be validated (Table 6.4). 
 Case Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
HRT Bank 3,77 4,26 3,9912 ,11385 
 NPP 3,60 4,74 4,1210 ,21450 
Team Orientation Bank 3,55 4,60 4,1633 ,22298 
 NPP 3,75 5,00 4,2506 ,32341 
Preoccupation with Failure Bank 3,75 4,47 4,1451 ,14693 
 NPP 3,60 4,90 4,2879 ,28058 
Deference to Expertise Bank 3,36 4,20 3,7556 ,19547 
 NPP 3,47 4,60 3,8375 ,25530 
Sensitivity to Operations Bank 3,50 4,40 3,8832 ,22418 
 NPP 3,67 5,00 4,1704 ,32131 
SenseMaking NPP 3,24 4,07 3,6543 ,22483 
 Bank 3,32 4,05 3,7293 ,17447 
Other Bank 3,19 4,25 3,8414 ,27070 
 NPP 3,44 4,50 4,0374 ,33292 
Self Bank 3,00 4,50 3,8453 ,30591 
 NPP 3,50 4,50 4,1237 ,28036 
Scheme Bank 2,78 4,13 3,5025 ,27394 
 NPP 1,25 3,50 2,5824 ,52405 
Moderator variables      
Deviation Bank 2,50 3,60 3,0685 ,24605 
 NPP 3,00 4,33 3,7222 ,38616 
Efficiency Bank 3,00 4,18 3,5978 ,33402 
 NPP 2,60 3,86 3,2112 ,33684 
Threat Flexibility Bank 3,29 4,20 3,6941 ,21486 
 NPP 3,22 4,50 3,6671 ,30368 
Table 6.4 - Comparison between cases on team construct level 
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H1-2c: The average Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis could not be validated (Table 6.4), but the difference is only marginal (Bank: 
3,6941 vs. NPP: 3,6671). 
H1-2d: The average Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis could be validated (Table 6.4) (Bank: 4,1451 vs. NPP: 4,2879). 
H1-2e: The average Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis could be validated (Table 6.4 ) (Bank: 3,8832 vs. NPP: 4,1704). 
H1-2f: The average Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis could be validated (Table 6.4) (Bank: 3,7556 vs. NPP: 3,8375) 
Proposition 1-3 
Proposition 1-3: The higher the requisite variety of a team, the higher its HRO propensity 
H1-3a: Teams using richer media exhibit a higher HRO propensity. 
For the Bank Case, this hypothesis can be validated at an acceptable level of significance (0.034) 
(Table 6.6) where teams that rely more on face-to-face communication exhibit a higher HRO 
propensity (3,9530 vs. 4,0315) (Table 6.5). Drilling down to the level of the HRT sub-constructs, 
we see that especially Deference to Expertise (p = 0.031 with means: 3,6889 vs. 3,8261) and 







Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Min. Max. 




Bound   
Team Orientation L 19 4,1275 ,21358 ,04900 4,0246 4,2305 3,55 4,53 
  H 18 4,2011 ,23248 ,05480 4,0855 4,3167 3,80 4,60 
  Total 37 4,1633 ,22298 ,03666 4,0890 4,2376 3,55 4,60 
Preoccupation with Failure L 19 4,1605 ,14445 ,03314 4,0909 4,2302 3,87 4,47 
  H 18 4,1287 ,15189 ,03580 4,0532 4,2042 3,75 4,40 
  Total 37 4,1451 ,14693 ,02415 4,0961 4,1940 3,75 4,47 
Deference to Expertise L 19 3,6889 ,18149 ,04164 3,6014 3,7764 3,36 4,06 
  H 18 3,8261 ,18919 ,04459 3,7320 3,9202 3,50 4,20 
  Total 37 3,7556 ,19547 ,03213 3,6905 3,8208 3,36 4,20 
SO L 19 3,7906 ,18226 ,04181 3,7028 3,8785 3,50 4,10 
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  H 18 3,9809 ,22711 ,05353 3,8679 4,0938 3,63 4,40 
  Total 37 3,8832 ,22418 ,03686 3,8084 3,9579 3,50 4,40 
SeMa L 19 3,7499 ,17364 ,03984 3,6662 3,8336 3,32 3,96 
  H 18 3,7075 ,17765 ,04187 3,6191 3,7958 3,37 4,05 
  Total 37 3,7293 ,17447 ,02868 3,6711 3,7874 3,32 4,05 
Other L 19 3,8855 ,22635 ,05193 3,7764 3,9946 3,19 4,25 
  H 18 3,7948 ,31056 ,07320 3,6403 3,9492 3,20 4,25 
  Total 37 3,8414 ,27070 ,04450 3,7511 3,9316 3,19 4,25 
Self L 19 3,9422 ,26196 ,06010 3,8160 4,0685 3,50 4,50 
  H 18 3,7429 ,32234 ,07598 3,5826 3,9032 3,00 4,13 
  Total 37 3,8453 ,30591 ,05029 3,7433 3,9473 3,00 4,50 
Scheme L 19 3,4409 ,27764 ,06369 3,3071 3,5747 2,78 3,92 
  H 18 3,5675 ,26188 ,06173 3,4373 3,6977 3,06 4,13 
  Total 37 3,5025 ,27394 ,04504 3,4111 3,5938 2,78 4,13 
Threat Flexibility L 19 3,6543 ,20314 ,04660 3,5564 3,7522 3,29 4,08 
  H 18 3,7362 ,22457 ,05293 3,6245 3,8478 3,38 4,20 
  Total 37 3,6941 ,21486 ,03532 3,6225 3,7658 3,29 4,20 
Efficiency L 19 3,5230 ,26889 ,06169 3,3934 3,6526 3,00 4,08 
  H 18 3,6766 ,38324 ,09033 3,4861 3,8672 3,06 4,18 
  Total 37 3,5978 ,33402 ,05491 3,4864 3,7091 3,00 4,18 
Logics of Action L 19 3,8116 ,21911 ,05027 3,7060 3,9172 3,33 4,22 
  H 18 3,8181 ,26344 ,06209 3,6871 3,9491 3,25 4,44 
  Total 37 3,8147 ,23830 ,03918 3,7353 3,8942 3,25 4,44 
Deviation L 19 2,9814 ,26027 ,05971 2,8560 3,1069 2,50 3,40 
  H 18 3,1603 ,19767 ,04659 3,0620 3,2586 2,92 3,60 
  Total 37 3,0685 ,24605 ,04045 2,9864 3,1505 2,50 3,60 
HRT L 19 3,9530 ,08256 ,01894 3,9133 3,9928 3,78 4,15 
  H 18 4,0315 ,12993 ,03062 3,9669 4,0961 3,77 4,26 
  Total 37 3,9912 ,11385 ,01872 3,9533 4,0292 3,77 4,26 
Table 6.5 - ANOVA Descriptives for Face-to-face Communication (Bank) 
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Square F Sig. 
Team Orientation Between Groups ,050 1 ,050 1,006 ,323 
  Within Groups 1,740 35 ,050     
  Total 1,790 36       
Preoccupation with Failure Between Groups ,009 1 ,009 ,427 ,518 
  Within Groups ,768 35 ,022     
  Total ,777 36       
Deference to Expertise Between Groups ,174 1 ,174 5,071 ,031 
  Within Groups 1,201 35 ,034     
  Total 1,375 36       
SO Between Groups ,335 1 ,335 7,939 ,008 
  Within Groups 1,475 35 ,042     
  Total 1,809 36       
SeMa Between Groups ,017 1 ,017 ,540 ,467 
  Within Groups 1,079 35 ,031     
  Total 1,096 36       
Other Between Groups ,076 1 ,076 1,040 ,315 
  Within Groups 2,562 35 ,073     
  Total 2,638 36       
Self Between Groups ,367 1 ,367 4,283 ,046 
  Within Groups 3,002 35 ,086     
  Total 3,369 36       
Scheme Between Groups ,148 1 ,148 2,031 ,163 
  Within Groups 2,553 35 ,073     
  Total 2,702 36       
Threat Flexibility Between Groups ,062 1 ,062 1,354 ,252 
  Within Groups 1,600 35 ,046     
  Total 1,662 36       
Efficiency Between Groups ,218 1 ,218 2,010 ,165 
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  Within Groups 3,798 35 ,109     
  Total 4,016 36       
Logics of Action Between Groups ,000 1 ,000 ,007 ,935 
  Within Groups 2,044 35 ,058     
  Total 2,044 36       
Deviation Between Groups ,296 1 ,296 5,497 ,025 
  Within Groups 1,884 35 ,054     
  Total 2,179 36       
HRT Between Groups ,057 1 ,057 4,863 ,034 
  Within Groups ,410 35 ,012     
  Total ,467 36       
Table 6.6 - ANOVA for Face-to-face Communication (Bank) 
For the NPP Case, this hypothesis can be validated at an acceptable level of significance ( 0.031) 
(Table 6.16) for the NPP Case where teams that rely more on face-to-face communication 
exhibit a higher HRO propensity (4,0283 vs. 4,2136). Drilling down to the level of the HRT sub-
constructs, we see that especially Team Orientation (p = 0.012 with means: 4,0909 vs. 4,4104) 
and Sensitivity to Operations (p = 0.061 with means: 4,0485 vs. 4,2924) are accountable for this 
observation. 
H1-3b: More experienced teams exhibit a higher HRO propensity. 
This hypothesis cannot be validated at an acceptable level of significance (Table 6.7). 




Square F Sig. 
Team Orientation Between Groups ,000 1 ,000 ,002 ,968 
  Within Groups 2,406 22 ,109     
  Total 2,406 23       
Sensitivity to Operations Between Groups ,071 1 ,071 ,680 ,419 
  Within Groups 2,303 22 ,105     
  Total 2,375 23       
Preoccupation with Failure Between Groups ,001 1 ,001 ,016 ,900 
  Within Groups 1,809 22 ,082     
  Total 1,811 23       
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Deference to Expertise Between Groups ,000 1 ,000 ,000 1,000 
  Within Groups 1,499 22 ,068     
  Total 1,499 23       
HRT Between Groups ,004 1 ,004 ,076 ,785 
  Within Groups 1,055 22 ,048     
  Total 1,058 23       
Other Between Groups ,020 1 ,020 ,173 ,681 
  Within Groups 2,529 22 ,115     
  Total 2,549 23       
Self Between Groups ,009 1 ,009 ,110 ,743 
  Within Groups 1,799 22 ,082     
  Total 1,808 23       
Scheme Between Groups ,295 1 ,295 1,079 ,310 
  Within Groups 6,021 22 ,274     
  Total 6,317 23       
SeMa Between Groups ,001 1 ,001 ,010 ,923 
  Within Groups 1,162 22 ,053     
  Total 1,163 23       
Threat Flexibility Between Groups ,024 1 ,024 ,250 ,622 
  Within Groups 2,097 22 ,095     
  Total 2,121 23       
Efficiency Between Groups ,224 1 ,224 2,066 ,165 
  Within Groups 2,386 22 ,108     
  Total 2,610 23       
Pressure Between Groups ,109 1 ,109 1,163 ,292 
  Within Groups 2,061 22 ,094     
  Total 2,170 23       
SupRes Between Groups ,120 1 ,120 1,185 ,288 
  Within Groups 2,231 22 ,101     
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  Total 2,352 23       
Deviation Between Groups ,111 1 ,111 ,736 ,400 
  Within Groups 3,319 22 ,151     
  Total 3,430 23       
Table 6.7 - ANOVA for Experience (NPP) 
Proposition 1-4 
Propostion 1-4:  The higher the requisite variety of a team, the higher its SeMa 
propensity  
H1-4a: Teams using richer media will exhibit a higher SeMa propensity. 
H1-4b: More experienced teams exhibit a higher SeMa propensity. 
In the Bank Case, we found no proof for this assertion at an acceptable significance for the SeMa 
root construct, but when drilling down to the level of the sub-constructs, at a significance of 
0.032 (Table 6.8), a falsification for the hypothesis could be provided. Table 6.9 shows that 
teams a lower score on Scheme, are more experienced on average than teams exhibiting a 
higher score on Scheme (8,8755 vs. 6,0127). In the NPP Case, no acceptable level of significance 
allowed for a reliable interpretation, or regarding the SeMa root, nor the SeMa sub-constructs. 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 75,753 1 75,753 5,014 ,032 
Within Groups 528,742 35 15,107     
Total 604,495 36       
Table 6.8 - ANOVA for Experience vs. SeMa Scheme (Bank) 
 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
L 19 8,8755 4,90581 1,12547 6,5109 11,2400 3,00 23,33 
H 18 6,0127 2,37061 ,55876 4,8338 7,1916 3,41 11,33 
Total 37 7,4828 4,09775 ,67367 6,1165 8,8490 3,00 23,33 
Table 6.9 - ANOVA Descriptive Statistics for Experience vs. SeMa Scheme (Bank) 
Proposition 1-5 
Proposition 1-5: The non-archetypical HRO (the Bank) exhibits the same HRO 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but exhibits a lower 
variance. 
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 Case Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
HRT Bank 3,77 4,26 3,9912 ,11385 
 NPP 3,60 4,74 4,1210 ,21450 
Team Orientation Bank 3,55 4,60 4,1633 ,22298 
 NPP 3,75 5,00 4,2506 ,32341 
Efficiency Bank 3,00 4,18 3,5978 ,33402 
 NPP 2,60 3,86 3,2112 ,33684 
Threat Flexibility Bank 3,29 4,20 3,6941 ,21486 
 NPP 3,22 4,50 3,6671 ,30368 
Preoccupation with Failure Bank 3,75 4,47 4,1451 ,14693 
 NPP 3,60 4,90 4,2879 ,28058 
Deference to Expertise Bank 3,36 4,20 3,7556 ,19547 
 NPP 3,47 4,60 3,8375 ,25530 
Sensitivity to Operations Bank 3,50 4,40 3,8832 ,22418 
 NPP 3,67 5,00 4,1704 ,32131 
SenseMaking NPP 3,24 4,07 3,6543 ,22483 
 Bank 3,32 4,05 3,7293 ,17447 
Other Bank 3,19 4,25 3,8414 ,27070 
 NPP 3,44 4,50 4,0374 ,33292 
Self Bank 3,00 4,50 3,8453 ,30591 
 NPP 3,50 4,50 4,1237 ,28036 
Scheme Bank 2,78 4,13 3,5025 ,27394 
 NPP 1,25 3,50 2,5824 ,52405 
Moderator variables      
Deviation Bank 2,50 3,60 3,0685 ,24605 
 NPP 3,00 4,33 3,7222 ,38616 
Table 6.10 - HRO Construct Comparison 
Taking the standard deviation as a measure of this variance (spread), we come to the following 
findings: 
H1-5a: The variance in HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated (0,11385 vs. 0,21450) 
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H1-5b: The variance in Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated (0,22298 vs. 0,32341) 
H1-5c: The variance in Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated (0,21486 vs. 0,30368) 
H1-5d: The variance in Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated (0,14693 vs. 0,28058) 
H1-1-5e: The variance in Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated (0,22418 vs. 0,32131) 
H1-5f: The variance in Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated (0,19547 vs. 0,25530) 
Proposition 1-6 
Proposition 1-6: The non-archetypical HRO (the Bank) exhibits the same SeMa 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but exhibits a lower 
variance. 
H1-6a: The variance in SenseMaking propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is falsified (0,22483 vs. 0,17447) 
At the level of the root SeMa construct, this hypothesis is falsified. However, two out of three of 
its underlying sub-constructs can be validated. 
H1-6b: The variance in Self propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is falsified (0,30591 vs. 0,28036) 
H1-6c: The variance in Other propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated (0,27070 vs. 0,33292) 
H1-6d: The variance in Scheme propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated (0,27394 vs. 0,52405) 
Proposition 1-7 
Proposition 1-7: The constructs of Mindfulness and Resilience interrelate 
Another presumption seems to be that the different constituting HRO factors are independent 
from each other in the sense that they do not conflict. Being preoccupied with failure in 
combination with being reluctant to simplify poses no problem. This is in conflict with what has 
been suggested by NAT, namely that since HROs operate in a setting of complexity and tight-
coupling, it is cognitively impossible to “predict everything and set up systems that alert them to 
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small changes so that they can prevent these small changes from becoming big 
problems”(Longstaff, 2003, p. 19). 
H1-7a: The higher a team’s Preoccupation with Failure, the lower its Deference to Expertise. 
We have not been able to validate this hypothesis in the Bank Case at an acceptable level of 
significance (Table 6.13). In the NPP Case, we see that at an acceptable significance (p 0.029) 
(Table 6.14) the hypothesis could be falsified. A low degree of Deference to Expertise matches a 
low degree of Preoccupation with Failure and vice versa (4,1652 vs. 4,4105).  
H1-7b: Being mindful is a prerequisite for being resilient. 
We have been able to validate this hypothesis (p 0.047) (See: Table 6.11) for the Bank Case as 
teams with a low degree of Deference to Expertise exhibit a low score on Sensitivity to 
Operations (3,8123 vs. 3,9580) (Table 6.12). It has been impossible to validate the hypothesis for 
the NPP Case at an acceptable level of significance (Table 6.14). 
    
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Team Orientation Between Groups ,034 1 ,034 ,675 ,417 
  Within Groups 1,756 35 ,050     




,000 1 ,000 ,015 ,902 
  Within Groups ,777 35 ,022     
  Total ,777 36       
Deference to Expertise Between Groups ,746 1 ,746 41,470 ,000 
  Within Groups ,630 35 ,018     
  Total 1,375 36       
SO Between Groups ,196 1 ,196 4,256 ,047 
  Within Groups 1,613 35 ,046     
  Total 1,809 36       
SeMa Between Groups ,104 1 ,104 3,655 ,064 
  Within Groups ,992 35 ,028     
  Total 1,096 36       
Other Between Groups ,093 1 ,093 1,278 ,266 
  Within Groups 2,545 35 ,073     
  Total 2,638 36       
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Self Between Groups ,003 1 ,003 ,033 ,857 
  Within Groups 3,366 35 ,096     
  Total 3,369 36       
Scheme Between Groups ,272 1 ,272 3,920 ,056 
  Within Groups 2,429 35 ,069     
  Total 2,702 36       
Threat Flexibility Between Groups ,306 1 ,306 7,895 ,008 
  Within Groups 1,356 35 ,039     
  Total 1,662 36       
Efficiency Between Groups ,736 1 ,736 7,854 ,008 
  Within Groups 3,280 35 ,094     
  Total 4,016 36       
Logics of Action Between Groups ,081 1 ,081 1,437 ,239 
  Within Groups 1,964 35 ,056     
  Total 2,044 36       
Deviation Between Groups ,000 1 ,000 ,000 ,986 
  Within Groups 2,179 35 ,062     
  Total 2,179 36       
HRT Between Groups ,155 1 ,155 17,369 ,000 
  Within Groups ,312 35 ,009     
  Total ,467 36       
Table 6.11 - ANOVA for Deference to expertise (Bank) 
  


















Team Orientation L 19 4,1338 ,22123 ,05075 4,0272 4,2405 3,55 4,53 
  H 18 4,1944 ,22688 ,05348 4,0816 4,3072 3,80 4,60 




19 4,1421 ,16223 ,03722 4,0639 4,2203 3,75 4,47 
  H 18 4,1482 ,13352 ,03147 4,0818 4,2146 3,87 4,40 




19 3,6174 ,13083 ,03001 3,5544 3,6805 3,36 3,75 
  H 18 3,9015 ,13750 ,03241 3,8331 3,9699 3,76 4,20 
  Total 37 3,7556 ,19547 ,03213 3,6905 3,8208 3,36 4,20 
SO L 19 3,8123 ,19367 ,04443 3,7190 3,9057 3,60 4,29 
  H 18 3,9580 ,23490 ,05537 3,8412 4,0748 3,50 4,40 
  Total 37 3,8832 ,22418 ,03686 3,8084 3,9579 3,50 4,40 
SeMa L 19 3,6778 ,17752 ,04073 3,5922 3,7633 3,32 3,93 
  H 18 3,7836 ,15811 ,03727 3,7050 3,8623 3,47 4,05 
  Total 37 3,7293 ,17447 ,02868 3,6711 3,7874 3,32 4,05 
Other L 19 3,7926 ,30261 ,06942 3,6467 3,9385 3,19 4,25 
  H 18 3,8929 ,22967 ,05413 3,7786 4,0071 3,36 4,25 
  Total 37 3,8414 ,27070 ,04450 3,7511 3,9316 3,19 4,25 
Self L 19 3,8362 ,26877 ,06166 3,7067 3,9658 3,33 4,17 
  H 18 3,8548 ,34856 ,08216 3,6815 4,0281 3,00 4,50 
  Total 37 3,8453 ,30591 ,05029 3,7433 3,9473 3,00 4,50 
Scheme L 19 3,4190 ,27388 ,06283 3,2870 3,5510 2,78 3,74 
  H 18 3,5906 ,25196 ,05939 3,4653 3,7159 3,03 4,13 
  Total 37 3,5025 ,27394 ,04504 3,4111 3,5938 2,78 4,13 
Threat Flexibility L 19 3,6056 ,16531 ,03792 3,5260 3,6853 3,29 3,88 
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  H 18 3,7876 ,22547 ,05314 3,6754 3,8997 3,35 4,20 
  Total 37 3,6941 ,21486 ,03532 3,6225 3,7658 3,29 4,20 
Efficiency L 19 3,4605 ,29690 ,06811 3,3174 3,6036 3,00 4,11 
  H 18 3,7427 ,31564 ,07440 3,5857 3,8996 3,10 4,18 
  Total 37 3,5978 ,33402 ,05491 3,4864 3,7091 3,00 4,18 
Logics of Action L 19 3,7693 ,21399 ,04909 3,6662 3,8725 3,25 4,22 
  H 18 3,8627 ,25890 ,06102 3,7340 3,9915 3,33 4,44 
  Total 37 3,8147 ,23830 ,03918 3,7353 3,8942 3,25 4,44 
Deviation L 19 3,0677 ,24524 ,05626 2,9495 3,1859 2,67 3,40 
  H 18 3,0692 ,25401 ,05987 2,9429 3,1955 2,50 3,60 
  Total 37 3,0685 ,24605 ,04045 2,9864 3,1505 2,50 3,60 
HRT L 19 3,9283 ,08186 ,01878 3,8888 3,9677 3,77 4,10 
  H 18 4,0577 ,10605 ,02500 4,0049 4,1104 3,88 4,26 
  Total 37 3,9912 ,11385 ,01872 3,9533 4,0292 3,77 4,26 
Table 6.12 - Descriptives for ANOVA for Deference to Expertise (Bank) 
We have been able to validate this hypothesis (p 0.029) (See: Table 6.14) for the NPP Case as 
teams with a lower Deference to Expertise exhibit a lower degree of Preoccupation with Failure 
(4,1652 vs. 4,4105). 
    
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Team Orientation Between Groups ,053 1 ,053 1,059 ,310 
  Within Groups 1,737 35 ,050     
  Total 1,790 36       
Deference to Expertise Between Groups ,007 1 ,007 ,170 ,683 
  Within Groups 1,369 35 ,039     
  Total 1,375 36       
Sensitivity to Operations Between Groups ,013 1 ,013 ,259 ,614 
  Within Groups 1,796 35 ,051     
Table 6.13 - ANOVA for Preoccupaton with failure vs. Deference to Expertise (Bank) 
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Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Threat Flexibility Between Groups ,872 1 ,872 15,347 ,001 
  Within Groups 1,249 22 ,057     
  Total 2,121 23       
Efficiency Between Groups ,510 1 ,510 5,341 ,031 
  Within Groups 2,100 22 ,095     
  Total 2,610 23       
Pressure Between Groups ,257 1 ,257 2,954 ,100 
  Within Groups 1,913 22 ,087     
  Total 2,170 23       
SupRes Between Groups ,269 1 ,269 2,842 ,106 
  Within Groups 2,083 22 ,095     
  Total 2,352 23       
Deviation Between Groups ,204 1 ,204 1,392 ,251 
  Within Groups 3,226 22 ,147     
  Total 3,430 23       
Team Orientation Between Groups ,051 1 ,051 ,480 ,495 
  Within Groups 2,354 22 ,107     
  Total 2,406 23       
SO Between Groups ,090 1 ,090 ,871 ,361 
  Within Groups 2,284 22 ,104     




,361 1 ,361 5,478 ,029 
  Within Groups 1,450 22 ,066     
  Total 1,811 23       
Deference to Expertise Between Groups ,766 1 ,766 22,982 ,000 
  Within Groups ,733 22 ,033     
  Total 1,499 23       
HRT Between Groups ,309 1 ,309 9,054 ,006 
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  Within Groups ,750 22 ,034     
  Total 1,058 23       
Other Between Groups ,039 1 ,039 ,344 ,564 
  Within Groups 2,510 22 ,114     
  Total 2,549 23       
Self Between Groups ,215 1 ,215 2,962 ,099 
  Within Groups 1,593 22 ,072     
  Total 1,808 23       
Scheme Between Groups ,245 1 ,245 ,889 ,356 
  Within Groups 6,071 22 ,276     
  Total 6,317 23       
SeMa Between Groups ,017 1 ,017 ,324 ,575 
  Within Groups 1,146 22 ,052     
  Total 1,163 23       
Table 6.14 - ANOVA for Deference to Expertise vs. Preoccupation with failure (NPP) 
 
 












Threat Flexibility L 12 3,4765 ,18616 ,05374 3,3582 3,5948 3,22 3,72 
  H 12 3,8577 ,28095 ,08110 3,6792 4,0362 3,44 4,50 
  Total 24 3,6671 ,30368 ,06199 3,5389 3,7953 3,22 4,50 
Efficiency L 12 3,3569 ,29291 ,08456 3,1708 3,5431 2,67 3,86 
  H 12 3,0655 ,32419 ,09359 2,8595 3,2715 2,60 3,50 
  Total 24 3,2112 ,33684 ,06876 3,0690 3,3534 2,60 3,86 
Pressure L 12 3,2778 ,26924 ,07772 3,1067 3,4488 2,78 3,76 
  H 12 3,0709 ,31847 ,09193 2,8685 3,2732 2,60 3,56 
  Total 24 3,1743 ,30715 ,06270 3,0446 3,3040 2,60 3,76 
SupRes L 12 3,3701 ,32037 ,09248 3,1666 3,5737 2,76 3,75 
  H 12 3,5819 ,29443 ,08500 3,3948 3,7689 3,03 4,00 
  Total 24 3,4760 ,31976 ,06527 3,3410 3,6110 2,76 4,00 
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Deviation L 12 3,6300 ,38759 ,11189 3,3837 3,8762 3,00 4,29 
  H 12 3,8144 ,37818 ,10917 3,5741 4,0547 3,00 4,33 
  Total 24 3,7222 ,38616 ,07883 3,5591 3,8852 3,00 4,33 
Team Orientation L 12 4,2044 ,32415 ,09358 3,9984 4,4103 3,75 5,00 
  H 12 4,2969 ,33008 ,09529 4,0872 4,5067 3,75 4,88 
  Total 24 4,2506 ,32341 ,06602 4,1141 4,3872 3,75 5,00 
SO L 12 4,1090 ,35375 ,10212 3,8843 4,3338 3,67 5,00 
  H 12 4,2318 ,28725 ,08292 4,0493 4,4143 3,75 4,75 
  Total 24 4,1704 ,32131 ,06559 4,0347 4,3061 3,67 5,00 
Preoccupation with Failure L 12 4,1652 ,29134 ,08410 3,9801 4,3503 3,60 4,64 
  H 12 4,4105 ,21657 ,06252 4,2729 4,5481 4,12 4,90 
  Total 24 4,2879 ,28058 ,05727 4,1694 4,4064 3,60 4,90 
Deference to Expertise L 12 3,6588 ,14137 ,04081 3,5690 3,7487 3,47 3,80 
  H 12 4,0161 ,21603 ,06236 3,8789 4,1534 3,81 4,60 
  Total 24 3,8375 ,25530 ,05211 3,7297 3,9453 3,47 4,60 
HRT L 12 4,0076 ,16234 ,04686 3,9044 4,1107 3,60 4,22 
  H 12 4,2344 ,20446 ,05902 4,1044 4,3643 3,95 4,74 
  Total 24 4,1210 ,21450 ,04379 4,0304 4,2115 3,60 4,74 
Other L 12 3,9970 ,31468 ,09084 3,7970 4,1969 3,53 4,50 
  H 12 4,0778 ,35939 ,10375 3,8495 4,3061 3,44 4,50 
  Total 24 4,0374 ,33292 ,06796 3,8968 4,1780 3,44 4,50 
Self L 12 4,2183 ,24329 ,07023 4,0637 4,3728 3,75 4,50 
  H 12 4,0292 ,29268 ,08449 3,8432 4,2151 3,50 4,50 
  Total 24 4,1237 ,28036 ,05723 4,0053 4,2421 3,50 4,50 
Scheme L 12 2,4813 ,43703 ,12616 2,2037 2,7590 2,00 3,30 
  H 12 2,6835 ,60078 ,17343 2,3018 3,0652 1,25 3,50 
  Total 24 2,5824 ,52405 ,10697 2,3611 2,8037 1,25 3,50 
SeMa L 12 3,6277 ,18777 ,05421 3,5084 3,7470 3,33 3,86 
  H 12 3,6808 ,26249 ,07577 3,5140 3,8476 3,24 4,07 
  Total 24 3,6543 ,22483 ,04589 3,5593 3,7492 3,24 4,07 
Table 6.15 - Descriptives for ANOVA for Deference to Expertise vs. Preoccupation with failure (NPP) 
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Proposition 1-8 
Proposition 1-8: The NPP is more reliable than the Bank 
H1-8: The NPP is more reliable than the Bank 
It would be relevant if we were able to compare organizational reliability between cases. 
Unfortunately, it is not achievable to compare the reliability of both organizations as the 
processes under study – however similar – are not identical69. What we can compare however is 
the range in of standardized reliability (ZScore). This range is a proxy of reliability as it 
corresponds to availability of the incident management/maintenance process as a service. An 
overview of this range is provided in Appendix J as Table 0.34, for the reliability of the Bank’s 
Incident Management process and in Table 0.35, for the reliability of the NPP’s Maintenance & 
Repair process. The conclusion is that the range at the Bank is 3,72076; 5,03739 and 4,39108 for 
the handling of urgent, non-urgent and all incidents respectively. For the NPP the corresponding 
ranges are 4,88034; 4,64523 and 4,86319. The conclusion therefore is that – based on this 
criterion for inter-case comparison of process reliability – the Bank is more reliable than the NPP 
with respect to the urgent incidents, less reliable than the NPP in the handling of non-urgent 
incidents and again more reliable than the NPP regarding the overall handling of incidents. 
 




Square F Sig. 
Team Orientation Between Groups ,613 1 ,613 7,516 ,012 
  Within Groups 1,793 22 ,082     
  Total 2,406 23       
SO Between Groups ,357 1 ,357 3,891 ,061 
  Within Groups 2,018 22 ,092     
  Total 2,375 23       
Preoccupation with Failure Between Groups ,123 1 ,123 1,609 ,218 
  Within Groups 1,687 22 ,077     
  Total 1,811 23       
Deference to Expertise Between Groups ,064 1 ,064 ,982 ,332 
  Within Groups 1,435 22 ,065     
  Total 1,499 23       
HRT Between Groups ,206 1 ,206 5,317 ,031 
  Within Groups ,852 22 ,039     
  Total 1,058 23       
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Other Between Groups ,582 1 ,582 6,503 ,018 
  Within Groups 1,968 22 ,089     
  Total 2,549 23       
Self Between Groups ,006 1 ,006 ,067 ,797 
  Within Groups 1,802 22 ,082     
  Total 1,808 23       
Scheme Between Groups ,002 1 ,002 ,008 ,931 
  Within Groups 6,314 22 ,287     
  Total 6,317 23       
SeMa Between Groups ,081 1 ,081 1,637 ,214 
  Within Groups 1,082 22 ,049     
  Total 1,163 23       
Threat Flexibility Between Groups ,375 1 ,375 4,728 ,041 
  Within Groups 1,746 22 ,079     
  Total 2,121 23       
Efficiency Between Groups ,114 1 ,114 1,003 ,328 
  Within Groups 2,496 22 ,113     
  Total 2,610 23       
Pressure Between Groups ,181 1 ,181 2,001 ,171 
  Within Groups 1,989 22 ,090     
  Total 2,170 23       
SupRes Between Groups ,692 1 ,692 9,180 ,006 
  Within Groups 1,659 22 ,075     
  Total 2,352 23       
Deviation Between Groups ,510 1 ,510 3,844 ,063 
  Within Groups 2,920 22 ,133     
  Total 3,430 23       
Table 6.16 - ANOVA for Face-to-face Communication (NPP) 
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3 Measuring Reliability [RQ2] 
An overview of the team scores on each construct and item is provided in Appendix D for the 
Bank Case and in Appendix E for the NPP Case.The codes used in the analysis in this section have 
the following logic. D: Dichotomized Variable; M: Mean value; S: Standard deviation, followed by 
the abbreviated variable name. For instance, TO for Team Orientation) (Table 6.17). The code 
composition for the dichotomized mean of the Team Orientation variable, therefore is DMTO, its 
dichotomized standard deviation DSTO. 
DE Deference to Expertise 
LA Logics of Action 
Dev Deviation 
Ef Efficiency 
NU12pe Average number of urgent incidents per employee 
NU3pe Average number of non-urgent incidents per employee 
NUApe Average number of incidents per employee 
Other SenseMaking Other 
HRT Overall High Reliability propensity 
PF Preoccupation with Failure 
Pres Pressure 
Scheme SenseMaking Scheme 
Self SenseMaking Self 
SeMa Overall SenseMaking propensity 
SO Sensitivity to Operations 
TO Team Orientation 
TF Threat Flexibility 
TS Team Size 
Table 6.17 - Construct Abbreviations 
3.1 Bank Case 
In this section, we examine what makes one team more reliable, more performant than another 
team. Which contextual and/or structural dimensions contribute to high reliability? In addition, 
how do these dimensions (or constructs) interrelate? Can a non-archetypical HRO and 
archetypical HRO learn from each other? With this second research question, we analyze the 
interrelationships that exist between the different determinants and wish to come to an 
integrating framework that has the potential of contributing to the explanation of reliability. The 
data provided in this section show only those analyses that have a sufficient statistical 
significance. The analyses with a statistical significance that is too low for our purposes (See: 
Chapter 3, Section 6) are omitted from the description. 
Proposition 2-1 
H2-1a: Teams exhibiting a higher propensity towards Team Orientation yield higher reliability in 
the handling of urgent incidents, whereas this is counterproductive for the handling of 
non-urgent incidents. 
No evidence has been found for this hypothesis (p≤0.10). 
H2-1b: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation and exhibiting a high 
degree of Sensitivity to Operations yield a higher reliability than teams than the same 
teams exhibiting a low degree of Sensitivity to Operations. 
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We have found no evidence for this hypothesis at p≤0.10. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Max Min Spread 
Bank PU12 DMTO DM137 0,04 0,57 0,68 0,75 0,47 0,75 0,47 0,28 
Bank PU3 DMTO DM137 0,08 0,90 0,96 0,98 0,88 0,98 0,88 0,11 
Bank PU3 DMTO DMDE 0,11 0,94 0,89 0,87 0,97 0,97 0,87 0,10 
Table 6.18 - Two-way ANOVA for Team Orientation 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Max Min Spread 
Bank PU12 DSTO DM137 0,01 0,76 0,43 0,53 0,64 0,76 0,43 0,33 
Bank PU12 DSTO DM10 0,05 0,78 0,47 0,56 0,59 0,78 0,47 0,31 
Bank PU12 DSTO DS10 0,06 0,50 0,80 0,59 0,56 0,80 0,50 0,30 
Bank PU12 DSTO DSDE 0,04 0,57 0,68 0,73 0,47 0,73 0,47 0,25 
Bank PU3 DSTO DSDE 0,06 0,90 0,98 0,96 0,87 0,98 0,87 0,11 
Bank PU3 DSTO DM137 0,10 0,98 0,87 0,90 0,94 0,98 0,87 0,11 
Table 6.19 - Two-way ANOVA for Spread of Team Orientation 
H2-1c: The higher the average Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability. 
Falsification of this hypothesis: For urgent incidents, a low average score on Threat Flexibility 
results in the highest reliability (0.67 at p≤0.05). 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Max Min Spread 
Bank PU12 DMTF DMNU12pe 0,10 0,59 0,70 0,30 0,65 0,70 0,30 0,40 
Bank PU12 DMTF DMEff 0,03 0,64 0,70 0,32 0,68 0,70 0,32 0,39 
Bank PU12 DMTF DM1 0,02 0,61 0,70 0,64 0,36 0,70 0,36 0,34 
Bank PU3 DMTF DM1 0,04 0,96 0,95 0,96 0,78 0,96 0,78 0,18 
Bank PU3 DMTF DMPF 0,06 0,94 0,96 0,94 0,79 0,96 0,79 0,17 
Bank PU3 DMTF DMNU12pe 0,08 0,97 0,94 0,83 0,96 0,97 0,83 0,14 
Bank PU12 DMTF 
 
0,05 0,67 0,50 
  
0,67 0,50 0,17 
Table 6.20 - Two-way ANOVA for Threat Flexibility 
H2-1d: Teams that operate in a less restrictive (more supportive) organizational climate perform 
better than teams that do not (Smith-Crowe, Burke, & Landis 2003). 
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The construct covering the degree of supportiveness is Threat Flexibility.  
We have found evidence (p≤0.05) for the falsification of this hypothesis, namely that where the 
handling of urgent incidents (threat) is concerned, a more restrictive (less supportive) degree of 
Threat Flexibility, is positively influencing reliability, regardless of any mediating variable. The 
one-way ANOVA is shown in Table 6.21. We notice however that the spread between the 
highest and lowest expected average reliability is a little lower (0.17) than the average spread 
(0.22) (based on the p≤0.10 significance level). 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
Bank PU12 DMTF 0,05 0,67 0,50 0,17 
Table 6.21 - One-way ANOVA for Threat Flexibility 
At this one-way ANOVA level, we have found no sufficient significance for non-urgent incidents. 
H2-1e: Teams that operate in a less efficiency-driven (more slack) organizational climate 
perform better than teams that do not. 
The construct covering the degree of supportiveness is Efficiency. We have found evidence 
(p≤0.05) for the falsification of this hypothesis, as well concerning the handling of urgent 
incidents as the non-urgent incidents. A higher focus on efficiency is positively influencing 
reliability, regardless of any mediating variable. The one-way ANOVA is shown in Table 6.22. We 
notice however that the spread between the highest and lowest expected average reliability is a 
little lower (0.19) than the average spread (0.22) (based on the p≤0.10 significance level) but 
substantially lower (0.10) for the non-urgent incidents.       
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Max Min Spread 
Bank PU12 DMEff 0,02 0,50 0,69 0,69 0,50 0,19 
Bank PU3 DMEff 0,03 0,88 0,97 0,97 0,88 0,10 
Table 6.22 - One-way ANOVA for Efficiency 
Proposition 2-2 
H2-2a: The higher the variance in SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability 
We have found no significance to support this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA level, but at 
the two-way ANOVA level a low spread in SenseMaking yields the highest reliability (Table 6.23).  
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSSeMa DS2 0,02 0,76 0,50 0,47 0,59 0,30 
Bank Urgent DSSeMa DM2 0,05 0,76 0,54 0,47 0,59 0,29 
Bank Urgent DSSeMa DS6 0,05 0,76 0,54 0,47 0,59 0,29 
Bank Non-Urgent DSSeMa DS4 0,01 0,95 0,98 0,97 0,77 0,21 
Bank Non-Urgent DSSeMa DMEff 0,09 0,94 0,97 0,79 0,97 0,18 
Bank Non-Urgent DSSeMa DMNU3pe 0,10 0,94 0,97 0,80 0,97 0,17 
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Bank Non-Urgent DSSeMa DS1 0,08 0,96 0,95 0,97 0,81 0,16 
Bank Non-Urgent DSSeMa DMNU12pe 0,08 0,98 0,94 0,84 0,96 0,14 
Bank Non-Urgent DSSeMa DS114 0,10 0,97 0,94 0,84 0,96 0,13 
Table 6.23 - Two-way ANOVA Analysis for Spread in SenseMaking Propensity 
H2-2b: The higher the variance in Scheme, the higher the reliability 
We have found no significance to support this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA level, but at 
the two-way ANOVA level, a low spread in SenseMaking propensity yields the highest reliability 
(Table 6.24).  
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSScheme DMNU12pe 0,00 0,59 0,62 0,29 0,77 0,48 
Bank Urgent DSScheme DS4 0,07 0,60 0,67 0,71 0,43 0,28 
Bank Urgent DSScheme DS2 0,08 0,71 0,50 0,49 0,59 0,23 
Bank Urgent DSScheme DM137 0,10 0,71 0,51 0,52 0,62 0,20 
Bank Non-Urgent DSScheme DMEff 0,08 0,94 0,97 0,79 0,97 0,18 
Bank Non-Urgent DSScheme DS4 0,04 0,95 0,97 0,97 0,80 0,17 
Bank Non-Urgent DSScheme DM8 0,07 0,96 0,95 0,79 0,95 0,16 
Bank Non-Urgent DSScheme DMNU12pe 0,08 0,98 0,94 0,84 0,96 0,14 
Bank Non-Urgent DSPF DSScheme 0,05 0,95 0,74 0,96 0,93 0,22 
Bank Non-Urgent DSTF DSScheme 0,04 0,98 0,97 0,94 0,77 0,21 
Table 6.24 - Two-way ANOVA for Spread in Scheme 
H2-2c: The higher the variance in Ongoing, the higher the reliability 
We have found no significance to support this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA level, but at 
the two-way ANOVA level a low spread in Enactment yields the highest reliability (Table 6.25).  
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DS137 DS4 0,01 0,59 0,68 0,70 0,37 0,33 
Bank Urgent DS137 DS1 0,05 0,60 0,63 0,77 0,46 0,31 
Bank Urgent DS137 DM113 0,01 0,71 0,52 0,45 0,71 0,26 
Bank Non-Urgent DS137 DS10 0,00 0,97 0,89 0,77 0,96 0,20 
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Bank Non-Urgent DS137 DM9 0,01 0,89 0,97 0,94 0,77 0,20 
Bank Non-Urgent DS137 DM10 0,01 0,90 0,97 0,96 0,77 0,19 
Bank Non-Urgent DS137 DS9 0,04 0,97 0,89 0,82 0,94 0,15 
Bank Non-Urgent DS137 DM5 0,07 0,96 0,92 0,85 0,99 0,14 
Bank Non-Urgent DS137 DM113 0,10 0,97 0,91 0,86 0,95 0,11 
Bank Non-urgent DSPer DS137 0,01 0,96 0,77 0,90 0,96 0,20 
Table 6.25 - Two-way ANOVA for Spread in Enactment 
Proposition 2-3 
 
H2-3: Teams using richer media are more reliable. 
No proof found for validation/falsification of this hypothesis neither at the one-dimensional 
level, nor for the urgent, or for the non-urgent incidents.  
Proposition 2-4 
H2-4a: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation, relying on richer media 
yield a higher reliability. 
H2-4b: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher HRO propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on the dedicated IS. 
Higher immediate registration in combination with a high homogeneity in HRO propensity 
results in the lowest reliability in the handling of urgent incidents (0.45 at p≤0.05). On the other 
hand, lower immediate registration in combination with a high homogeneity in HRO propensity 
results in the highest reliability (0.75 at p≤0.05), more particularly, the property of Deference to 
Expertise (0.52 vs. 0.78) and of Preoccupation with Failure (0.46 vs. 0.71). Remarkable is that in 
case of non-urgent incidents, the same observation can be made regarding the Preoccupation 
with Failure, but that a likewise high reliability (0.97) is obtained for the combination of a high 
degree of variance with a high degree of immediate registration (p≤0.08). 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Max Min Spread 
Bank PU12 DSHRT DM10 0,05 0,75 0,45 0,58 0,61 0,75 0,45 0,30 
Bank PU12 DSDE DM10 0,08 0,78 0,52 0,52 0,56 0,78 0,52 0,26 
Bank PU12 DSPF DM10 0,07 0,71 0,46 0,59 0,66 0,71 0,46 0,25 
Bank PU3 DSPF DM10 0,08 0,96 0,85 0,91 0,97 0,97 0,85 0,12 
Table 6.26 - Two-way ANOVA for timeliness of incident registration 
For urgent as well as non-urgent incidents, teams with a high homogeneity in incident 
management focus and a low reliance on Peregrine for their communication yield the best 
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reliability whereas they yield the worst reliability when they do. For non-urgent incidents, a low 
proportion of time devoted to the handling of incidents in combination with a high degree of use 
of Peregrine yields the worst reliability, whereas in combination with a low reliance on Peregrine 
yields the best reliability.  
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Max Min Spread 
Bank PU12 DS8 DMDed 0,00 0,40 0,69 0,67 0,46 0,69 0,40 0,29 
Bank PU3 DS8 DMDed 0,03 0,78 0,97 0,94 0,94 0,97 0,78 0,19 
Bank PU3 DM8 DMDed 0,08 0,81 0,96 0,95 0,95 0,96 0,81 0,15 
Table 6.27 - Two-Way ANOVA for the use of dedicated IS and incident management focus 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Max Min Spread 
Bank PU12 DSEff DM10 0,02 0,79 0,51 0,47 0,55 0,79 0,47 0,32 
Bank PU12 DSTO DM10 0,05 0,78 0,47 0,56 0,59 0,78 0,47 0,31 
Bank PU3 DS137 DM10 0,01 0,90 0,97 0,96 0,77 0,97 0,77 0,19 
 
H2-4c: More experienced teams exhibiting a higher level of use of dedicated IS for their 
communication are more reliable 
This hypothesis can be falsified. From Table 6.28 can be derived that teams with a high level of 
experience relying stronger on the dedicated IS (survey item 114, Peregrine) achieve a lower 
reliability (0.47) in the handling of urgent incidents. When they rely less on the dedicated IS their 
reliability is the highest (0.71). When less experienced teams rely heavily to face-to-face the 
yield the lowest reliability (0.48 for urgent incidents; 0.85 for non-urgent incidents). 
Table 6.28 also shows that teams with more experience relying stronger on richer media, 
achieve a higher reliability: telephone (0.78); face-to-face (0.77); voice-based systems (0.76). 
 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DM5 DM112 0,01 0,61 0,52 0,42 0,78 0,37 
Bank Urgent DM5 DM111 0,02 0,70 0,48 0,58 0,77 0,30 
Bank Urgent DM5 DMVoic 0,02 0,64 0,49 0,51 0,76 0,27 
Bank Urgent DM5 DM114 0,06 0,51 0,63 0,71 0,47 0,24 
Bank Urgent DM5 DMFac 0,06 0,67 0,48 0,56 0,71 0,23 
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Bank Non-Urgent DM5 DMFac 0,07 0,96 0,85 0,92 0,98 0,13 
Bank Non-Urgent DM5 DMVoic 0,08 0,94 0,86 0,91 0,98 0,13 
Table 6.28 - Two-way ANOVA for Experience (DM5) and use of communication tools (DM112) 
Proposition 2-5 
 
Proposition 2-5: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and IS use, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-5: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher SeMa propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on dedicated IS. 
We have found no significance to support this hypothesis at any ANOVA level. 
Proposition 2-6 
H2-6a: Teams that work under close physical proximity perform better than teams that do not. 
We have tested this variable by ranking the answer possibilities from little physical proximity to 
the IT headquarters, to high proximity. We have found evidence for the hypothesis on two 
levels: (1) proximity to the Bank’s IT headquarters (DM4) and (2) team dispersion (DS4). 
1. Teams that (on average) are more based in the Bank’s IT headquarters are performing better 
than teams that aren’t (DM4) (Table 6.29). These observations apply to the handling of urgent as 
well as non-urgent incidents.  
 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
Bank Non-Urgent DM4 0,07 0,89 0,97 0,08 
Bank Urgent DM4 0,04 0,54 0,73 0,19 
Table 6.29 - One-way ANOVA for vicinity to IT headquarters 
Despite its level of significance that strictly speaking is not acceptable for further analysis (p = 
0.11) we do want to point out the link with the Preoccupation with Failure construct, notably for 
urgent incidents. From Table 6.30 we derive that teams with a high degree of Preoccupation 
with Failure that are working in vicinity to the company headquarters are the most reliable. On 
the other hand, this high degree of Preoccupation with Failure yields the lowest process 
reliability when they are not working in vicinity to the IT headquarters.  
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DMPF DM4 0,11 0,58 0,59 0,45 0,79 0,34 
Table 6.30 - Two-way ANOVA for vicinity to IT headquarters 
 




2. A low spread in physical proximity is better for process reliability (DS4) (Table 6.31). 
 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 0,03 0,96 0,85 0,10 
Table 6.31 - One-way ANOVA for spread in Physical Proximity 
Also at the two-way ANOVA level, the results are interesting (Table 6.32 and Table 6.33) because 
of the general observation that low spread in physical location – i.e. a low team dispersion – 
yields the highest reliability. This is particularly true for the non-urgent incidents. We also notice 
that reliability is the lowest when team dispersion is high. For the urgent incidents this effect of 
team dispersion is countered by the impact of workload. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DS4 DMNU12pe 0,01 0,57 0,66 0,24 0,72 0,48 
Bank Urgent DS4 DM113 0,10 0,69 0,58 0,44 0,64 0,25 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DMEff 0,02 0,94 0,97 0,74 0,97 0,23 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DMNU3pe 0,01 0,94 0,97 0,74 0,97 0,23 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DMNUApe 0,01 0,94 0,97 0,74 0,97 0,23 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DS111 0,06 0,97 0,94 0,77 0,92 0,20 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DSFac 0,06 0,96 0,95 0,77 0,92 0,20 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DMNU12pe 0,02 0,97 0,94 0,78 0,96 0,20 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DS8 0,08 0,96 0,95 0,77 0,92 0,19 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DS114 0,05 0,97 0,95 0,79 0,95 0,18 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 
 
0,03 0,96 0,85 
  
0,10 
Table 6.32 - Two-way ANOVA for spread in Physical Proximity 
 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSTF DS4 0,02 0,71 0,83 0,57 0,35 0,48 
Bank Urgent DS137 DS4 0,01 0,59 0,68 0,70 0,37 0,33 
Bank Urgent DSScheme DS4 0,07 0,60 0,67 0,71 0,43 0,28 
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Bank Non-Urgent DSSeMa DS4 0,01 0,95 0,98 0,97 0,77 0,21 
Bank Non-Urgent DSTF DS4 0,04 0,97 0,98 0,94 0,77 0,21 
Bank Non-Urgent DSScheme DS4 0,04 0,95 0,97 0,97 0,80 0,17 
Table 6.33 - Two-way ANOVA for spread in Physical Proximity 
H2-6b: Larger teams are more reliable than smaller teams.  
We have found no evidence for this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA level. At the two-way 
level, Table 6.34 shows an interaction with time allocated to incident handling work. This 
observation is dealt with next. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DM6 DM8 0,05 0,50 0,73 0,66 0,54 0,23 
Table 6.34 - Two-way ANOVA for Team Size 
H2-6c: Teams with higher incident workload are more reliable than teams with a lower 
workload. 
This hypothesis can be validated from Table 6.35, as well concerning the workload regarding the 
handling of urgent incidents (0.68) as non-urgent incidents (0.97). Results from the two-way 
ANOVA support this finding with the exception of the combination with a high heterogeneity in 
the use of Peregrine for communication where a low workload shows the highest reliability 
(Table 6.36). 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
Bank Urgent DMNU12pe 0,00 0,43 0,68 0,25 
Bank Non-Urgent DMNU3pe 0,02 0,87 0,97 0,10 
Bank Non-Urgent DMNUApe 0,03 0,87 0,97 0,10 
Table 6.35 - One-way ANOVA of Workload 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DS4 DMNU12pe 0,01 0,57 0,66 0,24 0,72 0,48 
Bank Urgent DSScheme DMNU12pe 0,00 0,59 0,62 0,29 0,77 0,48 
Bank Urgent DS114 DMNU12pe 0,02 0,28 0,71 0,55 0,62 0,43 
Bank Urgent DM111 DMNU12pe 0,09 0,55 0,69 0,27 0,67 0,42 
Bank Urgent DS112 DMNU12pe 0,08 0,31 0,71 0,49 0,60 0,40 
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Bank Urgent DMTF DMNU12pe 0,10 0,59 0,70 0,30 0,65 0,40 
Bank Urgent DMSeMa DMNU12pe 0,07 0,34 0,72 0,54 0,64 0,38 
Bank Urgent DM1 DMNU12pe 0,10 0,56 0,66 0,32 0,69 0,36 
Bank Urgent DS1 DMNU12pe 0,06 0,62 0,68 0,33 0,68 0,35 
Bank Non-Urgent DM1 DMNU12pe 0,01 0,97 0,94 0,76 0,95 0,21 
Bank Non-Urgent DS112 DMNU12pe 0,02 0,76 0,96 0,95 0,92 0,20 
Bank Non-Urgent DS4 DMNU12pe 0,02 0,97 0,94 0,78 0,96 0,20 
Bank Non-Urgent DS1 DMNU12pe 0,04 0,98 0,95 0,80 0,95 0,18 
Bank Non-Urgent DS114 DMNU12pe 0,04 0,81 0,96 0,97 0,92 0,15 
Bank Non-Urgent DMTF DMNU12pe 0,08 0,97 0,94 0,83 0,96 0,14 
Bank Non-Urgent DSMSA DMNU12pe 0,08 0,98 0,94 0,84 0,96 0,14 
Bank Non-Urgent DSSeMa DMNU12pe 0,08 0,98 0,94 0,84 0,96 0,14 
Table 6.36 - Two-way ANOVA of Workload concerning the handling of urgent incidents 
H2-6d: Teams with a greater deal of their time allocated to incident management are more 
reliable than teams with smaller time allocation. 
We have found no evidence for this assertion at the one-way ANOVA level. At the two-way 
ANOVA level (Table 6.37) there is sufficient evidence that a low degree of time allocation leads 
to low reliability. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DM8 DM6 0,05 0,50 0,66 0,73 0,54 0,23 
Bank Non-Urgent DM8 DMNU3pe 0,10 0,80 0,97 0,93 0,97 0,17 
Bank Non-Urgent DM8 DMDed 0,08 0,81 0,96 0,95 0,95 0,15 
Bank Non-Urgent DM8 DSMSA 0,07 0,96 0,79 0,95 0,95 0,16 
Bank Non-Urgent DM8 DM1 0,08 0,96 0,81 0,95 0,95 0,16 
Table 6.37 - Two-way ANOVA of Time Allocation 
 
  
200 Two Cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
 
Proposition 2-7 
Proposition 2-7: The better the fit between HRO propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
H2-7a: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working under 
close physical proximity 
H2-7b:  A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
H2-7c: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams with higher 
incident workload. 
 
H2-7a: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working under 
close physical proximity 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH 
Bank Non-Urgent DM4 0,07 0,89 0,97 
Bank Urgent DM4 0,04 0,54 0,73 
Bank Non-urgent DS4 0.03 0.96 0.85 
Table 6.38 - One-way ANOVA for Proximity 
This hypothesis can be validated at an acceptable level of significance for urgent incidents. A low 
value for spread in vicinity (i.e. close proximity) results in the highest performance (Table 6.38). 
We notice also that the more a team is based in the vicinity of headquarters, themore reliable it 
is. 
H2-7b: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
This hypothesis cannot be validated at an acceptable level of significance. 
H2-7c: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams with higher incident 
workload. 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH 
Bank Urgent DMNU12pe 0,00 0,43 0,68 
Bank Non-Urgent DMNU3pe 0,02 0,87 0,97 
Bank Non-Urgent DMNUApe 0,03 0,87 0,97 
Table 6.39 - Workload 
This hypothesis can be validated. We see from Table 6.39 that a high workload has a strong 
effect on high reliability, as well for the handling of urgent as non-urgent incidents. 
 




Proposition 2-8: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
H2-8a: A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working 
under close physical proximity. 
No validation possible at an acceptable level of significance. 
H2-8b:  A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams. 
No validation possible at an acceptable level of significance 
 
Proposition 2-9 
H2-9a: More experienced teams are more reliable. 
No validation of this effect at acceptable levels of significance can be observed.  
H2-9b: The higher the variance in HRO propensity, the higher the reliability 
We have found no support for this hypothesis at a sufficient level of significance on the one-way 
analysis level. On the two-way ANOVA level (Table 6.40) we notice that the highest reliability is 
achieved low spread in HRO propensity in combination with highly experienced teams (0.72 for 
urgent, and 0.98 for non-urgent incidents), high use of e-mail (0.66 for urgent incidents and 0.97 
for non-urgent incidents). The lowest reliability is achieved for low spread in HRO propensity in 
combination with a less experienced teams (0.43 for urgent incidents and 0.85 for non-urgent 
incidents) and little use of e-mail (0.45 for urgent incidents and 0.88 for non-urgent incidents).  
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSHRT DM10 0,05 0,75 0,45 0,58 0,61 0,30 
Bank Urgent DSHRT DM5 0,03 0,43 0,72 0,62 0,51 0,29 
Bank Urgent DSHRT DS10 0,07 0,48 0,77 0,61 0,57 0,28 
Bank Urgent DSHRT DM9 0,05 0,69 0,50 0,53 0,71 0,21 
Bank Urgent DSHRT DS9 0,05 0,50 0,69 0,71 0,53 0,21 
Bank Urgent DSHRT DM113 0,08 0,45 0,66 0,63 0,51 0,21 
Bank Non-Urgent DSHRT DM5 0,07 0,85 0,98 0,93 0,88 0,13 
Bank Non-Urgent DSHRT DM113 0,08 0,88 0,97 0,94 0,86 0,11 
Table 6.40 - Two-way ANOVA for Spread in HRO propensity 
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Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSDE DSHRT 0,03 0,55 0,78 0,67 0,50 0,28 
Bank Urgent DSPer DSHRT 0,06 0,48 0,62 0,77 0,57 0,28 
Bank Non-Urgent DSSO DSHRT 0,10 0,98 0,88 0,86 0,92 0,12 
Table 6.41 - Two-way ANOVA for Spread in HRT 
H2-9c: The higher the variance in Team Orientation, the higher the reliability 
This hypothesis cannot be validated at the one-way ANOVA level. On the two-dimensional level 
(Table 6.42), the highest reliability can be found for urgent incidents for low spread in Team 
Orientation in combination with low score on Enactment (0.76), on registration in Peregrine 
(0.78)and for non-urgent incidents for low spread in enactment as well (0.98). A low score on 
spread in Team Orientation in combination with a high spread in registration in Peregrine (0.80). 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSTO DM137 0,01 0,76 0,43 0,53 0,64 0,33 
Bank Urgent DSTO DM10 0,05 0,78 0,47 0,56 0,59 0,31 
Bank Urgent DSTO DS10 0,06 0,50 0,80 0,59 0,56 0,30 
Bank Urgent DSTO DSDE 0,04 0,57 0,68 0,73 0,47 0,25 
Bank Non-Urgent DSTO DSDE 0,06 0,90 0,98 0,96 0,87 0,11 
Bank Non-Urgent DSTO DM137 0,10 0,98 0,87 0,90 0,94 0,11 
Bank Non-Urgent DSTO DM113 0,11 0,88 0,97 0,94 0,87 0,10 
Table 6.42 - Two-way ANOVA for spread in Team Orientation 
H2-9d: The higher the variance in Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability.  
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
Bank Non-Urgent DSTF 0,02 0,97 0,87 0,10 
Bank Urgent DSTF 0,00 0,74 0,48 0,26 
Table 6.43 - One-way ANOVA for Threat Flexibility 
This hypothesis is falsified. As well for urgent as for non-urgent incidents, the lowest variance 
yields the highest reliability (Table 6.43). 
H2-9e: The higher the variance in Preoccupation with Failure, the higher the reliability 
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This hypothesis could not be validated at the one-way ANOVA level. At the two-dimensional 
level, a low spread in Preoccupation with Failure generally yields the lowest reliability (Table 
6.44). 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSPF DS10 0,01 0,41 0,72 0,69 0,53 0,30 
Bank Urgent DSPF DSSO 0,02 0,69 0,39 0,56 0,65 0,30 
Bank Urgent DSPF DM10 0,07 0,71 0,46 0,59 0,66 0,25 
Bank Urgent DSPF DM5 0,10 0,46 0,67 0,64 0,55 0,22 
Bank Non-Urgent DSPF DSScheme 0,05 0,95 0,74 0,96 0,93 0,22 
Bank Urgent DSPF DM113 0,07 0,46 0,64 0,67 0,52 0,21 
Bank Non-Urgent DSPF DS10 0,04 0,83 0,96 0,97 0,91 0,14 
Bank Non-Urgent DSPF DM113 0,07 0,84 0,95 0,96 0,90 0,12 
Bank Non-Urgent DSPF DS9 0,10 0,85 0,94 0,97 0,90 0,12 
Bank Non-Urgent DSPF DM10 0,08 0,96 0,85 0,91 0,97 0,12 
Table 6.44 - Two-way ANOVA for Preoccupation with Failure 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSPer DSPF 0,03 0,46 0,69 0,71 0,57 0,25 
Bank Non-Urgent DSPer DSPF 0,09 0,85 0,96 0,96 0,92 0,12 
Table 6.45 - Two-way ANOVA for Spread in Preoccupation with Failure 
H2-9f: The higher the variance in Sensitivity to Operations, the higher the reliability 
This hypothesis cannot be validated at the one-way ANOVA level. For urgent incidents, a 
combination of low spread in Sensitivity to Operations and a low spread in Preoccupation with 
Failure yields the highest reliability (0.69) (Table 6.46). 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Non-Urgent DSSO DSHRT 0,10 0,98 0,88 0,86 0,92 0,12 
Bank Urgent DSPF DSSO 0,02 0,69 0,39 0,56 0,65 0,30 
Table 6.46 - Two-way ANOVA for spread in Sensitivity to Operations 
H2-9g:  The higher the variance in Deference to Expertise, the higher the reliability 
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This hypothesis could not be validated at the one-way ANOVA level. On the two-dimensional 
interpretation, we notice that the highest reliability is achieved for the combinations of low 
spread in Deference to Expertise and other factors, especially for urgent incidents (Table 6.47). 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
Bank Urgent DSDE DMScheme 0,01 0,77 0,56 0,43 0,66 0,34 
Bank Urgent DSDE DMSeMa 0,01 0,72 0,55 0,41 0,65 0,31 
Bank Urgent DSDE DSHRT 0,03 0,55 0,78 0,67 0,50 0,28 
Bank Urgent DSDE DS10 0,09 0,54 0,80 0,56 0,52 0,27 
Bank Urgent DSDE DM10 0,08 0,78 0,52 0,52 0,56 0,26 
Bank Urgent DSDE DMSO 0,03 0,71 0,59 0,44 0,69 0,26 
Bank Urgent DSDE DM137 0,05 0,73 0,49 0,49 0,59 0,24 
Bank Non-Urgent DSDE DMHRT 0,02 0,97 0,87 0,84 0,96 0,13 
Bank Non-Urgent DSDE DMSO 0,04 0,97 0,89 0,86 0,98 0,12 
Bank Non-Urgent DSDE DS113 0,08 0,97 0,87 0,87 0,94 0,10 
Bank Urgent DSTO DSDE 0,04 0,57 0,68 0,73 0,47 0,25 
Bank Non-Urgent DSTO DSDE 0,06 0,90 0,98 0,96 0,87 0,11 
Table 6.47 - Two-way ANOVA for Spread in Deference to Expertise 
Proposition 2-10 
 
H2-10a: Teams that perceive Threat Flexibility more homogenously perform better than teams 
that do not. 
At the same time we notice (Table 6.48) that a high homogeneity (i.e. low spread/variance) in 
the perception of the Threat Flexibility construct yields the highest reliability, as well for the 
handling of urgent (0.74 at p≤0.05) as of the non-urgent incidents (0.97 at p≤0.01). 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
Bank PU3 DSTF 0,02 0,97 0,87 0,10 
Bank PU12 DSTF 0,00 0,74 0,48 0,26 
Table 6.48 - One-way ANOVA for spread of Threat Flexibility 
 
 Data Analysis 205 
 
 
H2-10b: Teams that perceive efficiency drivenness more homogenously perform better than 
teams that do not. 
We notice that the higher the homogeneity in the perception of efficiency drivenness, the higher 
the reliability. The significance is sufficiently strong (p=0.07), as can be derived from (Table 6.49), 
to demonstrate the importance of a low degree of variance in the perception of efficiency 
orientation to  
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
Bank PU12 DSEff 0,07 0,67 0,52 0,16 
Table 6.49 - One-way ANOVA for spread of efficiency drivenness 
Propostion 2-11 
 
Proposition 2-11: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-11: More Eperienced teams, relying more on SeMa propensity, are more reliable. 
This hypothesis could not be validated at an acceptable level of significance. 
 
3.2 NPP Case 
Proposition 2-1 
H2-1a: Teams exhibiting a higher propensity towards Team Orientation yield higher reliability in 
the handling of urgent incidents, whereas this is counterproductive for the handling of 
non-urgent incidents. 
No effect found at an acceptable level of significance. 
H2-1b: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation and exhibiting a high 
degree of Sensitivity to Operations yield a higher reliability than teams than the same 
teams exhibiting a low degree of Sensitivity to Operations. 
No evidence found to validate the hypothesis. 
H2-1c: The higher the average Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability. 
The highest reliability (Table 6.50) is achieved by teams with a high score on Threat Flexibility in 
combination with a high score on SenseMaking and HRT constructs, regardless of the incident 
type. Remarkable in this respect is the observation that a low degree of Threat Flexibility in 
combination with a low score on SenseMaking and HRT constructs yields – for urgent incidents 
with 0.93 and for non-urgent incidents with 0.67 to 0.71 only 0.04 lower – a high reliability as 
well. 
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Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DMTF DMSeMa 0,10 0,93 0,56 0,83 0,97 0,42 
NPP Urgent DMTF DMSO 0,07 0,93 0,48 0,84 0,97 0,49 
NPP Urgent DMTF DMOther 0,06 0,93 0,48 0,77 0,97 0,49 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTF DMHRT 0,08 0,67 -0,21 0,25 0,76 0,97 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTF DMTO 0,10 0,69 -0,25 0,46 0,74 0,99 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTF DMSO 0,07 0,71 -0,29 0,42 0,76 1,05 
Table 6.50 - Two-way ANOVA for Threat Flexibility 
H2-1d: Teams that operate in a less restrictive (more supportive) organizational climate perform 
better than teams that do not. 
We have found no significant proof for this hypothesis since the construct covering the degree of 
supportiveness namely Threat Flexibility. Nor for the urgent incidents, nor for the non-urgent 
incidents is it so that the degree of restrictiveness/supportiveness of Threat Flexibility is 
positively influencing reliability, regardless of any mediating variable. 
Proposition 2-2 
H2-2a: The higher the variance in SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DM32 DSSeMa 0,07 0,92 0,94 0,96 0,45 0,51 
NPP Urgent DMSeMa DSSeMa 0,02 0,87 0,92 0,97 0,36 0,61 
NPP Urgent DS9 DSSeMa 0,02 0,91 0,94 0,96 0,33 0,63 
NPP Urgent DS8 DSSeMa 0,04 0,92 0,32 0,96 0,97 0,65 
NPP Urgent DS10 DSSeMa 0,10 0,99 0,84 0,91 0,12 0,87 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTeamSize DSSeMa 0,08 0,60 0,69 0,78 -0,29 1,08 
NPP Non-Urgent DM32 DSSeMa 0,07 0,58 0,69 0,81 -0,30 1,11 
NPP Non-Urgent DS4 DSSeMa 0,10 0,74 0,69 0,59 -0,54 1,28 
Table 6.51 - Two-way ANOVA for SenseMaking 
We have found no evidence for this assumption at the one-way ANOVA level. At the two way 
level ANOVA however, this hypothesis can be falsified. In general, it can be derived from Table 
6.51 that the higher the spread in SenseMaking, the lower the incident management reliability. 
More particularly, in the case of the handling of urgent incidents, a high homogenous degree of 
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SenseMaking propensity leads to the highest reliability (0.97), whereas a high but 
heterogeneous degree of SenseMaking propensity leads to the lowest reliability (0.36). 
H2-2b: The higher the variance in making sense of Other, the higher the reliability. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DSOther DSSupRes 0,06 0,89 0,96 0,94 0,47 0,49 
NPP Urgent DSOther DSPres 0,04 0,91 0,97 0,32 0,96 0,65 
We have found no significant evidence for this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA level. At the 
two-way ANOVA level we can falsify the hypothesis. A high variance in Other results in high 
reliability in combination with a low (0.94) spread in the perception of the availability of 
Supplementary Resources or with a high variance in the perception of Pressure (0.97). A low 
variance in Other results in high reliability in combination with a high (0.96) or low (0.94) spread 
in the perception of the availability of Supplementary Resources or with a high variance in the 
perception of Pressure (0.97).  
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DS32 DSScheme 0,11 0,94 0,52 0,92 0,97 0,45 
NPP Urgent DS31 DSScheme 0,06 0,97 0,52 0,88 0,97 0,45 
NPP Urgent DN0pe DSScheme 0,07 0,96 0,52 0,90 0,98 0,46 
NPP Urgent DM114 DSScheme 0,06 0,88 0,95 0,96 0,47 0,49 
NPP Urgent DN123pe DSScheme 0,07 0,91 0,43 0,95 0,97 0,55 
NPP Urgent DM31 DSScheme 0,02 0,95 0,34 0,91 0,95 0,61 
NPP Non-Urgent Dmvoic DSScheme 0,10 0,83 0,33 0,13 0,82 0,69 
NPP Non-Urgent DMSupRes DSScheme 0,09 0,79 0,29 0,16 0,87 0,71 
NPP Non-Urgent DM115 DSScheme 0,11 0,84 0,35 0,12 0,78 0,72 
NPP Non-Urgent DMPF DSScheme 0,07 0,08 0,82 0,66 0,13 0,74 
NPP Non-Urgent DMOther DSScheme 0,06 0,05 0,81 0,79 0,26 0,76 
NPP Non-Urgent DS115 DSScheme 0,10 0,81 0,33 0,04 0,79 0,77 
NPP Non-Urgent DS31 DSScheme 0,09 0,81 0,34 0,03 0,73 0,78 
NPP Non-Urgent DSDE DSScheme 0,06 0,01 0,77 0,84 0,29 0,83 
NPP Non-Urgent DSDE DSScheme 0,06 0,01 0,84 0,77 0,29 0,83 
Table 6.52 - Two-way ANOVA for Scheme 
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H2-2c: The higher the variance in Ongoing, the higher the reliability 
This hypothesis can be validated (0.75) at the two-way ANOVA level where the combination of 
larger teams and a more heterogeneous enactment results in the highest reliability (0.75) 
whereas the combination of larger teams and a more homogenous enactment results in the 
lowest reliability (-0.52). 
More female teams that exhibit more enactment properties are highly reliable (0.91) whereas 
they are less reliable (-1.02) when they exhibit less enactment properties. More male teams are 
relatively indifferent (0.50 vs. 0.69) towards the enactment properties. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTeamSize DS137 0,06 0,64 0,66 -0,52 0,75 1,27 
NPP Non-Urgent DM2 DS137 0,08 0,50 0,69 -1,02 0,91 1,93 
Table 6.53 - Two-way ANOVA for Enactment 
Proposition 2-3 
H2-3: Teams using richer media are more reliable. 
This hypothesis can be validated for non-urgent incidents. Teams that show a diversified use of 
telephone in the handling of incidents (in general) achieve a higher reliability (0.85) than teams 
that have the same tendency (regardless of the kind of inclination, positive or negative) towards 
the reliance on telephone. 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
NPP Non-Urgent DS112 0,0140859 0,02 0,85 0,83 
Table 6.54 - One-way ANOVA for spread in the use of telephone 
Proposition 2-4 
H2-4a: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation, relying on richer media 
yield a higher reliability. 
From Table 6.55 can be derived that teams with a high degree of Team Orientation and a high 
degree of reliance on face-to-face communication yield the highest reliability in the handling of 
urgent incidents. This reliability is very high (0.94). When these teams rely little on face-to-face 
communication their reliability drops considerably (with 0.56 to 0.39). The reliability of teams 
with a smaller degree of Team Orientation is independent from the degree of reliance on face-
to-face communication (0.88). 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DMFac DMTO 0,09 0,88 0,39 0,88 0,94 0,56 
Table 6.55 - Two-way ANOVA Team Orientation & Media Richness 
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H2-4b: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher HRO propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on the dedicated IS. 
Teams whose management expects they rigorously stick to procedures (low score on 243INV) 
and that homogenously rely on dedicated IS in the handling of incidents score the highest 
reliability in the handling of urgent incidents (0.96, which is very high) (Table 6.56). When these 
teams are less homogenous in the way they rely on dedicated IS, their reliability drops 
considerably (0.40). This underlines the relevance of the hypothesis as a guideline for the design 
of information systems (in its broadest sense of hardware, software and procedures). Teams 
whose management allows team members to deviate more from procedure and that exhibit a 
high variance in the way they make use of dedicated IS (0.93, also very high). 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DM243INV DSDed 0,07 0,96 0,40 0,87 0,93 0,56 
Table 6.56 - Deviation from procedure & Tool dedication 
H2-4c: More experienced teams exhibiting a higher level of use of dedicated IS for their 
communication are more reliable. 
No evidence can be found for this assertion at an acceptable level of significance.  
Proposition 2-5 
 
Proposition 2-5: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and IS use, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-5: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher SeMa propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on dedicated IS. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH 
NPP Non-Urgent Dmvoic DSScheme 0,10 0,83 0,33 0,13 0,82 
NPP Non-Urgent Dmvoic DSSelf 0,10 0,82 0,33 0,18 0,91 
NPP Urgent Dmvoic DSDed 0,01 0,97 0,23 0,85 0,93 
NPP Non-Urgent Dmvoic DSDed 0,06 0,85 -0,29 0,09 0,53 
NPP Urgent Dmvoic DSVoic 0,00 0,91 -0,74 0,93 0,89 
NPP Non-Urgent Dmvoic DS2 0,03 0,50 0,91 0,71 -1,02 
NPP Non-Urgent Dmvoic DS1 0,03 0,50 0,91 0,60 -1,55 
NPP Non-Urgent Dmvoic DSVoic 0,00 0,81 -2,26 0,04 0,44 
Table 6.57 - Two-way Anova for SeMa and Is Use 
We see from Table 6.57 that this hypothesis cannot be validated. However, we notice that a high 
spread in the SeMa propensity Scheme (DSScheme), i.e. a high homogeneity in combination with 
a high reliance on voice-based communication tools yields the lowest performance.  
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Proposition 2-6 
H2-6a: Teams that work under close physical proximity perform better than teams that do not. 
In the NPP Case, no data are available to test this hypothesis. Testing would be senseless 
because all team-members are housed in the same physical location. 
H2-6b: Larger teams are more reliable than smaller teams.  
We have found no proof for the validation of this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA level. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DMPres DMTeamSize 0,10 0,89 0,96 0,97 0,54 0,43 
NPP Urgent DMFac DMTeamSize 0,06 0,96 0,47 0,89 0,96 0,49 
NPP Urgent DMSupRes DMTeamSize 0,04 0,96 0,46 0,89 0,97 0,51 
NPP Urgent DM114 DMTeamSize 0,01 0,88 0,96 0,96 0,34 0,62 
NPP Non-Urgent DMSO DMTeamSize 0,05 0,54 0,87 0,84 -0,18 1,05 
NPP Non-Urgent DMHRT DMTeamSize 0,03 0,46 0,79 0,83 -0,30 1,13 
NPP Non-Urgent DSSupRes DMTeamSize 0,09 0,54 0,79 0,83 -0,12 0,95 
NPP Non-Urgent DSOther DMTeamSize 0,09 0,77 -0,15 0,55 0,83 0,97 
NPP Non-Urgent DSSO DMTeamSize 0,06 0,48 0,80 0,86 -0,12 0,98 
NPP Non-Urgent DSSeMa DMTeamSize 0,08 0,60 0,78 0,69 -0,29 1,08 
NPP Non-Urgent DMEff DMTeamSize 0,10 0,65 -0,30 0,64 0,79 1,09 
NPP Non-Urgent DM112 DMTeamSize 0,09 0,64 -0,33 0,65 0,81 1,14 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTO DMTeamSize 0,02 0,50 0,84 0,83 -0,35 1,19 
NPP Non-Urgent DS137 DMTeamSize 0,06 0,64 -0,52 0,66 0,75 1,27 
Table 6.58 - Two-way ANOVA for Team Size 
At the two-way ANOVA analysis level, it can be derived from Table 6.58 that in the majority of 
cases where team size moderates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable, large teams yield a lower reliability than small teams.  
For urgent incidents, the highest reliability (0.97) is obtained by small teams that perceive high 
pressure, whereas small teams that perceive little pressure still yield a high reliability score 
(0.89). Large teams perceiving high pressure yield the lowest reliability (0.54), and large teams 
perceiving low pressure manage to be very reliable (0.96). 
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Small teams relying little on face-to-face communication are the most reliable (0.96); large 
teams the least (0.47) in the handling of urgent incidents. Large teams, for that matter, can 
consistently increase their reliability when they (contrary to small teams), rely on face-to-face 
communication for the handling of urgent incidents. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DM114 DMTeamSize 0,01 0,88 0,96 0,96 0,34 0,62 
Table 6.59 - Two-way ANOVA for TeamSize (ctd) 
Big teams communicating considerably through the dedicated system, yield the lowest reliability 
(0.34), whereas big teams that do not do so, see their reliability increase spectacularly (to 0.96). 
Small teams relying heavily on the dedicated system are the most reliable. 
H2-6c: Teams with higher incident workload are more reliable than teams with a lower 
workload. 
We have been able to validate this hypothesis. Interestingly, Table 6.60 shows that the number 
of non-urgent notifications per employee is explaining the high reliability in the handling of 
urgent incidents. 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
NPP Urgent DN123pe 0,09 0,71 0,96 0,26 
Table 6.60 - One-way ANOVA for Workload (NPP) 
H2-6d: Teams with a greater deal of their time allocated to incident management are more 
reliable than teams with smaller time allocation. 
In the NPP Case, no data are available to test this hypothesis. Testing would be senseless 
because the large majority of teams in the survey are part of the Maintenance department, 
meaning that their time allocation would approach 100 percent. 
Proposition 2-7 
Proposition 2-7: The better the fit between HRO propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
H2-7a: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working under 
close physical proximity 
H2-7b:  A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
H2-7c: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams with higher 
incident workload. 
H2-7a: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working under close 
physical proximity 
This hypothesis cannot be tested in the NPP, since physical proximity is a given. 
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H2-7b: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
No validation possible at an acceptable level of significance. 
H2-7c: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams with higher incident 
workload. 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH 
NPP Urgent DN123pe 0,09 0,71 0,96 
Table 6.61 - Workload (NPP) 
This hypothesis can be validated (Table 6.61). 
Proposition 2-8 
Proposition 2-8: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
H2-8a: A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working 
under close physical proximity. 
No data available to test this hypothesis. 
H2-8b:  A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
No data available to test this hypothesis. 
Proposition 2-9 
H2-9a: More experienced teams are more reliable. 
This hypothesis can be falsified at an acceptable level of significance (p ≤ 0.08). From Table 6.62 
can be seen that teams with a lower level of experience perform better in the handling of urgent 
incidents. A side remark is that the difference between the average reliability of on average less 
experienced and more experienced teams is small (0.26 as compared to a minimum of 0.25 and 
a maximum of 0.29). 
Case Type Fact1 Sig. LL LH Spread 
NPP Urgent DM5 0,08 0,97 0,70 0,26 
Table 6.62 - One-way ANOVA of Experience 
H2-9b: The higher the variance in HRO propensity, the higher the reliability 
There is no evidence at an acceptable level of significance for this assertion at the one-
dimensional level. However, on the two-way ANOVA level, there is evidence for the hypothesis 
(Table 6.63).  
Regarding the handling of urgent incidents, the combination of a high variance in the spread of 
HRT propensity and a high spread in the degree to which team members adjust procedures leads 
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to the lowest reliability (0.45). Other combinations are less pronounced since they range only 
0.07 (0.89 to 0.96). Nevertheless, the lowest of these reliabilities (0.89) can be observed for the 
combination of a low variance in the spread of HRT propensity and a low spread in the degree to 
which team members adjust procedures. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Non-Urgent DSHRT DSTF 0,09 0,40 0,80 0,86 0,05 0,81 
NPP Non-Urgent DSHRT DSOther 0,06 0,72 0,42 -0,10 0,87 0,97 
NPP Urgent DSHRT DS9 0,06 0,89 0,96 0,95 0,45 0,51 
NPP Non-Urgent DSHRT DMHRT 0,08 0,39 0,75 0,81 -0,04 0,86 
NPP Non-Urgent DSHRT DMTO 0,10 0,46 0,72 0,83 -0,06 0,89 
NPP Non-Urgent DSHRT DMSO 0,09 0,47 0,71 0,84 -0,07 0,92 
NPP Non-Urgent DSHRT DM32 0,04 0,44 0,83 0,90 -0,13 1,03 
NPP Non-Urgent DSHRT DMEff 0,04 0,62 0,32 -0,47 0,81 1,28 
Table 6.63 - Two-way ANOVA for spread in HRO propensity 
Regarding the handling of non-urgent incidents, the combination of a high spread in HRO 
propensity and a high spread in Threat Flexibility results in the lowest reliability (0.05). The 
highest reliability (0.86) is obtained by teams with a low score on spread in Threat Flexibility and 
a high spread in HRO propensity. 
H2-9c: The higher the variance in Team Orientation, the higher the reliability 
The hypothesis cannot be validated significantly at the one-way ANOVA level. On the level of 
two-way ANOVA however, some conclusions can be drawn. For instance, the combination of a 
high variance in Team Orientation and a high degree of Sensitivity to Operations yields the worst 
reliability (-0.20). A low spread in Team Orientation combined with a high degree of Sensitivity 
to Operations yields the best reliability (0.86). 
A high variance in Team Orientation and a high degree of Team Orientation yields the lowest 
reliability (-0.37) and the highest reliability (0.85) for the combination of a high degree of Team 
Orientation and a low spread in Team Orientation.  
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DSSupRes DSTO 0,09 0,89 0,96 0,97 0,54 0,44 
NPP Non-Urgent DN0pe DSTO 0,08 0,77 -0,26 0,65 0,75 1,03 
NPP Non-Urgent DMSO DSTO 0,08 0,60 0,69 0,86 -0,20 1,06 
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NPP Non-Urgent DMTO DSTO 0,04 0,57 0,68 0,85 -0,37 1,22 
NPP Non-Urgent DS71 DSTO 0,05 0,63 -0,53 0,82 0,80 1,35 
NPP Non-Urgent DM1 DSTO 0,06 0,69 0,41 0,91 -1,55 2,47 
NPP Non-Urgent DS1 DSTO 0,06 0,69 0,41 0,91 -1,55 2,47 
Table 6.64 - Variance in Two-way ANOVA for Team Orientation 
H2-9d: The higher the variance in Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability 
On the one-way ANOVA level we have found no evidence for this hypothesis at an acceptable 
significant. At the two-way ANOVA level we have found support for this hypothesis in 
combination with a high degree for the number of urgent incidents per employee. A low spread 
in Threat Flexibility in combination with a low average number of urgent incidents per employ 
yields a high reliability as well (0.96). 
For the handling of urgent incidents a low spread in Threat Flexibility yields the highest results 
when seen in combination with a low degree of several constructs (average number of urgent 
incidents per employee 0.96; degree of face-to-face communication 0.96 and spread in face-to-
face communication 0.96; degree of supplementary resources 0.96) 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DN0pe DSTF 0,08 0,96 0,51 0,90 0,97 0,46 
NPP Urgent DMFac DSTF 0,07 0,96 0,47 0,89 0,94 0,49 
NPP Urgent DMSupRes DSTF 0,06 0,96 0,46 0,89 0,94 0,49 
NPP Urgent DSFac DSTF 0,08 0,96 0,42 0,89 0,92 0,54 
NPP Non-Urgent DSHRT DSTF 0,09 0,40 0,80 0,86 0,05 0,81 
NPP Non-Urgent DSSO DSTF 0,06 0,39 0,86 0,87 0,01 0,86 
NPP Non-Urgent DSOther DSTF 0,07 0,73 -0,11 0,45 0,84 0,95 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTO DSTF 0,06 0,45 0,84 0,78 -0,11 0,96 
NPP Non-Urgent DSDed DSTF 0,08 0,44 0,92 0,89 -0,12 1,04 
Table 6.65 - Two-way ANOVA for Spread in Threat Flexibility 
H2-9e: The higher the variance in Preoccupation with Failure, the higher the reliability 
This hypothesis could not be validated at an acceptable level of significance at the one-way 
ANOVA level. For urgent incidents, a high variance in Preoccupation with Failure only yields a 
high reliability (0.93) when combined with a high variance in the way teams deviate from 
procedure. The way teams deviate from procedure is much more homogeneous, reliability is the 
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lowest (0.64). The highest reliability (0.96) is obtained with a combination of a low variance in 
Preoccupation with Failure and a low variance in the way teams deviate from procedure.  
In combination with Team Orientation, the highest reliability (0.93) is obtained with low Team 
Orientation and a high variance in Preoccupation with Failure. The lowest reliability (0.03) with a 
high degree of Team Orientation and a high variance in Preoccupation with Failure. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DSPF DS243INV 0,11 0,96 0,73 0,64 0,93 0,32 
NPP Non-Urgent DSPF DSSO 0,07 0,37 0,81 0,90 0,05 0,85 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTO DSPF 0,09 0,45 0,93 0,76 0,03 0,90 
NPP Non-Urgent DSOther DSPF 0,06 0,74 0,00 0,42 0,96 0,96 
NPP Non-Urgent DM112 DSPF 0,11 0,58 -0,11 0,52 0,92 1,03 
Table 6.66 - Two-way ANOVA for combinations of Preoccupation with Failure 
H2-9f: The higher the variance in Sensitivity to Operations, the higher the reliability 
The lowest reliability is obtained with a combination of high variance in the degree of Sensitivity 
to Operations and a high variance in Threat Flexibility. 
Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Non-Urgent DSSO DSTF 0,06 0,39 0,86 0,87 0,01 0,86 
NPP Non-Urgent DMHRT DSSO 0,10 0,45 0,90 0,86 0,10 0,79 
NPP Non-Urgent DSPF DSSO 0,07 0,37 0,81 0,90 0,05 0,85 
NPP Non-Urgent DSOther DSSO 0,10 0,74 0,00 0,48 0,88 0,88 
NPP Non-Urgent DMTeamSize DSSO 0,06 0,48 0,86 0,80 -0,12 0,98 
NPP Non-Urgent DN123pe DSSO 0,10 0,64 -0,23 0,52 0,79 1,02 
NPP Non-Urgent DM32 DSSO 0,02 0,43 0,85 0,81 -0,31 1,15 
NPP Non-Urgent DS32 DSSO 0,01 0,80 -0,50 0,38 0,80 1,30 
NPP Non-Urgent DNApe DSSO 0,05 0,60 -0,51 0,57 0,81 1,31 
NPP Non-Urgent DN0pe DSSO 0,03 0,63 -0,51 0,50 0,81 1,31 
Table 6.67 - Two-way ANOVA for variance in Sensitivity to Operations 
H2-9g:  The higher the variance in Deference to Expertise, the higher the reliability. 
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Case Type Fact1 Fact2 Sig. LL LH HL HH Spread 
NPP Urgent DMSeMa DSDE 0,10 0,87 0,93 0,94 0,52 0,43 
NPP Urgent DM32 DSDE 0,10 0,89 0,98 0,96 0,54 0,43 
NPP Urgent DM31 DSDE 0,10 0,96 0,53 0,90 0,99 0,46 
NPP Urgent DN0pe DSDE 0,05 0,93 0,46 0,88 0,97 0,52 
NPP Urgent DS9 DSDE 0,04 0,86 0,99 0,96 0,45 0,53 
NPP Non-Urgent DMOther DSDE 0,08 0,10 0,89 0,79 0,33 0,79 
NPP Non-Urgent DS9 DSDE 0,06 0,07 0,90 0,71 0,15 0,83 
NPP Non-Urgent DMScheme DSDE 0,06 0,00 0,83 0,59 0,03 0,83 
NPP Non-Urgent DMSeMa DSDE 0,02 -0,10 0,87 0,74 0,13 0,97 
NPP Non-Urgent DSScheme DSDE 0,06 0,01 0,84 0,77 0,29 0,83 
Table 6.68 - Two-way ANOVA for variance in Deference to Expertise 
This hypothesis cannot be validated at the one-way ANOVA level at an acceptable level of 
significance.  
At the two-way ANOVA level, a number of interactions catch our attention.  
For the handling of urgent incidents, the average number of urgent incidents per employee 
strongly affects the process reliability. The highest reliability (0.97) is achieved for a high spread 
in Deference to Expertise, when employees have an on average high number of incidents to 
handle. But the combination of a low average number of urgent incidents per employee and a 
low spread in Deference to Expertise yields a high reliability as well (0.93) 
A combination of a low score on SenseMaking properties and a low score on variance in 
Deference to Expertise yields the lowest reliability (Other 0.10; Scheme 0.00; SenseMaking in 
general -0.10). The highest reliability is obtained for a low score on these constructs in 
combination with a high spread in Deference to Expertise (Other 0.89; Scheme 0.83; 
SenseMaking in general 0.87). 
Proposition 2-10 
 
H2-10a: Teams that perceive Threat Flexibility more homogenously perform better than teams 
that do not. 
This hypothesis could not be validated at an acceptable level of significance. 
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H2-10b: Teams that perceive efficiency drivenness more homogenously perform better than 
teams that do not. 
This hypothesis could not be validated at an acceptable level of significance. 
Propostion 2-11 
Proposition 2-11: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-11: More Eperienced teams, relying more on SeMa propensity, are more reliable. 
This hypothesis could not be validated at an acceptable level of significance. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion 
 
 
The dose makes the poison 
Paracelsus (1493-1541) 
 
This chapter discusses the research findings presented in the previous chapter. It successively 
addresses the findings from the inter-case comparison (Section 1) and the intra-case evaluation 
(Section 2).  
  
1 Comparison of the Bank Case and the NPP Case [RQ1] 
In this Section, we discuss how the HRO and SeMa characteristics of the two cases relate to each 
other. As we build on the findings from the data analysis, this chapter has an analogous outline 
as the previous chapter. 
Proposition 1-1 
Proposition 1-1: HRO properties are not unique, but HRO propensity levels are. 
H1-1: HRO properties will be discernible in the archetypical HRO (NPP) as well as in the 
mainstream High Reliability Seeking organization (Bank). 
This proposition can be supported for both cases since an exploratory factor analysis describes 
constructs with sufficient internal consistency that match the constructs described in HRT 
literature from 1999 onwards. That date is important because of the seminal paper by Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld’s (1999) in which they set the pace for future research on high reliability 
by introducing the five HRO constructs described in Chapter 2. Data show that of these five 
constructs, three constructs are discernable with sufficient internal validity: Preoccupation with 
Failure, Sensitivity to Operations and Deference to Expertise. Only the constructs of Reluctance 
to Simplify and Commitment to Resilience cannot be supported. However, with the three 
constructs, the Mindfulness criterion proposed by Weick et al. (1999) is covered, as can be seen 
from Figure 7.1 (Muhren et al., 2007, p. 579). 
The fact that we have found the constructs in itself merely means that our questionnaire 
managed to measure the constructs under study. It not necessarily indicates that the 
organization under study is an HRO. However, since an exploratory factor analysis has found the 
same factors (constructs) in both cases, we can conclude that HRO constructs indeed are present 
in both cases.  
220 Two Cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
 
 
Figure 7.1 - Mindfulness (Adapted from Muhren, Van Den Eede, & Van de Walle 2007, p. 579) 
Our research findings challenge, the construct taxonomy and description adopted in HRO 
research since 1999. Their high face-validity has added greatly to the popularity of the HRO 
domain as a discipline, both in academia and in practice. It has tremendous merit in stimulating 
thinking on what constitutes high reliability and through Managing the Unexpected (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001) it has caught the attention of practitioners in the broader field of High Reliability 
Seeking Organizations (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) as well. However, based on our findings we feel 
that a reconceptualization of the five classic high reliability constructs is imperative. We refer to 
our review of literature (Chapter 2) and posit that after the phase of diverging theorizing on High 
Reliability prior to 1999 and the phase of converging theorizing post 1999, time has come for 
research to formulate a synthesis of the two schools of thought. In accordance with our research 
methodology (Chapter 3) we bridge the characteristics of the Berkeley School (and its long-
established constructs stemming from organization science) and the Michigan School (and its 
high face-valid constructs stemming from an accumulated insight into the high reliability 
domain). 
The constructs that have emerged from our research seem to be capable of bridging the two 
schools of thought. Notably, Team Orientation, Threat Flexibility and Efficiency have that 
potential because they are capable of explaining what makes teams (or organizations) highly 
reliable and because they join in with constructs and research lines from mainstream 
organization science, as described in the reconceptualization exercise (Chapter 4). 
Complemented with constructs from the Michigan School, namely Preoccupation with Failure, 
Sensitivity to Operations and Deference to Expertise, this provides an interesting way of studying 
reliability. In both cases the presupposed construct of Commitment to Resilience and Reluctance 
to Simplify are not distinguished by a factor analysis. We feel this is not surprising because of the 
lack of univocality of these constructs. Reluctance to Simplify stands midway between Sensitivity 
to Operations and Preoccupation with Failure (Figure 7.1). With the former the construct shares 
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and its focus on even the smallest error as a sign that something could be wrong with the 
system. With the latter it shares its focus on keeping an overview of the ‘Swiss Cheese’ (Reason, 
1997). At the bottom end of the HRO construct spectrum, Commitment to Resilience stands 
midway between Sensitivity to Operations and Deference to Expertise. With the former the 
constructs shares its willingness to look and operate beyond the boundaries of one’s own job 
description and management commitment to free up resources whenever necessary in order to 
cope with the unexpected. For the latter it paves the way for decision-making authority to be 
shifted down to the lowest possible levels. The mutual exclusiveness therefore cannot be 
guaranteed70. 
Hence, our conclusion that the Michigan school constructs are valuable but that their mutual 
exclusiveness does not hold. These constructs have proven to be advantageous for the prima 
facie development of HRT as a discipline, but can be considered detrimental in view of reaching 
maturity. 
Proposition 1-2 
Proposition 1-2: The non-archetypical HRO (the Bank) exhibits the same HRO 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but to a lesser extent. 
Recall from Chapter 5 that this implies the following hypotheses. 
H1-2a: The average HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2b: The average Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2c: The average Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2d: The average Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2e: The average Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-2f: The average Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
 
H1-2a: The average HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated. The standard deviation in the NPP is considerably higher though 
than in the Bank. This observation is in line with what is suggested by theory, namely that an 
archetype like the NPP is more reliable than the Bank as a HRSO. However, the difference is 
relatively small. This leads us to comment on this finding in the event of a generalization. Based 
on this relatively small difference between the two organization types, and based on our action 
research, we feel that the HRO character of a HRSO is manifest. Notably from the interviews, we 
recall that the HRO propensity of the Bank was even more obvious than the HRO-likeness of the 
NPP. One explanation could be that we suffered from a researcher bias, instigated by the 
surprise of finding clear indications of genuine HRO traits. Another explanation could be that the 
items used in the survey were unalloyed HRO characteristics, stemming from a HRO jargon. This 
set of principles and jargon is more familiar to NPP staff than it is the incident handlers at the 
Bank. The HRO likeness of the Bank is much more difficult to seize in the known HRO jargon. 
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Apart from being less focused on safety, it is much more novel and revealing. Also in the Bank, 
“although the human mortality rate is low, the risk of small failures amplifying into 
organizational mortality is high” (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a, p. 877).  
H1-2b: The average Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated. This could be explained by the structural effect revisions have on 
teams. Revisions are the yearly scheduled periods where a reactor is completely dismantled for 
maintenance purposes (For an elaboration see the NPP Case Description section in Chapter 3). 
The rhythm of the revisions is a pace that is felt throughout the plant’s organization (Smals, 
2006, p. 36). Apart from the stress during revisions and the relative periods of calm between 
them and the implications they have for the employees, this tidal system also has a very direct 
effect on team cohesion, interrelation and interaction. During revisions, maintenance teams 
work long hours and have crammed schedules for the entire length of the revision, which can 
last up to about six weeks. In these periods, workers are continuously in very close contact with 
each other, especially within individual teams. This strengthens the bonds between team 
members and builds very strong social structures. As one executive noted during an interview: 
“*…+ these men go through war four times a year”. This comparison may seem a bit exaggerated, 
but indeed, the loyalty that team members have for each other and the strong cohesion within 
teams may not be very different in nature from the social structures found in army battalions 
(Smals, 2006, p. 36). This observation was felt to a lesser extent only during our field 
observations in the Bank. The absence of activities that are comparable to the NPP’s revisions 
can be seen as an explanation. The moments of tight-coupling are much rarer in the Bank 
context than in a NPP setting (Perrow, 1999). 
H1-2c: The average Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis could not be validated, but the difference is only marginal. This is surprising in 
one way, because we had an a priori belief that a NPP, as an HRO archetype, would show a 
higher score on this exponent of resilience. The development of knowledge and skills to cope 
with and respond to errors, capability for swift feedback and swift learning, speed and accuracy 
in communications, flexible role structures, quick size-ups, experiential variety, skills at re-
combining existing response repertoires, and comfort with improvisation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001, p. 67-68), are in line with the elasticity (van Fenema, 2005) associated with Threat 
Flexibility. Since Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) suggest that resilience emerges from Threat 
Flexibility, and that resilience is omnipresent in a NPP, Threat Flexibility should be clearly 
observable as well. On the other hand, this observation may not come as a surprise. We point 
out three reasons: First, a NPP is also an archetype of an organization that is driven by procedure 
and where deviation from procedure is considered a capital error. This characteristic overrides 
Threat Flexibility traits because it leaves no room for degrees of freedom. Second, Threat 
Flexibility presupposes that information and resources are plenty available and that control is 
not tightened in up-tempo times. The NPP we have studied does the opposite. Thirdly and 
finally, it can be argued that a NPP is not a genuine HRO archetype but a URO (Chapter 4). Like 
the plants senior manager and several other interviewees repeatedly said to us: ‘in case of 
doubt, there is no doubt’, meaning that they adopt an ultraconservative position towards the 
plant’s safety. The position that NPPs are not HROs is a bit provoking maybe, but we feel 
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Amalberti et al. (2005) are right when they put NPPs outside of the set of HROs and position 
them under the set of ultra-safe organizations. Drawing on Amalberti and colleagues (2005) and 
their research in the context of safety in health care as a starting point, we label this 
organization typology a URO, an Ultra Reliable Organization. Keeping in mind what we have said 
on the relation between safety and reliability (Chapter 1), we can translate this framework into a 
new framework that changes the angle of safety for the angle of reliability. The result is the 
characterization of a new type of reliable organization, which we label ‘Ultra Reliable 
Organization’, or under its acronym URO. 
The arguments for the discrimination between HRO and URO are important and are 
concentrated around the premise of safety first, with the quality of work preserved against 
unacceptable pressure (URO) instead of production first, with the degree of safety as high as 
possible for the imposed level of reliability (HRO). Regarding the stability of the process, a URO is 
determined by a well-codified and delineated area of expertise and ultra-dominant, rule-based 
behavior. A HRO on the other hand, is determined by a broad area of expertise and frequent 
knowledge-based behavior. The process reliability, in terms of risk per exposure, is better than 1 
x 10-5, possibly 1 x 10-6 for the URO and better than 1 x 10-4 for an HRO (Amalberti et al., 2005, p. 
762). 
In our view, however, the above categorization does not mean that High Reliability 
Organizations are inferior to Ultra Reliable Organizations. In fact, we argue the opposite: HROs 
are better than UROs. The context in which HROs have to perform is much more tiring than is 
the case of the UROs. But then again, also being Ultra Reliable is not an achievement either. It is 
only that the measures that have to be taken to guarantee this level of reliability are different as 
regards scope, intensity and level of application.  
H1-2d: The average Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated. Before the installment of a culture of collective mindfulness, the 
odds are that staff and management will deny the possibility of an unexpected event with 
disastrous consequences, or at least they will rationalize away the potential consequences 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 92). As people implicitly become more conscious about the ways in 
which the system can be disrupted, what might go wrong, and who these disruptions are likely 
to harm, mindfulness increases (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 92). Because of this increase in 
mindfulness, organization members now will explicitly accept that the unexpected can happen, 
or even that it will happen. In addition, such explicitism will reinforce consciousness 
considerably. From the qualitative part of our research (Chapter 3), we have learned that such 
an attitude was more manifest in the NPP than in the Bank. The NPP expects bad things to 
happen, whereas the Bank expects a normal course of events. The system dynamics effect just 
described therefore is reinforced in the NPP, more than it does in the Bank, and the result is a 
strong awareness that they are dealing with something out of the ordinary. In several interviews 
with NPP staff, we heard the same saying repeatedly: ‘We are not a cookie factory’.  
The NPP has several mechanisms in place to safeguard this Preoccupation with Failure. One of 
them being the extensive training sessions on the simulator for teams from the operations 
department or improvised incident handling for teams from the maintenance department. From 
a social-constructionist perspective on learning (Kolb, 1976), it is not necessarily the empiric 
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experience that triggers the learning, but somewhere in the process it is activated (Figure 7.2). A 
specific experience is needed for learning. The remarkable thing in HROs is that there is not 
necessarily such an experience and that – still – learning does take place. The organization 
(members) learn(s) from the non-event and give(s) it the status of an event. At best, it are small 
incidents or near misses, at worst, it are merely hypothetical ones, like in a simulation exercise.71 
HRO staff have developed multiple learning styles, hence their capacity to start learning at 
nearly every phase of the learning cycle depicted in Figure 7.2. Anyway, it will be clear that this is 
not an automatism and that a long-term continuing of such an effort should not be taken for 
granted. Paradoxically, in this respect an HRO’s success becomes its major enemy (Miller, 1993). 
 
Figure 7.2 - Learning Cycle (Kolb 1976) 
 
H1-2e: The average Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated. Staff at the NPP, more than at the Bank, were constantly wondering 
when, where, what and why something was happening. They constantly were developing and 
adjusting their ‘big picture’. The system of ex-ante incident reporting is far more developed than 
at the Bank, so that this well-developed situational awareness manages to deal with errors when 
they are still tractable and can still be isolated. When confronted with the Swiss Cheese model 
(Reason, 1997) interviewees recognized and appreciated this framework more than their Bank 
counterparts. The activity of constantly trying to find out where the holes are located in the 
cheese is more manifest in the NPP than in the Bank. Quoting Weick et al. (1999, p. 92-93): “One 
byproduct of this increased attentiveness to all failures is that in contrast to their inconsequential 
role in traditional organizations, maintenance departments in HROs become central locations for 
organizational learning *…+. Maintenance people come into contact with the largest number of 
failures, at earlier stages of development, and have an ongoing sense of vulnerabilities in the 
technology, sloppiness in the operations, gaps in the procedures, and sequences by which one 
error triggers another. These observations enlarge the database for learning and are given 
detailed attention”. This is what gives the NPP predictability and efficiency, but this also what 
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H1-2f: The average Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated. Deference to Expertise is reported as a NPP hallmark (Bourrier, 
1996). The flexibility and adaptability of a NPP assures that any problem can rapidly receive the 
attention it requires at all levels of the organization (Bourrier, 1996, p. 109). What we have 
learned in the field from our (in-real time and in person) witnessing a quite serious incident, is 
that errors are inevitable. The main characteristic of HROs is not that they are error-free, but 
that errors do not disable them (Bellamy et al., 2005;Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Deference to 
Expertise is an alternative formulation of the capacity of behavioral discretion, which is one of 
the causes of coupling (Orton & Weick, 1990). Behavioral discretion relates to the capacity for 
autonomous action (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 210). This behavioral discretion is not observable 
during the NPP’s normal operation, but becomes manifest during up-tempo events like the 
incident we have witnessed. 
What people in HROs have mastered is the ability to alter typical hierarchical patterns of 
deference when the tempo of operations changes and unexpected problems arise. Decisions are 
then made on the front line by people who have the most expertise, regardless of their rank. In 
these situations, expertise and experience are usually more important than rank, so the decision 
structure in HROs is a hybrid of hierarchy and specialization. Decision-making authority 
therefore is shifted down to the lowest possible levels and clear lines of responsibility need to be 
called into existence (Ericksen & Dyer, 2005, p. 29). This way, the shift to anarchy is a controlled 
one, and comes from a collective, cultural belief that the necessary capabilities lie somewhere in 
the system and that migrating problems will find them (Muhren et al., 2007). The system is 
designed “to oscillate effectively between various preplanned solutions to the more predictable 
aspects of a disaster circumstance and improvised approaches for the unforeseen and novel 
complications that often arise in such situations” (Bigley & Roberts, 2001, p. 1282).  
Proposition 1-3 
Proposition 1-3: The higher the requisite variety of a team, the higher its HRO propensity 
H1-3a: Teams using richer media exhibit a higher HRO propensity. 
In the Bank Case, no proof found for validation/falsification of this hypothesis neither at the one-
dimensional level, nor for the urgent, or for the non-urgent incidents. In the NPP Case, this 
hypothesis can be validated for non-urgent incidents only. Teams that show a diverse use of 
telephone in the handling of incidents (in general) achieve a higher reliability than teams that 
have the same tendency (regardless of the kind of inclination, positive or negative) towards the 
reliance on telephone. This finding challenges the hypothesis put forward by research on media 
richness (Daft & Lengel, 1986;Dennis, Fuller, & Valacich, 2008) and is in line with our findings 
from a case study in ongoing crisis situations (Muhren et al., 2009) that adds more nuance to the 
debate. H1-3a: Teams using richer media exhibit a higher HRO propensity. For instance, teams 
that rely more on face-to-face communication exhibit a higher HRO propensity. Drilling down to 
the level of the HRT sub-constructs, we see that especially Deference to Expertise and Sensitivity 
to Operations are accountable for this observation. Richer media offer more occasions for 
discovering subtle clues that might lead to a solution for the incident. 
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Waterman (1990) reports on team composition as an area often overlooked. He argues that 
membership of teams is crucial in their success: when membership is too homogeneous, 
reliability usually suffers. Studies in which very bright experts comprise a team, have been 
shown to underperform due to competition, abstractness, and individual rather than Team 
Orientation by members. Some of the considerations offered by Waterman are (1) to make sure 
styles are diverse and complementary. Diverse styles ensure that all perspectives on a problem 
are covered and different skills are brought to bear at stages of problem solving. However, 
greater diversity requires more time to be spent on acquaintance, team building, and conflict 
resolution; (2) that members should have relevant and diverse skills; (3) to get experienced team 
players or develop them.72 
H1-3b: More experienced teams exhibit a higher HRO propensity. 
For the Bank Case, this hypothesis cannot be validated for the HRT construct as a whole but, 
data show allow for conclusions at an acceptable level of significance for four constructs: 
Preoccupation with Failure and Deference to Expertise and for Threat Flexibility and Logics of 
Action. Regarding Preoccupation with Failure, it can be derived that more experienced teams are 
showing a higher score in this construct than less experienced ones. This might be because these 
teams have experienced more things going wrong than teams with less experience in the field. 
On the other hand, less experienced teams show a higher degree of Deference to Expertise than 
more experienced ones. This observation that less experienced teams exhibit a higher score on 
Deference to Expertise constructs, could be explained by a drive among younger staff members 
and a higher intrinsic motivation to achieve and to conform to the image of the ideal employee. 
It can be presupposed that the need to be self-efficacious is greater among less experienced, 
and on balance younger, staff. The same goes for the construct Logics of Action. Recalling the 
underlying items, more particularly regarding the perception of being sufficiently trained and 
experienced (survey item 22.4) and having a sufficient degree of freedom for doing the job 
(survey item 22.2), we can argue that that same drive accounts for this observation. A plausible 
explanation for the fact that less experienced teams exhibit a high score on the construct of 
Logic of action regarding the third construct item, namely the number of informal contacts 
within the organization to solve problems (13.6) could be that teams with little experience value 
an informal network more than people with more experience. Together with the gaining of 
experience, the need for developing an informal network decreases. The effect thereof is faded 
by the two other items. These findings seem to indicate that being HRO-like is a lifetime 
achievement and that there must be moderating variables that come into play. 
For the NPP Case, this hypothesis cannot be validated at an acceptable level of significance. This 
suggests that experience has no statistically significant impact on HRO propensity. This can be 
explained through a homogenizing effect of working at a NPP, which is driven by this one 
common interest of ‘safety first’ (Smals, 2006). Not a single occasion to emphasize the necessity 
for sufficient attention to the safety aspects of one’s work is missed. In situations where a choice 
must be made between giving priority to production or avoiding any unnecessary risks, safety 
aspects always put more weight in the scale (Schulman, 1993a;1993b;La Porte & Consolini, 
1991;Creed et al., 1993). Decisions on lower hierarchical levels that place safety above efficiency 
of operations are never disputed by higher management or peers of the decision maker. Indeed, 
the demand to work in the securest possible way is perhaps one of the most apparent aspects of 
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the plant’s organizational culture and it permeates through the entire organization. When 
planning jobs that involve exposure of personnel to radiation, a principle is applied that urges 
planners to keep doses as low as possible: ALARA, which stands for As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable (Prasad, Cole, & Haase, 2004), a principle that is well-known in every industry where 
people come into (indirect) contact with radioactive substances (Smals, 2006, p. 35).  
Proposition 1-4 
Proposition 1-4: The higher the requisite variety of a team, the higher its SenseMaking 
propensity 
H1-4a: Teams using richer media exhibit a higher SenseMaking propensity. 
In the Bank Case, this hypothesis cannot be validated overall. Yet it is validated for the SeMa 
sub-construct Self. A similar observation can be made in the NPP Case where although the 
hypothesis cannot be validated at an acceptable level of significance, drilling down to the level of 
the SeMa sub-construct Other is validating the hypothesis. The different observation in the Bank 
and in the NPP is interesting. First, the correlation between Self and media richness in the Bank 
Case is revelatory because it suggests the importance of the way people construct identity for 
the design and use of communication systems. From the perspective of SenseMaking, who we 
think we are (identity) as organizational actors lies primarily in the hands of others: “How can I 
know who we are becoming until I see what they say and do with our actions?” (Weick et al., 
2005, p. 416). Notably the degree of emotional involvement with the job and the sense of honor 
in doing the job right is an important factor with respect to media richness. People create their 
reality by making decisions based on what they observe and who they are. Teams that have a 
higher propensity to Identity Constructing do rely more on rich media for their communication. 
Second, the correlation between Other and media richness in the NPP Case is quite startling as 
well because it suggests the importance of the way people work together towards a common 
goal. Other people are integral to our efforts to make sense of things because what we say, 
think, or do is contingent on what others say, think, and do. People learn about events when 
they compare what they see with what someone else sees and then negotiate some mutually 
acceptable version of what really happened (Weick, 1985). Our data show that staff at the NPP 
has a preference towards using rich media for this aspect of SenseMaking. The interpretation we 
give to this finding is that it is a consequence of the NPP’s strong score on Team Orientation. 
They are two sides of the same coin.  
These findings have implications for the way communication systems are designed and 
implemented at the Bank and the NPP. The question arises in which way this correlation induces 
causality. If there is causality, is it that the SeMa propensity influences the media preference, or 
is it that the preference for a certain type of media leads to a certain degree of SeMa 
propensity? The design of this study does not permit us to pronounce upon this question. 
However, we can refer to a field survey we have conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Muhren et al., 2009), studying the relevance of SenseMaking for communication. Analyzing 
communication and SenseMaking data obtained from in-depth interviews shows that 
humanitarian actors in the DRC engage in eight different SenseMaking communication activities: 
noticing, updating, inquiring, triangulating, verifying, reflecting, enacting, and interpreting. 
Throughout our analysis, we have studied SenseMaking at the level where the goal of 
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communication is to reach individual understanding rather than shared understanding. We have 
also observed that the communication process does not start with the sending of a message, but 
incorporates making sense of the situation. Studying communication processes from a 
SenseMaking angle therefore provides a more holistic view of the communication process. Our 
findings also show that social interaction and enactment are vital for actors in the DRC to reach 
individual understanding, and that low synchronicity media will not provide for the best support 
in achieving this. Instead, actors will rather need high synchronicity media for these conveyance 
processes. Because of the continuous needs of building a SenseMaking communication 
infrastructure, designers of Information and Communication Systems (ICS) should allow users to 
connect. In contrast to how most of the ICS are designed and developed, they should not solely 
focus on institutional information and communication exchanges, but support exchanges in 
these mostly informal, personal based networks. The scanning media example of social 
networking software will for instance enable humanitarian actors to create and maintain their 
important network of contacts.  
H1-4b: More experienced teams exhibit a higher SeMa propensity. 
In the Bank Case, we found no proof for this assertion for the SeMa root construct, but when 
drilling down to the level of the sub-constructs a falsification for the hypothesis could be 
provided. Teams with a lower score on Scheme, are more experienced on average than teams 
exhibiting a higher score on Scheme. We recall from the reconceptualization chapter (Chapter 
4), that a Scheme is a mental structure people rely on to organize information they come across, 
based on previous experiences and suitable for present and future SenseMaking (Ericson, 2001, 
p. 117;Graesser et al., 1979). The construct refers to the Retrospective, Enacting, Cue Extracting 
and Plausibility SenseMaking property. It represents one’s understanding of the world by filling 
in white spots where information is missing (Gioia & Poole, 1984). The collection of cognitive 
schemes of people in a team or an organization is what is called its ‘cognitive profile’ (Ericson, 
2001, p. 118). Several scheme-building methods are available. We categorize them as (1) 
decision making and (2) SenseMaking. The falsification of the hypothesis is remarkable and calls 
for further theorizing. It suggests that the more experienced a team is, the less it relies on what 
is plausible, but that they are more driven by accuracy and ratio. Prima facie, we have found this 
conclusion hard to explain, because we assumed that the higher the level of experience, the 
smaller the importance of ratio and accuracy, the smaller the reliance on DecisionMaking, the 
more intuitive work would become. However, more experienced teams have gained a much 
higher degree of confidence in their work that they rely on a sound set of heuristics, scenarios 
and short-cuts that have proved their value in the past. It can be assumed that such a set is 
gradually developed at a lower level of maturity – basically through SenseMaking – but that after 
its emergence this set has started to live a life on its own as on-the-shelf solutions for the 
majority of situations. The fact that less experienced teams exhibit more orientation towards 
SeMa is in line with this induction. Because of their lack of experience, they are confronted more 
with gappiness (Dervin, 1999) and need to make sense of situations. From the moment ‘sense is 
made’, maturity is gained but time will have gone by so that their experience (expressed and 
measured as the number of years of experience in the job) will have increased as well. At the 
same time gaps are filled and replaced with (for instance) rules of thumb that have an aura of 
ratio and accuracy.  
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In the NPP Case, this hypothesis can be falsified. Teams with a lower level of experience perform 
better in the handling of urgent incidents. The fact that lower experience can lead to a higher 
level of reliability for urgent incidents possibly could be explained by a mental or physical 
fatigue. As an explanation, we refer to the notion of Hypervigilance (Janis, 1982a), addressed 
earlier in this discussion. This calls for urgent special action on the side of the NPP’s 
management. 
The above theorizing is done ceteris paribus, under stable conditions. However, when 
circumstances would change, the SenseMaking function would not necessarily be decreasing 
linearly. For instance, if the situation changes dramatically with ‘the unexpected’ happening, 
with ambiguity regarding cause and effect, a new phase of ambiguity (gappiness) would emerge. 
This increase in complexity would lead to a rather sudden increase of the SenseMaking 
propensity (and function) to the detriment of the DecisionMaking propensity. This is shown in 
Figure 7.3, with the explosion icons representing an unexpected event with a possible severe 
impact. 
This sheds some light on the SenseMaking mechanism and makes the construct more nuanced. 
It would mean that SenseMaking propensity is not a static property, but evolves over time.  
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Proposition 1-5 
Proposition 1-5: The non-archetypical HRO (the Bank) exhibits the same HRO 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but with a lower 
variance. 
Taking the standard deviation as a measure of this variance (spread), we come to the validation 
of the following hypotheses: 
H1-5a: The variance in HRO propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5b: The variance in Team Orientation at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5c: The variance in Threat Flexibility at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5d: The variance in Preoccupation with Failure at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-5e: The variance in Sensitivity to Operations at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
These hypotheses are validated. Burke et al. (2005) notice that it is very unlikely that everyone in 
the HRO sees the big picture, because of the system’s complexity. In line with what is suggested 
by NAT on the interactive complexity of the nuclear energy sector, this explains why the spread 
in Sensitivity to Operations in a NPP is higher than in a Bank. 
 
H1-5f: The variance in Deference to Expertise at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated. The higher variance for the NPP teams is not in line with what we 
would have expected at the start of our research, were literature review – at least implicitly – 
seemed to suggest that a homogenous HRO propensity was a characteristic of the archetypical 
HRO. However, from our field observations, interviews and system dynamics modeling exercises 
(See Chapter 3), we came to challenge this belief and questioned the HRO homogeneity of the 
NPP. The variance in HRO propensity can be seen as following the principle of requisite variety. 
As we have described in the Introduction chapter, organizations tend to simplify the complexity 
of their environment to the extreme and therefore seem to be caught in seeing homogeneity as 
a magic formula for success and consider team homogeneity as a management ideal. In order to 
cope with complexity, some requisite variety is necessary. Therefore, more divergence in an 
organization’s HRO propensity, paradoxically enough, is stronger an indication of HRO 
propensity than less divergence. This is where HRO propensity and SenseMaking propensity 
meet. Indeed, also the need for SenseMaking is the consequence of the drift to simplify to the 
extreme. This simplification concerns both the way reality is observed and the way an 
organization tends to homogenize its constituent parts, including its people. 
 
  




Proposition 1-6: The non-archetypical HRO (the Bank) exhibits the same SeMa 
characteristics as the archetypical HRO (the NPP) but with a lower 
variance. 
H1-6a: The variance in SenseMaking propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-6b: The variance in Self-propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-6c: The variance in Other propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
H1-6d: The variance in Scheme propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
 
H1- 6a: The variance in SenseMaking propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
The hypothesis regarding the aggregated (root) SeMa construct is falsified. However, two out of 
three of its underlying sub-constructs can be validated.  
H1-6b: The variance in Self propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is falsified. 
H1-6c: The variance in Other propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated. 
H1-6d: The variance in Scheme propensity at the Bank is lower than at the NPP 
This hypothesis is validated. 
The idea behind the proposition is that a low variance, i.e. a high degree of homogeneity is 
counter-indicative for high reliability, as well for the HRO propensity as for the SeMa propensity. 
In general, the findings for H1-1-6c and H1-1-6d therefore are in line with this supposition. The 
falsification regarding the Self construct (H1-1-6b) is also responsible for the falsification of the 
SeMa root construct (H1-1-6a). It can be explained as a NPP idiosyncrasy of taking an extreme 
pride in one’s job. For instance, the imposing technical plant facility, the direct link between the 
job and the education and training received, the macho culture (almost a 100% male working 
environment), the intensive training sessions or the employee of the month contest, are 
plausible explanations. 
Proposition 1-7 
Proposition 1-7: The constructs of Mindfulness and Resilience interrelate 
H1-7a: The higher a team’s Preoccupation with Failure, the lower its Deference to Expertise. 
We have not been able to validate this hypothesis in the Bank Case, whereas in the NPP Case it is 
falsified. This finding is in line with what is – at least implicitly – suggested by HRO scholars, 
namely that it is possible to be resilient and mindful at the same time. It is in line with the ex 
posteriori interpretation of the qualitative part of the research, where nor the outcomes of the 
232 Two Cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
 
interviews, nor the outcomes of the GSS workshops indicated that such combination would be 
impossible. 
H1-7b: Mindfulness is a prerequisite for Resilience. 
We have been able to validate this hypothesis for the Bank Case as teams with a low degree of 
Deference to Expertise exhibit a low score on Sensitivity to Operations. It has been impossible to 
validate the hypothesis for the NPP Case at an acceptable level of significance. 
This indicates that it is possible to be simultaneously mindful and resilient. Interesting is the 
difference in observation between the constructs ‘Sensitivity to Operations’ – which is as we 
have shown in Figure 7.1 and as developed earlier in this discussion chapter an exponent of 
Resilience – and ‘Preoccupation with Failure’, as an exponent of Mindfulness. The notions of 
Mindfulness and Resilience introduce a paradox: Mindfulness is the enemy of resilience. An 
organization that tries to be mindful has a better chance of being stable in the long short 
because it avoids intrusions on its processes. The organization is not endangered and can 
continue to operate as it is used to; business as usual. An organization that tries to be resilient, 
on the other hand, has a better chance of being stable in the end because it has learnt how to 
deal with intrusions in its processes. We refer to the result of the interview with a head of a 
mainframe department in the Bank who pointed out the danger in becoming very successful in 
operating their mainframe infrastructure. The same story could be heard while interviewing 
personnel from the NPP who argued that younger staff did not have the experience the older 
staff has on dealing with the teething troubles of nuclear installations: “The machinery is running 
smoothly, too smoothly”. 
The relationship between Mindfulness and Resilience (Figure 7.1) is not univocal. It is fuzzy, but 
hence also more interesting and useful. Both constructs are like Siamese Twins: They cannot live 
with each other, but neither can they live without each other. Like in all cases where paradox 
arises, it is good to realize that paradox is essential in keeping “the organization on its toes, in a 
state of continuous awareness of its own contradictions”.  
Proposition 1-8 
Proposition 1-8: The NPP is more reliable than the Bank 
H1-8: The NPP is more reliable than the Bank 
Based on the criterion of range (minimum vs. maximum value) for inter-case comparison of 
process reliability, we have found that the Bank is more reliable than the NPP regarding the 
overall handling of incidents, more reliable than the NPP with respect to the urgent incidents 
and less reliable than the NPP in the handling of non-urgent incidents. 
The Bank’s higher reliability is a remarkable observation. A priori, we would not have expected 
that a garden variety HRO would exhibit higher reliability, than an archetypical HRO like a NPP. 
We believe this situation can be explained in three ways. The first two reasons are technical, the 
last reason provides a more fundamental explanation.  
First, the technique we have used is far from perfect because it uses range as a measure. Even 
though we have smoothed the extreme effect of range by calculating the average range, it still is 
not ideal as a measure for reliability. Second, the definition of what is urgent and non-urgent is 
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quite different between our two cases. Time-horizons are much longer in the NPP compared to 
the Bank, whereas the level of complexity in the NPP is much greater than in the Bank (number 
of actors involved, safety issues, external regulations, etc.). This might explain in part this 
unexpected observation. Third, the observation that the Bank is more reliable (than the NPP) for 
the urgent incidents, does not come as a complete surprise. The Bank pays particular attention 
to the timely handling of urgent incidents. In order to meet deadlines, it has in place numerous 
procedures, roles, communication lines. Amongst others: (1) the morning briefings where all 
urgent incident of the past 24 hours are discussed; (2) the Service Delivery Owner who as a 
boundary spanner takes ownership of the incident and whose job it is to resolve the incident in 
the quickest possible time-frame; (3) publication of the incident status on the company intranet, 
creating a considerable visibility throughout the organization; (4) intense senior management 
commitment and personal follow-up to name just these. We refer to the case descriptions 
(Chapter 3, Section 2) for an elaboration of these measures. From interviews can be learned that 
the NPP, at the time we were studying it, had pointed out that the timely handling of its urgent 
(i.e. non-planable) Maintenance & Repair work was a major concern, whereas this was not 
reported upon as a problem with respect to the non-urgent work. 
2 Measuring Reliability [RQ2] 
In this Section, we discuss how organizational characteristics influence reliability. We do so for 
each proposition separately. 
Proposition 2-1 
Proposition 2-1 : The higher the HRO propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-1a: Teams exhibiting a higher propensity towards Team Orientation yield better reliability in 
the handling of urgent incidents, whereas this is counterproductive for the handling of non-
urgent incidents. 
H2-1b: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation and exhibiting a high 
degree of Sensitivity to Operations yield a higher reliability than teams than the same teams 
exhibiting a low degree of Sensitivity to Operations. 
H2-1c: The higher the average Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability. 
H2-1d: Teams that operate in a less restrictive (more supportive) organizational climate perform 
better than teams that do not (Smith-Crowe, Burke, & Landis 2003). 
H2-1e: Teams that operate in a less efficiency-driven (more slack) organizational climate 
perform better than teams that do not. 
 
H2-1a: Teams exhibiting a higher propensity towards Team Orientation yield higher reliability in 
the handling of urgent incidents, whereas this is counterproductive for the handling of 
non-urgent incidents. 
Neither for the Bank nor for the NPP Case, evidence can be been found for this hypothesis. Such 
could indicate that there is no one-dimensional effect of Team Orientation on reliability 
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(positively nor negatively inclined). Other effects might play a role, as is shown by the two-way 
ANOVA that do lead to significant observations. In view of the all-in-all small number of units of 
analysis (n=37) this observation is remarkable, because if one were to expect significance it 
definitely would be for the one-way ANOVA and not for the two-way ANOVA. This is a strong 
indication for the thesis that based on existing literature there is no univocal formula for HRO 
success, but that contingency theory applies. 
H2-1b: Teams with a high propensity towards Team Orientation and exhibiting a high degree of 
Sensitivity to Operations yield a higher reliability than the same teams exhibiting a low 
degree of Sensitivity to Operations. 
Neither for the Bank nor for the Bank Case, have we found evidence for this hypothesis at an 
acceptable level of significance. 
2-1c: The higher the average Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability. 
In the Bank Case we have falsified this hypothesis. For urgent incidents, a low average score on 
Threat Flexibility results in the highest reliability. At the NPP, the highest reliability is achieved by 
teams with a high score on Threat Flexibility in combination with a high score on SeMa and HRT 
constructs, regardless of the incident type. Remarkable in this respect is the observation that a 
low degree of Threat Flexibility in combination with a low score on SenseMaking and HRT 
constructs yields a high reliability as well. Combinations of a high degree on the constructs under 
study yield the highest reliability when they are directly proportional. Therefore, the conclusion 
should be that two strategies are worth considering: (1) high Threat Flexibility in combination 
with a high degree of SenseMaking propensity and with a high degree of HRO propensity. 
H2-1d: Teams that operate in a less restrictive (more supportive) organizational climate perform 
better than teams that do not. 
The construct covering the degree of supportiveness is Threat Flexibility.  
For the Bank Case, we have found evidence for the falsification of this hypothesis, namely that 
where the handling of urgent incidents (threat) is concerned, a more restrictive (less supportive) 
degree of Threat Flexibility is positively influencing reliability, regardless of any mediating 
variable. We notice however that the spread between the highest and lowest expected average 
reliability is a little lower than the average spread. At this one-way ANOVA level, we have found 
no sufficient significance for the non-urgent incidents. For the NPP Case, we have found no 
significant proof for this hypothesis. Nor for the urgent incidents, nor for the non-urgent 
incidents, the degree of restrictiveness/supportiveness of Threat Flexibility is positively 
influencing reliability, regardless of any mediating variable. 
This may indicate that Threat Rigidity is not necessarily a bad strategy after all, meaning that 
restriction of information, tightening of control, squeezing on the resources favors reliability in 
case of critical circumstances. This is challenging work by Sandelands et al (1981) and 
complements the Vogus and Welbourne (2003a) study on Threat Flexibility. A rationale behind 
this observation could be that the urgency of the incidents does not correspond to the 
characteristics of a threat: uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, etc., and therefore, the 
mechanisms behind threat rigidity/Threat Flexibility would not apply. When the incident 
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represents a situation that is known or knowable, then heuristics, algorithms and procedures will 
provide a valuable assistance in resolving them. In most urgent incidents this is the case. A 
restricted leadership style suits such situations better than one that is oriented towards Threat 
Flexibility. This puts the Threat Flexibility theme in a new light by making the necessary 
differentiations. 
Especially in the archetypical context of an NPP where processes are procedure driven par 
excellence the Threat Flexibility construct is particularly interesting. During our interviews and 
observations, we were confronted at several occasions with the ambiguous attitude towards the 
degree of restrictiveness/supportiveness of Threat Flexibility. On the one hand, it could be heard 
that sticking to procedures is the conditio sine qua non, especially in situations under stress. On 
the other hand, it became obvious that the difference in Threat Flexibility in terms of 
restrictiveness/supportiveness has the potential of explaining organizational reliability as well. 
Supposedly, this ambiguous and equivocal position of the Threat Flexibility constructs explains 
why it shows no significant one-dimensional effect on organizational reliability. This suggests 
that a two-dimensional effect bears more promises for explaining the dependent variable. 
Our findings are in line with Carley and Zhiang’s (1995) findings that no coordination scheme – 
hierarchy or team, or put differently threat rigidity or Threat Flexibility – dominated. Their 
research outcome shows that teams outperform hierarchies when the task is unbiased but that 
hierarchies can outperform teams when the task is biased if they have the right information 
access structure and right level turnover. This strengthens our assertion that work in the NPP 
most of the time is not complex, but merely complicated (Bennet & Bennet, 2004), which is 
challenging Perrow’s (1999) assertion that a NPP as a whole is an interactively complex 
enterprise. The conclusion therefore is that different coordination schemes are optimal for 
different tasks. 
H2-1e: Teams that operate in a less efficiency-driven organizational climate perform better than 
teams that do not. 
For the Bank as well as for the NPP, we have found evidence for the falsification of this 
hypothesis, concerning the handling of urgent incidents as well as the non-urgent incidents. Both 
for the Bank and for the NPP, a higher focus on efficiency is positively influencing reliability, 
regardless of any mediating variable. We notice however that the spread between the highest 
and lowest expected average reliability is a little lower than the average spread (but 
substantially lower for the non-urgent incidents. 
This can be explained through the notion of ambidextrous organization (Tushman & O'Reilly, 
1997). A so-called ambidextrous organization can operate in multiple modes simultaneously, 
managing for short-term efficiency by emphasizing stability and control, and for long-term 
innovation by taking risks and learning by doing (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1999). They are 
ambidextrous, hosting multiple, internally inconsistent architectures, competencies and 
cultures, with built-in capabilities for efficiency, consistency and reliability on the one hand, and 
experimentation, improvisation and luck on the other. “They exhibit relatively formalized roles 
and responsibilities, centralized procedures, functional structures, efficiency-oriented cultures, 
highly engineered work processes, strong manufacturing and sales capabilities and relatively 
homogeneous, older and experienced human resources” (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1999). These 
236 Two Cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
 
efficiency-oriented units have relatively short time frames and are often relatively large and old 
with highly ingrained, taken-for-granted assumptions and knowledge systems. Their cultures 
emphasize efficiency, teamwork and continuous improvement. From our findings, it can be 
supposed that the Bank’s incident management is a process that bears all the hallmarks of one 
side of the ambidextrous organization.  
For the NPP Case, we have found no evidence for any of the HRO constructs, meaning that we 
have not been able to validate this hypothesis. This is in line with the analysis for the Bank Case 
where there was no one-dimensional effect of HRO propensity on reliability (positively nor 
negatively inclined). Other effects might play a role. In view of the all-in-all small number of units 
of analysis (n=24) this observation is remarkable, because if one were to expect significance it 
definitely would be for the one-way ANOVA and not for the two-way ANOVA. This is a strong 
indication for the thesis that based on existing literature there is no univocal formula for HRO 
success, but that contingency theory applies. One of the objectives of this research is to shed 
some light on this contingency black box. We do so by examining the balance between 
effectiveness and efficiency. We deal with this issue next. 
The triangulation between qualitative and quantitative techniques has yielded substantial 
additional insights into the nature of HROs. More particularly the insight that: 
- the dose makes the poison; 
- moderators have a tremendous impact; 
- the effect of factors over time can alter; 
- the composition of HRO constructs differs from what is suggested in literature; 
- some constructs are incompatible; 
- there is an undeniable relation between efficiency and effectiveness. 
The economic dimension is essential in our approach of High Reliability Theorizing. In that sense, 
our view contrasts sharply with dominant HRO literature (Weick et al., 1999) which seems to 
suggest that mindfulness is ‘costless’ (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003a, p. 881). However, as pointed 
out by HRO researchers like La Porte (1996), Levinthal and Rerup (2006), and Rerup (2005), 
ongoing mindfulness comes at a cost. Among these scholars, Rerup (2005) has been the most 
vigorous in making the cost and benefit structure of Mindfulness explicit. In that sense he warns 
that too much Preoccupation with Failure paints too dark a picture of the situation. Besides, in 
pursuit of a blind attempt to minimize the chance of failure, unnecessary and costly adjustments 
to routines and practices that worked in the past can be the consequence. A Reluctance to 
Simplify interpretation (e.g. the diversity of opinion and multiple perspectives) may similarly 
generate too much discussion and too little action, as well as provoking unnecessary skepticism, 
preventing the business venture/economic exploitation of good ideas. Sensitivity to Operations 
can lead to cognitive overload. Commitment to Resilience can cause a hyper-response triggered 
by almost any one clue. If all events are seen as unexpected and important, in the end, nothing 
is. Therefore, it is wise to heed as well as to ignore some events and signals. Deference to 
Expertise, finally, may also generate ‘noise,’ creating cognitive overload (Rerup, 2005, p. 462). 
Theoretically, the ideal degree of mindfulness can be determined and – if one would succeed in 
quantifying all the underlying variables and constants – one could determine it mathematically. 
This would be an exercise to be dealt with by means of quantitative system dynamics (see: 
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future research). We posit however, that regardless of a precise calculation of the optimal 
degree of mindfulness, successful HROs explicitly do take into account – if not all, then still most 
of – the constants and variable contributing to mindfulness. We refer to a workshop and 
conversation with the High Reliability Officers from British Petrolium (Colin Reid) and Shell (Ian 
Crawford) at the previous HRO conference (Stewart, 2000). 
Proposition 2-2 
Proposition 2-2 : The higher the SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-2a: The higher the variance in SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-2b: The higher the variance in Scheme, the higher the reliability. 
H2-2c: The higher the variance in Ongoing, the higher the reliability. 
 
H2-2a: The higher the variance in SeMa propensity, the higher the reliability 
In the Bank Case, we have found no significance to support this hypothesis at the one-way 
ANOVA level, but at the two-way ANOVA level, a low spread in SenseMaking propensity yields 
the highest reliability. In the NPP Case, we have found no evidence for this assumption at the 
one-way ANOVA level. At the two-way level ANOVA however, this hypothesis can be falsified. In 
general, the higher the spread in SenseMaking, the lower the incident management reliability. 
More particularly, in the case of the handling of urgent incidents, a high homogenous degree of 
SenseMaking propensity leads to the highest reliability, whereas a high but heterogeneous 
degree of SenseMaking propensity leads to the lowest reliability. Univocal SenseMaking 
propensity seems to have a clear relevance for the composition of incident response teams 
H2-2b: The higher the variance in Scheme, the higher the reliability 
At the Bank, we have found no significance to support this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA 
level, but at the two-way ANOVA level, a low spread in SenseMaking propensity yields the 
highest reliability. In the NPP, we have found no significant evidence for this hypothesis at the 
one-way ANOVA level. At the two-way ANOVA level we can falsify the hypothesis. A high 
variance in Scheme results in high reliability in combination with a low spread in the perception 
of the availability of Supplementary Resources or with a high variance in the perception of 
Pressure. 
A low variance in Scheme results in high reliability in combination with a high or low spread in 
the perception of the availability of Supplementary Resources or with a high variance in the 
perception of Pressure. 
H2-2c: The higher the variance in Ongoing, the higher the reliability 
In the Bank Case, we have found no significance to support this hypothesis at the one-way 
ANOVA level, but at the two-way ANOVA level, a low spread in Enactment yields the highest 
reliability. In the NPP Case, this hypothesis can be validated at the two-way ANOVA level where 
the combination of larger teams and a more heterogeneous enactment results in the highest 
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reliability whereas the combination of larger teams and a more homogenous enactment results 
in the lowest reliability.  
Teams with more female members that exhibit more enactment properties are highly reliable 
whereas they are less reliable when they exhibit less enactment properties. More male teams 
are relatively indifferent towards the enactment properties. 
Proposition 2-3 
Proposition 2-3 : The lower the use of dedicated IS, the higher the reliability. 
H2-3: Teams using richer media are more reliable. 
 
Proposition 2-4 
Proposition 2-4: The better the fit between HRO propensity and IS use, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-4a: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation, relying on richer media 
will yield a better reliability. 
H2-4b: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher HRO propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on dedicated IS. 
 
H2-4a: Teams exhibiting a high propensity towards Team Orientation, relying on richer media 
yield a higher reliability. 
In the NPP Case, teams with a high degree of Team Orientation and a high degree of reliance on 
face-to-face communication yield the highest reliability in the handling of urgent incidents. This 
reliability is very high. When these teams rely little on face-to-face communication their 
reliability drops considerably. The reliability of teams with a smaller degree of Team Orientation 
is independent from the degree of reliance on face-to-face communication. That the hypothesis 
can be validated for urgent incidents can be explained by the fact that teams with a strong Team 
Orientation discuss situations on a frequent level. One might suppose that there is a mutual 
influence between both constructs. It can be assumed that teams with less orientation on the 
team have team members that may be close to each other, thus favoring face-to-face 
communication. 
H2-4b: Teams relying little on the dedicated IS and exhibiting a higher HRO propensity perform 
better than when they rely more on the dedicated IS. 
In the Bank Case, higher immediate incident registration in combination with a high 
homogeneity in HRO propensity results in the lowest reliability in the handling of urgent 
incidents. Lower immediate registration, in combination with a high homogeneity in HRO 
propensity, results in the highest reliability, more particularly regarding the homogeneity of the 
Deference to Expertise and Preoccupation with Failure constructs. Remarkable is that in case of 
non-urgent incidents, the same observation can be made regarding the Preoccupation with 
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Failure, but that at the same time also a high reliability is obtained for the combination of a high 
degree of variance with a high degree of immediate registration. 
Also in the Bank, for urgent as well as non-urgent incidents, teams with a high homogeneity in 
incident management focus and a low reliance on the dedicated system for their communication 
yield the best reliability whereas they yield the worst reliability when they do rely more. For 
non-urgent incidents, a low proportion of time devoted to the handling of incidents in 
combination with a high degree of use of Peregrine yields the worst reliability, whereas in 
combination with a low reliance on Peregrine yields the best reliability.  
At the NPP, teams whose management expects they rigorously stick to procedures and that 
homogenously rely on dedicated IS in the handling of incidents score the highest reliability in the 
handling of urgent incidents. When these teams are less homogenous in the way they rely on 
dedicated IS, their reliability drops considerably. This underlines the relevance of the hypothesis 
as a guideline for the design of information systems. Teams whose management allows team 
members to deviate more from procedure and that exhibit a high variance in the way they make 
use of dedicated IS perform better. The general lesson that can be derived from this evidence is 
that user characteristics should be compatible with the procedures that apply to them. 
 
Proposition 2-5 
Proposition 2-5: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and IS use, the higher the 
reliability. 
We have seen that this proposition could not be validated in both our case studies. However, for 
the NPP Table 6.57 shows that a high spread in the SeMa propensity Scheme (DSScheme), i.e. a 
high homogeneity in combination with a high reliance on voice-based communication tools 
yields the lowest performance. This provides an indication that teams in the context of a NPP, 
that are homogeneously making sense out of a situation have no advantage in relying on rich 
media (voice-based). For them, a uniform dedicated system may be suitable since such systems 
allow for much less richness and diversity in communication channels. This does not come at a 
surprise in view of the highly standardized nature of the M&R work. 
Proposition 2-6 
Proposition 2-6: The more balanced the structural organization dimension, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-6a: Teams that work under close physical proximity perform better than teams that do not. 
H2-6b: Larger teams are more reliable than smaller teams.  
H2-6c: Teams with higher incident workload are more reliable than teams with a lower 
workload. 
H2-6d: Teams with a greater deal of their time allocated to incident management are more 
reliable than teams with smaller time allocation. 
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H2-6a: Teams that work under close physical proximity perform better than teams that do not. 
We have tested this variable by ranking the answer possibilities from little physical proximity to 
the IT headquarters, to high proximity. We have found evidence for the hypothesis on two 
levels: (1) proximity to the Bank’s IT headquarters (DM4) and (2) team dispersion (DS4). Teams 
that (on average) are more based in the Bank’s IT headquarters are performing better than 
teams that are not (DM4). In addition, a low spread in physical proximity is better for process 
reliability. 
Also at the two-way ANOVA level, the results are interesting because of the general observation 
that low spread in physical location – i.e. low team dispersion – yields the highest reliability. This 
is particularly true for the non-urgent incidents. We also notice that reliability is the lowest when 
team dispersion is high. For the urgent incidents, this effect of team dispersion is countered by 
the impact of workload. 
This finding indicates a strong influence of physical proximity on process reliability. Especially 
when seen in combination with the impact of Preoccupation with Failure the conclusions are 
important since dispersing a team from the headquarters can seriously negatively moderate the 
positive effect of HRO propensity. From the analysis of spread in physical location, we derive 
that team dispersion does not seem to be a good strategy either. In general, team dispersion 
results in low reliability. These conclusions can have important consequences for work 
organization and potentially constitute a modest addition to the large body of research on team 
effectiveness.  
H2-6b: Larger teams are more reliable than smaller teams.  
In the Bank Case, we have found no evidence for this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA level. At 
the two-way level, there is an interaction with time allocated to incident handling work. Team 
size in itself does not seem to be a valuable explanation for the Bank’s success. The other 
hypotheses under this proposition indicate that the measures that are derived from it do have a 
potential of explaining process reliability. In the NPP Case, we have found no proof for the 
validation of this hypothesis at the one-way ANOVA level. At the two-way ANOVA analysis level, 
it can be derived that in the majority of cases where team size moderates the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable, large teams yield a lower reliability than small 
teams.  
For urgent incidents, the highest reliability is obtained by small teams that perceive high 
pressure. On the other hand, small teams that perceive little pressure still yield a high reliability 
score. Large teams perceiving high pressure yield the lowest reliability and large teams 
perceiving low pressure manage are very reliable. Both Pressure and Team Size are strongly 
influencing a team’s reliability, but their combined effect often is counterproductive. The highest 
reliability is obtained when their effect is mutually compensating. This can be explained through 
Loose Coupling Theory. Small team size (tight coupling) and low pressure (loose coupling), or 
vice versa are compensating each other. Judging from the data, when compensation should not 
be possible, a low value for both parameters is advisable. This cannot be explained by means of 
Loose Coupling Theory, but it could be assumed that the sole impact of operating as a small 
team is causing this relatively high reliability.  
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Small teams relying little on face-to-face communication are the most reliable, large teams the 
least in the handling of urgent incidents. Large teams, for that matter, can consistently increase 
their reliability when they (contrary to small teams), rely on face-to-face communication for the 
handling of urgent incidents. The first observation can be explained in the same way as above, 
namely that the impact of operating as a small team is causing this high reliability. The 
combination of large teams (loosely coupled) communicating face-to-face (tightly coupled) can 
be explained by Loose Coupling Theory. 
Big teams communicating considerably through the dedicated system, yield the lowest 
reliability, whereas big teams that do not do so, see their reliability increase spectacularly. Small 
teams relying heavily on the dedicated system are the most reliable. 
Again, it is shown that the influence of being a small team is important, but remarkable is the 
positive impact communication through a dedicated system can have, even with larger teams. 
The positive result of the combination of little use of dedicated systems for the communication 
(loose coupling) and bigger teams. 
H2-6c: Teams with higher incident workload are more reliable than teams with a lower 
workload. 
In the Bank Case, this hypothesis is validated, as well concerning the workload regarding the 
handling of urgent incidents as non-urgent incidents. Results from the two-way ANOVA support 
this finding with the exception of the combination with a high heterogeneity in the use of 
Peregrine for communication where a low workload shows the highest reliability. 
In the NPP Case, we have been able to validate this hypothesis. Interestingly, the number of non-
urgent notifications per employee is explaining the high reliability in the handling of urgent 
incidents. 
This finding is remarkable at first sight, but can be explained quite easily. The fact that the 
incident pipeline is full causes a team to develop mindfulness in terms of attitude, procedures 
and mechanisms for dealing with non-urgent incidents. This mindfulness is bearing fruit for the 
handling of incidents. That data do not show an effect on the handling of non-urgent incidents 
as well does not necessarily mean there is no such effect. However, it just means that we have 
failed to reject the null hypothesis.  
H2-6d: Teams with a greater deal of their time allocated to incident management are more 
reliable than teams with smaller time allocation. 
We have found no evidence for this assertion at the one-way ANOVA level. At the two-way 
ANOVA level there is sufficient evidence that a low degree of time allocation leads to low 
reliability. 
This is in line with our field observation and team reporting that the concentration on the 
incident handling is key in explaining a team’s reliability. If a team is handling incidents as a 
sideline, with project work (e.g. software engineering) as primary activity, then the risk exist that 
a more sloppy incident handling job is done. We can think of three reasons for this. First, it can 
be considered normal since teams get no credit for handling the incidents correctly. Second, 
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they are mentally much more preoccupied and interested by working on something new, than 
on fixing something old. Third, often the incident is a result from a bug or sloppy work done by a 
predecessor so team members feel little enthusiasm to clean-up somebody else’s mess. 
Proposition 2-7 
Proposition 2-7: The better the fit between HRO propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
H2-7a: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working under close 
physical proximity. 
H2-7b: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams.  
H2-7c: A high HRO propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams with higher incident 
workload. 
These hypothesis can be validated in the Bank Case (no data available for the NPP). This 
indicates the importance of the structural dimension for explaining high reliability. For instance, 
notice from Table 6.38 that the more a team is based in the vicinity of IT headquarters, the more 
reliable it is. This can be explained by the fact that IM is at the heart of the activity over there, 
whereas this is less the case in other places of the organization. 
 
Proposition 2-8 
Proposition 2-8: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and the structural 
organization dimension use, the higher the reliability. 
H2-8a: A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of teams working under close 
physical proximity 
H2-8b:  A high SeMa propensity enhances the effect on reliability of larger teams  
We have not been able to validate these hypotheses at an acceptable level of significance. 
Regarding the strong indication provided by the previous propostion regarding HRO propensity 
and structure, this may indicate that SeMa propensity is much less affected by the structural 
dimension. Future research should determine the validity of this statement.  
Proposition 2-9 
Proposition 2-9 : The more balanced the variety, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9a:  More experienced teams are more reliable.  
H2-9b:  The higher the variance in HRO propensity, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9c:  The higher the variance in Team Orientation, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9d:  The higher the variance in Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability.  
H2-9e:  The higher the variance in Preoccupation with Failure, the higher the reliability. 
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H2-9f:  The higher the variance in Sensitivity to Operations, the higher the reliability. 
H2-9g:   The higher the variance in Deference to Expertise, the higher the reliability. 
 
H2-9b: The higher the variance in HRO propensity, the higher the reliability 
At the Bank, we have found no support for this hypothesis at a sufficient level of significance on 
the one-way analysis level. On the two-way ANOVA level, we notice that the highest reliability is 
achieved for low spread in HRO propensity in combination with highly experienced teams, high 
use of e-mail. The lowest reliability is achieved for low spread in HRO propensity in combination 
with a less experienced teams and little use of e-mail.  
At the NPP, there is no evidence at an acceptable level of significance for this assertion at the 
one-dimensional level. However, on the two-way ANOVA level, there is evidence for the 
hypothesis.  
With respect to the handling of urgent incidents, the combination of a high variance in the 
spread of HRT propensity and a high spread in the degree to which team members adjust 
procedures leads to the lowest reliability. Other combinations are less pronounced since they 
range much less. Nevertheless, the lowest reliability can be observed for the combination of a 
low variance in the spread of HRT propensity and a low spread in the degree to which team 
members adjust procedures. A high spread in HRO propensity should be compensated by a low 
spread in the degree to which team members adjust procedures or vice versa (Orton & Weick, 
1990). 
Also at the NPP, regarding the handling of non-urgent incidents, the combination of a high 
spread in HRO propensity and a high spread in Threat Flexibility results in the lowest reliability. 
The highest reliability is obtained by teams with a low score on spread in Threat Flexibility and a 
high spread in HRO propensity. A high spread in HRO propensity should be compensated by a 
low spread in the degree of Threat Flexibility or vice versa (Orton & Weick, 1990).  
As discussed in the Reconceptualization chapter (Chapter 4), this is in line with earlier findings by 
Waterman (1990) reporting on team composition. When membership is too homogeneous, 
reliability usually suffers. The reason is that such is goes at the expense of Team Orientation. The 
paradox however is, that too much Team Orientation in itself (as a result, a product) is bad for 
reliability. This conclusion is pushing the consequences of the need for requisite variety to the 
extreme: too much sugar wastes the taste. Therefore, once again, the dose makes the poison. 
Such leads to paradoxical situations, notably at the Bank, where this finding is reflected in 
double policy regarding team composition. On the one hand the Bank values heterogeneity 
among its staff and recruits people from a very diverse range of disciplines and backgrounds. It 
also deliberately breaks with too strong a team homogeneity by strongly stimulating – some 
would say, forcing – job rotation. On the other hand, it fosters homogeneity where it has been 
reported at several instances, that the Bank does not stimulate opposed views. This is mainly 
reflected in a deliberate recruiting policy of preferring school-leavers, bearing no marks of a past 
organizational culture or experiences. This duality cannot be observed in the NPP where 
homogeneity is the dominant leitmotiv and opposes the notion of requisite variety. This 
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observation is in line with a general finding that high-risk industries, such as the nuclear industry, 
are characterized by homogeneity or low requisite variety (Aase & Nybø, 2002, p. 17). It is 
obvious that in systems that are as complex as our case organizations, a continuous balance 
needs to be strived for between team heterogeneity and homogeneity (Baker et al., 2006). On 
the one hand, team composition must be such that the compound effect of team members 
reaches a higher level of variance than is present in the system the team operates (Weick, 
1987;Burke et al., 2005). On the other hand, effective interaction and communication still has to 
be feasible (Shea & Guzzo, 1987). In that respect, in HROs, a special role is reserved for the 
emergence of trust. A low degree of mutual trust between team members leads to a lack of 
cooperation and communication (Cox et al., 2006). 
H2-9c: The higher the variance in Team Orientation, the higher the reliability 
In the Bank Case, this hypothesis cannot be validated. The highest reliability can be found for 
urgent incidents for low spread in Team Orientation in combination with low score on 
Enactment, on registration in the dedicated IS and for non-urgent incidents for low spread in 
enactment as well. In the NPP Case, the hypothesis cannot be validated significantly at the one-
way ANOVA level. On the level of two-way ANOVA however, some conclusions can be drawn. 
For instance, the combination of a high variance in Team Orientation and a high degree of 
Sensitivity to Operations yields the worst reliability. A low spread in Team Orientation combined 
with a high degree of Sensitivity to Operations yields the best reliability. A high degree of one 
property should be altered by a low degree of the other property (Orton & Weick, 1990). Also in 
the NPP Case, a high variance in Team Orientation and a high degree of Team Orientation yields 
the lowest reliability and a high degree of Team Orientation and a low spread in Team 
Orientation. This is a strong indication for the relevance of Team Orientation as a construct.  
H2-9d: The higher the variance in Threat Flexibility, the higher the reliability.  
At the Bank, this hypothesis is falsified. As well for urgent as for non-urgent incidents, the lowest 
variance yields the highest reliability. At the NPP, on the one-way ANOVA level, we have found 
no evidence for this hypothesis at an acceptable significance. At the two-way ANOVA level we 
have found support for this hypothesis in combination with a high degree for the number of 
urgent incidents per employee. A low spread in Threat Flexibility in combination with a low 
average number of urgent incidents per employee yields a high reliability as well. It is obvious 
however, that the number of urgent incidents per employee on itself is a strong explanation for 
organizational reliability. Remarkable however is the compensating influence of a high spread in 
Threat Flexibility on reliability when combined with a low average number of urgent incidents 
per employee. Reliability drops considerably. However, when this low number of urgent 
incidents per employee is studied in combination with a low spread of Threat Flexibility 
reliability increases. In terms of coupling this is an example of loose – tight, thus explaining high 
reliability (Orton & Weick, 1990). 
Also at the NPP, for the handling of urgent incidents a low spread in Threat Flexibility yields the 
highest results when seen in combination with a low degree of several constructs. Based on 
these findings, for face-to-face communication it becomes obvious that a desirable combination 
would be a low degree of face-to-face communication and a low spread in Threat Flexibility.  
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H2-9e: The higher the variance in Preoccupation with Failure, the higher the reliability 
In the Bank Case, this hypothesis could not be validated at the one-way ANOVA level. At the 
two-dimensional level, a low spread in Preoccupation with Failure generally yields the lowest 
reliability. In the NPP Case, this hypothesis could not be validated at an acceptable level of 
significance at the one-way ANOVA level. For urgent incidents, a high variance in Preoccupation 
with Failure only yields a high reliability when combined with a high variance in the way teams 
deviate from procedure. Where teams deviate from procedure is more homogeneous, reliability 
is the lowest. The highest reliability is obtained with a combination of a low variance in 
Preoccupation with Failure and a low variance in the way teams deviate from procedure. This is 
in line with what is suggested by HRT literature. A high homogeneity of Preoccupation with 
Failure is good, independent whether this score should be high or level in order to obtain high 
reliability. In combination with Team Orientation, the highest reliability is obtained with low 
Team Orientation and a high variance in Preoccupation with Failure; the lowest reliability is 
obtained with a high degree of Team Orientation and a high variance in Preoccupation with 
Failure. 
H2-9f: The higher the variance in Sensitivity to Operations, the higher the reliability 
At the Bank, this hypothesis cannot be validated at the one-way ANOVA level. For urgent 
incidents, a combination of low spread in Sensitivity to Operations and a low spread in 
Preoccupation with Failure yields the highest reliability. The lowest reliability is obtained with a 
combination of high variance in the degree of Sensitivity to Operations and a high variance in 
Threat Flexibility. This might indicate that the homogeneity of a team at this point is essential for 
its reliability. On the other hand, the highest reliability is obtained for a high variation in the 
Sensitivity to Operations construct if combined with a low degree of variance in the Threat 
Flexibility construct or for the inverse, i.e. for a low variation in the Sensitivity to Operations 
construct if combined with a high degree of variance in the Threat Flexibility construct. This 
observation could be explained through the Loose Coupling paradigm. 
H2-9g:  The higher the variance in Deference to Expertise, the higher the reliability 
In the Bank Case, this hypothesis could not be validated at the one-way ANOVA level. On the 
two-dimensional interpretation, we notice that the highest reliability is achieved for the 
combinations of low spread in Deference to Expertise and other factors, especially for urgent 
incidents. In the NPP Case, this hypothesis cannot be validated at the one-way ANOVA level at 
an acceptable level of significance. This stresses the complexity of the phenomenon since it 
cannot be explained unidimensionally. For the handling of urgent incidents, the average number 
of urgent incidents per employee strongly affects the process reliability. The highest reliability is 
achieved for a high spread in Deference to Expertise, when employees have an on average high 
number of incidents to handle. However, the combination of a low average number of urgent 
incidents per employee and a low spread in Deference to Expertise yields a high reliability as 
well. Such is a remarkable conclusion, because we have seen at the one-way ANOVA level that 
the Deference to Expertise construct has a convincing influence on organizational reliability. Our 
reading of these data is that low pressure/efficiency drivenness is an expression of loose 
coupling, which is compensated by a low spread in the degree of Deference to Expertise, which 
is an expression of tight coupling.  
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A combination of a low score on SenseMaking properties and a low score on variance in 
Deference to Expertise yields the lowest reliability. The highest reliability is obtained for a low 
score on these constructs in combination with a high spread in Deference to Expertise. The high 
scores can be explained through Loose Coupling Theory. Despite a high score on SenseMaking 
propensity (loose coupling), the overall reliability is low, because of reinforcement by a high 
spread in Deference to Expertise (i.e. loose coupling). 
Proposition 2-10 
Proposition 2-10: The better the fit between HRO propensity and variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-10a: Teams that perceive Threat Flexibility more homogenously perform better than 
teams that do not. 
H2-10b: Teams that perceive efficiency drivenness more homogenously perform better 
than teams that do not. 
 
H2-10a: Teams that perceive Threat Flexibility more homogenously perform better than 
teams that do not. 
A high homogeneity (i.e. low spread/variance) in the perception of the Threat Flexibility 
construct yields the highest reliability, as well for the handling of urgent as of the non-urgent 
incidents. When a team has about the same perception of Threat Flexibility it means that there 
is little ambiguity in the direction pointed out by management. This straightforwardness and 
univocality might very well be contributing to the team’s reliability because it simultaneously 
reduces complexity and allows for the necessary degrees of freedom to cope with the 
unexpected. We argue that Threat Flexibility, as a newly distinguished HRO construct, is 
univocally positive: it has no side effects, there are no caveats, and there is no catch. This has 
considerable consequences for management and the practice of organization design. Because of 
the observed straightforwardness of the construct, it can be administered quite easily in settings 
that are comparable to the organizations and processes we have studied. 
H2-10b: Teams that perceive efficiency drivenness more homogenously perform better 
than teams that do not. 
Both for the Bank and the NPP, we remark that the higher the homogeneity in the perception of 
efficiency drivenness, the higher the reliability. This demonstrates the importance of a low 
degree of variance in the perception of efficiency orientation to achieve high reliability. At this 
level, a team’s shared interpretation of the orientation towards efficiency is determining for a 
team’s reliability. Despite what we have argued regarding the necessity of requisite variety, this 








Proposition 2-11: The better the fit between SeMa propensity and variety, the higher the 
reliability. 
H2-11: More experienced teams, relying more on SeMa propensity, are more reliable. 
We have not been able to validate this hypothesis at an acceptable level of significance. Since 
experience did not seem to matter in general throughout our data analysis. We are inclined to 
conclude that experience is not relevant for explaing high reliability, nor is it providing any 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
 
Science becomes dangerous  
only when it imagines  
that it has reached its goal  
George Bernard Shaw 
 
This chapter draws conclusions from the research presented in the previous chapters. First, the 
answers to the research questions raised at the beginning of this dissertation are summarized 
(Section 1). Subsequently, this thesis’ main contributions are presented (Section 1.3) and its 
limitations acknowledged (Section 3). The chapter concludes with an identification of directions 
for future research (Section 4). 
1 Answering the Research Questions and Main Findings 
1.1 RQ1 – Are the organizations HROs? 
Both our case studies can be called HROs since HRO characteristics, as the ones described in 
HRO literature are observable in both organizations [RQ1-1]. In addition, our data have shown 
that it are the same constructs that are observable [RQ1-2]. In general, the NPP (as an 
archetypical HRO) has the highest values on HRO properties [RQ1-3]. The first research question 
therefore can be answered affirmatively. However, our research has also pointed out that a NPP, 
although theoretically an archetypical HRO, in fact is not really a HRO, but an Ultra Reliable 
Organization (URO). The Bank on the other hand, is much more a HRO than originally 
hypothesized because of the day-to-day exercise of seeking equilibrium between effectiveness 
and efficiency. 
1.2 RQ2 – What constitutes high reliability? 
The answer to this research question is much less univocal than the answer to the first research 
question. In general, we can conclude that HRO and SeMa constructs do not necessarily 
positively influence process reliability [RQ2-1], but that the dose makes the poison. Starting from 
a reconceptualized theoretical framework, we have observed that newly introduced factors such 
as Team Orientation, Threat Flexibility and Efficiency, univocally contribute to reliability. Despite 
the fact that there is not something like an ideal ‘reliability cocktail’ fully explaining reliability 
[RQ2-2], there are strong indications that a reconceptualized HRT offers valuable advice for the 
design of processes that are needed to be highly reliable. The same conclusion can be reached 
when comparing the composition of the reliability cocktail from one team to another [RQ2-3]. 
Indeed, we have found that contextual and structural dimensions (e.g. team size, workload and 
time allocation) have an important moderating impact on high reliability parameters influencing 
a team’s reliability.  
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1.3 Main Findings: HRO paradoxes 
Bourrier (1996), in her study of French and US Nuclear Power Plants, found out that two NPPs 
that were organized in a totally different way, yet both demonstrated impressive records of 
safety and productivity. “One French NPP showed little common socialization among workers. 
Worker skills were only tacitly acknowledged by management, for example by implicit gaps in 
procedures. For workers on the other hand, filling in these procedural gaps as they performed 
their task was the only acceptable/reasonable strategy if they wanted to be seen as competent, 
and, therefore worthy of retaining some measure of autonomy and power” (Bourrier, 1996, p. 
105). Bourrier’s observation goes to the heart of what we label the ‘HRO paradox’: an ardent 
acknowledgement of the blessings of mechanistic organizing, without losing sight of common 
sense. Essential in this respect is not to exaggerate so that core competencies never turn into 
incompetencies. Rochlin captures this innate HRO paradox as follows: “In short, these 
organizations seek an ideal of perfection but never expect to achieve it. They demand complete 
safety but never expect it. They dread surprise but always anticipate it. They deliver reliability but 
never take it for granted. They live by the book but are unwilling to die by it. If these beliefs seem 
wonderfully contradictory, those who express them are under no particular pressure to 
rationalize their paradoxes; indeed, they seem actively to resist such rationalization. We often 
hear the whole spectrum expressed by a single individual over the course of an interview or series 
of discussions” (Rochlin, 1993, p. 24). 
The remainder of this section deals with the background of this paradox: What is the relevance 
(advantages and disadvantage)? How can it be explained? How does it show itself in everyday 
organizing? 
1.3.1 The dose makes the poison 
Roberts and Bea (2001b, p. 181) warn that organizations can develop core competencies that 
later turn into incompetencies. Core competencies are sets of skills, complementary assets and 
routines that provide the basis for an organization’s survival and prosperity. In this section, we 
emphasize that what can be considered as core competences of HROs can become 
incompetencies. This is a paradox in the sense that ‘much can be too much and little too little’. 
HROs capable of finding the balance between both extremes can truly call themselves High 
Reliability Organizations. The others can do so maybe just in name. In our view, this balancing is 
most characteristic for HROs. To make our point, we first dwell on the paradoxical nature of 
HROs. We subsequently deal with the duality between procedure and improvisation (Subsection 
2), standardization and requisite variety (Subsection 3), hubris and confidence of self and the 
other (i.e. trust) (Subsection 4).  
1.3.2 Working smarter 
A first argument can be found in the complexity of reality. Today’s organizational setting has 
nothing to do with the linear environment of a few decades ago (e.g., what you produce will be 
sold). In business and academic journals, in the rhetoric of consultants, in public relations talk, 
on websites, etcetera, lip service is paid to the dynamics of the environment and the strategies 
that emerge from it. In practice however, organizations do not tend to do what they preach: 
instead of embracing complexity, they reduce (i.e. try to destroy) it by means of key reliability 
indicators (KPIs), balanced scorecards, and the like. If what we state is true, we should see 
organizations fail in large numbers, but remarkably, they do not. What happens is that 
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organizations cope with this reality in their own way, a way that is familiar to them and where 
they are good at: by working hard. Reorganizing, rescheduling, re-engineering, hiring more staff, 
new projects, new technologies, implementing new strategies … are part of this ‘working hard’ 
approach. Therefore, stress levels are high, communication becomes difficult or equivocal and 
budgets are used at the speed of light. HROs though are organizations that have found a way 
around this working harder strategy; instead of working harder, they work smarter. By this is 
meant that instead of putting more effort in operations, they invest this energy in the build-up 
of organizational capability: by training, by smart design, by working on a culture of flexibility 
and reliability. Organizations that invest in improvement will experience increasing capability 
and find that they have more time to allocate to working smarter and less need for heroic efforts 
to solve problems by working harder (Repenning & Sterman, 2001). No matter how appealingly 
straightforward this idea might be, non-HRO managers do not apply it in their everyday practice. 
This is not only because they might not be aware of this inherent dynamics, but also because it is 
simply not rewarding to invest in capability: 
(1) The effect is not noticeable until after a long time whereas the effect of working harder 
is quasi immediate. 
(2) The means that are needed for a working smarter approach are esteemed to be more 
needed elsewhere in the organization (working harder). 
This idea has been developed by Repenning and Sterman (2001) when coining the term 
Capability Trap. In the short run, there is nothing that urges the organization to do things 
differently and on the condition that enough resources become available to continue to put the 
necessary effort in the working harder approach, even in the longer run the failure will not 
materialize. The opportunity cost however is high. 
1.3.3 Stability in cognition, variance in design 
Early work on HROs characterized high reliability in terms of the role of repeatability and 
routines in avoiding adverse consequences (Roberts, 1990b). However, more recent work 
portrays reliable outcomes as the result of stable processes of cognition, such as vigilance or 
monitoring, directed at variations in work activities (Weick et al., 1999). HROs show variation in 
activity, but that what makes a HRO typical is stability in the cognitive processes that make sense 
of this activity. HROs seem to have stopped treating stable patterns of activity as the source of 
reliable outcomes. Ramanujam and Goodman (2003, p. 816) point out that this represents a shift 
in focus from processes that aid repeatability of operations to the role of stable cognitive 
processes in managing the variability inherent in HRO work activities, but that the focus remains 
reliable outcomes (i.e., avoidance of adverse consequences). Of all HRO scholars, Schulman 
probably has phrased this best (Schulman, 1993b, p. 369) in his analysis of Diabolo Canyon: “The 
proposition that emerges from analyzing Diabolo Canyon is that reliability is not the outcome of 
organizational invariance, but, quite the contrary, results from a continuous management of 
fluctuation both in job reliability and in overall department interaction”. Put differently: it is not 
that HROs do not experience failures or deviations from the expected, but these events do not 
disable them. They deal with them. 
For a comprehension of the cognitive mechanism behind this characteristic behavior we refer to 
Weick et al (1999, p. 87): “[To be] opportunistic and flexible in order to detect and to adapt to 
events which require revision of situation assessment and plans … problem solvers need to revise 
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their understanding of the situation, the evidence collection and evaluation tactics, or their 
response strategy when new events are detected and evaluated. Failures to revise in any of these 
ways produce what are seen as fixation failures”. By separating the variation and stability folded 
into design and routines, and assigning the variation to routines and the stability to processes of 
cognition, stable patterns of activity are no longer treated as the source of reliable outcomes 
(Weick et al., 1999, p. 87). 
1.3.4 Dynamic adaptation 
Therefore, good design in essence is not about rigidly preventing incidents, accidents and crises, 
but about a design for a reliable management of them. This is confirmed by Lin & Carley (Lin & 
Carley, 2001) when they write: “If crises are indeed inevitable, then the more important question 
is not about how to design the organization to avoid crisis, but how to design the organization 
for high reliability during a crisis. Re-framing the question in this way gives rise to an entire new 
set of concerns. Is the organizational design that exhibits high reliability during a crisis also 
optimal under non-crisis conditions? Is it reasonable for organizations to design for crisis, or 
should organizations alter their designs when faced with a crisis? In other words, is dynamic 
adaptation called for? Further, if organizations do restructure, what will be the most effective 
new structure?” An onset to the answer to this pertinent design question is provided by Weick et 
al. (2005): “If one looks to see what constitutes this reliability, it cannot be found in any single 
element of the system. It is certainly not to be found in the equipment….for a period of several 
months during our field work it was failing regularly….Nor is it to be found in the rules and 
procedures, which are a resource for safe operation but which can never cover every 
circumstance and condition. Nor is it to be found in the personnel who, though very highly skilled, 
motivated and dedicated, are as prone as people are everywhere to human error. Rather we 
believe it is to be found in the cooperative activities of controllers across the ‘totality’ of the 
system, and in particular in the way that it enforces the active engagement of controllers, chiefs, 
and assistants with the material they are using and with each other” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 418).  
2 Main Contributions 
However modest in the light of an eminent research track as HRT, this study claims to have 
made some relevant contributions. Despite its high relevance for society, ‘Reliability’ has not 
always been given appropriate research consideration, resulting in some notable shortcomings. 
Our research has attempted to remedy these shortcomings. To clarify this, we decompose this 
dissertation’s title – Two cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
– since every word has its meaning. In that respect we first explain the relevance of the double 
case study approach (2.1). Subsequently we summarize the relevance of our findings for the field 
of HRT (2.2), paying special attention to the distinction between organization and organizing 
(2.3). Next, the hermeneutic research methodology is dealt with (2.4) and the major conclusions 
concerning the Reconceptualization are presented (2.5). Finally, as a form of synthesis of the 
above, the question is addressed whether the theorizing on HROs can be labeled a theory (2.6). 
It should be noted that categorizing this research’s contributions under these labels should not 
be seen as completely exclusive, or as limitative. Many of the contributions are the result of a 
combination of theory, method and data, fully in line with our hermeneutic approach. When 
they are discussed as presented below, it is for analytical reasons. 
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2.1 Two cases 
‘A Bank can learn from a Nuclear Power Plant and vice versa’. That statement has been the 
starting point of our research, now five years ago, and as is shown in the previous section, it 
more or less has remained intact. We are convinced that we thank this to the research design 
and research ambition. More particularly, we feel we have empirically broadened the HRT field 
in three ways that are novel in HRO research and find their origin in the double case study 
approach underlying our study:  
- The application of HRT to the Incident Management Process; 
- By applying HRT in the context of a mainstream highly reliable (garden variety) 
organization; 
- The comparison of a mainstream highly reliable organization to an archetypical HRO; 
Many aspects of these contributions have been presented in detail in this dissertation and need 
no further elaboration, so that in the remainder of this subsection, we can suffice with a 
discussion of those contributions that might need further elaboration. We subsequently deal 
with the extension of HRO research to the context of Incident Management (2.1.1), the question 
whether garden variety organizations can learn from archetypical HROs (2.1.2) and vice versa 
(2.1.3).  
2.1.1 Incident management process 
As we have shown in our review of literature, the field of application of HRT, although 
substantial, still is focused on a limited number of processes and contexts. By expanding this 
scope with a case study on the high reliability of the (IT) incident management process, we are 
convinced that we have made a double contribution: First, we have brought within reach the 
HRO community’s ambition to expand its natural habitat. Second, we have accepted the 
invitation to study the usefulness of HRO concepts in the IS domain (Butler & Gray, 2006). We 
therefore hope that our study has created an opening towards more HRO case studies in the 
field of IS.  
2.1.2 Can ‘garden variety’ organizations learn from archetypical HROs? 
Can mainstream organizations – or ‘garden variety’ organizations (Roberts, 1993, p. 2) – learn 
from archetypical HROs? We believe the a posteriori answer is double: yes and no. The answer is 
no, because archetypical HROs in fact are not HROs but UROs, so that a comparison without 
nuance is not relevant. The answer is also yes, because there are hallmarks from NPPs that can 
be applied to other contexts (e.g. introducing time-outs, non-punishability, decoupling process 
design, etc.), as discussed in the body of this dissertation.  
2.1.3 Can archetypical HROs learn from garden variety organizations? 
Furthermore, we have learned that an archetypical HRO can learn from a non-archetypical as 
well. We take the advice of Creed et al. seriously when they posit that: “Only by finding variance 
in what is claimed to be the outstanding feature of these organizations – their overreaching 
concern for reliability – can we begin to examine just how the politics of technology and the 
culture of reliability develop differently over time. By searching for neighbors, we may find that 
HROs are oriented toward avoiding ineffectiveness to the near conclusion of trying to reach 
effectiveness. As we move down to the reliability continuum, we may find a more balanced 
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addressing of both effectiveness and ineffectiveness criteria. By studying these phenomena we 
can begin to untangle criteria for both” (Creed et al., 1993, p. 71-72). HROs as described in 
literature are of limited relevance for mainstream context because of their exclusive focus on 
effectiveness. In reality, organizations do not have this luxury and must constantly balance 
between a striving for effectiveness and the economic imperative to use resources efficiently. 
2.2 High Reliability 
This study has contributed to the fine-tuning of what constitutes high reliability. More 
particularly, we feel we have empirically broadened the HRT field in four ways that are novel in 
HRO research and that find their origin in the explication of the high reliability concept:  
- By applying HRT to the study of organizational reliability, instead of the more common 
issue of safety; 
- By explicitly and empirically testing the impact of HRO properties (independent variable) 
on reliability (dependent variable); 
- By incorporating in this conceptual model structural and contextual dimensions that are 
potentially moderating the impact of HRO properties on reliability; 
- By measuring HRO properties not solely in terms of averages, but also as spread.  
First, we explain in what way this study has accomplished reaching an encompassing definition 
of reliability (2.2.1). Next, we explicate the relevance for HRO research of taking reliability as a 
dependent variable (2.2.2). Then we point out the relevance of incorporating moderator 
variables in the research design (2.3.3). We conclude with pointing out the relevance of working 
with spread in HRO properties, next to working with mean observations. 
2.2.1 A definition of reliability 
A shortcoming in research on reliability is that, at least from an academic point of view, the 
concept of reliability itself has not been defined univocally and holistically. Even though many 
scholars have given an accurate description of this concept, most of their research takes a 
particular viewpoint. As such reliability studies deal with manufacturing reliability, organizational 
reliability or safety, but not with an all-compassing reliability that takes a systems perspective 
and acknowledges social, human, economic or technological aspects. Besides, few studies exist 
on the interrelation between task environment and organization design on how this influences 
organizational reliability (Lin & Carley, 2001;Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). We have addressed this 
shortcoming by taking a systems perspective to reliability. 
2.2.2 Reliability as dependent variable 
Another contribution of our work is that it does not take a dependent variable as a starting point 
for the selection of our cases, an approach typical of NAT and HRT research (Rosa, 2005, p. 232). 
We have taken the systems interactive complexity and tight coupling as a start, not their 
assumed well-oiled functioning or their past of dramatic incidents or accidents. The starting 
point are two organizations/processes that can be characterized as interactively complex and 
tightly coupled without categorizing the organization of the case as a whole as highly reliable. 
Since we are not working back from empirical evidence, we believe in the generalizability (or 
transferability) of our findings even though we have merely studied two cases in depth. 
Noteworthy in this respect is also that our study of process reliability through the technique of 
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Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance since it has permitted us to have a more nuanced view 
on reliability by taking into account the spread in the data. We argue that this is a far more 
realistic picture of reliability than taking a snapshot or than taking a mean observation as 
dependent variable.  
2.2.3 HRO properties as mean and as variance 
To the best of our knowledge, literature up to now has not operationalized the nuanced 
character of High Reliability thinking. Our research claims it has done so by incorporating in its 
design the spread in observations between team members. In line with the Requisite Variety 
idea (Various Variances), we have shown that examining a team’s standard deviation on 
particular variable can be revealing for explaining reliability. 
2.3 Organizing 
We are convinced that ‘HRO’ is the right acronym for the type of organization studied by HRT. 
However, based on our findings, we argue that it should not be used for ‘High Reliability 
Organization’ but rather for ‘High Reliability Organizing’ (Berniker & Wolf, 2001, p. 26). There is a 
double rationale for this: being highly reliable is dynamic (2.3.1) and it makes the joining in with 
mainstream organization science more feasible (2.3.2). 
2.3.1 Reliability is dynamic 
We believe that the HRO concept has value as a verb, not as a noun. By this we imply that the 
nature of HROs is dynamic, not static. Indeed, reliability is a dynamic non-event (Weick, 1987), 
and a continuous effort is necessary for finding an equilibrium that is perishable and will be 
replaced by a new equilibrium. We have investigated the mechanisms and interferences that 
play a role in achieving high reliability and demonstrated the impact of contextual and structural 
dimensions other than those proposed by HRT literature on organizational reliability.  
2.3.2 HRT as guide for organization science 
We are convinced of the potential of HRT as a guide for organization science. The problem with 
past and contemporary HRO research is that its practical application still is very much 
underdeveloped or unrevealed. For this reason, HRT seems incapable of joining in with 
mainstream organization theory. In a recent contribution to The Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Management, Karlene Roberts puts it like this: “Today, the research [on reliability] flourishes, 
although it has not been well tied to mainstream organizational theory” (Roberts, 2005, p. 157). 
This is the fundamental objective we had with our work: tying insights from high reliability 
thinking into mainstream organization theory and mainstream organizational learning (Van Den 
Eede et al., 2004). Our research has addressed this by investigating whether and how HROs can 
learn from garden-variety organizations. We posit that the study of HROs, using similar 
approaches as described in this dissertation, can offer additional guidance in the study of 
organizations of all types.  
We believe this dissertation has made a modest contribution to the study of organizations in 
closing what could be called the Weick Circle. By this we mean the process of reading Weick’s 
oeuvre backwards by studying Loose Coupling (Weick, 1976; later reconceptualized in Orton & 
Weick, 1990), The Social Psychology of Organizing (Weick, 1979), SenseMaking (Weick, 1995); 
High Reliability Organizations (Weick et al., 1999), back to organizing, coupling and SenseMaking.  
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2.3.3 Moderator variables 
In line with Drazin and van de Ven (1985), our research has examined the effects of multiple 
contextual or structural factors on reliability. Multiple factors like team size, experience, physical 
location etc., have shown to be important in explaining reliability. We have found adopting a 
systems approach is uniquely valuable in addressing research questions as the ones we have 
raised in this study.  
2.4 Hermeneutic 
We have taken Drazin and van de Ven’s (1985) advice at heart and have combined research 
approaches for the study of contingency. Following a Systems Approach to organizational 
reliability, we have not sufficed with a mere focus on how single contextual factors and single 
structural characteristics affect each other and how these pairs of context and structure factors 
interact to explain reliability. Nevertheless, this kind of reductionism is important in our 
research. The reason is that it “treats the anatomy of an organization as being decomposable 
into elements that can be examined independently. The knowledge gained from each element 
can then be aggregated to understand the whole organizational system” (Drazin & van de Ven, 
1985, p. 529). However, the systems perspective added to the holism that resulted from the 
combination of an intra- and inter-case analysis, from a triangulation of theory and method. The 
combination of reductionism and holism offers potential for general contingency-theory 
research. With Drazin and van de Ven (1985), we posit “that contingency studies should be 
designed to permit comparative evaluation of several forms of fit. The resulting complementary 
information can lead to more comprehensive descriptions of context structure- reliability 
relationships than a single approach to fit alone. By examining multiple approaches to fit in 
contingency studies and relating these findings to unique sample characteristics, one can develop 
mid-range theories of fit”.  
HRT seems to favor the empirical or case approach. Management is studied by analyzing 
experience, usually through cases. “It is based on the premise that students and practitioners will 
understand the field of management and somehow come to know how to manage effectively by 
studying managerial successes and failures in various individual cases”(Koontz, 1980, p. 177). 
HRT acknowledges the contingency or situational approach to management theory. NAT 
obviously makes the distinction between situations depending on the degree of coupling and 
complexity. HRT scholars place themselves in the same framework by adopting this same 
terminology. On the other hand, they are not contingency-driven where they leave their 
descriptive role and take a normative tone when proposing treatments. In this sense they seem 
to ignore that there is no “one best way” and are “often overlooking the fact that intelligent 
practicing managers have always tailored their practice to the actual situation” (Koontz, 1980, p. 
177). 
The cornerstone of the hermeneutic approach underpinning our research is its multiple-case 
character. Because of the identical research build-up in both our cases, we were capable not 
only of data-theory triangulating within-cases, but also in between them. This ‘twin’ approach is 
quite exceptional in HRO research, where theory development is based on individual case 
studies, leading to a “danger of falling victim to a kind of evolutionary optimism that infers that 
because features have evolved in an organization that is surviving in a high-reliability niche, 
these features must all contribute to its overall reliability. In research on high reliability in 
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organizations, we are beset by the problem of many variables and few cases. How, without more 
failures, can we really be sure which of the many organizational features we see are in fact 
adding to reliability?” (Schulman, 2001, p. 347). 
Another contribution this research makes is in the way it combines scientific and practical 
relevance. Scientific research and consulting, especially in environments like the ones we have 
studied, are separated most of the time. It is rare that scientists are involved in decision-making 
and that they are in a position to share their expertise with the highest level of the organization 
(Bourrier, 2005, p. 99). In this, our research differentiates itself, because it has been 
commissioned by the organization’s senior management. Our research findings, for this reason, 
have the potential of being translated and implemented into organizational practices and 
design. 
Another significant contribution of this research is that it adds to the body of quantitative 
research in this field. As for HRT, prior empirical data was gathered only in the following cases, 
to the best of our knowledge: 
 Vogus and Welbourne (2003b) provided an indirect, partial test of the connection 
between collective mindfulness and innovation activity in new (IPO) software firms, 
suggesting that human resources practices are the mechanisms by which three of these 
processes develop and lead to mindfulness (Knight, 2004, p. 13); 
 Schulman (1993a;1993b) examined the Diabolo Canyon NPP on its high reliability; 
 Rochlin, La Porte & Roberts (1987) and Roberts, Rousseau & La Porte (1994) on Nuclear 
Power Aircraft Carriers ; 
 Knight (2004) provided a test for the relationship between collective mindfulness and 
safety in public swimming pools. 
As for as NAT, even fewer empirical studies are available: 
 Berniker and Wolf (1999;2001;2007) provided evidence for NAT in the oil refinery sector. 
 Sagan (1993) did the same in the field of nuclear warfare technology. 
All in all, this constitutes a limited body of empirical research. Our research as such is one of the 
few studies that systematically examines the direct effect of both high reliability and 
Sensemaking properties on organizational reliability.  
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2.5 Reconceptualization 
2.5.1 Towards a balanced theory on High Reliability by including Efficiency 
If mindfulness is defined only in terms of favorable outcomes, then it is always a positive thing 
(Rerup, 2005). “Because theory needs to specify circumstances under which the positive 
consequences outweigh the negative, and vice versa, it follows that a ‘balanced’ theory of 
mindfulness will have to specify both the costs and benefits incurred by being mindful. As 
theorizing about mindfulness continues, I expect the literature to develop an appreciation for 
both the costs and the benefits of mindfulness” (Rerup, 2005, p. 467-468). 
The factor analysis we conducted was relevant in this regard, as it (re-)produced a majority of 
the major themes in the conceptual framework. This occurred despite the fact that the items 
were not strictly grouped by theme in the questionnaire. This provides empirical support for the 
clustering of characteristics into a set of themes that is a combination of the two schools of 
thought in the HRO discipline. 
The purpose of our research was to propose a process ‘theory’ of the relationship between 
constructs and insights stemming from different theoretical perspectives on organizational 
reliability. Therefore, the elements of our work by themselves are not novel; throughout the 
dissertation, we have indeed extensively acknowledged our debt to the groundbreaking 
theoretical work of the authors we build upon. What we do claim as novel, however, is our 
selection, reinterpretation and rearrangement of these elements. This combination of analysis 
and synthesis bears the promise of shedding a broader and more precise light on what 
constitutes organizational reliability. The systemic blend of analysis and synthesis we have 
developed here has the potential of explaining conflicting empirical results and of suggesting 
guidelines for future research (Soh & Markus, 1995, p. 30).  
The concepts, used in this reconceptualization process, are not things we see in reality, but 
constructs that emerge from our insight in order to help us understand reality (Singer, 1983, p. 
85). Understanding how reliability, flexibility, coupling and other organizational constructs relate 
to each other is a necessary step in building construct validity (Hinkin, 1998;Knight, 2004, p. 16). 
Furthermore, understanding how they interrelate is vital when the purpose is to link our findings 
to the broader organizational theory domain (Weick et al., 1999;Knight, 2004, p. 16-17). 
2.5.2 Bridging the dichotomy between the Berkeley and the Michigan School 
As we have argued in Chapter 2, the Michigan school of thought pays more attention to the 
notion of culture (as contextual dimension) whereas the Berkeley group favors the structural 
dimensions (e.g. the notion of bureaucracy) (Eisenhardt, 1993, p. 133). In this sense, the 
Michigan school takes independent dimensions (causes)73, the Berkeley school dependent 
dimensions (effects from the independent dimensions) as starting point for understanding the 
concept of high reliability. Our reconceptualization has tried to strike a balance between both 
views as it combines constructs originating from both schools, by adding the causality that is 
missing in the Berkeley school. For instance, we added the constructs of Team Orientation and 
Threat Flexibility as the cause of the cultural dimension. 
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2.5.3 Bridging the dichotomy between HRT and NAT 
Another limitation addressed by our research regards the two dominant bodies of literature: 
High Reliability Theory (HRT) and Normal Accidents Theory (NAT). “While the notion of high(er) 
reliability is theoretically justifiable, to the best of our knowledge, HRT and NAT have undergone 
only limited empirical testing. This might be due to the acute problem in reliability research that 
mainly consists of case studies examining the background of effective action or catastrophic 
failure (e.g., Perrow, 1984; Shrivastava, 1987; Vaughan, 1996; Weick, 1990, 1993) in reliability 
seeking organizations” (Ericksen & Dyer, 2005, p. 8). Our research takes the advice of Erickson 
and Dyer (2005, p. 10) at heart, and has aimed at a merging in thinking across the case studies 
and empirical testing, hence making a contribution to Reliability literature. We believe we have 
succeeded in doing so by developing a nuanced view on the notions both theories have in 
common – those of complexity and coupling. Snook (2002, p. 204) gives three reasons for the 
origin of conflicting insights between HRT and NAT with regard to how reliability should be 
guaranteed: “Part of the answer lies in our inherent limitations as information processors. Part of 
the answer lies in our linear deterministic approach to causality. And, part of the answer lies in 
the inherent unpredictability of events in complex organizations”. The nuance we brought into 
the debate relates to the (re-)introduction of paradigms regarding efficiency vs. effectiveness; 
reliability vs. flexibility; sense making vs. decision making; tight vs. loose coupling; improvisation 
vs. procedure; stability vs. instability, etc. One of the objectives of our study was to make these 
approaches less conflicting. We did so by taking the discussion a bit further than the traditional 
conclusions from contingency theory. We address the question whether there are design and 
behavioral characteristics that are robust – in the sense of reliable and flexible enough – to allow 
for an ‘all-seasons’ approach to organizational reliability.74 This kind of studies seems to be rare. 
Lin & Carley (2001) report that there are few studies that compare organizational designs with 
an eye to reliability and that there is no research that compares actual behavior with a formal 
model. In more dynamic environments – such as in our case studies – flexibility is a stronger 
predictor for reliability than stability (Anand & Ward, 2004). 
2.6 Theory 
Kurt Lewin said: “Nothing is as practical as a good theory”(Lewin, 1945, p. 129). Popper asked: 
‘What is a theory?’ and Weick showed us that even a bad ‘theory’ can be practical.75 Therefore, 
theories provide a lever to see more than there is to see without the application of a theoretical 
framework. However, theory must be explaining reality and not just be ‘theoretically’ correct. 
Science outside of societal problems is at best nothing more than intellectual ‘Spielerei’ (Behnke 
& Behnke, 2006). Hence, the question arises whether HRT genuinely is a theory. We could 
suffice here to prove the importance of High Reliability Theorizing, for the study of reliability – 
which is after all what the HRO discipline has proved over the years to be capable of – but we dig 
a little deeper into its essence as a theory, in the hope of finding clues that could better specify 
its value. We clarify how our research has answered the question whether HRT genuinely is a 
theory. To this end, we ask the question whether HRT is a theory in the scientific sense (2.6.1) 
and what type of theory HRT is (2.6.2). 
2.6.1 Is HRT a theory? 
The question what theory is and is not has practical implications for the quality of organization 
science. This is discussed in an issue of the Academy of Management Review (1989, Vol. 14, 
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Issue 4, e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989;Weick, 1989), which focused specifically on theory and theory 
development. Similarly an issue of Administrative Science Quarterly (1995, Vol. 40, Issue. 3, e.g. 
Sutton & Staw) contained articles about what theory is, what theory is not and how theorizing 
occurs. However, multiple views of theory exist. Differences in these views depend to some 
degree on philosophical and disciplinary orientations, yet there are also commonalities (Gregor, 
2006), centered around abstraction and generalization about phenomenon, interactions and 
causation. 
Table 8.1 shows the components of theories (Gregor, 2006), allowing us to identify what 
components HRT is composed of.  
Theory component Definition HRT (in this 
dissertation) 
Means of representation The theory must be represented physically in 
some way: in words, mathematical terms, 
symbolic logic, diagrams, tables or 
graphically.  
Chapter 5 
Constructs These refer to the phenomena of interest in 
the theory. All the primary constructs in the 
theory should be well defined.  
Chapter 4 
Statements of relationship These show relationships among the 
constructs. Again, these may be of many 
types: associative, compositional, 
unidirectional, bi-directional, conditional, or 
causal.  
Chapter 5 
Scope The scope is specified by the degree of 
generality of the statements of relationships  
Chapter 5 
Causal explanations The theory gives statements of relationships 





Statements of relationships between 
constructs are stated in such a form that they 
can be tested empirically. 
Chapter 6 
Prescriptive statements Statements in the theory specify how people 
can accomplish something in practice, e.g., 
construct an artifact or develop a strategy. 
Chapter 7 
Table 8.1 - Structural components of theory (Gregor, 2006) 
The conclusion from the overview presented in Table 8.1 is that there is sufficient reason to 
state that the theorizing on High Reliability genuinely can be called a theory since the structural 
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components of theory are present in the way it is reconceptualized in this dissertation. This gives 
a first indication that HRT can be considered a scientific theory. This validates our choice to 
consistently use HRT – throughout this dissertation –as a body of constructs that explains high 
reliability in organizations.  
2.6.2 Theory type 
In the remainder of this section, we examine the theory type HRT represents. This examination 
will make clear where future enhancement of HRT could or should aim at. 
Theory type  Distinguishing attributes HRT status 
Analysis Says ‘what is’. The theory does 
not extend beyond analysis and 
description. No causal 
relationships among phenomena 
are specified and no predictions 
are made. 
Causal relationships are specified 
and predictions are made. 
Explanation  Says ‘what is’, ‘how’, ‘why’, 
‘when’, ‘where’. The theory 
provides explanations but does 
not aim to predict with any 
precision. There are no testable 
propositions. 
There are testable propositions. 
Prediction  Says ‘what is’ and ‘what will be’. 
The theory provides predictions 
and has testable propositions but 
does not have well-developed 
justificatory causal explanations. 
There are causal explanations. 
Explanation and 
prediction 
Says ‘what is’, ‘how’, ‘why’, 
‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘what will be’. 
Provides predictions and has both 
testable propositions and causal 
explanations. 
Testable hypotheses can be 
formulated. 
Design and Action Says ‘how to do something’. The 
theory gives explicit prescriptions 
(e.g., methods, techniques, 
principles of form and function) 
for constructing an artifact. 
Modest evidence can be found on 
the presence of guidelines. 
Table 8.2 - Testing HRT's theory type 
Starting from these views on theory, we argue that HRT is a theory of the second-highest level, a 
theory for Explanation and Prediction. Nevertheless, this qualification is flattering for HRT since 
some remarks are in place. For instance, HRT does not explicitly say ‘why’ observations are 
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made, which is a necessary condition for being capable of explaining. However, this shortcoming 
is compensated by its capacity to put forward testable propositions and causal explanations. We 
are strongly convinced that for answering this ‘why’ question an additional theoretical 
framework must be brought in, namely Loose Coupling Theory (Orton & Weick, 1990). 
We assert that our research has contributed to the determination of HRT as a scientific theory. 
However, much more research must be done to perfect this determination and to provide it 
with an enhanced validity. In that respect, several questions arise. They can be grouped as 
follows (Gregor, 2006): 
(1) Domain questions. What phenomena are of interest in the discipline? What are 
the core problems or topics of interest? What are the boundaries of the 
discipline? 
(2)  Structural or ontological questions. What is theory? How is this term understood 
in the discipline? Of what is theory composed? What forms do contributions to 
knowledge take? How is theory expressed? What types of claims or statements 
can be made? What types of questions are addressed? 
(3)  Epistemological questions. How is theory constructed? How can scientific 
knowledge be acquired? How is theory tested? What research methods can be 
used? What criteria are applied to judge the soundness and rigor of research 
methods? 
(4)  Socio-political questions. How is the disciplinary knowledge understood by 
stakeholders against the backdrop of human affairs? Where and by whom has 
theory been developed? What are the history and sociology of theory evolution? 
Are scholars in the discipline in general agreement about current theories or do 
profound differences of opinion exist? How is knowledge applied? Is the 
knowledge expected to be relevant and useful in a practical sense? Are there 
social, ethical or political issues associated with the use of the disciplinary 
knowledge? 
3 Limitations of this Study 
The research reported in this dissertation has four limitations that can serve as additional 
directions for future research. They are addressed next.  
The results obtained in this thesis, using the ANOVA approach, are in themselves relatively 
discouraging since little significance is found when testing the hypotheses. This is especially so 
on the level of the one-way ANOVA testing. There are two explanations for this observation. 
First, little variance exists in the observations of the dependent and independent variables. 
Therefore, the probability of detecting significant interactions of independent variables, 
moderators and dependent variables using ANOVA is substantially reduced (Drazin & van de 
Ven, 1985, p. 535). Second, effects could not be easily tested due to the small sample size on the 
aggregated team level (Campion et al., 1996, p. 448). Despite the significant number of 
respondents in both cases (n=320 for the Bank, and n=124 for the NPP), once aggregated on 
team level, this was reduced to a considerably smaller number of teams in view of analysis of 
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variance. Thus future research, aimed at replicating this research’s findings, should strive to 
increase the number of teams under study so that the impact of mediating variables can be 
better studied. Obviously, the cost of such extensive study will likely be a critical factor. 
Above we have argued that the fact that only two cases were studied is no impediment for the 
value of this thesis’ conclusions. The internal validity is sufficiently covered for our purposes by 
the double case study approach. However, in view of ameliorating the external validity of our 
reconceptualized model, an extension to more cases is clearly beneficial.  
A third limitation regards the fact that our survey needed to measure too much at the same 
time, which has lead to a relatively limited number of items per construct under study. Although 
we argue that this is necessary because of the exploratory and holistic vocation of our research, 
future research should consider remediating ths problem.  
A last shortcoming of this research is the relative underexposure of SenseMaking. Although 
clearly present in our design and analysis, it has not been elaborated inf full. Future research 
could make an attempt of remediating this. 
4 Future Research Directions 
It is clear that a good deal of work lies ahead. Apart from the limitations and shortcomings in this 
study that should be remediated in future research, some additional directions become 
apparent. 
4.1 Stronger research collaboration 
HRO research is characterized by a tradition of collaboration. The interdisciplinarity of the 
Berkeley group for instance is characteristic in that respect (e.g. Rochlin et al., 1987). Although 
less prominent, also the collaboration between the Berkeley and Michigan scholars is in line with 
this observation (e.g. Weick & Roberts, 1993). What is lacking however is a structured inter-case 
analysis. This study has made a step in this direction, but the hope is real that by documenting 
such results and accumulating knowledge across and between organizational levels and 
populations, researchers can make significant advances in mid-range theory (Drazin & van de 
Ven, 1985, p. 536). If a series of studies at an industry level of analysis or for professional rather 
than bureaucratic subunits shows a different pattern of findings, then some systematic 
relationships between types (or levels) of organizations may become evident (Drazin & van de 
Ven, 1985, p. 536). 
4.2 Loose Coupling Theory 
During our research, we noted the following paradox: In spite of the fact that literature does not 
seem to mention something like a reliability equation or a recipe for reliability (stating what 
‘ingredients’ and in which portions should be added to the organization’s setting to ensure 
reliability), after the occurrence of a mishap, people seem to be always capable of “pinpointing 
the exact moment when the balance tipped towards disaster” (Sullivan & Beach, 2003). 
Therefore the question emerges whether it would not be possible to pre-determine the cut-off 
point at which an organization transfers from a reliable environment to one headed for disaster 
(Sullivan & Beach, 2003). Our research has not managed to find this recipe, it merely has found 
some of the ingredients and some indication on how the reliability cocktail could be created. We 
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posit that Loose Coupling Theory, as reconceptualized by Orton and Weick (1990), is a proper 
framework for studying reliability. It offers an additional lens to better understand the reliability 
cocktail through the interrelation of dimensions like type, cause, effect, compensation and 
outcome of coupling. LCT may answer the ‘why’ question that cannot be answered by HRT 
alone.  
A relevant question in that respect is then how HRT strategies influence the degree and shape of 
coupling and complexity. Therefore an examination into how one theory's independent variables 
affect the other theory's dependent variable (Rijpma, 1997a), and vice versa, is needed. In other 
words: What are the effects of complexity and tight-coupling on overall reliability? Or in Rijpma’s 
words: “And how do HROs' reliability-promoting strategies impinge on complexity and tight-
coupling and, hence, on normal-accident proneness? How prone to normal accidents are 
organizations applying the reliability-enhancing strategies discerned by HRT?” (Rijpma, 1997a, p. 
16). 
4.3 System Dynamics 
Besides a more suitable theoretical framework in form of Loose Coupling Theory, also a stronger 
technique is needed to finetune what we have found in this study in order to determine more 
precisely the contextual and structural dimensions that have to be administered for reliability. 
System Dynamics is such a technique, and its further application in the domain looks promising. 
For instance, System Dynamics can help in challenging the Threat Rigidity thesis (Staw et al., 
1981). Our findings indicate that there is reason to doubt this theory in its entirety. On the other 
hand, we have found evidence that Threat Rigidity sometimes is a valuable altenative for Threat 
Flexibility. System Dynamics is a suitable technique for dealing with such paradox. 
4.4 Networked Reliability76 
Another line of research would be the inter-organizational aspects of HRO. Inter-organizational 
high reliability is increasingly gaining importance, especially in the field of networked 
organizations like utility services (de Bruijne, 2006). Indeed, the particularity of this organization 
type magnifies the questions already raised in non-networked settings: can high reliability be 
accomplished by a network of organizations? What would this mean for the way they are 
coupled? What about the balance between efficiency and effectiveness? These questions are 
important because the transformation into network organizations means that traditional HROs 
tend to exchange their monolithic nature for one that is built out of many relations. 
Both the sector of energy and finance are an excellent example of this tendency. The electricity 
market, for instance, is characterized by a liberalization of the composing parts (de Bruijne, 
2006). Whereas a few years ago the production, distribution, transport and marketing of 
electricity was managed by one and the same firm, legislators under impulse of neo-liberalism 
have (artificially) split the industrial column and attributed the responsibility to different players. 
The business model was not the only aspect the ‘electricians’ had to change more or less over-
night. The existing procedures, co-ordination and information processing mechanisms also had 
to be adapted to fit the new paradigm. It cannot be taken for granted that this is done in a way 
that can guarantee reliability in the longer run. It cannot be excluded that under the pressure of 
legislation and reasons of efficiency and shareholder-value creation merely lip service has been 
paid to reliability. Insight in complexity science however, learns that these changes do have 
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consequences. The couplings between the ‘anythings’ (Weick, 1976, p. 5) have changed, and 
because it has not been mapped how and at what levels they have changed, the historic 
evidence of reliability cannot be extrapolated to the years to come. 
The same logic and course of action applies to the sector of banking, where the search of 
economies of scale, market value and market share have lead to a conglomeration, nationally 
and internationally. The inter-organizational dimension becomes prevalent, especially when 
different (organization and/or national) cultures are in play or that processes and their quality 
show a different degree of maturity when comparing elements from the conglomeration. At 
best, this difference in speed will lead to some friction with loss of efficiency as a consequence. 
At worst, organizational reliability cannot be guaranteed conform the standards of the more 
mature processes. The potential result is not a leveling down of reliability, but its sheer 
destruction. 
The key to solving the issue of inter-organizational high reliability might be a thorough 
elaboration of the concept of trust. Trust is an umbrella term for reliability for what links the 
constructs underlying HRT. It is a requisite for properties like Deference to Expertise, 
commitment ro resilience or Reluctance to Simplify. It is the lubricant for cross-boundary high 
reliability. In that respect, special attention should be paid to the design of information systems 
that can support the emergence and maintenance of trust between organizations (Ibrahim & 
Ribbers, 2006). 
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Appendix A. Interview Protocol (Bank Case) 
 
Z. Meta data 
 Context Are you familiar with the ITIL methodology? Do you know what Incident 
Management is? In what respect? How did you find out about it? 
 Context In what way do you consider yourself related to continuous IT services? Since 
how long are you working as….? Current job-function? 
   
A. People  
 HR Are there sometimes tensions between first, second and third line 
collaborators/services? Can these tensions cause sub optimality, danger even? Is 
there a divergence of goals between the stakeholders in the IM process? 
 HR Is it easy to motivate personnel? Are collaborators complimented when they 
have successfully managed an incident? How is morale amongst IM service 
members? 
 HR How is the promotion of collaborators of the process dealt with? How are 
collaborators rewarded? On what criteria is he/she judged? For working quickly 
or for working thoroughly? 
 HR Is succession of key players guaranteed? Is there redundancy in people? 
 KM Are collaborators stimulated to share information on solving problems/problems 
solved? Do we teach each other on IM? 
 KM Is it possible to use competences of other specialists in the Bank if possible? 
 Training Are people in the service sufficiently experienced for their job? Are all staff 
sufficiently trained? Why not? Do you know IM procedures are trained? 
 Training To what extent do you think IM organization members are committed to 
resilience (ability to bounce back from errors and cope with unexpected events 
via improvisation) (HRT)? 
 Culture Is there a shared mental model amongst the organization members on what it is 
all about (HRT)? 
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 Culture Is there 'requisite variety' (HRT)? Imagination, experiences, stories, simulations 
and symbolic representations here play an important role. A system that values 
these alternatives is more reliable, not only because one knows the system (and 
its possible failures) better but also befcause one has greater confidence in being 
able to handle failures because one knows others have been able to deal with 
them also (Weick 1987). 
 Culture To what extent do you think IM organization members are preoccupied with 
failure? (HRT) “HROs train their people to look for anomalies, recognize decoys, 
and, most importantly, to decouple systems when problems are discovered and 
then empower employees to act. HROs know that odd things can occur and want 
their people to be on the lookout for these odd or unusual things instead of 
assuming that they don't matter or are not important” (Roberts 2001). 
 Culture To what extent do you think IM organization members are reluctant to simplify 
interpretations (multiple perspectives) (HRT)? 
 Culture Is there a ‘shoot the messenger mentality’? 
   
B. Process  
 Incident What is the most dramatic event you can recall during which business processes 
came to a halt? Can you give an example of an incident that caused a hindrance 
to your work? What is an incident to you? What determines something to be an 
incident? What determines priority? What are your ideas about informing people 
that an incident has occurred? Who should be responsible? Do you have 
examples of events that nearly caused interruption of daily processes? Which 
business interruptions occurred that in your view are related to 
automation/information technology? Which business interruptions do you expect 
to occur in future?  
 Incident What is meant by recovery according to you? What data should be recovered 
first? What process should be recovered first? Could you tell in which order 
applications need to be restarted, in case a major disruption has occurred? What 
are your ideas about the organization recovery? What case could you construct in 
which recovery is successful? What case could you construct in which recovery is 
a failure? 
 Incident What are the most critical IT services for your department? Which services should 
be provided in order to keep business running at a minimal level according to 
you? How should this level be determined? In what way does a minimal level of 
service relate to the goals of your department? 
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 Incident What is your opinion about how the continuity of IT services is managed? What 
aspects is a limitation in providing continuous IT service? What could be done 
according to you to improve continuity of IT services? On what criteria would you 
evaluate continuous service? What should IT know from the business units in 
order to improve the delivery of continuous service? 
 Incident What is the impact to the business processes in case IT services come to a halt? 
How do you assess the importance of IT applications to function continuously? 
How do you assess the impact of business processes that are disrupted? 
How do you assess the financial impact of business processes that are disrupted? 
Which applications can automatically not function anymore due to the 
unavailability of other applications? In what way the point of time (within a 24h 
day) of an IT service disruption influences the organization? How would you 
determine the impact of a failure? 
 Incident In what way your department is affected if other departments face discontinuity 
of IT services? What interdependencies between departments do you observe if 
the application of one department fails to function? For how long can you 
continue your business operations in case the processes in all other departments 
would have discontinued? 
 Incident Can you give examples of a domino effect that culminated in a disaster? 
 Procedure Are there procedures for IM? Are they known to you? Does everybody in the 
business know who to contact in case of an incident? Are they giving satisfaction? 
Are they always followed? Why not? Is it sometimes good that they are not 
followed? 
 Procedure Are there procedures to alert for a threatening escalation of an incident? Is it 
possible that these procedures are ignored if they might disgrace a (group of) 
collaborator(s)? What happens if an incident seems to indicate that a 
mistake/failure/abuse/improper use has occurred? Is there the risk for a cover-
up? Are all procedures always followed or are there by-passes possible? Is this 
always/sometimes/never good? 
 Procedure Does IM provide in registration of incidents? Are these incidents traceable 
afterwards? Do they really get investigated or is it just an idle database? Is there a 
post-incident registration of the definitive incident category, impact code and 
cause (causing component). How do you get track of the incident management 
failures? Do you yourself register the failures concerning the IM process? 
 Procedure How does the IM deal with waiting-lists for the registering of the calls/incidents? 
What happens to a no-answer (the user gave up trying to 'get in')? Is this a shared 
responsibility of the IM and user of just of the user alone? How is overburdening 
dealt with? How is it resolved ad-hoc? How is resolved on a longer term basis? 
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 Procedure If it seems during the handling of the incident that the number of impacted users 
is higher, how is this dealt with? Does the priority change? 
 Procedure Is there a feedback mechanism to the user who reported the incident (on the 
projected time frame needed to solve the incident? Is there a feedback 
mechanism from the user to IM on the appreciation of the time frame? 
 Procedure What kind of Key Reliability Indicators are in place in connection to the IM 
process? 
 Procedure Has it happened that an incident was dealt with by an expert (elsewhere) in the 
organization, instead of the proper domain expert in the IM process? Were there 
conflicting solutions suggested? Which measures have been taken to avoid this?  
 Procedure Do you know of situations were IM has worsened the situation? Was there 
something fundamentally wrong or was it just a coincidence? Do you know of 
situations where risk migrates when the introduction of a risk mitigation measure 
to address one problem in the system introduces other, unintended 
consequences in another part of the system. 
 Procedure Are there aspects of the current procedures that are somewhat bureaucratic? 
 Procedure Is there 'slack' built in the IM process (HRT)? 
 Procedure Does the process of prioritizing incidents take into account SLAs? (quint.nl) 
 Procedure Does Incident Management do a good job in identifying the priority of incidents? 
Did they get the impact right? Did they get the priority right? Is there a better 
way to get impact and/or priority right? 
 Procedure Communication. What platforms are in place for briefing? What platforms are 
used for debriefing? How/Do you communicate changes in desired service levels 
and availability levels. When they increase? When they decrease? Has it ever 
happened that a service was restored conveniently but that you were not aware 
of this until you discovered by accident? Did you lose valuable time in the mean 
while? Do you have an opportunity to express your view on the incident? Did it 
occur that the solution which had been found was known to you/could have been 
suggested by you? 
 Meta Are the stakeholders of IM questioned on a regular basis? How are the outcomes 
of these inquiries dealt with? Are they used for improving the IM process? Is 
there a double-loop learning mechanism, even when the incident does not lead 
to a 'problem'? Is there a double loop learning concerning IM. Are the procedures 
reviewed? Or is just the incident fixed? 
 Meta If trends are spotted (by the Incident Managers), how are they implemented in 
the IT service management process? 
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 Meta Does the Incident Management Process Owners analyze the reliability of their 
service on a cost/benefit basis? 
 Meta In a distributed system with limited physical oversight, the normal antidotes to 
human and organizational error—checks and balances, redundancy, and 
training—may be defeated by the size and scope of the system, or by subcultures 
which can develop in the system. How is internal control done? How can one be 
sure that procedures are followed? Are there sufficient checks and balances? Is 
there an equilibrium between responsibility and accountability? 
 Meta Are there people in the IM process who still see the 'big picture'? How is the 
Sensitivity to Operations (seeing the big picture of operation in the moment)How 
is this big-picture composed (HRT)? The ultimate objective is the development of 
a culture of trust, which is so typical of HROs. HROs consistently communicate the 
big picture of what the organization seeks to do, and try to get everyone to 
communicate with each other about how they fit in the big picture (Roberts 
2001). This is also called transactive memory (van Fenema 2003) and means that 
people know who does what in their (temporary) group, which in turn brings 
about stability. 
 Meta Is the internal audit procedure effective in discovering risks? Are the 
recommendations of audit followed-up? 
 Meta Is the best person always dealing with the problem? Or is there a mechanism to 
migrate the incident to the best-suited person? (migrating decision-making) 
 Meta Is there a knowledge transfer from first line to second line collaborators in such a 
way that there is an increase in the success rate of solving incidents (quint.nl)? 
 Meta How is Incident Management embedded in the other ITIL processes? How are the 
bridges between IM en Problem management? What about the information 
exchange? 
   
C. Technology 
 Technology Is the technology currently in use sufficient? 
 Technology Is the technology compatible with other IS? 
 Technology Is there redundancy in hardware and software? 
 Technology Is the technology supportive of mindfulness (HRT)? 
 Procedure Does the IM-tool simultaneously provide an adaptation of the Configuration 
Management Database (CMDB)? 
 Technology Does the tool report adequate Management Information? Is this regularly 
checked with the management? 
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D. Environment 
 Meta What mechanisms are there to assure that the IM process is in line with external 
norms and legislation? 
 Structure Are there elements in the IT organization, or the whole organization that are a 
hindrance to the way IM is operating? 
 Structure On what basis are decisions for supplementary funding made? Have you had a 
restructuring of your services (downsizing, loss of personnel, cost-cutting)? 
 Structure How would you describe the vision of management: long-term or short term? Do 
you have enough support from management or are they just pay lip service to 
you and your team (i.e. they are only happy when nothing happens but are not 
willing to do a preventive effort?) Have you tried to pull their attention to your 
problems? 
 Structure Is there an under-specification of structures (organized anarchy via fluid decision-
making) (HRT)? 
 Structure Looking at crisis situations, Perrow (1999) recommends to put limits to the size of 
the parts of systems that could be stand-alone parts. He furthermore advises to 
“link them through 'buses' – in the electrical sense – designed to buffer the 
disturbances in each”. The ‘glue’ between these components must be such that 
components still can range in diversity. This is with regard to management-styles, 
technologies, structures and decision processes. What is your opinion? 
 Culture Does your organization have a safety culture? Would you describe the 
organization’s culture as one fostering risk awareness/ Are there incentives for 
reporting on risk? Do you think the safety culture will still stand regardless of the 
leadership’s personality and their concern with risk. Do you know who you should 
address in case you want to report a risk? Are you rewarded for a pro-active 
reporting on possible risks? 
 Culture Hierarchies must allow for a broad and real delegation (Bigley 2001), with real 
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Appendix B. Interview Protocol (NPP Case) 
 
 
Z. Meta data 
 Context Are you familiar with the M&R methodology? Do you know what Incident 
Management is? In what respect? How did you find out about it? 
 Context In what way do you consider yourself related to Maintenance & Repair (M&R) 
services? How long are you working as….? Current job-function? 
   
A. People 
 HR Are there sometimes tensions people from different organizational levels (e.g. 
between you and your superior(s))? Can these tensions cause sub-optimality, 
danger even? Is there a divergence of goals between the stakeholders in the 
M&R process? 
 HR Is it easy to motivate personnel? Are collaborators complimented when they 
have successfully managed an incident? How is morale amongst M&R service 
members? 
 HR How is the promotion of collaborators of the process dealt with? How are 
collaborators rewarded? On what criteria is he/she judged for working quickly 
or for working thoroughly? 
 HR Is succession of key players guaranteed? Is there redundancy in people? 
 KM Are collaborators stimulated to share information on solving problems/ 
problems solved? Do we teach each other on M&R? 
 KM Is it possible to use competences of other specialists in the plant if possible? 
 Training Are people in the service sufficiently experienced for their job? Are all staff 
sufficiently trained? Why not? Do you know if M&R procedures are trained? 
 Training To what extent do you think M&R organization members are committed to 
resilience (ability to bounce back from errors and cope with unexpected 
events via improvisation) (HRT)? 
 Culture Is there a shared mental model amongst the organization members on what it 
is all about (HRT)? 
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 Culture Is there 'requisite variety' (HRT)? Imagination, experiences, stories, simulations 
and symbolic representations here play an important role. A system that 
values these alternatives is more reliable, not only because one knows the 
system (and its possible failures) better but also because one has greater 
confidence in being able to handle failures because one knows others have 
been able to deal with them also (Weick 1987). 
 Culture To what extent do you think M&R organization members are preoccupied with 
failure? (HRT) “HROs train their people to look for anomalies, recognize decoys, 
and, most importantly, to decouple systems when problems are discovered and 
then empower employees to act. HROs know that odd things can occur and 
want their people to be on the lookout for these odd or unusual things instead 
of assuming that they don't matter or are not important” (Roberts 2001). 
 Culture To what extent do you think M&R organization members are reluctant to 
simplify interpretations (multiple perspectives) (HRT)? 
 Culture Is there a ‘shoot the messenger mentality’? 
   
B. Process 
 Incident What is the most dramatic event you can recall during which business 
processes came to a halt? Can you give an example of an incident that caused 
a hindrance to your work? What is an incident to you? What determines 
something to be an incident? What determines priority? What are your ideas 
about informing people that an incident has occurred? Who should be 
responsible? Do you have examples of events that nearly caused interruption 
of daily processes? Which business interruptions occurred that in your view 
are related to automation/information technology? Which business 
interruptions do you expect to occur in future?  
 Incident What is meant by recovery according to you? What process should be 
recovered first? Could you tell how to act in order to let the plant resume its 
operations, in case a major disruption has occurred? What are your ideas 
about the organization recovery? What case could you construct in which 
recovery is successful? What case could you construct in which recovery is a 
failure? 
 Incident What are the most critical (production) services for your department? Which 
services should be provided in order to keep business running at a minimal 
level according to you? How should this level be determined? 
In what way does a minimal level of service relate to the goals of your 
department? 
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 Incident What is your opinion about how the continuity of plant operation is managed? 
What aspect is a limitation in providing continuous plant operation? What 
could be done according to you to improve continuity of plant operation? On 
what criteria would you evaluate continuous service?  
 Incident What is the impact to the business processes in case (production) services 
come to a halt? How do you assess the importance of production applications 
to function continuously? How do you assess the impact of business processes 
that are disrupted? How do you assess the financial impact of business 
processes that are disrupted? Which applications can automatically not 
function anymore due to the unavailability of other applications? In what way 
the point of time (within a 24h day) of an service disruption influences the 
organization? How would you determine the impact of a failure? 
 Incident In what way your department is affected if other departments face 
discontinuity of services? What interdependencies between departments do 
you observe if the application of one department fails to function? 
For how long can you continue your business operations in case the processes 
in all other departments would have discontinued? 
 Incident Can you give examples of a domino effect that culminated in an incident? 
 Procedure Are there procedures for M&R? Are they known to you? Does everybody in 
the business know who to contact in case of an incident? Are they giving 
satisfaction? Are they always followed? Why not? Is it sometimes good that 
they are not followed? 
 Procedure Are there procedures to alert for a threatening escalation of an incident? Is it 
possible that these procedures are ignored if they might disgrace a (group of) 
collaborator(s)? What happens if an incident seems to indicate that a 
mistake/failure/abuse/improper use has occurred? Is there the risk for a 
cover-up? Are all procedures always followed or are there by-passes possible? 
Is this always/sometimes/never good? 
 Procedure Does M&R provide in registration of incidents? Are these incidents traceable 
afterwards? Do they really get investigated or is it just an idle database? Is 
there a post-incident registration of the definitive incident category, impact 
code and cause (causing component). How do you get track of the incident 
management failures? Do you yourself register the failures concerning the 
M&R process? 
 Procedure How does the M&R deal with waiting-lists for the registering of the 
calls/incidents? What happens to a no-answer (the user gave up trying to 'get 
in')? Is this a shared responsibility of the M&R and user of just of the user 
alone? How is overburdening dealt with? How is it resolved ad-hoc? How is 
resolved on a longer term basis? 
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 Procedure If it seems during the handling of the incident that the impact on operations or 
plant/personnel safety changes? Does the priority change? 
 Procedure Is there a feedback mechanism to the user who reported the incident (on the 
projected time frame needed to solve the incident? Is there a feedback 
mechanism from the user to M&R on the appreciation of the time frame? 
 Procedure What kind of Key Reliability Indicators are in place in connection to the M&R 
process? 
 Procedure Has it happened that an incident was dealt with by an expert (elsewhere) in 
the organization, instead of the proper domain expert in the M&R process? 
Were there conflicting solutions suggested? Which measures have been taken 
to avoid this?  
 Procedure Do you know of situations where M&R has worsened the situation? Was there 
something fundamentally wrong or was it just a coincidence? Do you know of 
situations where risk migrates when the introduction of a risk mitigation 
measure to address one problem in the system introduces other, unintended 
consequences in another part of the system? 
 Procedure Are there aspects of the current procedures that are somewhat bureaucratic? 
 Procedure Is there 'slack' built in the M&R process (HRT)? 
 Procedure Does the process of prioritizing incidents take into account SLAs? (quint.nl) 
 Procedure Does Incident Management do a good job in identifying the priority of 
incidents? Did they get the impact right? Did they get the priority right? Is 
there a better way to get impact and/or priority right? 
 Procedure Communication. What platforms are in place for briefing? What platforms are 
used for debriefing? (How/Do you communicate changes in desired service 
levels and availability levels. When they increase? When they decrease?) Has it 
ever happened that a service was restored conveniently but that you were not 
aware of this until you discovered by accident? Did you lose valuable time in 
the meanwhile? Do you have an opportunity to express your view on the 
incident? Did it occur that the solution which had been found was known to 
you/could have been suggested by you? 
 Meta Are the stakeholders of M&R questioned on a regular basis? How are the 
outcomes of these inquiries dealt with? Are they used for improving the M&R 
process? Is there a double-loop learning mechanism, even when the incident 
does not lead to a 'problem'? Is there a double loop learning concerning M&R. 
Are the procedures reviewed? Or is just the incident fixed? 
 Meta If trends are spotted (by the M&R Managers), how are they implemented in 
the M&R process? 
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 Meta Does the Incident Management Process Owners analyze the reliability of their 
service on a cost/benefit basis? 
 Meta In a distributed system with limited physical oversight, the normal antidotes to 
human and organizational error—checks and balances, redundancy, and 
training—may be defeated by the size and scope of the system, or by 
subcultures which can develop in the system. How is internal control done? 
How can one be sure that procedures are followed? Are there sufficient checks 
and balances? Is there an equilibrium between responsibility and 
accountability? 
 Meta Are there people in the M&R process who still see the 'big picture'? How is the 
Sensitivity to Operations (seeing the big picture of operation in the 
moment)How is this big-picture composed (HRT)? The ultimate objective is the 
development of a culture of trust, which is so typical of HROs. HROs 
consistently communicate the big picture of what the organization seeks to do, 
and try to get everyone to communicate with each other about how they fit in 
the big picture (Roberts 2001). This is also called transactive memory (van 
Fenema 2003) and means that people know who does what in their 
(temporary) group, which in turn brings about stability. 
 Meta Is the internal audit procedure effective in discovering risks? Are the 
recommendations of audit followed-up? 
 Meta Is the best person always dealing with the problem? Or is there a mechanism 
to migrate the incident to the best-suited person? (migrating decision-making) 
 Meta Is there a knowledge transfer from first line to second line collaborators in 
such a way that there is an increase in the success rate of solving incidents 
(quint.nl)? 
 Meta How is Incident Management embedded in the other NPP processes 
(raakpunten)? How are the bridges between M&R en Problem management? 
What about the information exchange? 
C. Technology 
 Technology Is the technology currently in use sufficient? 
 Technology Is the technology compatible with other IS? 
 Technology Is there redundancy in hardware and software? 
 Technology Is the technology supportive of mindfulness (HRT)? 
 Procedure Does the M&R-tool simultaneously provide an adaptation of the Configuration 
Management Database (CMDB)? 
 Technology Does the tool report adequate Management Information? Is this regularly 
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checked with the management? 
   
D. Environment 
 Meta What mechanisms are there to assure that the M&R process is in line with 
external norms and legislation? 
 Structure Are there elements in the NPP organization, or the whole mother holding that 
are a hindrance to the way M&R is operating? 
 Structure On what basis are decisions for supplementary funding made? Have you had a 
restructuring of your services (downsizing, loss of personnel, cost-cutting)? 
 Structure How would you describe the vision of management: long-term or short term? 
Do you have enough support from management or are they just there to pay 
lip service to you and your team (i.e. they are only happy when nothing 
happens but are not willing to do a preventive effort?) Have you tried to pull 
their attention to your problems? 
 Structure Is there an under-specification of structures (organized anarchy via fluid 
decision-making) (HRT)? 
 Structure Looking at crisis situations, Perrow (1999) recommends to put limits to the size 
of the parts of systems that could be stand-alone parts. He furthermore 
advises to “link them through 'buses' – in the electrical sense – designed to 
buffer the disturbances in each”. The ‘glue’ between these components must 
be such that components still can range in diversity. This is with regard to 
management-styles, technologies, structures and decision processes. What is 
your opinion? 
 Culture Does your organization have a safety culture? Would you describe the 
organization’s culture as one fostering risk awareness/ Are there incentives for 
reporting on risk? Do you think the safety culture will still stand regardless of 
the leadership’s personality and their concern with risk. Do you know who you 
should address in case you want to report a risk? Are you rewarded for a pro-
active reporting on possible risks? 
 Culture Hierarchies must allow for a broad and real delegation (Bigley 2001), with real 
delegation meaning the transfer of task, responsibility and authority.  
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Appendix C. Testing the A Priori Conceptual Model 
 
13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can reach a decision-
maker. 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the consequences for 
the organization as a whole. 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our team on HOW 
things could go wrong with crucial systems. 
24.2 I am familiar with processes (business or IT) that are strictly 
speaking outside the scope of my job. 
Table 0.1 - A Priori Survey Items for Sensitivity to Operations 
 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why things did not go 
as expected. 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s opinion regarding the 
handling of incidents. 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident analysis in order to 
better understand future incidents. 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is exceptional that 
an opinion is not listened to. 
20.2 In our team people demonstrate trust for each other. 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 
Table 0.2 - A Priori Survey Items for Reluctance to Simplify 
 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I use to deal with 
problems. 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 it is easy to get access 
to supplementary resources. 
19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle incidents. 
23.2 My management mobilizes supplementary people whenever the 
workload of our teams becomes excessive. 
Table 0.3 - A Priori Survey Items for Commitment to Resilience 
 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential danger. 
15.2 I handle near-misses and mistakes as information on the reliability 
of our system. 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have important consequences, 
even when no-one has noticed them. 
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19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our team what has 
happend prior to the incident. 
20.4 There is consensus amongst the members of our team on 
WHAT should not go wrong with crucial systems. 
23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about difficulties in my work 
situation. 
Table 0.4 - A Priori Survey Items for Preoccupation with Failure 
 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who has the 
expertise to respond. 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) it is easy to get 
hold of all necessary information. 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill it is solved. 
20.3 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) we consult other 
team members. 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with more 
technical expertise make decisions. 
Table 0.5 - A Priori Survey Items for Deference to Expertise 
The exploratory factor analysis based on these items resulted in the rotated component matrix 
shown in Table 0.6.  
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident analysis 
in order to better understand future incidents. 0,735879 0,059589 -0,00587 0,105499 0,114218 0,164073 0,093717 -0,08817 
19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 0,71688 0,258561 0,157433 0,062689 0,054365 0,063477 0,055555 0,043863 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our team 
what has happend prior to the incident. 0,67914 0,256382 -0,04072 0,193936 -0,0395 0,020641 0,206143 -0,02806 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill it is 
solved. 0,567189 -0,02391 0,382932 0,085644 0,260354 0,005678 -0,02678 0,072606 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s opinion 
regarding the handling of incidents. 0,510133 0,242375 0,331973 0,042018 0,347693 0,092082 -0,15197 0,156172 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is 
exceptional that an opinion is not listened to. 0,468758 0,383378 0,198256 -0,03959 0,340996 0,036005 -0,2596 0,250464 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 0,453692 0,382631 0,246712 0,001942 0,260617 0,033632 -0,28706 0,272172 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our team 
on HOW things could go wrong with crucial systems. 0,206431 0,818518 -0,04997 0,152929 0,11828 0,129859 0,087403 0,016138 
20.4 There is consensus amongst the members of our team 
on WHAT should not go wrong with crucial systems. 0,243208 0,81815 0,042542 0,083918 0,042218 0,075375 0,122969 -0,03652 
20.3 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) we 
consult other team members. 0,265215 0,423159 0,192173 0,351273 0,217668 -0,18997 -0,11183 0,026635 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have important 
consequences, even when no-one has noticed them. 0,13097 -0,10581 0,75672 -0,06393 0,042138 0,092235 0,120929 -0,01963 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the 
consequences for the organization as a whole. 0,032041 0,199192 0,720781 0,078698 -0,1796 0,089565 0,037373 0,026071 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why 
things did not go as expected. 0,147736 0,030801 0,612825 0,08907 0,098257 0,031717 0,208606 -0,07893 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 it is easy 
to get access to supplementary resources. 0,211247 0,090249 0,019004 0,817586 0,0797 0,006448 0,017315 -0,0822 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) it is 
easy to get hold of all necessary information. 0,216511 0,047481 -0,1243 0,57188 0,009538 0,212213 -0,25045 -0,14327 
13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can reach a 
decision-maker. -0,06747 0,238966 0,231424 0,540783 0,157388 0,22604 -0,08116 0,147054 
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22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with more 
technical expertise make decisions. 0,064237 0,07354 -0,02696 0,531077 0,385313 -0,07909 0,237974 0,283001 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who has 
the expertise to respond. -0,04967 -0,0161 0,149353 0,509214 0,040088 0,453774 0,227097 0,161641 
23.2 My management mobilizes supplementary people 
whenever the workload of our teams becomes excessive. 0,078556 -0,07326 -0,11229 0,205183 0,731951 -0,00243 -0,06049 -0,07275 
23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about difficulties in my 
work situation. 0,151568 0,203155 0,129797 0,072934 0,659 0,285572 0,012822 0,111777 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 0,23007 0,348075 0,044337 0,045238 0,631223 0,125209 0,088679 -0,26067 
24.2 I am familiar with processes (business or IT) that are 
strictly speaking outside the scope of my job. 0,119371 0,12575 0,041226 0,024054 0,104514 0,752709 0,013768 -0,06857 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle 
incidents. 0,116823 0,010907 0,114498 0,193012 0,102237 0,711112 0,005702 0,235024 
15.2 I handle near-misses and mistakes as information on 
the reliability of our system. 0,158236 0,186734 0,187531 -0,05455 -0,11068 0,157592 0,738563 0,039766 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential 
danger. 0,025914 -0,03546 0,420013 0,011217 0,154931 -0,0922 0,614604 0,161293 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I use to 
deal with problems. 0,045614 6,63E-05 -0,06127 0,030525 -0,08739 0,146334 0,122894 0,847598 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
Table 0.6 - Rotated Component Matrix of HRT items from Literature 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,828 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1889,098 
  Df 325 
  Sig. ,000 
Table 0.7 - KMO and Bartlett's Test for a priori HRT Variables (Bank) 
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Table 0.8 shows that the total variance explanation criterion of 60% is met. 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 6,202 23,853 23,853 6,202 23,853 23,853 2,977 11,449 11,449 
2 2,205 8,482 32,335 2,205 8,482 32,335 2,352 9,047 20,495 
3 1,917 7,372 39,707 1,917 7,372 39,707 2,246 8,640 29,135 
4 1,410 5,422 45,129 1,410 5,422 45,129 2,156 8,292 37,428 
5 1,256 4,832 49,961 1,256 4,832 49,961 2,112 8,124 45,552 
6 1,113 4,280 54,241 1,113 4,280 54,241 1,651 6,350 51,902 
7 1,061 4,079 58,320 1,061 4,079 58,320 1,451 5,580 57,482 
8 1,015 3,906 62,226 1,015 3,906 62,226 1,233 4,744 62,226 
9 ,865 3,326 65,552             
10 ,850 3,268 68,820             
11 ,834 3,209 72,029             
12 ,762 2,930 74,959             
13 ,708 2,722 77,680             
14 ,637 2,448 80,129             
15 ,611 2,348 82,477             
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16 ,586 2,255 84,732             
17 ,550 2,117 86,849             
18 ,514 1,977 88,826             
19 ,478 1,837 90,663             
20 ,438 1,684 92,347             
21 ,421 1,620 93,967             
22 ,378 1,452 95,419             
23 ,353 1,356 96,775             
24 ,329 1,265 98,040             
25 ,268 1,030 99,070             
26 ,242 ,930 100,000             
Table 0.8 - Total Variance Explained of A Priori Factor Analysis for HRT items 
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Appendix D. Descriptive Respondent Statistics (Bank 
Case) 
 N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev 
1. Are you an internal or external employee? 320 1 2 1,26 ,439 
2. What is your gender? 318 1 2 1,22 ,417 
4. At what physical location do you work? 311 1 10 4,03 2,646 
5. How many years of experience with incident handling 
do you have? 
294 ,0 30,0 6,901 5,6118 
6. What team are you a member of? In case you are a 
member of more than one team, indicate that team 
where you feel most part of. 
315 2 69 34,79 20,972 
Team Size 296 3 36 13,86 7,369 
Number of team members 320 1 19 8,22 4,687 
7. What department are you a member of? 316 2 29 10,00 6,530 
8. How much of your time (%) do you spend in handling 
incidents? 
309 0 100 21,22 19,907 
9. How much (%) do you rely on Peregrine for the 
registration/coordination/escalation/closing of an 
incident? 
311 0 100 83,15 26,441 
10. How much (%) do you register allmost immediately 
the necessary data in Peregrine? 
306 0 100 69,27 28,464 
11.1 face-to-face communication 246 1 80 16,65 14,818 
11.2 telephone/cell phone 314 3 95 31,82 18,316 
11.3 e-mail 300 1 75 21,29 12,885 
11.4 Peregrine 309 1 100 35,42 24,220 
11.5 Other means of communication 59 1 20 6,46 3,914 
Ratio nondedicated vs dedicated 232 ,18 99,00 5,6850 10,34781 
Ratio voice vs nonvoice 232 ,05 13,29 1,4302 1,68983 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved when handling 
incidents. The work does not let go. 
306 1 5 3,46 1,043 
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13.2 I consider the adequate handling of incidents as a 
matter of honour. 
309 1 5 4,13 ,764 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior 
incidents to mind. 
312 2 5 4,27 ,639 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take into 
account the possible reaction of my colleagues. 
307 1 5 3,79 ,896 
13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can 
reach a decision-maker. 
314 1 5 4,13 ,677 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I 
use to deal with problems. 
310 1 5 4,03 ,710 
13.7 When handling an incident I deal with it 
incrementally. I adjust my actions. 
311 1 5 4,01 ,617 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who 
has the expertise to respond. 
313 1 5 3,98 ,655 
14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a 
solution. 
311 1 5 3,39 ,884 
14.3 To perform the job, I sometimes defer from 
procedure. 
309 1 5 3,54 ,847 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the 
consequences for the organization as a whole. 
311 2 5 4,29 ,567 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes rely on 
information that is (or does not need to be) 100% 
certain. 
309 1 5 2,83 ,965 
14.6 When I make decisions in the handling of 
incidents, my approach is rational rather than intuitive. 
311 1 5 3,81 ,750 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential 
danger. 
296 1 5 3,92 ,666 
15.2 I handle near-misses and mistakes as information 
on the reliability of our system. 
297 1 5 3,88 ,648 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have 
important consequences, even when no-one has 
noticed them. 
313 2 5 4,38 ,577 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why 
things did not go as expected. 
310 2 5 4,24 ,599 
 Appendices 311 
 
 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) it 
is easy to get hold of all necessary information. 
290 1 5 3,26 ,853 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 it is 
easy to get access to supplementary resources. 
289 1 5 3,79 ,742 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our 
team what has happend prior to the incident. 
311 1 5 3,85 ,773 
19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 314 2 5 4,17 ,577 
19.3 I feel good in our team. 316 1 5 4,22 ,760 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill 
it is solved. 
313 2 5 4,14 ,653 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s 
opinion regarding the handling of incidents. 
313 2 5 4,12 ,587 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident 
analysis in order to better understand future incidents. 
309 1 5 3,51 ,896 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is 
exceptional that an opinion is not listened to. 
312 2 5 4,05 ,657 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 313 2 5 4,11 ,631 
20.3 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) 
we consult other team members. 
296 2 5 4,20 ,676 
20.4 There is consensus amongst the members of our 
team on WHAT should not go wrong with crucial 
systems. 
300 2 5 3,96 ,640 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our 
team on HOW things could go wrong with crucial 
systems. 
297 2 5 3,76 ,638 
20.6 Because of pressure (time-pressure or other) our 
team often deviates from procedure. 
308 1 5 2,92 ,924 
22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs and time. 313 1 5 3,58 ,910 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling incidents. 307 1 5 3,55 ,851 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 312 1 5 3,46 ,777 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle 
incidents. 
308 1 5 3,82 ,792 
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22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with 
more technical expertise make decisions. 
300 1 5 3,79 ,750 
23.1 [COMPANY]-ICT is exposed to many 
dangers/threats. 
309 2 5 3,17 ,784 
23.2 My management mobilizes supplementary people 
whenever the workload of our teams becomes 
excessive. 
308 1 5 3,20 ,899 
23.3 In [COMPANY]-ICT it is easy to ask for help. 314 1 5 3,63 ,667 
23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about difficulties in 
my work situation. 
313 1 5 3,85 ,732 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 317 1 5 3,62 ,699 
24.2 I am familiar with processes (business or IT) that 
are strictly speaking outside the scope of my job. 
312 1 5 3,31 ,823 
24.3 I am expected to do my job in a certain manner 
without deviating from procedure. 
315 1 5 3,34 ,792 
24.4 I often work under high productivity pressure 
(time, costs). 
314 1 5 3,57 ,829 
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N Min. Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
0. ID 124 1 128 63,36 37,045 
1. Are you an internal or external employee? 124 1 2 1,02 ,154 
2. What is your gender? 124 1 2 1,03 ,177 
3.1. Are you a manager? 124 1 2 1,27 ,444 
3.2. Which personnel category do you belong to? 124 1 3 1,73 ,515 
4. What is your physical work location? 124 1 6 2,60 1,715 
5. How many years of experience do you have in 
handling incidents? 








N BREAK 124 1 11 5,18 3,001 
Team Size 119 2 70 23,54 22,711 
Participation 119 ,11 1,00 ,3500 ,21632 
7.1. How much (%) do you use SAP history for the work 
preparation? 
108 0 100 35,77 30,501 
7.2. From how many different people do you get input 
(conversation, telephone, e-mail, notifications)? 
97 0 1000 183,97 
276,38
7 
Q72LIKERT 97 1 5 2,86 1,436 
8. How many of the cases (%) do you notice a 
procedure needs to be adjusted? 
111 0 80 14,69 16,591 
9. In how many of the cases (%) do you take action to 
change the procedure? 
114 0 100 77,57 33,624 
10. In how many of the cases (%) do you timely register 
the necessary data in SAP? 
87 0 100 66,33 33,329 
11.1 face-to-face communication 120 ,00 1,00 ,2787 ,25701 
11.2 telephone/cell phone 120 ,00 ,75 ,1972 ,14638 
11.3 e-mail 120 ,00 ,80 ,2045 ,16822 
11.4 SAP 120 ,00 1,00 ,3004 ,27084 
11.5 Other means of communication 120 ,00 ,30 ,0192 ,05422 
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Ratio nondedicated vs dedicated 
104 ,00 24,00 4,8262 
5,6427
0 
Ratio voice vs nonvoice 
113 ,00 9,00 1,4269 
1,8278
0 
Ratio face vs distance 114 ,00 4,00 ,5241 ,84234 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved with my work. The work 
does not let go. 
123 1 5 3,77 ,885 
13.2 I consider the adequate handling of incidents as a 
matter of honour. 
124 3 5 4,44 ,615 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior 
incidents to mind. 
122 1 5 4,11 ,695 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take into 
account the possible reaction of my colleagues. 
124 1 5 3,75 ,823 
13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can 
reach a decision-maker. 
121 1 5 4,10 ,735 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I 
use to deal with problems. 
120 1 5 3,51 ,935 
13.7 When handling an incident I deal with it 
incrementally. I adjust my actions. 
124 2 5 4,01 ,591 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who 
has the expertise to respond. 
124 1 5 3,90 ,748 
14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a 
solution. 
121 1 5 2,84 1,103 
14.3 To perform the job, I sometimes defer from 
procedure. 
121 1 5 3,08 ,988 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the 
consequences for the organization as a whole. 
123 3 5 4,11 ,603 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes rely on 
information that is (or does not need to be) 100% 
certain. 
121 1 5 2,44 ,999 
14.6 When I make decisions in the handling of 
incidents, my approach is rational rather than intuitive. 
124 2 5 3,86 ,702 
Q146INV 124 1 4 2,14 ,702 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential 
danger. 
122 2 5 4,30 ,628 
15.2 I handle near-misses and mistakes as information 
on the reliability of our system. 
123 1 5 4,24 ,669 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have important 123 3 5 4,48 ,548 
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consequences, even when no-one has noticed them. 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why 
things did not go as expected. 
121 3 5 4,32 ,520 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 0) it is 
easy to get hold of all necessary information. 
100 1 5 3,23 ,930 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 it is 
easy to get access to supplementary resources. 
98 1 5 3,24 ,975 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our 
team what has happend prior to the incident. 
116 2 5 4,08 ,592 
19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 119 3 5 4,30 ,545 
19.3 I feel good in our team. 120 2 5 4,32 ,661 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill 
it is solved. 
119 2 5 4,22 ,666 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s 
opinion regarding the handling of incidents. 
119 3 5 4,23 ,559 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident 
analysis in order to better understand future incidents. 
119 1 5 3,66 ,906 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is 
exceptional that an opinion is not listened to. 
119 3 5 4,13 ,566 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 119 2 5 4,19 ,601 
20.3 When handling an urgent incident (priority 0) we 
consult other team members. 
98 2 5 3,62 ,767 
20.4 I know which assignments are crucial. 119 2 5 4,19 ,492 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our 
team on HOW things could go wrong with crucial 
systems. 
115 3 5 4,13 ,522 
20.6 There is consensus amongst the members of our 
team on WHAT could go wrong with crucial systems. 
115 1 5 3,92 ,677 
20.7 Because of pressure (time-pressure or other) our 
team often deviates from procedure. 
117 1 5 2,08 ,892 
22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs and time. 121 1 5 2,96 ,934 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling incidents. 124 1 5 3,62 ,907 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 124 2 5 3,64 ,725 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle 
incidents. 
123 2 5 3,88 ,696 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with 
more technical expertise make decisions. 
121 1 5 3,63 ,776 
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23.1 [COMPANY] is exposed to many dangers/threats. 123 1 5 3,03 ,999 
23.2 My management mobilizes supplementary people 
whenever the workload of our teams becomes 
excessive. 
119 1 5 2,87 ,962 
23.3 In [COMPANY] it is easy to ask for help. 124 2 5 3,56 ,735 
23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about difficulties in 
my work situation. 
124 2 5 4,08 ,645 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 124 2 5 3,65 ,735 
24.2 I am familiar with processes that are strictly 
speaking outside the scope of my job. 
123 1 5 3,37 ,716 
24.3 I am expected to do my job in a certain manner 
without deviating from procedure. 
124 2 5 3,76 ,820 
Q243INV 124 1 4 2,24 ,820 
24.4 I often work under high productivity pressure (time, 
costs). 
124 2 5 3,56 ,735 
Q244INV 124 1 4 2,44 ,735 
25. When we do not dispose of a particular type of 
knowledge/information, we know who in our 
organization can help us. 
123 1 5 3,72 ,659 
26. I feel free to contact people outside of our team 
about difficulties in my work. 
122 2 5 3,87 ,692 
27. The interaction between the different steps in the 
maintenance & repair process runs smoothly. 
116 1 5 3,26 ,825 
28. The order in which you perform tasks that are 
necessary to solve a problem can vary. 
123 1 5 3,67 ,719 
29. The Maintenance & Repair process has built-in 
buffers/security in case something goes wrong or 
makes a mistake. 
118 1 5 3,32 ,738 
Q29INV 118 1 5 2,68 ,738 
30. The systems and processes I am responsible for, 
have no secrets for me. 
122 1 5 3,07 ,864 
Q30INV 122 1 5 2,93 ,864 
31. The systems and processes in our work, can lead to 
unpredictable reactions. 
122 1 5 3,02 ,848 
32. The systems and processes in our work are tightly 
coupled. 
123 2 5 3,84 ,751 
Q32INV 123 1 4 2,16 ,751 
33. The information that is needed for my work can 120 3 5 4,14 ,612 
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come from many different sources. 
1. Are you an internal or external employee? 124 1,00 1,50 1,0242 ,09065 
2. What is your gender? 124 1,00 1,50 1,0323 ,09687 
3.1. Are you a manager? 124 1,00 2,00 1,2661 ,31009 
3.2. What personnel category do you belong to? 124 1,00 3,00 1,7258 ,35369 
4. What is your physical work location? 
124 1,00 6,00 2,5968 
1,4567
0 
5. How many years of experience do you have 
regarding the Maintenance & Repair process? 





7.1. How much (%) do you use SAP history for the work 
preparation? 





7.2. From how many different people do you get input 








Q72LIKERT 120 1,00 5,00 2,7789 ,91344 
8. How many of the cases (%) do you notice a 
procedure needs to be adjusted? 





9. In how many of the cases (%) do you take action to 








10. In how many of the cases (%) do you timely register 








11.1 face-to-face communication 





11.2 telephone/cell phone 



















11.5 Other means of communication 
124 ,00 52,50 3,7132 
8,7258
6 
Ratio nondedicated vs dedicated 
124 ,00 24,00 5,0142 
3,9411
5 
Ratio voice vs nonvoice 
124 ,00 5,67 1,4073 
1,0459
4 
Ratio face vs distance 124 ,00 3,00 ,5245 ,42945 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved with my work. The work 
does not let go. 
124 2,00 4,50 3,7742 ,43845 
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13.2 I consider the adequate handling of incidents as a 
matter of honour. 
124 3,00 5,00 4,4355 ,35816 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior 
incidents to mind. 
124 3,00 5,00 4,1169 ,33956 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take into 
account the possible reaction of my colleagues. 
124 1,00 5,00 3,7500 ,44921 
13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can 
reach a decision-maker. 
124 2,00 5,00 4,1109 ,36546 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I 
use to deal with problems. 
123 2,57 5,00 3,5158 ,60604 
13.7 When handling an incident I deal with it 
incrementally. I adjust my actions. 
124 3,00 5,00 4,0081 ,30932 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who 
has the expertise to respond. 
124 3,00 5,00 3,9032 ,36633 
14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a 
solution. 
124 1,00 5,00 2,8293 ,58849 
14.3 To perform the job, I sometimes defer from 
procedure. 
124 1,00 4,00 3,0789 ,51652 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the 
consequences for the organization as a whole. 
124 3,00 5,00 4,1129 ,28176 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes rely on 
information that is (or does not need to be) 100% 
certain. 
123 1,00 4,00 2,4295 ,59763 
14.6 When I make decisions in the handling of 
incidents, my approach is rational rather than intuitive. 
124 2,75 5,00 3,8629 ,42229 
Q146INV 124 1,00 3,25 2,1371 ,42229 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential 
danger. 
124 3,33 5,00 4,2979 ,41311 
15.2 I handle near-misses and mistakes as information 
on the reliability of our system. 
124 3,00 5,00 4,2460 ,37242 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have important 
consequences, even when no-one has noticed them. 
123 3,67 5,00 4,4797 ,29139 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why 
things did not go as expected. 
124 3,67 5,00 4,3246 ,29137 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 0) it is 
easy to get hold of all necessary information. 
122 2,00 5,00 3,2447 ,60304 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 it is 
easy to get access to supplementary resources. 
121 2,00 5,00 3,2544 ,53644 
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19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our 
team what has happend prior to the incident. 
123 3,00 5,00 4,0724 ,34190 
19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 123 3,67 5,00 4,2977 ,30407 
19.3 I feel good in our team. 123 3,00 5,00 4,3221 ,38361 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill 
it is solved. 
123 3,00 5,00 4,2302 ,35146 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s 
opinion regarding the handling of incidents. 
123 3,00 5,00 4,2359 ,38420 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident 
analysis in order to better understand future incidents. 
123 2,00 5,00 3,6622 ,48951 
19.7 In our team we spend a lot of time on technical 
problem analysis to better understand future problems. 
123 3,00 5,00 3,8627 ,43870 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is 
exceptional that an opinion is not listened to. 
123 3,00 5,00 4,1378 ,36691 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 123 3,00 5,00 4,1927 ,29307 
20.3 When handling an urgent incident (priority 0) we 
consult other team members. 
118 2,00 4,60 3,6182 ,49822 
20.4 I know which assignments are crucial. 123 3,67 5,00 4,1896 ,27327 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our 
team on HOW things could go wrong with crucial 
systems. 
122 3,00 5,00 4,1264 ,31816 
20.6 There is consensus amongst the members of our 
team on HOW things could go wrong with crucial 
systems. 
122 2,00 5,00 3,9160 ,41189 
20.7 Because of pressure (time-pressure or other) our 
team often deviates from procedure. 
123 1,00 4,00 2,0707 ,42193 
22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs and time. 123 2,00 4,00 2,9537 ,53973 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling incidents. 124 2,29 5,00 3,6210 ,63641 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 124 3,00 5,00 3,6371 ,44279 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle 
incidents. 
124 3,00 5,00 3,8746 ,39664 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with 
more technical expertise make decisions. 
124 2,71 4,50 3,6363 ,42433 
23.1 [COMPANY] is exposed to many dangers/threats. 124 2,00 4,00 3,0242 ,52427 
23.2 My management mobilizes supplementary people 
whenever the workload of our teams becomes 
excessive. 
124 1,86 4,50 2,8704 ,59612 
23.3 In [COMPANY] it is easy to ask for help. 124 2,00 4,50 3,5645 ,40709 
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23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about difficulties in 
my work situation. 
124 3,00 5,00 4,0806 ,36986 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 124 2,80 5,00 3,6452 ,40698 
24.2 I am familiar with processes that are strictly 
speaking outside the scope of my job. 
124 2,00 4,50 3,3656 ,39063 
24.3 I am expected to do my job in a certain manner 
without deviating from procedure. 
124 2,00 5,00 3,7581 ,46729 
Q243INV 124 1,00 4,00 2,2419 ,46729 
24.4 I often work under high productivity pressure (time, 
costs). 
124 2,80 5,00 3,5645 ,39648 
Q244INV 124 1,00 3,20 2,4355 ,39648 
25. When we do not dispose of a particular type of 
knowledge/information, we know who in our 
organization can help us. 
124 2,60 5,00 3,7177 ,41215 
26. I feel free to contact people outside of our team 
about difficulties in my work. 
124 3,00 5,00 3,8669 ,30166 
27. The interaction between the different steps in the 
maintenance & repair process runs smoothly. 
123 2,00 4,33 3,2766 ,51447 
28. The order in which you perform tasks that are 
necessary to solve a problem can vary. 
124 2,00 5,00 3,6774 ,39123 
29. The Maintenance & Repair process has built-in 
buffers/security in case something goes wrong or 
makes a mistake. 
124 2,00 4,00 3,3230 ,37852 
Q29INV 124 2,00 4,00 2,6770 ,37852 
30. The systems and processes I am responsible for, 
have no secrets for me. 
124 1,00 5,00 3,0645 ,48845 
Q30INV 124 1,00 5,00 2,9355 ,48845 
31. The systems and processes in our work, can lead to 
unpredictable reactions. 
124 1,00 4,00 3,0339 ,50741 
32. The systems and processes in our work are tightly 
coupled. 
124 3,00 4,67 3,8367 ,34980 
Q32INV 124 1,33 3,00 2,1633 ,34980 
33. The information that is needed for my work can 
come from many different sources. 
123 3,50 5,00 4,1450 ,31530 
Efficiency 124 1,50 5,00 3,2742 ,70525 
SupRes 124 1,67 4,67 3,4718 ,64592 
Deviation 124 2,00 5,00 3,7581 ,82018 
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Team Orientation 120 2,67 5,00 4,1889 ,46964 
Sensitivity to Operations 120 3,00 5,00 4,1542 ,43384 
Preoccupation with Failure 124 3,00 5,00 4,2931 ,41620 
Deference to Expertise 124 2,40 5,00 3,8177 ,44118 
HRT 124 3,00 4,94 4,1003 ,33223 
Other 120 2,50 5,00 4,0014 ,54938 
Self 124 2,00 5,00 4,1089 ,61671 
Scheme 123 1,00 5,00 2,6504 ,88228 
SeMa 124 2,71 4,43 3,6443 ,38365 
Threat Flexibility 124 3,17 4,50 3,6156 ,26381 
Efficiency 124 2,50 4,50 3,2742 ,38662 
Pressure 124 2,33 4,33 3,2124 ,36325 
SupRes 124 2,76 4,67 3,4718 ,35956 
Deviation 124 2,00 5,00 3,7581 ,46729 
TO 123 3,50 5,00 4,1912 ,27868 
SO 123 3,50 5,00 4,1497 ,25005 
Preoccupation with Failure 124 3,60 4,90 4,2931 ,24626 
DE 124 3,20 4,60 3,8177 ,24413 
HRT 124 3,60 4,74 4,1003 ,18064 
Other 123 3,33 4,50 4,0037 ,30691 
Self 124 3,00 4,50 4,1089 ,28803 
Scheme 124 1,00 4,50 2,6391 ,53912 
SeMa 124 3,24 4,29 3,6443 ,20749 
Valid N (listwise) 30         
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Appendix F. Descriptive Team Statistics (Bank Case) 
 
 N Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Deviation 
6. What team are you a member of? In case you are a 
member of more than one team, indicate that team where 
you feel most part of. 
37 2 65 33,95 19,449 
1. Are you an internal or external employee? 37 1,00 2,00 1,2366 ,21524 
2. What is your gender? 37 1,00 2,00 1,2216 ,23919 
4. At what physical location do you work? 37 1,00 9,00 4,1881 2,43490 
5. How many years of experience with incident handling do 
you have? 
37 3,00 23,33 7,4828 4,09775 
Team Size 37 4,00 36,00 11,8378 6,51287 
7. What department are you a member of? 37 2,00 21,00 8,9221 5,61222 
8. How much of your time (%) do you spend in handling 
incidents? 
37 4,33 78,75 20,2337 14,19904 
Q9 37 56,11 100,00 85,4289 12,27276 
10. How much (%) do you register allmost immediately the 
necessary data in Peregrine? 
37 37,00 92,25 69,2769 15,17100 
11.1 face-to-face communication 37 6,67 25,00 15,6305 5,33051 
11.2 telephone/cell phone 37 7,50 60,00 30,6649 9,71278 
11.3 e-mail 37 5,27 60,00 21,3738 9,44950 
11.4 Peregrine 37 12,50 73,75 37,7853 13,57361 
11.5 Other means of communication 24 1,00 11,67 6,0645 3,15934 
Ratio non dedicated vs dedicated 37 ,42 33,81 5,5101 6,41696 
Ratio voice vs non voice 37 ,22 3,57 1,2327 ,84678 
Ratio face vs distance 37 ,06 ,65 ,1758 ,12507 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved when handling incidents. 
The work does not let go. 
37 2,00 4,25 3,4964 ,46545 
13.2 I consider the adequate handling of incidents as a 
matter of honour. 
37 3,17 5,00 4,1941 ,36927 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior incidents to 
mind. 
37 3,67 4,83 4,2645 ,24039 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take into 
account the possible reaction of my colleagues. 
37 3,00 4,40 3,7230 ,38674 
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13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can reach a 
decision-maker. 
37 3,17 4,67 4,1719 ,32094 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I use to 
deal with problems. 
37 3,33 4,67 3,9878 ,32124 
13.7 When handling an incident I deal with it incrementally. I 
adjust my actions. 
37 3,20 4,67 4,0468 ,28193 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who 
has the expertise to respond. 
37 3,50 4,67 4,0270 ,27998 
14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a solution. 37 2,00 4,40 3,3457 ,49504 
14.3 To perform the job, I sometimes defer from procedure. 37 2,33 4,20 3,4881 ,39416 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the 
consequences for the organization as a whole. 
37 3,75 4,67 4,2989 ,21463 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes rely on 
information that is (or does not need to be) 100% certain. 
37 2,17 3,67 2,8972 ,42289 
IntuitiefipvRationeel 37 1,50 2,86 2,1739 ,27914 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential 
danger. 
37 3,25 4,67 3,9358 ,31257 
15.2 I consider near-misses and mistakes as information on 
the performance of our system. 
37 3,33 4,33 3,8830 ,23491 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have important 
consequences, even when no-one has noticed them. 
37 3,80 4,83 4,3753 ,25237 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why 
things did not go as expected. 
37 3,80 4,67 4,2323 ,20060 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) it is 
easy to get hold of all necessary information. 
37 2,17 4,00 3,3129 ,41247 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 it is easy to 
get access to supplementary resources. 
37 3,17 4,50 3,8818 ,34482 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our team 
what has happend prior to the incident. 
37 2,75 4,50 3,8951 ,36538 
19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 37 3,67 4,75 4,1797 ,25747 
19.3 I feel good in our team. 37 3,67 4,83 4,2699 ,31904 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill it is 
solved. 
37 3,50 4,67 4,2044 ,30013 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s opinion 
regarding the handling of incidents. 
37 3,63 4,75 4,1510 ,27366 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident analysis 
in order to better understand future incidents. 
37 2,40 4,67 3,5677 ,46039 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is 37 3,20 4,80 4,0793 ,31276 
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exceptional that an opinion is not listened to. 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 37 3,29 4,80 4,1293 ,32385 
20.3 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) we 
consult other team members. 
37 3,50 4,67 4,2525 ,32972 
20.4 There is consensus amongst the members of our team 
on WHAT should not go wrong with crucial systems. 
37 3,33 4,40 3,9638 ,24273 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our team 
on HOW crucial systems can go wrong. 
37 3,29 4,40 3,8026 ,26170 
20.6 Because of pressure (time-pressure or other) our team 
often deviates from procedure. 
37 2,00 3,50 2,7960 ,41121 
22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs and time. 37 2,83 4,67 3,6262 ,45986 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling incidents. 37 2,50 5,00 3,5865 ,44847 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 37 2,67 4,00 3,4934 ,37134 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle 
incidents. 
37 3,22 5,00 3,8699 ,33938 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with more 
technical expertise make decisions. 
37 2,67 4,67 3,8173 ,35448 
23.1 [COMPANY]-ICT is exposed to many dangers/threats. 37 2,33 3,50 3,1336 ,26093 
23.2 My management mobilizes supplementary people 
whenever the workload of our teams becomes excessive. 
37 2,25 4,25 3,2422 ,46042 
23.3 In [COMPANY]-ICT it is easy to ask for help. 37 3,18 4,33 3,6940 ,27266 
23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about difficulties in my 
work situation. 
37 3,25 4,67 3,9199 ,29545 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 37 2,83 4,50 3,7073 ,37941 
24.2 I am familiar with processes (business or IT) that are 
strictly speaking outside the scope of my job. 
37 2,50 4,40 3,2848 ,38183 
Deviation 37 2,00 3,17 2,6488 ,29698 
24.4 I often work under high productivity pressure (time, 
costs). 
37 3,00 4,42 3,5693 ,37156 
NU12 deadline alert 37 1,00 357,00 59,8378 80,03628 
NU12 closed 37 2,00 2248,00 194,6757 391,97754 
PU12 resolved on time 37 ,00 87,32 55,6210 23,46889 
NU3 deadline alert 37 ,00 96,00 29,0270 25,83009 
NU3 closed 37 11,00 69749,00 2942,3514 11394,7998
5 
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PU3 resolved on time 37 41,89 100,00 93,6303 11,53535 
NUA deadline alert 37 1,00 417,00 88,8649 98,47593 
NUA closed 37 14,00 69785,00 3137,0270 11372,2734
4 
PUA resolved on time 37 32,73 99,91 87,1434 15,29910 
Mean NU12 per employee 37 ,22 132,24 14,7402 24,19485 
Mean NU3 per employee 37 2,75 3321,38 208,0978 558,94713 
Mean NUA per employee 37 3,50 3323,10 222,8380 555,99184 
Team Orientation 37 3,55 4,60 4,1633 ,22298 
Preoccupation with Failure 37 3,75 4,47 4,1451 ,14693 
Deference to Expertise 37 3,36 4,20 3,7556 ,19547 
Sensitivity to Operations 37 3,50 4,40 3,8832 ,22418 
HRT 37 3,77 4,26 3,9912 ,11385 
SenseMaking 37 3,32 4,05 3,7293 ,17447 
Other 37 3,19 4,25 3,8414 ,27070 
Self 37 3,00 4,50 3,8453 ,30591 
Scheme 37 2,78 4,13 3,5025 ,27394 
Threat Flexibility 37 3,29 4,20 3,6941 ,21486 
Efficiency 37 3,00 4,18 3,5978 ,33402 
Logics of Action 37 3,25 4,44 3,8147 ,23830 
Deviation 37 2,50 3,60 3,0685 ,24605 
Team Size 37 4 36 11,84 6,513 
Valid N (listwise) 24         
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Appendix G. Descriptive Team Statistics (NPP Case) 
 
 N Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Deference to Expertise (DE) 24 3,47 4,60 3,8375 ,25530 
Deviation 24 3,00 4,33 3,7222 ,38616 
Efficiency (Eff) 24 2,60 3,86 3,2112 ,33684 
High Reliability Theory (HRT) 24 3,60 4,74 4,1210 ,21450 
Other 24 3,44 4,50 4,0374 ,33292 
Preoccupations with Failure (PF) 24 3,60 4,90 4,2879 ,28058 
Pressure 24 2,60 3,76 3,1743 ,30715 
Scheme 24 1,25 3,50 2,5824 ,52405 
Self 24 3,50 4,50 4,1237 ,28036 
SenseMaking (SeMa) 24 3,24 4,07 3,6543 ,22483 
Sensitivity to Operations (SO) 24 3,67 5,00 4,1704 ,32131 
Supplementary Resources (SupRes) 24 2,76 4,00 3,4760 ,31976 
Team Orientation (TO) 24 3,75 5,00 4,2506 ,32341 
Threat Flexibility (TF) 24 3,22 4,50 3,6671 ,30368 
Number of team members (TM) 24 2 11 4,46 2,467 
Number of urgent notifications per 
employee (N0pe) 
24 ,20 292,45 46,8322 62,14910 
Number of non-urgent notifications per 
employee (N123pe) 
24 ,33 436,91 53,1870 90,61430 
Number of notifications per employee 
(NApe) 
24 ,53 729,36 100,0191 151,92554 
Team Participation (TP) 24 ,11 1,00 ,3493 ,19698 
1. Ben je [company] personeel of 
contractor? 
24 1,00 1,50 1,0313 ,11211 
10. In how many of the cases (%) do you 
timely register the necessary data in SAP? 
24 5,00 100,00 65,5115 21,14723 
11.1 face-to-face communication 24 15,00 82,50 42,5240 21,35135 
11.2 telephone/cell phone 24 3,37 80,00 30,1366 15,15244 
11.3 e-mail 24 ,00 80,00 29,9078 16,75122 
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11.4 SAP 24 10,00 63,50 39,0600 13,18074 
11.5 Other means of communication 24 ,00 52,50 4,8007 11,14991 
13.7 When handling an incident I deal 
with it incrementally. I adjust my actions. 
24 3,00 4,50 3,9498 ,33317 
2. What is your gender? 24 1,00 1,50 1,0396 ,11701 
3.1. Are you a manager? 24 1,00 2,00 1,3948 ,33351 
3.2. What personnel category do you 
belong to? 
24 1,00 2,25 1,5871 ,33162 
4. What is your physical work location? 24 1,00 6,00 2,4146 1,37378 
5. How many years of experience do you 
have regarding the Maintenance & Repair 
process? 
24 ,53 23,29 9,2827 5,36222 
7.1. How much (%) do you use SAP 
history for the work preparation? 
24 7,50 90,00 36,0900 20,69900 
7.2. From how many different people do 
you get input (conversation, telephone, e-
mail, notifications)? 
23 12,50 733,33 211,1306 203,62842 
Q72LIKERT 23 1,50 5,00 3,0391 ,99496 
8. How many of the cases (%) do you 
notice a procedure needs to be adjusted? 
24 2,00 37,50 14,7288 8,95689 
9. In how many of the cases (%) do you 
take action to change the procedure? 
24 5,00 100,00 76,8371 23,14973 
Ratio face vs distance 24 ,10 1,76 ,5642 ,42393 
Ratio nondedicated vs dedicated 24 ,00 24,00 5,4369 5,06875 
Ratio voice vs nonvoice 24 ,00 4,67 1,4851 1,07004 
Team Size 24 4 70 18,04 18,700 
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Appendix H. Data Reduction (Bank Case) 
 
Control variables 
An overview of all variables is shown in Appendix D (Bank Case) and Appendix E (NPP Case). It 
was the basis for our further analysis. We have used factor analysis to reduce various sets of 
items into a smaller number of compound factors. All factors are extracted by Principal 
Component Analysis with Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization. First, we isolated the 
moderator items () from the items relating to theory and we performed a factor analysis on the 
first set. We only performed such an analysis if the necessary conditions are met: KMO measure 
higher than 0.50 and a significant value of the Bartlett test (Poelmans, 2002, p. 135) (Table 0.10). 
The factors emerging from our analysis meet the exigency that they should explain for 60% of 
total Variance (Table 0.11). Our approach is in line with Koch’s (1993) modus operandus and has 




Deviation Analysis N Missing N 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 3,62 0,699 317 3 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 3,46 0,777 312 8 
23.3 In [COMPANY]-ICT it is easy to ask for 
help. 
3,63 0,667 314 6 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 
it is easy to get access to supplementary 
resources. 
3,79 0,742 289 31 
24.4 I often work under high productivity 
pressure (time, costs). 
3,57 0,829 314 6 
22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs and 
time. 
3,58 0,910 313 7 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts 
that I use to deal with problems. 
4,03 0,710 310 10 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to 
handle incidents. 
3,82 0,792 308 12 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling 
incidents. 
3,55 0,851 307 13 
24.3 I am expected to do my job in a certain 
manner without deviating from procedure. 
3,34 0,792 315 5 
14.3 To perform the job, I sometimes defer from 
procedure. 
3,54 0,847 309 11 
Table 0.9 - Items relating to Control Variables (Bank) 
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Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
,618 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 359,479 
  df 55 
  Sig. ,000 




Total % Var. Cum.% Total % of Var. Cum.% Total % Var. Cum.% 
1 2,174 19,760 19,760 2,174 19,760 19,760 1,869 16,988 16,988 
2 1,704 15,492 35,252 1,704 15,492 35,252 1,706 15,513 32,501 
3 1,350 12,272 47,524 1,350 12,272 47,524 1,492 13,560 46,061 
4 1,111 10,095 57,619 1,111 10,095 57,619 1,271 11,558 57,619 
5 ,890 8,087 65,707       
6 ,819 7,446 73,153       
7 ,702 6,378 79,531       
8 ,627 5,701 85,232       
9 ,602 5,468 90,700       
10 ,580 5,276 95,976       
11 ,443 4,024 100,000       
Table 0.11 - Total Variance Explained by the Factors for the Control Variables (Bank) 
 
  Component 
 
1 2 3 4 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 0,674912 -0,07482 -0,03762 0,128155 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 0,658099 -0,06776 0,12968 0,150919 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 it is easy to get 
access to supplementary resources. 0,629954 0,279555 0,004025 -0,20017 
23.3 In [COMPANY]-ICT it is easy to ask for help. 0,610508 -0,17318 0,130691 -0,04616 
24.4 I often work under high productivity pressure (time, costs). -0,00729 0,824612 0,12017 -0,16194 
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22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs and time. -0,07863 0,777188 -0,10134 0,123354 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I use to deal 
with problems. -0,14782 0,167159 0,724447 0,138339 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle 
incidents. 0,274569 0,019724 0,702002 -0,26601 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling incidents. 0,220746 -0,24842 0,599949 0,240725 
24.3 I am expected to do my job in a certain manner without 
deviating from procedure. -0,21081 0,279237 0,057654 -0,71778 
14.3 To perform the job, I sometimes defer from procedure. -0,11767 0,368895 0,225107 0,696784 
Table 0.12 - Rotated Component Matrix for Control Variables 
 
Threat Flexibility 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 
 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 
 
23.3 In [COMPANY]-ICT it is easy to ask for help. 
 
23.2 My management mobilizes supplementary people whenever the workload of our 
teams becomes excessive. 
 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 1 or 2 it is easy to get access to supplementary 
resources. 
Efficiency 
24.4 I often work under high productivity pressure (time, costs). 
 
22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs and time. 
Peregrine 
10. How much (%) do you register allmost immediately the necessary data in Peregrine? 
 
9. How much (%) do you rely on Peregrine for the registration/coordination 
/escalation/closing of an incident? 
Logics of Action 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I use to deal with problems. 
 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle incidents. 
 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling incidents. 
Deviation 
24.3INV 








20.6 Because of pressure (time-pressure or other) our team often deviates from 
procedure. 
Table 0.13 - Labeling of the factors based on moderator variables 
HRT and SeMa 
Next, we chose to split the items in two sets: a set of items relating to theory (HRT and SeMa), 
and another set relating to the moderator variables. By doing so we obtained the result shown in 
Table 0.14. 
Some constructs could be labeled according to theoretical constructs and sub-constructs. For the 
factors relating to HRT, we refer to Weick et al. (1999). For the factors relating to Scheme and 
making sense of uncertainty, we specifically refer to our relabeling of SenseMaking in Chapter 4 
(Conceptual Model). Other constructs could not be labeled according to theoretical constructs 
and sub-constructs. For these factors we have chosen a new, best-fitting, label (e.g. Team 
Orientation). The factors in bold (Table 0.18) have a sufficiently high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha ≥.60) to allow for aggregating them in a compounded indicator.  







13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I 
can reach a decision-maker. 
4,13 ,677 314 6 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I 
know who has the expertise to respond. 
3,98 ,655 313 7 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into 
account the consequences for the organization 
as a whole. 
4,29 ,567 311 9 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of 
potential danger. 
3,92 ,666 296 24 
15.2 I consider near-misses and mistakes as 
information on the performance of our system. 
3,88 ,648 297 23 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have 
important consequences, even when no-one 
has noticed them. 
4,38 ,577 313 7 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I 
investigate why things did not go as expected. 
4,24 ,599 310 10 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 
or 2) it is easy to get hold of all necessary 
information. 
3,26 ,853 290 30 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the 4,14 ,653 313 7 
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incident untill it is solved. 
19.5 In our team we take into account each 
other’s opinion regarding the handling of 
incidents. 
4,12 ,587 313 7 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each 
other; it is exceptional that an opinion is not 
listened to. 
4,05 ,657 312 8 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 4,11 ,631 313 7 
20.3 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 
or 2) we consult other team members. 
4,20 ,676 296 24 
20.4 There is consensus amongst the members 
of our team on WHAT should not go wrong with 
crucial systems. 
3,96 ,640 300 20 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members 
of our team on HOW things could go wrong with 
crucial systems. 
3,76 ,638 297 23 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let 
subordinates with more technical expertise 
make decisions. 
3,79 ,750 300 20 
23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about 
difficulties in my work situation. 
3,85 ,732 313 7 
24.2 I am familiar with processes (business or 
IT) that are strictly speaking outside the scope 
of my job. 
3,31 ,823 312 8 
Table 0.14 - Descriptive Statistics for items relating to HRT 
The KMO analysis (Table 0.15) results in a value of 0.795 which can be considered meritorious 
(Poelmans, 2002) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant (p ≤ 0.001).  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
,795 




  df 153 
  Sig. ,000 
Table 0.15 - KMO and Bartlett's Test for HRT Factor Analysis 
Subsequently a factor analysis was run on these items, resulting in the Rotation Component 
Matrix shown in Table 0.17 from which four factors can be derived, cumulatively explaining 
50.43% of total variance (Table 0.16). From Table 0.17 can be derived the items underlying the 
factors relating to the HRT constructs. As the factor composition matched the factor 
composition of the Bank Case, they got labeled accordingly (Table 0.18). 




ent Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 















1 4,338 24,098 24,098 4,338 24,098 24,098 2,944 16,356 16,356 
2 2,012 11,176 35,274 2,012 11,176 35,274 2,342 13,009 29,366 
3 1,459 8,105 43,379 1,459 8,105 43,379 2,016 11,201 40,566 
4 1,269 7,048 50,427 1,269 7,048 50,427 1,775 9,860 50,427 
5 ,977 5,427 55,854             
6 ,934 5,189 61,043             
7 ,859 4,772 65,815             
8 ,832 4,623 70,438             
9 ,771 4,286 74,723             
10 ,739 4,104 78,827             
11 ,664 3,690 82,517             
12 ,607 3,374 85,890             
13 ,573 3,184 89,074             
14 ,536 2,978 92,052             
15 ,437 2,426 94,477             
16 ,396 2,201 96,678             
17 ,323 1,795 98,474             
18 ,275 1,526 100,000             
Table 0.16 - Total Variance Explained by the HRT Factors (Bank) 
  





1 2 3 4 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 0,779539 0,037776 0,101271 0,147273 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is 
exceptional that an opinion is not listened to. 0,779074 0,006255 0,076774 0,193751 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s opinion 
regarding the handling of incidents. 0,728231 0,133892 0,155673 0,126674 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill it is 
solved. 0,584455 0,292655 0,055097 0,009185 
20.3 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) we 
consult other team members. 0,486741 0,039816 0,173282 0,31757 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential 
danger. -0,02712 0,686307 0,03997 0,091803 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have important 
consequences, even when no-one has noticed them. 0,291055 0,669452 0,028237 -0,2635 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the 
consequences for the organization as a whole. 0,107064 0,638492 0,019427 0,134006 
15.2 I consider near-misses and mistakes as information on 
the performance of our system. -0,10705 0,631128 0,002229 0,447503 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why things 
did not go as expected. 0,229484 0,615763 0,138503 -0,10685 
13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can reach a 
decision-maker. 0,090566 0,059052 0,695075 0,0867 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who has 
the expertise to respond. -0,04398 0,258817 0,690137 -0,04908 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with more 
technical expertise make decisions. 0,220019 -0,01888 0,524863 0,040273 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) it is 
easy to get hold of all necessary information. 0,12746 -0,18948 0,503384 0,077087 
23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about difficulties in my 
work situation. 0,427503 0,054195 0,446155 0,007562 
24.2 I am familiar with processes (business or IT) that are 
strictly speaking outside the scope of my job. 0,018834 0,117848 0,423331 0,188404 
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20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our team 
on HOW things could go wrong with crucial systems. 0,3024 -0,00321 0,200798 0,788595 
20.4 There is consensus amongst the members of our team 
on WHAT should not go wrong with crucial systems. 0,332119 0,084327 0,117706 0,784991 
 Table 0.17 - Rotation Matrix for HRT constructs 
Team Orientation 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is exceptional 
that an opinion is not listened to. 
 20.2 In our team we trust each other. 
 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s opinion 
regarding the handling of incidents. 
 19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill it is solved. 
 
20.3 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) we consult 
other team members. 
 




15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential danger. 
 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have important 
consequences, even when no-one has noticed them. 
 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the 
consequences for the organization as a whole. 
 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why things did not 
go as expected. 
 
15.2 I handle near-misses and mistakes as information on the 
reliability of our system. 
Deference to Expertise 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who has the 
expertise to respond. 
 
13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can reach a 
decision-maker. 
 
24.2 I am familiar with processes (business or IT) that are strictly 
speaking outside the scope of my job. 
 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with more 
technical expertise make decisions. 
 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 1 or 2) it is easy to 
get hold of all necessary information. 
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Sensitivity to Operations 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our team on 
HOW crucial systems can go wrong. 
 
20.4 There is consensus amongst the members of our team on 
WHAT should not go wrong with crucial systems. 
Making sense of Other 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our team what 
has happend prior to the incident. 
 19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 
 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident analysis in order 
to better understand future incidents. 
 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take into account the 
possible reaction of my colleagues. 
Making sense of Self 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved when handling incidents. The work 
does not let go. 
 
13.2 I consider the adequate handling of incidents as a matter of 
honour.. 
Scheme 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes rely on information that 
is (or does not need to be) 100% certain. 
 14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a solution. 
 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior incidents to mind. 
Table 0.18 - Labeling of HRT constructs based on the research data 
Next, the procedure was repeated for the items relating to SenseMaking (Table 0.19). These 
items were factor analyzed. 
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19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 4,17 ,577 314 6 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on 
incident analysis in order to better understand 
future incidents. 
3,51 ,896 309 11 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report 
in our team what has happend prior to the 
incident. 3,85 ,773 311 9 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved when handling 
incidents. The work does not let go. 3,46 1,043 306 14 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior 
incidents to mind. 4,27 ,639 312 8 
13.2 I consider the adequate handling of 
incidents as a matter of honour.. 4,13 ,764 309 11 
14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a 
solution. 3,39 ,884 311 9 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes 
rely on information that is (or does not need to 
be) 100% certain.  
2,83 ,965 309 11 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take 
into account the possible reaction of my 
colleagues. 
3,79 ,896 307 13 
Table 0.19 - Descriptive Statistics for SenseMaking related items 
The KMO analysis (Table 0.20) results in a value of 0.651 which can be considered mediocre and 
the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant (p ≤ 0.001) (Poelmans, 2002). The three factors 
explain 55.84% of total variance of the eigenvalues (Table 0.21). 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
,651 




  df 36 
  Sig. ,000 
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Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % Var Cum.% Total % of Var Cum. % Total % of Var. Cum.% 
1 2,251 25,008 25,008 2,251 25,008 25,008 2,095 23,277 23,277 
2 1,494 16,603 41,611 1,494 16,603 41,611 1,648 18,311 41,588 
3 1,281 14,232 55,843 1,281 14,232 55,843 1,283 14,256 55,843 
4 ,845 9,387 65,230             
5 ,827 9,193 74,423             
6 ,774 8,596 83,019             
7 ,568 6,313 89,332             
8 ,564 6,268 95,600             
9 ,396 4,400 100,000             
Table 0.21 - Total Variance Explained by the SenseMaking Factors (Bank) 
From Table 6.2 can be derived the items underlying the factors relating to the SeMa constructs. 





1 2 3 
19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 0,82791 -0,04916 0,072066 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our team what has happend prior to the 
incident. 0,825758 -0,06752 0,101278 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident analysis in order to better understand future 
incidents. 0,66467 0,198809 -0,17084 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take into account the possible reaction of my 
colleagues. 0,489268 0,205248 -0,06493 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved when handling incidents. The work does not let go. 0,016869 0,789055 -0,14554 
13.2 I consider the adequate handling of incidents as a matter of honour.. 0,087022 0,777071 -0,04115 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior incidents to mind. 0,150058 0,575723 0,388872 
14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a solution. 0,054505 -0,01671 0,768505 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes rely on information that is (or does not need to be) 
100% certain. -0,11451 -0,03377 0,685168 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
Table 0.22 - Rotation Matrix for SenseMaking (Bank) 
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Appendix I. Data Reduction (NPP Case) 
 
We proceeded by analogy with the Bank Case as follows: 
Control Variables 
First, we isolated the moderator items from the items relating to theory and we performed a 
factor analysis on the first set (Table 0.23). We only performed such an analysis if the necessary 
conditions are met: KMO measure higher than 0.5 and a significant value of the Bartlett test 
(Table 0.24) (Poelmans, 2002, p. 135). 








24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 
3,72 ,832 128 0 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 
3,71 ,824 128 0 
23.3 In [COMPANY] it is easy to ask for help. 
3,64 ,839 128 0 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 0 it 
is easy to get access to supplementary 
resources. 3,89 1,449 128 0 
24.4 I often work under high productivity 
pressure (time, costs). 
3,64 ,839 128 0 
22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs 
and time. 3,13 1,143 128 0 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal 
contacts that I use to deal with problems. 
3,66 1,089 128 0 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience 
to handle incidents. 3,96 ,798 128 0 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling 
incidents. 
3,70 ,985 128 0 
24.3 I am expected to do my job in a certain 
manner without deviating from procedure. 3,83 ,897 128 0 
14.3 To perform the job, I sometimes defer 
from procedure. 3,24 1,169 128 0 
Table 0.23 - Descriptive Statistics for items related to moderator items (NPP) 
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Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
,703 




  df 55 
  Sig. ,000 
Table 0.24 - KMO and Bartlett's Test for Factor Analysis on Control Variable Items (NPP) 
The total variance that can be explained by the factors resulting from this rotation is sufficient 





Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
















1 3,448 31,343 31,343 3,448 31,343 31,343 2,582 23,471 23,471 
2 1,715 15,592 46,936 1,715 15,592 46,936 1,852 16,833 40,304 
3 1,115 10,137 57,073 1,115 10,137 57,073 1,602 14,564 54,868 
4 1,001 9,100 66,174 1,001 9,100 66,174 1,244 11,306 66,174 
5 ,801 7,279 73,453             
6 ,721 6,556 80,009             
7 ,617 5,611 85,620             
8 ,489 4,445 90,065             
9 ,474 4,312 94,377             
10 ,371 3,375 97,751             
11 ,247 2,249 100,000             
Table 0.25 - Total Variance Explained by Control Factors (NPP) 
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By doing so we obtained the result shown in Table 0.26. 
  Component 
 
1 2 3 4 
22.3 I feel I receive challenging assingments. 0,793042 0,265743 0,012742 0,005526 
22.2 I have a lot of freedom when handling incidents. 0,689263 0,075591 0,312801 -0,43032 
24.1 I am encouraged to ask questions. 0,674437 0,107802 0,237991 0,231671 
22.4 I have sufficient training and experience to handle incidents. 0,66928 0,042443 0,022402 0,277159 
24.4 I often work under high productivity pressure (time, costs). 0,130925 0,802759 0,082538 0,123202 
22.1 I feel a lot of pressure to save on costs and time. -0,04732 0,786163 0,105917 0,329976 
14.3 To perform the job, I sometimes defer from procedure. 0,233215 0,679231 -0,11599 -0,21383 
17.2 When handling an incident of priority 0 it is easy to get access to 
supplementary resources. -0,00235 0,070339 0,90128 0,055043 
13.6 I dispose of a number of informal contacts that I use to deal with 
problems. 
0,455056 0,00422 0,589496 -0,15026 
23.3 In [COMPANY] it is easy to ask for help. 0,485522 -0,04516 0,503062 0,281174 
24.3 I am expected to do my job in a certain manner without deviating 
from procedure. 
0,241771 0,176149 0,05002 0,808389 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation 
converged in 6 iterations. 
Table 0.26 - Rotated Component Matrix for Control Variables (NPP Case) 
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HRT and SeMa 








13.5 When problems arise, I know 
where/how I can reach a decision-
maker. 
4,20 ,836 128 0 
14.1 When something exceptional 
happens, I know who has the 
expertise to respond. 
3,97 ,822 128 0 
14.4 When handling an incident I take 
into account the consequences for 
the organization as a whole. 
4,19 ,696 128 0 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an 
indication of potential danger. 4,38 ,711 128 0 
15.2 I handle near-misses and 
mistakes as information on the 
reliability of our system. 4,31 ,740 128 0 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that 
could have important consequences, 
even when no-one has noticed them. 4,54 ,614 128 0 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, 
I investigate why things did not go as 
expected. 
4,41 ,634 128 0 
17.1 When handling a severe incident 
(priority 0) it is easy to get hold of all 
necessary information. 3,82 1,405 127 1 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for 
the incident untill it is solved. 4,34 ,788 128 0 
19.5 In our team we take into account 
each other’s opinion regarding the 
handling of incidents. 
4,35 ,705 128 0 
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20.1 In our team we listen carefully to 
each other; it is exceptional that an 
opinion is not listened to. 
4,27 ,726 128 0 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 4,32 ,742 128 0 
20.3 When handling an urgent 
incident (priority 0) we consult other 
team members. 
4,18 1,213 128 0 
20.4 I know which assignments are 
crucial. 
4,32 ,663 128 0 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the 
members of our team on HOW things 
could go wrong with crucial systems.. 4,32 ,752 128 0 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let 
subordinates with more technical 
expertise make decisions. 3,76 ,929 128 0 
23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors 
about difficulties in my work situation. 4,14 ,718 128 0 
24.2 I am familiar with processes that 
are strictly speaking outside the 
scope of my job. 
3,47 ,869 128 0 
Table 0.27 - Items related to HRT 
The KMO analysis (Table 0.28) results in a value of 0.887 which can be considered meritorious 
(Poelmans, 2002) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant (p ≤ 0.001).  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
,887 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 965,206 
  df 153 
  Sig. ,000 
Table 0.28 - KMO and Bartlett's Test for Factor Analysis on HRT items 
Subsequently a factor analysis was run on these items, resulting in the Rotation Component 
Matrix shown in Table 0.30 from which four factors can be derived, cumulatively explaining 
61.32% of total variance (Table 0.29). From Table 0.30 can be derived the items underlying the 
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factors relating to the HRT constructs. As the factor composition matched the factor 




Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cum. % Total % of 
Variance 
Cum. % Total % of 
Variance 
Cum. % 
1 6,762 37,567 37,567 6,762 37,567 37,567 3,907 21,706 21,706 
2 1,953 10,851 48,418 1,953 10,851 48,418 3,238 17,990 39,696 
3 1,286 7,146 55,563 1,286 7,146 55,563 2,302 12,787 52,483 
4 1,037 5,759 61,322 1,037 5,759 61,322 1,591 8,839 61,322 
5 ,904 5,021 66,343             
6 ,853 4,737 71,080             
7 ,715 3,974 75,054             
8 ,633 3,518 78,572             
9 ,593 3,293 81,866             
10 ,517 2,873 84,739             
11 ,441 2,449 87,188             
12 ,402 2,235 89,424             
13 ,387 2,148 91,572             
14 ,357 1,981 93,553             
15 ,351 1,948 95,500             
16 ,307 1,708 97,208             
17 ,296 1,645 98,853             
18 ,206 1,147 100,000             
Table 0.29 - Total Variance Explained HRT constructs (NPP Case) 





 1 2 3 4 
19.4 As a team we feel ownership for the incident untill it is solved. 0,805917 0,225291 0,17263 -0,06453 
19.5 In our team we take into account each other’s opinion regarding the handling of incidents. 0,798533 0,072209 0,309148 0,030481 
20.2 In our team we trust each other. 0,769187 0,223861 0,018252 0,169564 
20.1 In our team we listen carefully to each other; it is exceptional that an opinion is not listened to. 0,732879 0,119266 0,21503 0,245246 
20.4 I know which assignments are crucial. 0,686456 0,208878 0,35489 0,049751 
20.5 There is consensus amongst the members of our team on HOW things could go wrong with 
crucial systems. 
0,663605 0,240695 0,023317 0,327856 
15.1 I consider near-misses as an indication of potential danger. 0,211704 0,726828 -0,00383 0,248599 
14.4 When handling an incident I take into account the consequences for the organization as a whole. 0,26487 0,710737 0,100608 0,000151 
15.2 I handle near-misses and mistakes as information on the reliability of our system. 0,08264 0,701886 0,281949 0,114067 
15.3 I tend to report mistakes that could have important consequences, even when no-one has 
noticed them. 
0,061786 0,69845 0,167185 0,044508 
15.4 When the unexpected happens, I investigate why things did not go as expected. 0,25702 0,658074 0,279043 -0,04206 
13.5 When problems arise, I know where/how I can reach a decision-maker. 0,236786 0,497769 0,472131 -0,23803 
22.5 When necessary, superiors let subordinates with more technical expertise make decisions. 0,148353 0,15957 0,628949 0,171374 
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23.4 I feel free to speak to superiors about difficulties in my work situation. 0,391778 0,152033 0,6214 0,097085 
24.2 I am familiar with processes that are strictly speaking outside the scope of my job. 0,151695 0,225424 0,613175 0,287231 
14.1 When something exceptional happens, I know who has the expertise to respond. 0,124702 0,464247 0,537089 -0,0847 
20.3 When handling an urgent incident (priority 0) we consult other team members. 0,339445 0,068124 0,007808 0,762989 
17.1 When handling a severe incident (priority 0) it is easy to get hold of all necessary information. 0,051062 0,044247 0,372455 0,735659 
Table 0.30 - Rotated Component Matrix for HRT 
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Next, the procedure was repeated for the items relating to SenseMaking. The items that were 
supposedly related to SenseMaking were grouped (Table 0.31) and factor analyzed.  
 







19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 4,42 ,683 128 0 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on 
incident analysis in order to better understand 
future incidents. 
3,82 1,061 128 0 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in 
our team what has happend prior to the incident. 
4,26 ,796 128 0 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved with my work. The 
work does not let go. 3,86 ,970 128 0 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior 
incidents to mind. 4,20 ,787 128 0 
13.2 I consider the adequate handling of incidents 
as a matter of honour. 4,48 ,664 128 0 
14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a 
solution. 
3,02 1,292 128 0 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes 
rely on information that is (or does not need 
to be) 100% certain. 2,63 1,267 128 0 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take 
into account the possible reaction of my 
colleagues. 
3,82 ,900 128 0 
Table 0.31 - Items Related to SenseMaking 
 
The KMO analysis (Table 0.32) results in a value of 0.752 which can be considered middling and 
the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant (p ≤ 0.001) (Poelmans, 2002). 
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Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
,752 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Aprox. Chi-Square 310,119 
  df 36 
  Sig. ,000 
Table 0.32 - KMO and Bartlett's Test for Factor Analysis on SenseMaking items 
 
From Table 0.33 can be derived the items underlying the factors relating to the SeMa constructs. 
As the factor composition matched the factor composition of the Bank Case, they got labeled 
accordingly. 
  Component 
 1 2 3 
19.2 In our team we learn from our mistakes. 0,834937 0,162808 0,151281 
19.1 When the unexpected happens, we report in our team what has happend prior 
to the incident. 
0,808836 0,163605 0,080555 
19.6 In our team we spend a lot of time on incident analysis in order to better 
understand future incidents. 
0,787484 0,1094 0,189624 
13.1 I feel emotionally involved with my work. The work does not let go. 0,027415 0,85125 0,023237 
13.3 When handling incidents I call similar prior incidents to mind. 0,145967 0,757837 0,225462 
13.2 I consider the adequate handling of incidents as a matter of honour. 0,33816 0,663014 -0,17009 
13.4 When making decisions/taking action I take into account the possible reaction 
of my colleagues. 
0,16369 0,491224 0,453343 
14.2 I sometimes rely on improvisation to find a solution. 0,123443 0,049064 0,864034 
14.5 When I handle an incident, I sometimes rely on information that is (or does not 
need to be) 100% certain. 
0,151918 0,027915 0,794955 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
Table 0.33 - Rotated Component Matrix for SenseMaking (NPP Case) 
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Appendix J. Normalized Process Reliability 
 
 
 N Range Minimum Maximum 
Zscore: PU12Year 37 3,72076 -2,36999 1,35077 
Zscore: PU3Year  37 5,03739 -4,48520 ,55219 
Zscore: PUAYear  37 4,39108 -3,55682 ,83426 
Zscore: PU12Jan 23 3,07840 -1,87752 1,20088 
Zscore: PU12Feb 24 3,51438 -1,78266 1,73172 
Zscore: PU12Mrt 22 2,81663 -1,34533 1,47131 
Zscore: PU12Apr 30 3,24782 -1,83309 1,41473 
Zscore: PU12May 29 3,43007 -2,02372 1,40635 
Zscore: PU12Jun 30 3,55642 -2,02148 1,53494 
Zscore: PU12Jul 29 3,26228 -1,91728 1,34501 
Zscore: PU12Aug 29 2,68551 -1,40794 1,27757 
Zscore: PU12Sep 31 3,30188 -1,99040 1,31148 
Zscore: PU12Oct 31 3,41166 -2,34082 1,07084 
Zscore: PU12Nov 32 3,44995 -1,99183 1,45811 
Zscore: PU12Dec 28 2,84375 -1,40146 1,44229 
Zscore: PU3Jan 27 3,96238 -3,33641 ,62597 
Zscore: PU3Feb 28 4,62945 -4,06401 ,56543 
Zscore: PU3Mrt 28 4,24944 -3,73046 ,51898 
Zscore: PU3Apr 35 4,29728 -3,62560 ,67168 
Zscore: PU3May 36 4,71747 -4,19621 ,52126 
Zscore: PU3Jun 35 5,73936 -5,21862 ,52074 
Zscore: PU3Jul 36 5,47266 -5,05227 ,42039 
Zscore: PU3Aug 35 4,79958 -4,14012 ,65946 
Zscore: PU3Sep 37 4,35678 -3,98692 ,36986 
Zscore: PU3Oct 37 4,61972 -4,12664 ,49308 
Zscore: PU3Nov 36 5,33167 -4,81682 ,51486 
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Zscore: PU3Dec 36 5,19247 -4,69573 ,49673 
Zscore: PUAJan 28 5,22378 -4,72210 ,50167 
Zscore: PUAFeb 28 3,74268 -2,87864 ,86405 
Zscore: PUAMrt 28 3,55559 -2,73827 ,81732 
Zscore: PUAApr 35 4,02718 -3,16700 ,86019 
Zscore: PUAMay 36 4,14928 -3,41943 ,72984 
Zscore: PUAJun 35 4,81781 -3,88840 ,92941 
Zscore: PUAJul 36 4,82024 -4,18222 ,63802 
Zscore: PUAAug 35 4,18379 -3,38935 ,79445 
Zscore: PUASep 37 4,67746 -4,08140 ,59606 
Zscore: PUAOct 37 4,40914 -3,73210 ,67704 
Zscore: PUANov 37 4,90871 -4,13243 ,77628 
Zscore: PUADec 37 4,42816 -3,74315 ,68502 
Valid N (listwise) 14       
Table 0.34 - Descriptive Statistics for Normalized Reliability (Bank) 
 
  N Range Minimum Maximum 
Zscore: PU0Year 24 4,88034 -4,47932 ,40101 
Zscore: PU123Year 24 4,64523 -4,10073 ,54450 
Zscore: PAUYear 24 4,86319 -4,38086 ,48232 
Zscore: PU0Sep 21 3,08333 -2,58828 ,49505 
Zscore: PU0Oct 22 4,38224 -3,92281 ,45943 
Zscore: PU0Nov 21 4,15628 -3,76692 ,38936 
Zscore: PU0Dec 22 4,01329 -3,37757 ,63571 
Zscore: PU0Jan 20 4,52649 -4,12816 ,39833 
Zscore: PU0Feb 23 3,96763 -3,41906 ,54857 
Zscore: PU0Mrt 23 4,75177 -4,43154 ,32023 
Zscore: PU0Apr 23 4,13402 -3,68107 ,45294 
Zscore: PU0May 21 3,51009 -2,85264 ,65745 
Zscore: PU0Jun 22 4,50153 -4,06979 ,43174 
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Zscore: PU0Jul 20 4,52894 -4,20285 ,32608 
Zscore: PU0Aug 22 4,13832 -3,81177 ,32655 
Zscore: PU123Sep 18 3,39753 -2,69348 ,70404 
Zscore: PU123Oct 20 3,88119 -3,23855 ,64264 
Zscore: PU123Nov 22 3,68808 -3,09649 ,59159 
Zscore: PU123Dec 23 3,53178 -2,86935 ,66242 
Zscore: PU123Jan 22 4,03969 -3,39461 ,64509 
Zscore: PU123Feb 23 3,97340 -3,44645 ,52695 
Zscore: PU123Mrt 24 4,25985 -3,74701 ,51284 
Zscore: PU123Apr 23 4,74845 -4,38152 ,36693 
Zscore: PU123May 23 4,88451 -4,56209 ,32242 
Zscore: PU123Jun 23 4,82065 -4,46075 ,35990 
Zscore: PU123Jul 23 4,74773 -4,31826 ,42947 
Zscore: PU123Aug 22 4,55869 -4,03981 ,51888 
Zscore: PUASep 21 3,57641 -3,03245 ,54395 
Zscore: PUAOct 22 3,88619 -3,24994 ,63625 
Zscore: PUANov 23 3,71465 -3,04689 ,66776 
Zscore: PUADec 23 4,62036 -4,12752 ,49284 
Zscore: PUAJan 22 4,48929 -3,84268 ,64661 
Zscore: PUAFeb 23 4,65562 -3,99182 ,66380 
Zscore: PUAMrt 24 4,00746 -3,48936 ,51811 
Zscore: PUAApr 23 4,29313 -3,77966 ,51347 
Zscore: PUAMay 23 4,84519 -4,58307 ,26212 
Zscore: PUAJun 23 4,89441 -4,52366 ,37075 
Zscore: PUAJul 23 4,86141 -4,53609 ,32532 
Zscore: PUAAug 23 4,15063 -3,75422 ,39642 
Valid N (listwise) 17       
Table 0.35 - Descriptive Statistics for Normalized Reliability (NPP) 
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Appendix K. Incident Management Workflow (Bank Case) 
 
Incident management VERSION  2.0
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Figure 0.1 - Incident Management Work Flow 
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
Organizationele betrouwbaarheid is een belangrijk thema binnen elke organisatie. In deze thesis 
hebben we trachten na te gaan welke contextuele en structurele organisatiedimensies bijdragen 
tot een hoge betrouwbaarheid van het incident management proces van het IT departement van 
een financiële instelling en dat van een kerncentrale. We deden dit aan hand van constructen en 
inzichten die hun oorsprong vinden in onderzoek naar zogenaamde Hoge Betrouwbaarheid 
Organisaties (HROs) en Sensemaking (SeMa) met de bedoeling een antwoord te vinden op 
volgende onderzoeksvragen: (1) zijn beide organisaties HROs? en (2) welke factoren dragen bij 
tot een hoge organizationele betrouwbaarheid? Middels een hermeneutische 
onderzoeksmethodologie, bouwend op zowel kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve methoden, en na 
een studie van de belangrijkste literatuur inzake High Reliability Theory (HRT), Normal Accidents 
Theory, Sensemaking en IS Fit, kwamen we tot een reconceptualisatie van HRT. Het is deze 
reconceptualizatie die het mogelijk maakt de onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden zoals 
hieronder weergegeven. 
1. Zijn beide gevalsstudies HROs? Beide organisaties kunnen terecht HRO genoemd worden 
aangezien de constructen zoals beschreven in onze HRT reconceptualisatie er waargenomen 
kunnen worden. In het algemeen scoort de kerncentrale (als archetypische HRO) het hoogst op 
de HRO karakteristieken.  
2. Welke factoren dragen bij tot een hoge organizationele betrouwbaarheid? Het antwoord op 
deze tweede onderzoeksvraag is veel minder eenduidig. In het algemeen stellen we vast dat een 
hoge score op HRO en SeMa constructen niet noodzakelijkerwijze positief bijdraagt tot 
betrouwbaarheid, maar dat het vergif in de dosis zit. Vertrekkend van het gereconceptualiseerde 
theoretische kader konden we vaststellen dat de nieuw geïntroduceerde factoren als Team 
Orientation, Threat Flexibility en Efficiency, eenduidig bijdragen tot betrouwbaarheid. Ondanks 
het feit dat er niet zoiets is als een ideale betrouwbaarheidscocktail zijn er sterke aanwijzingen 
dat een gereconceptualiseerde HRT waardevol advies kan verlenen voor het ontwerp van 
processen die nood hebben aan hoge betrouwbaarheid. Dezelfde conclusie kan getrokken 
worden wanneer de vergelijking gemaakt wordt tussen teams. Contextuele en structurele 
dimensies (bv. teamgrootte, werklast en tijdsbesteding) blijken immers een belangrijke 
modererende invloed te hebben op de betrouwbaarheid van een team. 





                                                             
1 In this thesis, more than once we rely on metaphors to gain insights in the objects of our study. “The dangers of metaphorical 
reasoning are well known. They provide tools for explanation, giving us insights rather than understanding, and insights can often 
prove illusory. They must be considered points of departure for the reasoning process rather than points of arrival” (Boisot & Cohen, 
2000, p. 123). Philosophy of Science has since long been studying the duality between empiricism and rationalism. We refer to the 
Heraclitus-Parmenides debate elsewhere in this thesis. Also Charles S. Peirce attributed to this debate by introducing the notion of 
abduction. He called this “borrowing of metaphors from other disciplines” and described “how it can be used creatively to form a new 
explanatory hypothesis” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 9). 
2 “These days, the business of Banking is risk management“ Dennis Westherstone, Retired JP Morgan chairman (BT, 2005). 
3 A general denominator for reliability could be system effectiveness. This system effectiveness consists of different properties like: 
(1) Reliability; (2) Availability; (3) Reparability; (4) Maintainability; (5) Serviceability; (6) Design adequacy; (7) Capabi lity; (8) 
Dependability; (9) Human reliability and (10) Environmental effect (Prasad, Hwang, Kuo, & Tillman, 2001, p. 7-8).  
4 A FIT is equivalent to one failure per billion device hours. 
5 Also from a practitioner’s perspective, this nuance can be important. In the US Military, for instance, failure is defined in terms of a 
Class A mishap or failure, where there is loss of life, or property damages exceeding one million dollars. This is what in other context 
hardly would be called a failure, but more a disaster(Sullivan & Beach, 2003). 
6 One of the first findings in this general area was that front line operators are not usually the perpetrators of catastrophes  because 
catastrophes require the resources no single individual has at his or her demand (Roberts, 2005, p. 157). 
7 Translated from French : ‘la fiabilité se distingue de la sûreté nucléaire car elle désigne la capacité d’un matériel ou d’une 
installation d’assurer sa fonction prévue sans défaillance. Elle est, pour une partie du système ou pour le système, la proba bilité de 
non-panne’. 
8 A model in which the combined effect of several factors is the sum of the effects that would be produced by each of the factors in 
the absence of the others (http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Additive model). 
9 For example, the rate of production of new guidance materials and rules by the European Joint Aviation Regulat ors is substantially 
increasing. More than 200 new policies, guidance documents, and rules are created each year even though the safety of global 
commercial aviation has been at a plateau of 1 x 10–6 for years. Because little is known about which rules or new guidelines are truly 
linked to safety levels, the system is purely additive: Old rules and guidance material are never discarded or removed (Amalberti et 
al., 2005, p. 760). 
10 Holes are not static for several reasons. They may represent individual human actions - so a human error will be represented as a 
hole in this model. They may represent procedural failings that may only arise under certain environmental circumstances (e.g . when 
the team of people involved in carrying out a procedure is under-strength). They may represent transient software faults that are 
corrected automatically when the system state is re-computed. 
11 Citation retrieved from Weick et al. (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 418) but checked against original. 
12 With this ‘all-seasons’ denomination, we mean an organizational Gestalt that is capable of dealing with changing conditions in an 
automatic or semi-automatic manner. One should compare such a design and behavior to an experienced mountain-hiker and his 
gear. He/She is someone who has the situational awareness to sense what weather it is now and who – by taking into account the 
weather it has been in the past (an hour ago, last week, same time last year, …) – will be able to develop a kind of feeling for the 
weather he is facing in the (near) future. The design of his clothes should be such that without changing his outfit should allow him to 
cope with hot and cold, dry or wet weather. The material should be GORE-TEX®-like, since that fabric allows sweating (warmth 
release) but also protects for cold (warmth collecting); it is also impermeable enough to protect for the rain, but still it is light enough 
not to hinder free movement. Besides, featuring all these qualities it still is fashionable and appealing. Bringing this Gore-Tex 
metaphor to the field of reliability studies and organizational reliability, we state that organizations should be more Gore-Tex-like in 
their design and more mountain hiker-like in their behavior. 
356 Two Cases in High Reliability Organizing: a Hermeneutic Reconceptualization 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
13 “The ideas about complex systems were not developed by any one field and were not accepted overnight. Indeed, they remain 
controversial in some disciplines and in their application to some issues. These new ideas are all slightly  different and there are no 
bright lines between them. They include: complexity theory, chaos theory, complex adaptive systems, general systems theory, 
nonlinear systems, self-organizing systems, and far-from-equilibrium systems” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 14). 
14 For the record: the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) which will be dealt with in the description on the Incident 
Management Process, might be considered an example of such best-practices, although ITIL is more about a process-oriented 
framework than a stress of good practices themselves. 
15 Therefore it might be wiser to talk about ‘Lessons Observed’ instead of ‘Lessons Learned’. 
16 It is quite interesting to see the parallel between absorbing downside complexity via requisite variety and Barnett and Pratt’s  
(2000) autogenic crisis induction. 
17 The key finding is that members of the organization deal with the problem of requisite variety by reducing a large number of 
combat missions to a limited number of basic-action categories (i.e., 15 meta-scripts), with missions configured as particular 
combinations of meta-scripts. Subsequently, each mission is accompanied by reliability feedback, also construed in terms of the 
same metascripts, thus stimulating ongoing learning and resulting in continued development of available variety in operators.  Jointly, 
therefore, this strategy reduces inequalities of requisite vs. available variety by adjusting at both ends (Dov & Gil, 2003, p. 853). 
18 We argue that variety tends to increase unless there is a dedicated policy to prevent this. Examples of such policies can be found 
in big five consultant firms and other international high potential hiring companies who systematically are engaging the same 
applicant profiles. 
19 Boisot and Child refer to ‘organisms’ whereas we have narrowed this scope to ‘organizations’. We feel we are entitled to  do so 
because of these authors deal with organizations in the remainder of their article. 
20 In case of the NPP the more accurate term is ‘Maintenance & Repair Process’. Although it fully corresponds with the notion of 
incident management, it is not used because of the typicality of the term ‘incident’ in the nuclear energy industry where it has a 
negative connotation. In Banking the term incident has a far more neutral meaning. 
21 We use the label High Reliability Theory for sake of convenience. At this point we do not wish to make a statement in the 
discussion on whether HRT is a theory or merely a metaphor or a school of thought - or like critics say: class(es) of thought. 
22 Examples of complex systems include the weather and the spread of disease in a population (Longstaff, 2003, p. 15). 
23 ‘The effect of adding something to the system (an infected person or the air disturbed by a butterfly flapping its wings) may  
diffuse unevenly throughout the system because the other components of the system are not evenly distributed, or the force doing 
the distribution is not equally strong throughout the system” (Longstaff, 2003, p. 15). 
24 For a comparison: Simon (1962, p. 468) roughly describes system complexity as one made up of a large number of parts that 
interact in a non-simple way. 
25 Elsewhere we deal with the question whether HRT really is a theory in the scientific sense. 
26 Plural High Reliability Organizations (HROs). 
27 Another working definition can be found in Sullivan & Beach (2003): “A state that an organization seeks to achieve whereby the 
attainment of specified requirements are consistently achieved through the expeditious use of its resources over time. These 
organizations have a mean time between failure approaching infinity”. 
28 The faculty members of the project team are T. R. LaPorte, K. H. Roberts, and G. I. Rochlin, University of California, Berkeley; D. M. 
Rousseau, Northwestern University; and Karl Weick, University of Texas.(at that time) (Roberts & Rousseau 1989, p. 139). 
29 We call them HRO archetypes. 
30 This is in line with other but related research from the Weick branch on Loose Coupling. We refer to the Loose Coupling 
Framework by Orton and Weick (Orton & Weick, 1990) and the voice of causation. 
31 For example, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), in their study of the influence of HR practices (like) have found a positive 
impact of these same constructs on organizational reliability. 
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32 Worth noting is that the mindfulness concept was first brought to maturity by Langer (Langer, 1989), something which is 
acknowledged by the Michigan school (Weick et al., 1999).Remarkably, Langer, in her later writings (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000), 
does not refer to Weick.  
33 Having the bubble. The bubble is U.S. Navy lingo for maintaining a big picture view of operations (Roberts & Rousseau 1989, p. 
135). 
34 “The data suggests there is some evidence for improving reliability, perhaps through organizational means. Three of the refineries 
classified “more complex” experienced no RQs during the period 1993-97.All were operated by the same corporation. We do not 
know if this is the result of some systematic and deliberate effort to under-report such accidents, or if other factors, possibly 
organizational in nature are involved. Additional work is planned to determine if organizational factors were involved in the atypical 
reliability of the three refineries” (p. 23). On my request for information (an e-mail to Eli Berniker), no answer has come. 
35 We make a distinction between first generation authors like Rochlin, La Porte, Roberts, Schulman, Consolini and Weick; second  
generation writers like Sutcliffe and Vogus, and third generation writers, like De Bruijne. Among this last category we put ourselves. 
The first generation initiated HRO research, either at Berkeley or Michigan; the second generation still has direct and strong links 
with the first generation – for instance because they are their former PhD students. The third generation has followed a trail 
independent from the original thinkers, even though some have been brought in contact with them in a later stage of their ini tial 
HRO research. The idiosyncrasy of the third generation is that they have the freedom to build on the work of their predecessors 
without being intellectually tributary. Today, the three generations continue to publish simultaneously, not only resulting in an 
eclectic mix of styles, approaches, domains and cases, but also in a cross-fertilization between them. This offers interesting 
perspectives for an original and fundamental development of the discipline. 
36 We do not imply that HRT scholars do not offensively defend the position the take when challenged by NAT scholars, but they 
clearly have chosen a not-juxtaposing perspective to both approaches. 
37 In this dissertation we use ‘SenseMaking’ in that spelling to discern it from the colloquial ‘sense making’.  
38 In this respect, it should be mentioned that this thesis’ core is HRT, not SenseMaking. The limited elaboration of theory on 
SenseMaking should be seen from that perspective. 
39 This basic premise applied to all technologies is one of the basic building blocks of the Socio-Technical Systems (STS) approach 
(Bostrom & Heinen, 1977, p. 18). 
40 A common background in education, training, hiring policies and (organizational) culture will have something to do with this. 
41 Substantial parts of this section are borrowed with permission from Muhren (2006). 
42 Substantial parts of this section are borrowed with permission from Smals (2006). 
43 These figures are based on the year 2004. 
44 To put these numbers into perspective: in 2001, the average American household used about 10,000 kWh (0.01 GWh) in a year 
[EIA, 2005].  
45 The operational factor for the reactors over the period 1985-2005 averaged about 88% 
46 For an elaboration of SenseMaking as an interpretive research methodology, we refer to research we have conducted in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the DRC, Development-aid organizations often face situations characterized by complexity 
and uncertainty, with crises occurring anytime. These networked organizations need to make sense of their crisis environment inter- 
and intra-organizationally. In a first paper (Muhren, Van Den Eede, & Van de Walle, 2008b) we attempt to reveal the "black box" of 
information processing activities by relying on SenseMaking as a methodology and as the object of research. In particular, this 
research aims at studying intuitive information processing activities in ongoing crisis situations, one of the most extreme c ontexts in 
which discontinuity is the rule and continuity the exception. The authors argue that this SenseMaking approach offers valuable 
insights for the design of information systems for crisis response and management (ISCRAM). This paper describes an interpret ive 
case study methodology as it was applied to discover SenseMaking episodes in the daily work of humanitarian relief actors in the 
ongoing crisis of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In a second paper (Muhren, Van Den Eede, & Van de Walle, 2008a) we 
addresses three research issues: Firstly, we use the theory of SenseMaking as a  lens to study how organizations process information 
inter-organizationally and intra-organizationally. Secondly, we identify the need of more sensible information systems to support 
SenseMaking in crisis environments. Thirdly, we argue why the inverse of the journal title – i.e. Development for IT – bears some 
promising perspectives for the expansion of the IS research discipline in the developed world as well. For this triple resear ch 
objective, we take the extreme conditions under which humanitarian and development actions take place as a starting point. We 
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have used an interpretive approach to this research by interviewing senior managers of organizations for humanitarian aid and  
development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
47 At the Bank we were assisted by Joris Hens, Geert Thoelen and Thomas Huyghe from Vlekho Business School and Willem Muhren 
from Tilburg University. At the NPP we got the help from Koen Ceuppens (Vlekho Business School) and Raphaël Smals (Tilburg 
University). All of them were master students preparing their master thesis in the HRT field under our primary (Vlekho Business 
School) or secondary (Tilburg University) supervision. 
48 In addition to the 19 and 23 interviews, respectively at the Bank and at the NPP, in total 9 more interviews were conducted with 
the objective to study the degree and way of coupling in both organizations. This data is analyzed and discussed in the Epilogue to 
this dissertation. As such these interviews are no inherent part of the research thread. 
49 Idem. 
50 For an elaboration of the use of GSS in this research/the Bank Case study, we refer to Rutkowski, Van de Walle and Van Den Ee de 
(2006) in which we presented results from a field study at our Bank Case on the use of Group Support Systems (GSS) as a novel 
approach to identify operational risks in the Bank’s Incident Management Process. Our research has lead to two important find ings. 
First, we found that the use of GSS enables unique risks to reach a short-list of crucial risks to be managed by the Bank. Second, the 
use of GSS allowed an isolated minority of senior managers to implicitly influence the decision of the group on the risk management 
decision process. Parts from this title is taken from the same source. 
51 The name ‘building blocks ‘ originated from the methodological approach we took to the writing of this thesis but was afterwa rds 
confirmed by an article by Roberts and Bea (2001) where these authors also use the term ‘building blocks’ to denote what composes 
the typicality of HROs 
52 The necessity to get a ‘buy-in’ from the organizations in question was a constant preoccupation. Senior management continuously 
asked for their ‘Return on Investment’: what will it cost them (especially in time) and what will they get back for it. The organizations 
under study were triggered by the prospect of being presented a ‘photo of who they are’.  
53 The complete data preparation logbook is available from the author upon simple request. 
54 In this it resembles SenseMaking properties of retrospection, enactment etc. 
55 This conclusion is supported by confirmatory factor analysis through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) (Wijnen, Janssens, De 
Pelsmacker, & Van Kenhove, 2002, p. 247), which results yielded no support for the theoretical underpinning of High Reliability 
Theory or SenseMaking. Confirmatory factor demonstrated that the multidimensionality of High Reliability theory does not hold. 
Data shows that a multidimensional theory, consisting out of five sub-constructs yield no better results than a single-construct one. A 
testing of the constructs shows that multicollinearity between the items is extremely high. Confirmatory factor analysis 
demonstrates that the construct of Deference to Expertise does not attribute to the model. Hence our choice not to totally rely on 
the constructs as they are described in literature and not to build on confirmatory factor analysis, but to rely on exploratory factor 
analysis in order to find those constructs that are best/better suited for use in our analysis.  
56 Other researchers have built on these categories as well. Sullivan & Beach (2003), for instance, in their study on a conceptual 
model to balance risk by HRO Success Factors stemming from these five categories. 
57 Smart et al. (2003) illustrated how recent tragedies have been shown to be threatening to the medium-term sustainability of 
organizations designed and developed solely on the basis of short-term efficiency gain.  
58 The resulting hypothesized curvilinear relationship was supported by comprehensive worldwide data on 264 functional 
departments of two multinational corporations.  
59 For sake of completeness: A Type III error occurs whenever the right solution is given to the wrong problem. A Type IV error is 
defined as "the incorrect interpretation of a correctly rejected hypothesis", comparable to "a physician's correct diagnosis of an 
ailment followed by the prescription of a wrong medicine". 
60 Original definition from Albert, S. & Whetten, D. (1985). Organizational Identity. In: Research in organizational behavior, V ol. 7, 
pp. 263-295. 
61 The other property is the use of plausibility as the fundamental criterion of SenseMaking (Weick et al. 2005).  
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62 Originally In: Gililand, S. W. & Day, D. V. (2000) Business management. F. T. Durso, ed. Handbook of Applied Cognition. Wiley, New 
York, pp. 315–342. Mezias, J. M., W. H. Starbuck. 2003. Managers and their inaccurate perceptions: Good, bad or inconsequential? 
British J. Management. 
63 The other relevant elements of the structural dimension are discussed under the Deference to Expertise issue. 
64 Note that this relates to Simon’s notion of nearly decomposable systems (1962). 
65 One such experience was gained from an exercise for the Bank Case to build a multiple regression model capable of explaining 
reliability. The outcome of this regression analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It has been reported upon in a separate 
internal memo. 
66 Myers and McPHee found that one crew-level variable—crew reliability—affected and modified the influence of tenure, 
proactivity, involvement, acculturation, and trust on members’ commitment. 
67 Lin and Carley have observed more of an increase in resource-to-people links than in people-to-people links; whereas, most 
researchers have focused on change in people-to-people links (Krackhardt and Stern 1988; La Porte and Consolini 1991) (Lin & 
Carley, 2001). 
68 In the same research, Lin and Carley also found that this kind of organizations “switched their designs toward more complex 
designs, not necessarily more rigid designs. The number of restructurings in resource access structure is eight times as large as the 
number of restructurings in organizational authority structure. This suggests that organizations are more likely to maintain existent 
lines of communication and authority during crises but are more likely to restructure who has access to what and responsibility for 
what. Of all the 69 organizations, only 31 did not alter either their organizational authority or resource access structures.” (Lin & 
Carley, 2001)(p. 26-27). 
69 What should be feasible however, is to compare the relative reliability of both processes, e.g. by normalizing the values for  
reliability. But then again, this allows intra-case comparison, but no inter-case assessment. 
70 We have reached a similar conclusion while conducting a linear regression analysis on the Bank data. Multicollinearity diagnostics 
revealed that several independent variables were a linear function of other independent variables, in casu Commitment to Resilience 
vis-à-vis the other HRT constructs.  
71 In the NPP incidents are so rare that there is hardly something to learn from. The community of international nuclear product ion 
facilities has found a way of sharing their experiences amongst each other. Another way of compensating for the lack of learning is 
exercising by means of incident scenarios in a simulator setting. 
72 http://www.css.edu/users/dswenson/web/TWAssoc/adhocracy.html 
73 This is in line with other but related research from the Weick branch on Loose Coupling. We refer to the Loose Coupling 
Framework by Orton and Weick (Orton & Weick, 1990) and the voice of causation. 
74 With this ‘all-seasons’ denomination, we mean an organizational Gestalt that is capable of dealing with changing conditions in an 
automatic or semi-automatic manner. One should compare such a design and behavior to an experienced mountain-hiker and his 
gear. He/She is someone who has the situational awareness to sense what weather it is now and who – by taking into account the 
weather it has been in the past (an hour ago, last week, same time last year, …) – will be able to develop a kind of feeling for the 
weather he is facing in the (near) future. The design of his clothes should be such that without changing his outfit should allow him to 
cope with hot and cold, dry or wet weather. The material should be GORE-TEX®-like, since that fabric allows sweating (warmth 
release) but also protects for cold (warmth collecting); it is also impermeable enough to protect for the rain, but still it i s light enough 
not to hinder free movement. Besides, featuring all these qualities it still is fashionable and appealing. Bringing this Gore-Tex 
metaphor to the field of reliability studies and organizational reliability, we state that organizations should be more Gore-Tex-like in 
their design and more mountain hiker-like in their behavior. 
75 Weick recounting an incident that happened to a small Hungarian detachment on military maneuvers in the Alps (Weick, 1983, p. 
48-49): “Their young lieutenant sent a reconnaissance unit out into the icy wilderness just  as it began to snow. It snowed for two 
days, and the unit did not return. The lieutenant feared that he had dispatched his people to their deaths, but the third day  the unit 
came back. Where had they been? How had they made their way? Yes, they said, we considered ourselves lost and waited for the 
end, but then one of us found a map in his pocket. That calmed us down. We pitched camp, lasted out the snowstorm, and then with 
the map we found our bearings. And here we are. The lieutenant took a good look at this map and discovered to his astonishment 
that it was not a map of the Alps, but of the Pyrenees.”  
76 For an elaboration on the concept of networked reliability see De Bruijne (de Bruijne, 2006) 
